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Abstract 
Co-creation has emerged today as a concept which thinkers across otherwise largely 
opposed traditions have come to embrace. This dissertation substantiates how the 
concept of co-creation, from proponents of Strategic Management Thought to 
thinkers coming out of Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies, 
appears as designating either: (1) a new win-win mode of value creation where 
businesses co-create value with various sorts of outsiders; (2) a new social, 
commons-based value creation autonomous from business interests; or (3) a mode 
of value creation intimately intertwined with new modes of management capable of 
harnessing and exploiting productive capacities outside established organizations. 
Behind these contemporary differences, the dissertation discloses a more 
encompassing history. Through this, the emergence of a widely shared co-creation 
vocabulary is brought forth. While this vocabulary is used persistently to express a 
whole new mode of value creation, in whatever form, the dissertation argues that 
the co-creation vocabulary actually undermines the very possibility of speaking 
about value creation in a consistent manner.  
At the same time, however, it is not a vocabulary which can just be dispensed 
with, since its emergence is intimately intertwined with an accelerated emphatic 
injunction; an injunction advanced by a reformulated managementality that 
throughout the twentieth century has tempted management ‘to go outside’. 
Accounting for this history, the dissertation claims that a complex experience has 
been born, an experience of the outside. Through this experience, the outside has 
emerged not merely as a source of value creation and an object of management; it 
has also emerged as an obligation that has to be met, an obligation which is 
forcefully expressed today through the co-creation vocabulary.  
In order to inquire into contemporary accounts of co-creation, as well as the 
historical trajectories through which this phenomenon has come to emerge, the 
dissertation develops what is designated as the historical problematization analysis, 
inspired by and reconstructed from the very late work of Michel Foucault. By 
utilizing this mode of analysis, it becomes possible to bring together otherwise 
separate accounts of co-creation on the same level of analysis, to inquire into 
central historical conditions of possibility through which the phenomenon of co-
creation has come to emerge and to take stock of what difference the arrival of co-
creation introduces in relation to yesterday.  
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Dansk resumé 
Begrebet co-creation træder i dag ikke blot frem som et nyt strategisk ledelseskoncept, 
hvormed virksomheder søger at skabe værdi gennem samarbejde med en række 
organisationseksterne produktive kapaciteter. Co-creation optræder ligeledes som et 
begreb, der er begyndt at dukke op og gøre sig gældende på tværs af en række i 
udgangspunktet forskelligartede akademiske traditioner. Denne afhandling undersøger, 
hvordan co-creation træder frem på umiddelbart ganske forskellige måder i litteratur, 
der spænder fra strategisk ledelse over diverse former for ny-marixsme til kritisk 
orienterede ledelsesstudier. Inden for disse traditioner forstås co-creation enten (1) 
som en helt ny form for værdiskabelse, hvor virksomheder og diverse former for 
produktive konsumenter finder sammen i nye og gensidigt berigende fællesskaber, (2) 
som en helt ny, autonom og fællesskabsorienteret måde at skabe værdi på, der på 
ingen måde blot lader sig indordne under virksomhedsinteresser, og som samtidig, i 
større eller mindre udstrækning, synes at udfordre kapitalismens orden som sådan, 
eller (3) som en ny måde at skabe værdi på, der er intimt og uadskilleligt forbundet 
med, hvordan nye ledelsesformer har muliggjort udbytning af produktive kapaciteter, 
der befinder sig uden for allerede etablerede organisationer.  
Frem for at tage stilling til, hvilken af disse tre forståelser der i udgangspunktet 
synes mest adækvat, analyserer afhandlingen deres respektive fremstillinger som led i 
en mere omfattende problematiseringshistorie, hvori den vedvarende og udbredte 
mobilisering af co-creation anskues som et komplekst og mangefaceteret svar på 
problemet angående, hvordan og under hvilke betingelser værdi i dag (kan eller bør) 
skabes. Bag de umiddelbart givne forskelle fremanalyserer afhandlingen følgelig en 
mere omfattende historie, igennem hvilken fremkomsten af et vidt udbredt co-
creation vokabular dukker op som en sammenbindende mønsterdannelse, hvis 
komponenter går på tværs af og træder frem i de ovennævnte forskellige udlægninger 
og forståelser af co-creation. Trods det forhold, at dette vokabular vedvarende 
anvendes til at artikulere, hvordan værdi nu skabes, så hævder afhandlingen, at co-
creation vokabularet underminerer mulighedsbetingelserne for at konceptualisere 
værdiskabelse på konsistent vis, såfremt denne anskues på baggrund af centrale 
karakteristika, der hidtil har gjort sig gældende som uomgængelige for tidligere 
historisk vægtige værdiskabelsesbegreber.  
Samtidig hermed hævder afhandlingen imidlertid, at dette forhold ikke bør 
forlede til, at man følgelig blot skulle se bort fra og diskvalificere co-creation og det 
hertil knyttede vokabular. Det handler derimod om at begribe, på hvilken måde og 
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under hvilke betingelser dette vokabular kunne komme til at få en sådan forpligtende 
og tværgående karakter, som det for indeværende synes at have fået. Afhandlingen 
belyser derfor, hvordan dette co-creation vokabular er blevet til igennem en langstrakt 
problematiseringshistorie. Med denne historie vises det, hvordan en bestemt erfaring, 
kaldet erfaringen af det udenfor, i løbet af det 20. århundrede gradvist har sat sig igennem 
med stadig større vægt. Arnestederne for dannelsen denne erfaring finder afhandlingen 
i særdeleshed i den måde, hvorpå en række centrale begivenheder og 
problematiseringsforløb i ledelses-, organisationsteoriens og økonomiens historie fra 
1920’erne til 1940’erne har lagt grunden til en række nye måder at koncipere ledelse, 
organisering og værdiskabelse på. Ved at analysere og sammenbinde disse 
begivenheder viser afhandlingen ikke blot, hvorledes erfaringen af det udenfor gradvist 
er kommet til at få en stadig mere omsiggribende og forpligtende karakter; den 
fastholder tillige, at det samtidige fænomen co-creation er nært forbundet med og 
synes at give udtryk til denne erfaring på en særlig kondenseret vis.  
Som antydet gøres der i forbindelse med afhandlingens undersøgelse af co-
creation brug af en såkaldt “historisk problematiseringsanalyse”. Inspirationen og 
forlægget til rekonstruktionen af denne analyseform finder afhandlingen i Michel 
Foucaults senværk. Ved at udvikle og bringe denne analyseform i spil bliver det ikke 
kun muligt at sammenholde umiddelbart modstridende samtidige udlægninger af co-
creation på ét og samme analytisk plan. Det bliver desuden muligt at analysere de 
historiske mulighedsbetingelser for dette fænomens fremkomst, ligesom det bliver 
muligt at tage bestik af, hvilken forskel fremkomsten af co-creation markerer og 
implicerer i forhold til vores forståelser af værdiskabelse og ledelse. Endelig tillader 
den i afhandlingen anvendte analyseform at fastholde den på én og samme tid 
normativt forpligtende og problemgenererende karakter, der aktuelt synes at præge 
fænomenet co-creation. Gennem problematiseringsanalysen fastholdes det hermed, 
hvorledes det analyserede fænomen melder sig som en særlig problematisk begivenhed 
i tankens historie, som det både er vanskeligt at undslå sig og undslippe, samtidig med 
at det fastholdes, at dette fænomens fremkomst implicerer en række vanskeligheder og 
udfordringer, der ikke umiddelbart lader sig løse. Et væsentligt bidrag fra afhandlingen 
såvel som fra den anvendte historiske analyse tager således form af den hidtil mest 
omfattende redegørelse for, hvordan og hvorfor det syntes at forholde sig på denne 
måde med co-creation som et komplekst udtryk for værdiskabelsens problemer mere 
generelt.    
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Introduction 
 
 
Revaluing the outside: from the sentiment of the street to co-creation. 
The research questions  
In October 1922, Wallace B. Donham, Dean at Harvard Business School, opened 
the very first article in the very first issue of Harvard Business Review by outlining the 
agenda for the necessary groundwork to be initiated if a proper theory of business 
were ever to come into being:  
Unless we admit that rules of thumb, the limited experience of the executives 
in each individual business, and the general sentiment of the street, are the 
sole possible guides for executive decisions of major importance, it is 
pertinent to inquire how the representative practices of business men 
generally may be made available as a broader foundation for such decisions, 
and how a proper theory of business is to be obtained. (Donham 1922: 1) 
In formulating his proposal for this endeavor, in the very first sentence of what 
was later to become the most influential and wide reaching research-based 
practitioner-oriented management journal, Donham sets up his argument in such a 
way that it, if not negates, then at least points to the insufficiencies of executive 
decision making founded on the three sources of rules of thumb, individual 
experience and the general sentiment of the street. While Frederick W. Taylor 
([1911] 1967) had already devalued and opposed the quality and legitimacy of 
decision making based on rules of thumb and individual experience, the interesting 
thing to note about Donham’s opening is perhaps the latter of the three sources - 
“the general sentiment of the street”. Perhaps it is merely a substantially 
insignificant gesture on Donham’s part, a way of adding a third element to enhance 
the rhythmic structure of the composition of the sentence, a rhetorical move of 
which we should be careful not to overestimate the importance? Then again, 
perhaps this “general sentiment of the street” is to be ascribed the same weight as 
both rules of thumb and individual experience, also implying that it is just as 
accessible and immediately available as these?  
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However we assess and tentatively answer these questions, Donham never 
states what this general sentiment of the street actually means, thus leaving it open 
to interpretation as to whether it might refer to a loosely shared executive way of 
relating to business problems, a matter of a general organizational or public 
sentiment, or perhaps something entirely different. While it is possible to point to 
how the word sentiment from the eighteenth century, as specified in the Oxford 
English Dictionary (OED Online version, Sept. 2012), have carried a number of 
historically varying meanings, ranging from “a knowledge due to vague sensations”, 
“an opinion or view as to what is right or agreeable”, which were often used “with 
[a] collective sense”, and which, from the nineteenth century onwards, additionally 
took on the connotations of something which acted “as a principle of action or 
judgment”; and while it is possible, moreover, to point to early twentieth century 
usages of “the sentiment of the street” as a phrase used explicitly in conjunction 
with political (Ray 1913: 391) as well as economic (Selden 1910: 96) themes, it is 
questionable whether an analysis of such usages would bring us much closer to 
Donham’s intended meaning.  
Instead of specifying to what the sentiment of the street refers, Donham 
quickly moves on to make his point that “business will continue” to be 
“unsystematic, haphazard, and for many men a pathetic gamble” (Donham 1922: 
1), if its basis for decision making remains exclusively anchored in these three 
sources, while neglecting the more encompassing theoretical framework on which 
practical decisions could lean for support. Hence, if the foundation for executive 
decision making is not based on the systematized and elaborated experience of 
other business men, that is, on a proper theory of business, the individual executive 
will be unable to “grasp the underlying forces controlling business” and his 
capabilities of sound judgment will suffer accordingly (ibid: 1).  
While the preconditions for the progress of such a theory preoccupy the 
central thrust of the remainder of the article, the general sentiment of the street, 
whatever it might imply, allegedly remains unimportant, too vague and incoherent, 
something to be overcome and dispensed with, an obstacle to the further 
development of these systematizing concerns of major importance. Then again, 
perhaps it is merely a straw man to be knocked down and eliminated by the 
promise and potential of a true theory of business in the making? In any case, such 
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a sentiment seems much too diffuse, too inaccurate, too uncontrollable, too much 
on the outside of the sphere of representation, and therefore incapable of either 
competing with or adding to a scientifically founded business theory developed 
through the strict procedure of “first, the recording of facts; second, the 
arrangement of these facts into series and relationships; third, the development of 
generalizations which can be safely made only upon the basis of such recorded 
facts” (Donham 1922: 10). 
 
Today when one browses through the latest issues of Harvard Business Review, what 
is striking is the way in which what Donham considered as something to be left 
behind and overcome, in order to arrive at a proper theory of business, now seems 
to have come to the forefront of issues related to executive decision making. Here, 
the sentiment of the street has become something which holds a promise, 
something which managers and management thinkers celebrate and cherish, 
something which, if attended to in a proper way, may be a source of hitherto 
unimaginable creativity, innovation and, not least, value creation. Thus, in a 2010 
autumn issue of Harvard Business Review, engaging and listening to outsiders is 
placed at the very center of successfully conducting a business. This can either be 
done online by hiring community managers “whose sole purpose is monitoring, 
participating in, and engaging customers (…) wherever people meet online” 
(Armano 2010: 24), or by arranging exclusive multiple course dinner parties where 
the company, in an intimate atmosphere, not only shares its plans with but also 
listens to “would-be customers’ reactions and suggestions” by way of asking “how 
best to serve them” (Kramer 2010: 122). This aspiration to involve and utilize 
outside parties might even go so far as to lay bare key issues such as strategy 
formulation, usually developed in utmost secrecy, in a manner inspired by the open 
strategy process of the Wikimedia Foundation (Newstead and Lanzerotti 2010: 32). 
Hence, within the confines of one of the most prestigious practitioner-oriented 
management journals, the sentiment of the street seems to have moved from 
initially being the more or less readily available, loosely defined background 
knowledge which a theory of business somehow had to move beyond and 
transgress in order to establish itself as a legitimate and practically useful mode of 
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knowledge, to becoming something which business theorists inquire into (cf. 
Lopdrup-Hjorth and Raffnsøe 2012).  
In spite of the fact that it is difficult to assess exactly what Donham had in 
mind when using the phrase “sentiment of the street”, the important point to take 
stock of is the following: whereas previously the knowledge necessary for guiding 
business men in their actions should be obtained through dispensing with the 
sentiment of the street, and in its place put the collection and systematization of 
the knowledge of other business men, today, the knowledge, opinions, and 
sentiments of all kinds of outsiders have come into sight as being of major 
importance to operating a business. From being something which theorists of 
management should move beyond and dispense with, the sentiment of the street 
has today become something to be harnessed, something into which management 
thought inquires, something into which it advises managers to set themselves in a 
beneficial relation. In this sense, the sentiment of the street has moved from being 
something of questionable value to becoming a highly valued asset, not merely in 
the sense of something to which positive connotations are being ascribed, but 
more importantly as a source of economic value, as a source that is indispensable 
for the creation of value, and as something to which managers must therefore 
attend (Cf. Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000; Allee 2000; Vargo and Lusch 2004; 
Tan et al. 2008). 
 
Perhaps the most striking example of how this revaluation of the sentiment of the 
street has come to be expressed is the phenomenon of co-creation. In the Harvard 
Business Review article “Building the co-creative enterprise”, Ramaswamy and 
Gouillart (2010b: 102) state that co-creation amounts to nothing less than a 
complete reversal of how businesses ought to conceive of and conduct themselves. 
Whereas businesses previously held on “to their hierarchies”, and restricted their 
focus to optimizing the activities and processes of the firm, they now have to open 
up their organizations to engage and interact with all kinds of outside parties if they 
are to succeed. This has become a necessity, since “people are inherently creative 
and want to engage with organizations” (ibid.), but also because establishing 
relations through co-creation provides new opportunities for the creation of value 
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– not merely for the firm, but for all those in the “ecosystem” who participates in 
such co-creation processes (ibid; see also Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000). 
Simultaneously with co-creation surfacing in Harvard Business Review, the 
concept has manifested itself as a new business approach through which major 
global corporations have reorganized their strategies in order to manage and 
harness value-creating capacities outside their own organizations. Throughout the 
last decade, co-creation has thus been sweeping across the corporate world where it 
has been taken up by major firms, including, among others, BMW, Procter & 
Gamble, Nokia, LEGO, Nike, IBM, Samsung, Starbucks, IKEA, Ducati, Philips 
Electronics, Unilever, and Harley Davidson (see Promise/LSE Enterprise 2009).  
However, what is possibly more surprising is that the notion of co-creation 
additionally has caught on as a key concept that scholars coming out of radically 
different traditions have embraced recently.1 From various strands of management 
                                            
1 R. Normann and R. Ramírez (1993a) “From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing Interactive 
Strategy”, Harvard Business Review, 71(4): 65-77. Id. (1993b) “Strategy and the Art of Reinventing Value: In a 
Post-Industrial Economy is the Value Chain Obsolete?”, Harvard Business Review, 71(5): 39-51. C. K. Prahalad 
and V. Ramaswamy (2000) “Co-opting Customer Competence”, Harvard Business Review, 78(1): 79-87. Id. 
(2003) “The New Frontier of Experience Innovation”, MIT Sloan Management Review, 44(4): 12-18. Id. (2004a) 
“Co-creating Unique Value with Customers”, Strategy and Leadership, 32(3): 4-9. Id. (2004b) The Future of 
Competition: Co-Creating Unique Value with Customers. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press. Id. 
(2004c) “Co-Creating Experiences: The Next Practice in Value Creation”, Journal of Interactive Marketing, 18(3): 5-
14. M. Lazzarato (2004) “From Capital-Labor to Capital-Life”, Ephemera: theory & politics in organization, 4(3): 
187-208. S. Vargo and R. Lusch (2004) “Evolving To a New Dominant Logic for Marketing”, Journal of 
Marketing, 68(1): 1-17. Id. (2010) “From Repeat Patronage to Value Co-creation in Service Ecosystems: A 
Transcending Conceptualization of Relationship”, Journal of Business Market Management, 4(4): 169-179. R. Lusch 
and S. Vargo (2006) “Service-dominant logic: reactions, reflections and refinements”, Marketing Theory, 6(3): 
281-288. P. Berthon et al. (2007) “When Customers Get Clever: Managerial Approaches To Dealing With 
Creating Consumers”, Business Horizons, 50 (1): 39 -50. Rowley et al. (2007) “Customer community and co-
creation: a case study”, Marketing Intelligence and Planning, 25(2): 136-146. A. Arvidsson (2008) “The Ethical 
Economy of Customer Coproduction”, Journal of Macromarketing, 28(4): 326-338. Id. (2009) “The Ethical 
Economy: Towards a Post-Capitalist Theory of Value”, Capital & Class, 33(1): 13-29. Id. (2010) “The Ethical 
Economy: New forms of Value in the Information Society?”, Organization, 17(5): 637–644. A. Arvidsson et al. 
(2008) “The Crisis of Value and the Ethical Economy”, Journal of Futures Studies, 12(4): 9-20. J. Banks and S. 
Humphreys (2008) “The Labour of User Co-Creators: Emergent Social Network Markets?”, Convergence, 14(4): 
401-418. S. Bonsu and A. Darmody (2008) “Co-creating Second Life: Market Consumer Cooperation in 
Contemporary Economy”, Journal of Macromarketing, 28(4): 355-368. A. Humphreys and K. Grayson (2008) 
“The Intersecting Roles of Consumer and Producer: A Critical Perspective on Co-production, Co-creation and 
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thought, encompassing first and foremost Strategic Management Thought and 
marketing, to Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies, co-creation 
has come into view as a way in which hitherto reigning concepts of value creation 
and management have been reformulated and recast so as to provide new kinds of 
responses to the problems and possibilities conceivably at hand. The way in which 
it does so, however, differs markedly.  
Within Strategic Management Thought (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b, 
1994; Ramírez 1999; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b), co-creation shows up as a particular 
answer to the problem of how companies can handle and utilize the fact that value 
creation has moved increasingly outside of established organizations. In this 
context, co-creation comes into view not only as a description of a new mode of 
value creation, but also as an answer to how businesses can take advantage of and 
manage value-creating capacities located beyond the boundaries of the 
organization. By way of doing so, it is stated that businesses can co-create value 
                                                                                                                                   
Prosumption”, Sociology Compass, 2(3): 963–980. A. Payne et al. (2008) “Managing the co-creation of value”, 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36(1): 83-96. J. Spohrer and P. Maglio (2008) “The Emergence of 
Service Science: Toward Systematic Service Innovations to Accelerate Co-Creation of Value”, Production and 
Operations Management, 17(3): 238–246. S. Vargo et al. (2008) “On value and value co-creation: A service systems 
and service logic perspective”, European Management Journal, 26: 145– 152. D. Zwick et al. (2008) “Putting 
Consumers to Work: ‘Co-Creation and New Marketing Govern-mentality”, Journal of Consumer Culture, 8 (2): 163-
196. S. Böhm and C. Land (2009) “The New ‘Hidden Abode’: Reflections on Value and Labour in the New 
Economy”, Working Paper No. WP 09/06, University of Essex. B. Cova and D. Dalli (2009) “Working 
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with various sorts of outsiders in a way that not only creates value for businesses, 
but also for those outside the organization who contribute to this process. 
Exemplarily, Ramaswamy and Gouillart (2010a: 7) state that co-creation “involves 
both a profound democratization and decentralization of value creation, moving it 
from concentration inside the firm to interactions with its customers, customer 
communities, suppliers, partners, and employees”. Hence, it seems as if previously 
reigning conceptions of value creation and management are put into question and 
rendered insufficient.   
In more critical lines of thought, the concept of co-creation, (or equivalent 
terms), also shows up. Here, however, it is used with different inferences. Within 
Autonomist Marxists’ accounts, for instance, co-creation surfaces as designating a 
decentralized, social, and commons-based production that marks the arrival of a 
whole new mode of value creation irreducible to business interests, and signaling an 
actual or potential challenge to capitalism as such. Whether formulated as 
“singularities acting in common” (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 204, 348-9), 
“biopolitical” value creation (Hardt and Negri: 2009: 317) “cooperation between 
minds” (Lazzarato: 2004: 187), or as the emergence of an “ethical economy” 
(Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidsson et al. 2008), co-creation, within these 
accounts, is tied together with a larger transformation by way of which value 
creation has moved beyond the confines of organizations, and in so doing has been 
socialized and transformed in radical ways. When Hardt and Negri (2000: 364-365, 
2004: 148, 2009: 317), for instance, argue that value creation has today become 
“biopolitical”, this not merely implies that value creation has been relocated 
spatially outside of established organizations, but also, more fundamentally, that 
“living and producing tend to be indistinguishable” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 148). 
According to these influential authors, this transformation implies that value 
creation has become dependent upon the “externalities” of “the common” that can 
neither be contained nor completely captured by corporations, nor measured as it 
previously could (ibid: 148-149). While co-creation within Autonomist Marxists’ 
accounts is also seen as something businesses have come to be dependent upon, it 
is first and foremost seen as holding the promise of a socialized mode of value 
creation that goes beyond, and is irreducible to, business interests (Lazzarato 2004). 
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Hence, when businesses intervene in and capitalize upon this mode of value 
creation, it actually decreases “the power of co-creation” (ibid: 197). 
Finally, within Critical Management Studies, co-creation has also come into 
view within recent years (Banks and Humphreys 2008; Humphreys and Grayson 
2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Cova and Dalli 2009; Willmott 
2010; Bonsu and Polsa 2011; Cova et al. 2011). While several thinkers within this 
tradition have remained in close dialogue with and been inspired by Autonomist 
Marxism, the postulate that co-creation should be seen in conjunction with the rise 
of a new and irreducible mode of value creation beyond business interests has been 
criticized (see for example Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 2010). While agreeing 
that the coming into being of co-creation marks a new mode of value creation, 
thinkers within this line of thought have nevertheless predominantly insisted on 
viewing co-creation as being inseparably tied to new and more supple modes of 
management that reach beyond the confines of organizations to exploit or harness 
the value created by an unpaid, ‘free’ workforce consisting of consumers and 
various sorts of user-communities. In spite of being less sanguine about the 
emergence of a new autonomous mode of value creation beyond business interests, 
thinkers coming out of Critical Management Studies also insist that value is now 
created “beyond the factory walls” (Böhm and Land 2009: 7), and that this 
relocation towards the outside implies nothing less than the emergence of a “new 
‘hidden abode of production’” in which value is now increasingly  created (ibid.).  
 
The starting point of this dissertation is thus the observation that co-creation has 
caught on - in a major way and across rather different lines of thought - as a key 
concept through which value creation and management have been associated  with 
a number of new problems and possibilities, demands and prospects, anticipations 
and drawbacks. While differences persist as to whether co-creation is 
predominantly to be understood in conjunction with new possibilities for 
businesses, with a fundamental challenge to capitalism, or as being irreducibly tied 
to new forms of exploitation, these differences, however, could also be regarded 
simultaneously in light of the prevalent and mutual agreement that value creation 
increasingly takes place outside organizations, that this challenges previously 
dominant understandings of value creation and management, and that these 
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transformations, in one way or another, are intimately interwoven with and 
expressed through the concept of co-creation. Hence, from Donham’s initial 
characterization of the sentiment of the street as something to be overcome and 
dispensed with, a radical reversal seems to have taken place. Today, with the arrival 
of co-creation, the sentiment of the street appears to have surfaced in an alternative 
or mutated form: as something through which value can be created; as something 
in which hopes and worries are invested; as something signaling the arrival of new 
and potentially ground-breaking possibilities; and therefore as something with 
which thinkers, across otherwise largely opposed traditions, have come to be 
centrally preoccupied. 
Given the somewhat antagonistic normative and political outlooks that exist 
between management thought on the one hand and Autonomist Marxism and 
Critical Management Studies on the other, the emergence of co-creation as a 
shared, though also disputed and undecided, concept through which a whole new 
mode of value creation has come to be expressed, is already in and of itself of such 
interest that it merits further interrogation and examination.  
However, the emergence and widespread appeal of co-creation across 
practical and theoretical contexts also seems to carry with it a number of more 
general issues, concerns and themes which are currently still undetermined and 
open for further developments, and therefore neither clarified to any further extent 
nor comprehensively accounted for. While businesses at present experiment with 
co-creation in a major way, and while strong hopes are invested in co-creation as a 
new silver bullet, there are at present no clear-cut guidelines and unambiguous 
formulas as to how organizations can be successful in utilizing this new outside 
reference that has become indispensable for the creation of value (Promise/LSE 
Enterprise 2009). While the already existing literature, critical as well as non-critical, 
presents various kinds of answers regarding what co-creation is and how it 
challenges previous understandings of value creation and management, the issue as 
to what kind of broader transformation is implied by the way in which the outside 
has surfaced as central to the creation of value at present also seems to be largely 
unresolved and in need of further clarification. Consequently, co-creation appears 
as something in which practitioners and scholars from all works of life have 
invested strong interests, hopes and aspirations; but at the same time the arrival of 
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this phenomenon also comes into view with implications that are still largely 
unsettled and as something with which businesses and scholars still seem to be 
struggling to come to terms.   
Consequently, it is these largely unresolved issues that make up the point of 
departure for this dissertation’s explorations. This is not least the case since such 
issues have not been explored sufficiently within the already existing literature on 
co-creation, no matter whether this literature has predominantly  viewed co-
creation as a contemporary phenomenon (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b; 
Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Vargo and Lusch 
2004, 2010; Lusch and Vargo 2006; Berthon et al. 2007; Rowley et al. 2007; Banks 
and Humphreys 2008; Bonsu and Darmody 2008; Humphreys and Grayson 2008; 
Payne et al. 2008; Spohrer and Maglio 2008; Vargo et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 
2009; Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Helm and Jones 2010; Le Ber and Branzei 
2010; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b; Willmott 2010; Lusch and Webster 
2011), or as something that has a preceding history to be accounted for (Ramírez 
1999; Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Zwick et al. 2008; Cova and Dalli 2009; 
Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010; Cova et al. 2011). When seen in light of this 
unresolvedness it becomes pertinent to ponder the contemporary complex 
phenomenon of co-creation, apparently able to materialize across radically different 
streams of thought as something that has to be attended to, as something inducing 
reflection and new directions, and as something urgent in which optimism, hope, 
and positive expectations (for example Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004a; Lazzarato 
2004; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a) but also reservations and suspicions (for 
example Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009) are presently invested. 
Approaching co-creation from this perspective not only entails a meticulous 
assessment of what the arrival of this phenomenon, across otherwise largely 
different accounts, appears to carry with it, but entails equally a consideration of 
what implications it seems to have to embrace the concept of co-creation, not least 
for our understanding of value creation and management.  
 
It is in light of these important and still largely unresolved issues that the present 
dissertation poses the first of two sets of research questions, which are at the same 
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time supposed to be relatively simple and yet carry with them implications of a 
more general kind:  
— How is it possible for co-creation to surface as a mutual concern with 
divergent inferences and prospects within the literature coming out of the different 
traditions of Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and Critical 
Management Studies? What exactly characterizes co-creation as a mode of value 
creation in order for this phenomenon to represent a mutually shared concern for 
exponents of these different traditions? Which transformations and implications 
does the advent of a prevalent and transverse attention to co-creation seem to 
convey when regarded in light of the history of seminal conceptions of value 
creation?   
However, to inquire adequately into the common concern with co-creation 
against the backdrop of the way in which value creation has hitherto been 
delimitated  also requires special attention to a number of the key characteristics of 
this phenomenon which are voiced by the exponents of the three traditions 
themselves. Thus, when scholars coming out of Critical Management Studies claim 
that a new “hidden abode” (Böhm and Land 2009) has emerged outside of 
established organizations, by implication this would involve an occurrence that has 
become possible through a specific historical transformation at which juncture new 
modes of management, reaching beyond the confines of organizations and tapping 
into productive user-communities, have come to play a key role (Zwick et al. 2008; 
Willmott 2010). Similarly, as protagonists of Autonomist Marxism, Hardt and 
Negri (2004) accentuate how value creation in the process of becoming 
“biopolitical” concurs with a major historical transformation by which the creation 
of value has come to be reliant on the externalities of the common (Hardt and 
Negri 2004, 2009), elusive to the territories and assessments traditionally belonging 
to corporations. Finally, when Ramaswamy and Gouillart (2010a) state that co-
creation is closely related to a movement in which the creation of value is 
democratized and decentralized beyond the boundaries of the organization, they 
are not only expanding the question of value creation to a “ecosystem” of 
interactions between corporation, customers, suppliers, partners and employees. By 
the same token, proponents of Strategic Management Thought are pointing to the 
arrival of an entirely new situation at which point “the firm-centric view of the 
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world” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004c: 8) is put into question, presumably with 
profound consequences not only for the determinations of value creation in 
general, but for managers as well who have to now establish progressively “an 
active, explicit, and ongoing dialogue” in order to manage the new externally 
located producer-consumers (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000: 81).      
When the present dissertation embarks upon a second set of research 
questions in order to complement the first, it is therefore with the specific aim of 
taking into account the historical conditions of possibility for the emergence of co-
creation which are to a certain extent already voiced by the literature concerned 
with this phenomenon. Taking seriously how exponents of the three traditions 
mentioned either specifically account for or implicitly presuppose: a major 
historical transition with the arrival of co-creation, a solid rapport between this 
phenomenon and the revaluation of the outside of organizations, and new 
challenges related to managing value creation with regard to this outside, the 
second set of research questions consequently inquires:     
— How, why and in relation to what could co-creation emerge as a specific 
mode of value creation which is currently the object of common but differing 
concerns? What kind of historical transformations has been paving the way for the 
advent of co-creation as a common yet heterogeneous concern combining 
questions about value creation in general and the revaluation of the outside in 
particular? And how has the arrival of co-creation, discernibly merging the topic of 
the outside of organizations with value creation, presented problems for the 
management of these matters?  
The reason why it becomes important to pose these two series of questions in 
relation to one another is not only that in conjunction – and from a historical point 
of view – they make it possible to shed new light on a significant contemporary 
phenomenon that has drawn wide attention within contemporary business life and 
various kinds of scholarship from the more instructive to the more critical. Just as 
importantly, inquiring into co-creation and the way in which this phenomenon 
appears to be capable of gathering the apparently disparate and different, it also 
becomes possible to explore the arrival of this phenomenon in light of historically 
changing conceptions of value creation and management at a more general level. 
The importance of such an inquiry - seen from the contemporary as well as the 
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historical point of view - is closely connected to the unresolved concern as to how 
something outside established organizations could come into view as a matter of 
concern that at one and the same time presented a challenge and held out a 
promise for the way in which value could be created.  
Thus, by way of exploring the set of research questions presented above, the 
dissertation ventures to excavate a stratum beneath and behind contemporary 
differences about how co-creation is to be understood. By doing so, the aim is to 
inquire into the contemporary, wide-spread appeal of the notion of co-creation 
through a historical investigation which aspires to take stock of what the arrival of 
this phenomenon signals in a broader way than has previously been accounted for 
by the existent literature (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b; Ramírez 1999; 
Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Vargo and Lusch 
2004, 2010; Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Lusch and Vargo 2006; Berthon et 
al. 2007; Rowley et al. 2007; Banks and Humphreys 2008; Bonsu and Darmody 
2008; Humphreys and Grayson 2008; Payne et al. 2008; Spohrer and Maglio 2008; 
Vargo et al. 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Cova and Dalli 2009; 
Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Helm and Jones 2010; Le Ber and Branzei 2010; 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b; Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010; Willmott 
2010; Lusch and Webster 2011; Cova et al. 2011). 
 
The attempt to answer research questions with ambitions of this kind makes it 
essential that the dissertation enacts a mode of analysis that is able to satisfy at least 
three principal requirements. Accordingly, the proposed study on co-creation first 
of all necessitates a mode of analysis that is capable of identifying, articulating and 
making explicit how and in what ways exponents of various traditions or schools of 
thought more or less concurrently begin to relate to and inquire into the same 
issue, but apparently with profoundly different goals, expectations and aspirations. 
Secondly, the aspiration to analyze how and through what co-creation has emerged 
historically also requires a particular mode of analysis that is capable of bringing 
together previous and alternative conceptions of value creation, the outside as a 
point in question, and challenges to management, yet without doing so on a level 
of analysis that is different from and incomparable with the level of exposition 
characterizing the configuration or constellation identified within and across the 
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respective traditions. Finally, in light of the different normative propensities or 
predilections respectively implied, pursued or sought out by the different ways in 
which co-creation is presented by the proponents of the respective traditions, it 
becomes necessary as well to enact a mode of analysis capable of making explicit 
the implied forms of normativity invested in the respective accounts of co-creation, 
in such a way that the implicit prescriptions can be assessed on an equal footing 
and without forcing the dissertation at the outset to identify with, to speak for, or 
to be subsumed under any of the investigated interpretations.   
Consequently, the dissertation is in need of a mode of analysis that is not only 
capable of bringing the different accounts of co-creation into contact with one 
another with the aim of identifying their mutuality and, on the same level of 
exposition, weaving such accounts together with previous conceptions of value 
creation, the outside and management, but which is also apposite to investigate co-
creation as a contemporary phenomenon, that is, so to speak, beyond good and 
evil. Not in the sense that the normative propensities invested in the phenomenon 
should be disregarded, but in the sense that the analysis should attempt to remain 
neutral to the specific prescriptive inclinations invested in the respective accounts 
of co-creation in order to arrive at a more encompassing level where it becomes 
possible to assess what the arrival of this phenomenon, in all its complexity, also 
carries with it and seems to imply. It is this mode of analysis that the dissertation 
finds the groundwork for in what Michel Foucault throughout the latter part of his 
life referred to as analyzing “problematizations”. Referring to this notion, Foucault 
gave a retrospective account of a mode of analysis that he seemingly had been 
working with already in his early work, which clearly served him as a tool in his 
later studies, and which also appears to be apposite for the present study of co-
creation.  
However, as becomes apparent in the following sections of this introduction, 
analyzing what difference the arrival of co-creation introduces in relation to 
yesterday, to use a phrase from Foucault (2007c: 99), does not only entail a 
reconstruction of what is from now on  designated the historical problematization 
analysis. The questions that the dissertation poses using this mode of analysis also 
imply a specific positioning in relation to the already existing literature on co-
creation which, given the fact that parts of this literature also make up the empirical 
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material of the dissertation, is presented after the analytical framework has been 
introduced. In the final section of this introduction, the dissertation’s overall 
argument, exposition and outline is presented.  
As a final point, the remaining sections in the introduction are also supposed 
to expand upon and clarify what it means to ask the two sets of posed research 
questions respectively, from the chosen analytical point of view, from the point of 
view of the existent literature and current research on the topic of co-creation, and 
finally with regard to how the augment of the dissertation proceeds. The aim of the 
introduction is therefore also to clarify and specify successively and cumulatively 
the research questions already posed above.  
Historical problematization analysis  
Given that the dissertation employs Foucault’s notion of “problematization” as 
part of an analytical approach which makes it possible to address how dissimilar 
traditions, at the same time, can share the same object but with different 
aspirations, this mode of inquiry involves a number of the same questions raised by 
Foucault in a series of lectures held in 1983 on the problematization of parrhesia in 
Antiquity:  
What I tried to do from the beginning was to analyse the process of 
‘problematization’ - which means: how and why certain things (behaviour, 
phenomena, processes) became a problem. Why, for example, certain forms of 
behaviour were characterized and classified as ‘madness’ while other similar 
forms were completely neglected at a given historical moment; the same thing 
for crime and delinquency, the same question of the problematization of 
sexuality.  
Some people have interpreted this type of analysis as a form of “historical 
idealism”, but I think that such an analysis is completely different. For when I 
say that I am studying the “problematization” of madness, crime, or sexuality, 
it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the contrary, I 
have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which 
was the target of social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is 
this one: How and why were very different things in the world gathered 
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together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, ‘mental illness’? 
What are the elements which are relevant for a given ‘problematization’? And 
even if I won’t say that what is characterized as ‘schizophrenia’ corresponds 
to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I 
think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the 
process of problematization. The problematization is an “answer” to a 
concrete situation which is real. (Foucault 2001: 171) 
Provisionally substituting “co-creation” for “mental illness”, with which Foucault 
retrospectively exemplified a number of the characteristic features pertaining to the 
historical analysis of processes of problematization, the application of this mode of 
inquiry in the present dissertation would entail an analysis that takes into account 
how and why certain things (such as questions about the relevant conditions of 
value creation, questions about new modes of management, questions about how 
productive capacities increasingly became identified as something located outside 
established organizations) could become a problem to be responded to by 
proponents of Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and Critical 
Management Studies. Equally, to inquire into co-creation in a manner of 
resemblance with Foucault’s account of problematizations would also imply asking 
why certain objects, concepts and topics of economic, organizational, managerial 
and critical relevance could come to be mobilized, considered and categorized as 
being of importance for problems concerning value creation. And in agreement 
with Foucault’s avowal, this mode of inquiry would not refute the “reality” of co-
creation, in spite of the fact that the problematization analysis patently presumes it 
to be a phenomenon of genuine and dateable historical emergence, that the 
phenomenon is seemingly gathered together form diverse materials before it is 
treated as something explicit, and that referents of co-creation are contested and 
therefore not immediately coinciding. Even if co-creation, in accord with 
schizophrenia as a mental illness, does not correspond to something real in the 
world, this would not mean that the phenomenon could be reduced to a plane of 
existence that was ultimately dependent only on mental representations, conceptual 
delineations or scholarly dispute, that is, “a formal system that has only reference 
to itself” (Foucault 1997e: 117). According to the historical problematization 
analysis sporadically outlined by Foucault, co-creation would instead come into 
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view precisely as a specific “answer” to a concrete situation that is real, and the key 
question would be to ask exactly what the relevant elements constituting the 
problematizations are in which co-creation emerges as an answer.  
Hence, inserting the question about the elements of co-creation within a 
specific constellation between the various existent problems and responses to the 
problematization of the phenomenon signals that the prospect of the historical 
problematization analysis is to account for how unlike traditions of thought, at the 
same time, can exhibit a shared concern in co-creation, with aspirations that are 
unalike in both content and perspective. However, in order to specify more 
precisely how this mutual interest exercised differently by exponents of Strategic 
Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies 
surfaces from the analysis of the processes of problematization, the dissertation 
would also have to take into consideration several comments given by Foucault in 
two very similar interviews, from November 1983 and May 1984. Hence, in 
answering his interlocutors by explaining what he had meant by a “history of 
problematics” (Foucault 1996a: 421, 1997e: 117), Foucault contends that the aim of 
a historical analysis of this kind was principally to revive “what has made possible 
the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a practice into a general 
problem for which one proposes diverse solutions” (Foucault 1996a: 421). Yet in 
this context he also sheds light on how the analysis of problematizations would 
consider the differences which emerge frequently amongst purported solutions and 
identified problems:          
Actually, for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought [i.e. 
problematization], it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have made 
it uncertain, to have it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain 
number of difficulties around it. These elements result from social, economic, 
or political processes. But here their only role is that of instigation. They can 
exist and perform their action for a very long time, before there is effective 
problematization by thought. And when thought intervenes, it doesn’t assume 
a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression of these 
difficulties; it is an original or specific response – often taking many forms, 
sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects – to these difficulties, 
which are defined for it by a situation or a context, and which hold true as a 
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possible question.  […] To one single set of difficulties, several responses can 
be made. And most of the time different responses are actually proposed. But 
what has to be understood is what makes them simultaneously possible: it is 
the point in which their simultaneity is rooted; it is the soil that can nourish 
them in all their diversity and sometimes in spite of their contradictions.  
(Foucault 1997e: 117-18) 
It is exactly in this important facet of Foucault’s notion of problematization that 
this dissertation finds its principal analytical inspiration for the elucidation of co-
creation as an object of simultaneous, conjoint and yet divergent concern for the 
exponents of the three traditions mentioned. The task is therefore  
to rediscover at the root of these diverse solutions the problematization that 
has made them possible – even in their very opposition; or what has made 
possible the transformation of the difficulties and obstacles into a general 
problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions. (Foucault 1996a: 
421) 
The task of the analysis is therefore to discern what the common elements are in 
the assorted determinations of co-creation when this phenomenon is regarded not 
only as “an “answer” to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault 2001: 171), 
but also as an actual answer in which a range of emerging concerns, lurking 
difficulties, identified problems, specific responses and instructive solutions are 
drawn together in a particular constellation, which is the problematization of the 
given matter of concern. From the analytical point of view, it is then “the 
problematization that responds to these difficulties, but by doing something quite 
other than expressing them or manifesting them” (Foucault 1997e: 118). As a 
certain kind of answer to a matter of concern, the problematization is the 
development that in close connection with the said difficulties and problems 
“develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given” and “defines 
the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to respond 
to” (ibid.). In other words, the “point of problematization” and the question which 
the analysis inquires into is the “transformation of a group of obstacles and 
difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce a 
response” (ibid.).      
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It is in a similar way that this dissertation scrutinizes how co-creation has 
surfaced today across a range of different traditions, each of them reflecting upon 
the phenomenon as a specific answer to the problem of how value is, or ought to 
be, created. In spite of their differences, in spite of their diverse understandings of 
the phenomenon of co-creation, the differing answers appear as a way in which the 
conditions of value creation are presently rearticulated, and thereby also as specific 
answers that show up persistently and induce further reflection in particular 
directions. Equally, it is in light of the persistency with which this answer occurs 
today - and in light of the ever more prevalent articulation of co-creation as a 
vocabulary of components which are neither completely ingrained or determined 
nor entirely haphazard but rather appear to be characterized by a certain family 
resemblance - that the dissertation finds it necessary to inquire into why this 
phenomenon continually seems to emerge, and what the utilization of this 
vocabulary of problematization across heterogeneous and otherwise incompatible 
streams of thought seems to bear with it. As such, a basic question that presents 
itself in light of the historical problematization analysis as the chosen mode of 
inquiry becomes: What is it that is happening right now with the intricate arrival of 
the phenomenon of co-creation as an “answer”?  
Accordingly, it is with the ambition to inquire into ongoing or still arriving 
answers of this kind that the dissertation reconstructs a mode of analysis that 
works not only to identify how the various accounts of co-creation “in all their 
diversity and sometimes in spite of their contradictions” (Foucault 1996a: 421) 
have been assembled in specific sequences of concerns, difficulties, responses and 
solutions in association with this phenomenon, but also to make explicit by what 
kind of mutually shared components these problematization successions are linked 
together and arranged in specific constellations.  
 
While the above excerpts of the late Foucault’s reflections on what he sporadically 
referred to as “the history of problematizations” (Foucault 2007e: 141) and their 
interpretation in the context of examining co-creation provide several key features 
of relevance to the historical problematization analysis under construction in the 
present dissertation, they also point to the conditions under which it is necessary to 
introduce this mode of inquiry by way of inventive paraphrasing. Since Foucault 
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never gave any comprehensive or systematic presentation of the contours and 
characterizations of the history of problematizations, the mobilization of this mode 
of analysis in the context of the dissertation is dependent upon the piecing together 
of statements scattered throughout Foucault’s work. Regarding the piecing together 
of the analytical categories that make up this mode of analysis, it is therefore 
important to take note that even though the reconstruction put forward here draws 
extensively upon - and remains indebted to - Foucault’s work, its primary concern 
is not to be faithful to Foucault (whatever that might imply). This is not to suggest 
that one can more or less pick out at random whatever is found to be useful in 
Foucault’s work and, in so doing, totally disregard the way in which he 
characterizes and utilizes his analytical terms. It is rather to suggest that such terms  
are never presented as clear-cut methodological categories to be followed, that the 
categories continually remain ‘under construction’ throughout Foucault’s work, and 
that they are seldom presented and discussed as something that should be 
abstracted from the concrete analysis within which they are developed (Foucault 
2002d: 240, see also 1992: 10-13, 1998a: 92-102, 2001: 171-173, 2007a: 2-4, 116-
118, 2007b: 55-65, 2007d: 115-118, 2007e: 136-142).  
Consequently, the criterion through which the reconstruction carried out here 
finds its relevance is in a certain way only partly grounded with reference to 
Foucault’s work and to how he specifically uses and alters the term problematization 
(Foucault 1992: 10-13, 1996a: 418-421, 1996b: 456-457, 1997e: 114-119, 1997g: 
256, 2001: 74, 171-173, 2007d: 115-118, 2007e: 136-142). Likewise, this dissertation 
can only find partial support in later receptions, discussions and further 
developments of the historical problematization analysis (Castel 1994; Rabinow 
1997: xxxvi; O’Leary 2010; Lemke 2011a; Borch 2012; Gudmand-Høyer, 
forthcomming), because the relevance of the reconstruction carried out here has to 
be established first of all by the way in which the historical problematization 
analysis can provide a framework through which it becomes possible to analyze co-
creation. The reconstruction put forward therefore seeks to systematize and tie 
together a range of more or less heuristic recommendations and guidelines given by 
Foucault on different occasions, with the aim of developing a specific analytical 
framework through which it becomes possible to explore what the arrival of co-
creation signals, what implications it has, and how it has come into being.   
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While the scope of the analytical framework in a number of respects can only 
be assessed and fully evaluated in light of the dissertation as a whole, it is 
nevertheless possible to formulate a number of key implications which are, with 
reference to Foucault’s formulations, important to recognize in regards to how this 
mode of analysis is undertaken. Accordingly, it is on these conditions that a 
number of key points pertaining to the reconstructed historical problematization 
analysis are presented below, primarily with reference to Foucault's scarce 
comments on the subject matter and only secondarily to other developments 
(especially O’Leary 2010; Borch 2012; Gudmand-Høyer, forthcomming) of this 
mode of analyzing contemporary concerns in light of the history of their 
problematizations. In addition to the requirements of the mode of inquiry already 
hinted at above - that is, first, the analytical possibility of accounting for the 
simultaneity in different problematizations of the phenomenon of co-creation, and, 
second, the prospects of investigating on the same level of analytical exposition 
how related or similar matters of concern were previously problematized - the 
following presentation of the important heuristic implications in the chosen mode 
of inquiry also considers a third analytical prerequisite regarding the question about 
the implied normativity in interrelating problems and responses in a certain way.  
   
Heuristic implications of the historical problematization analysis  
First of all, the object of analysis is neither the problems nor their solutions themselves 
but the process of problematization in which the former two occur and 
interconnect in specific ways. This proposition does not mean that the notion of a 
problem is not central to the problematization analysis (Foucault 2007e: 141), or 
that commonsensical understandings of the word are irrelevant to the context (see 
Gudmand-Høyer, forthcomming: 40-41). According to a commonsense 
understanding, a problem can be a thing or an object, a person or a group, a 
process, a way of being, a fact, an institution, a lack of something, a cause or a 
consequence of something that presents a certain difficulty towards which some 
kind of action is to be initiated. And for the problem to be a problem, it obviously 
has to be so in relation to something or someone to whom it appears as a problem 
in a more or less intense way. For that reason, a problem is conceived here as 
something which is yet unresolved and therefore in need of a solution, that is, the 
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problem is conceivable as an obstacle towards which an action will have to be 
initiated – an action which is successful to the extent that its immediate effect is the 
disappearance of the problem (see Deleuze 1994: 158). 
Yet, when analyzing problematizations one is not aiming to solve a specific 
problem, neither is one interested in assessing the extent to which a particular 
solution to a problem actually solves the problem, thereby making it disappear. As 
maintained by Foucault, what comes into view when one analyzes 
problematizations is rather a particular “relation between the thing which is 
problematized and the process of problematization”, or a relation that is also “an 
‘answer’ to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault 2001: 172, 1996a: 421). In 
this respect, the genuine object of analysis is therefore the very process in which 
something presenting a certain difficulty or concern comes to be taken up as a 
problem in various ways and toward which a number of responses and solutions 
are formulated. What the analysis asks of this object, also designated “the process 
of problematization” (see Foucault 2001: 171), is then how but also why do certain 
issues relating to the creation of value, to new democratized and decentralized 
modes of production, to forms of management reaching beyond the confines of 
established organizations, begin to be addressed as problems in need of varying 
kinds of responses? In other words, a central question to ask of the object of 
analysis becomes: what are “the elements which are relevant for a given 
problematization” (Foucault 2001: 172)? 
It is therefore important to stress that in addition to the commonsensical 
understanding, the problem in the context of historical problematization analysis is 
also to be regarded as something that comes about and begins to stand out in 
relation to something other than itself. It is something that under a set of more or 
less contingent circumstances emerges within or across a set of practices, where it 
makes itself felt in the sense that its appearance presents a difficulty and an obstacle 
in relation to upholding and continuing with what had previously been done 
(Foucault 2001: 74). In this sense, the problem as such is neither good nor bad. It is 
simply something one finds it apposite to relate to and take into consideration. As 
such, a specific kind of problem might appear within and in relation to a certain 
way of conceptualizing value creation, to a specific reflection upon the way in 
which the mode of organization leading to its creation ought to be altered, to 
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pointing out how changing conditions for the creation of value necessitate new 
modes of management, or to maintaining that such changed conditions contain a 
yet unrealized but ground-shaking potential for a new social order. In light of the 
historical problematization analysis, the arrival of a problem destabilizes and 
questions what had - up until the arrival of the problem - been the more or less 
self-evident conditions for thinking, acting and being (Foucault 2007e: 141-142). 
The arrival of the problem regarded from this point of view is thus detectable 
through the way in which it gives rise to reflection, discussion, contestations and 
debates about possible or adequate responses. Since the genuine object of analysis 
is interrelated with the elements relevant for a given “problematization”, the 
problem is therefore not equal to the starting point of any straightforward practical 
solution; instead the problem surfaces as the “instigation” (Foucault 1997e: 118) of 
a whole development of interrelations between various difficulties, concerns, 
reflections, responses and solutions to be analyzed.  
An important implication of an analytical object along these lines is that the 
present dissertation is not first and foremost concerned with whether and to what 
extent problems identified are real, merely imagined, or pseudo-problems to be 
ignored. Neither is it primarily concerned with whether and to what extent 
proposed solutions actually solve or respond to problems in an adequate way. 
Furthermore, the analysis itself is not aimed at solving the problems perceived, or 
prescribing the necessary interventions needed according to which such problems 
would go away or disappear (see Foucault 1991c: 84, 2002d: 288). Rather, what 
comes to be analytically central is the fact that something has emerged as a 
problem and that specific attempts, mobilizing various kinds of resources, are made 
at countering or solving the problem at hand. Hence, by attending to the complex 
object of a problematization, including the elements comprised within it, the 
analysis aspires to make intelligible the process through which such a 
problematization embracing specific problem-response-constellations could come 
into being in all its complexity. In the specific context of the inquiry undertaken 
this entails, for instance, analyzing how and in what way the ‘firm-centric’ view of 
the world came to pose a problem for the creation of value, including taking into 
account the way in which a range of elements came to be rearticulated and 
reassembled, thereby providing the conditions through which co-creation could 
 32 
 
eventually come into view as a perceivably adequate or necessary response capable 
of displacing the firm as the central locus of value creation.  
Second, what is closely related to an object of analysis along these lines is the 
specific level of exposition to which the historical problematization analysis attends 
(see Gudmand-Høyer, forthcomming 2012: 62-65). Accordingly, the analytical task 
is not to disclose and record each and every instance of concern, difficulty, solution 
and response conceivably present in the variety of assertions considered in regards 
to co-creation. Rather, the task is to scrutinize the assertions comprised in the 
assortment of materials, which frequently work on different levels of abstraction, as 
well as with diverse targets and aspirations, in order to discern how a given account 
of a phenomenon such as co-creation tends to advance the specific type of 
“answer” that interrelates problems and responses in a certain fashion. Even if this 
latter approach  depends to some extent upon the former, the level upon which 
this mode of analysis aims to expose the contents of the material studied represents  
a reduction, or rather an abstraction, by which the assertions are construed in order 
to exteriorize a particular rapport between their immediate contents and the 
potential difficulties, problems, responses or solutions that make it relevant to 
introduce the material in a given context at a given time and with a given purpose.  
For that reason, the aim of the analysis could also be regarded as an attempt 
to convert all the assertions dealt with into a cluster of coordinates dispersed by the 
rapports existing between the problems, the responses and the given matter of 
concern. By implication, what the problematization analysis attempts to expound 
could then be conceived of as a kind of lateral vocabulary that is neither 
determining what is to be conveyed about the matter of concern nor merely 
expressing what it is that is of concern. Rather, the specific level of exposition that 
the problematization analysis aspires to reach and elucidate is the simultaneous 
vocabulary that is somehow co-coordinated with or is laterally present in most 
assertions that either explicitly or implicitly find it relevant to address something of 
concern.  
To illustrate, it is on this level that exponents of Strategic Management 
Thought addressing co-creation become an object for problematization analysis 
insofar as they criticize the firm-centric view of the world as a problem and purport 
as a solution the necessity of establishing various kinds of relations with external, 
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creative producer-consumers in order to further value creation (see Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004b; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a). Equally, it is on this same 
level of exposition that the problematization analysis attends to how proponents of 
Autonomous Marxism conceive of how “singularities acting in common” (Hardt 
and Negri 2004: 204) rise as a new commons-based mode of value creation that is 
irreducible to corporate interests and points to the possibility of establishing new 
relations beyond exploitation (Hardt and Negri 2000: 410) Finally, it is also by 
attending to this expositional level of analysis that such statements can be brought 
together with thinkers from Critical Management Studies, challenging the 
“unapologetically under socialized” (Le Ber and Branzei 2010: 599) resource-based 
view when they point to how the mobilization of thinkers ranging from Marxism, 
Feminism and Environmentalism enables the establishment of a new theoretical 
scheme that can be mobilized in order to advance an alternative and more 
socialized mode of value creation taking into account what Le Ber and Branzei 
(2010) designate as the intended beneficiary in cross-sector value creation 
partnerships. Finally, it is the transversality pertaining to this level of exposition 
that makes it analytically relevant to compare what is mutually common in 
assertions ranging from how companies ought to conduct themselves, to how 
exploitation might be ended, and how otherwise neglected beneficiaries can be 
given a more prominent role in cross-sector value creation partnerships. These 
assertions can all be analyzed at the same level, in spite of the fact that such 
statements at first sight might appear incommensurable and seemingly concerned 
with non-related problem-response constellations. 
Third, the particular problem-response constellation pertaining to the 
problematization entails a circuitous imperative dimension. As emphasized by Borch 
(2012: 7-8) in his short outline of the problematization analysis concerned with the 
sociological history of the “crowd problem”, it would be rare to observe any 
instance of problematization that was not in one way or the other infused or 
supported by “something like an imperative discourse” (see Foucault 2007a: 3). As 
in Borch’s case, this circumstance could be described as the tendency of the 
problematization of something to always involve an explicit or implicit articulation 
of a preferred solution to the related problem, particularly if it is suggested how to 
deal practically with the problem at hand. In light of the object of analysis and the 
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level of exposition accounted for above, this circuitous imperative dimension could 
also be depicted less overtly as the particular directions which are implied when 
certain kinds of problems and certain kinds of responses are arranged in a 
particular manner. Advancing a specific type of “answer” in relation to a matter of 
concern would in this case imply that the coordinates established by the 
interrelations between potential difficulties, problems, responses or solutions can 
also be described as a particular set of vectors which would rather point the 
attention to the matter of concern in one direction as opposed to another.  
While the circuitous imperative, or the convoluted “ought to”, inhabiting the 
problem-response constellations in this manner is likely to be indirect, concealed or 
even negative in numerous instances of the problematization activity, it would 
nevertheless be analytically discernible through the ways in which a particular field 
of concern are put forward at the expense of others of a principally similar kind. 
Compatibly, both the start and the end points of the circuitous imperatives could 
often be as different as in the examples given above: they could relate to the 
rewarding conduct of companies or to liberation and the end of exploitation, or 
they could merely point to a detailed problem within a larger framework of interest, 
or simply warn against a very specific effect in connection to a given solution. Yet 
in the context of the historical problematization analysis, these roundabout 
imperatives would still represent a special kind of instance of normative injunction 
by way of which it is possible not only to tell various problematizations apart in 
view of the specific coordinates organizing them, but at times to also identify an 
additional mutuality between them when the established vectors of problem-
response, in one way or another, appear to point in a similar direction.  
To finish, it is by taking these injunctions into consideration, although only 
expediently and not systematically, that the historical problematization analysis 
concomitantly makes it possible to confirm and explore implicit or explicit 
prescriptions regularly emerging in relation to the different problematizations of 
value creation through the notion of co-creation, and to place the analysis in a 
position from whence it is possible to describe normative injunctions without 
subjugating to one or the other.   
Forth, the historical analysis of a problematization entails further 
problematizations. While problematization is the most basic and foundational element 
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to which the analysis attends it is important to note that a problematization, at the 
same time, can be conceived of as being more or less encompassing, making it 
difficult at the outset to account for its spatial and temporary extension. 
Furthermore, one problematization can be tied in with another, and with a third, 
and with a forth, and so on. As an outcome hereof, partial and local 
problematizations can come together to form a more complex problematization. 
Since such variability and interrelation exists, the dissertation utilizes the term 
problematization in the singular as well as in the plural. So, for instance, when it is 
said that value creation is problematized, across otherwise separate traditions, 
through the concept of co-creation this problematization can be seen at the same 
time to be made up of other problematizations. 
For instance, when different scholars of co-creation can agree that something 
outside established organizations has come into view today as being central for the 
creation of value, it becomes necessary to inquire into how this outside-reference 
could emerge as something of major significance. In the dissertation, this entails 
attending to how from the early twentieth century something outside established 
organizations had already come to pose central problems for management thought 
towards which specific responses were made. By analyzing how this outside-
reference has become central today to the way in which value creation is 
problematized through co-creation, the inquiry is for that reason led to other 
problematizations that feed into and show up as relevant for something that 
otherwise allegedly is stated as being of a recent date. In this way, different and 
partial problematizations from the early twentieth century, comprising more or less 
limited series of problems and responses, come to be tied together with the overall 
investigation of co-creation.    
In spite of this variability, the historical problematization analysis rests on the 
assumption that it is empirically possible to identify a certain family resemblance 
between, on the one hand, the overall or inclusive problematization being analyzed 
in the singular in relation to a specific matter of concern and, on the other hand, 
the plurality of problematizations which are at the same time contributing to the 
singularity in various ways but differ from it since these problematizations are also 
occupied with other matters of concern. That this presumably indefinable family 
resemblance – which could also be characterized as a recurrent pattern or a 
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particular order in the constellation between problems and responses with 
reference to certain issues – is only empirically discernible implies the unfeasibility 
of defining in apriority where or how to find the semblances between the singular 
problematization and the problematizations in plural.  
Fifth, the mode of analysis does not uncover the origin of a problem but 
instead how things are problematized anew. Explaining in an interview from 1981 how 
his general analytic concern had been “the history of problematizations, that is, the 
history of the way in which things become a problem”, Foucault also emphasized 
how this difference should be understood, once again addressing his history of 
madness:  
How, why and in what exact way, does madness become a problem in the 
modern world, and why has it become an important one? It is such an 
important problem that a number of things, for example, psychoanalysis (and 
God knows how much it is spread throughout our entire culture) take off 
from a problem which is absolutely contained within the relationships that 
one could have with madness. No, you know, it’s the history of these 
problems. In what new way did illness become a problem; illness which was 
obviously always a problem. But, it seems to me, that there is a new way of 
problematizing illness starting with the 18th and 19th centuries. (Foucault 
2007e: 141, emphasis added)  
On this note, it also becomes important for the present dissertation to clarify a 
central issue concerning the historical dimension of the mode of analysis it 
employs. Since it is not unreasonable to infer that value and the conditions under 
which it was created has, in ways not unlike illness, always posed a problem, the 
relevant criterion is rather in what new way value creation has come to be 
problematized. This does not necessarily imply that the line separating one 
problematization from another is always clear-cut and unambiguous. The arrival of 
a new problematization might both be discernible from previous problematizations 
and draw in completely new elements; yet it might also carry with it elements from 
former problematizations that it draws upon, implicitly or explicitly, in the way in 
which it rearticulates the problem of value creation and elaborates new guidelines 
according to which it can be adequately handled. As suggested by Foucault in direct 
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continuation of the above, it is therefore “the genealogy of problems” that are of 
interest here in the sense that new ways of problematizing emanate from a family 
tree of affiliated problematizations, and beg the questions: “Why a problem and 
why such a kind of problem, why a certain way of problematizing appears at a 
given point in time” (ibid.). 
In the context of the dissertation, this implies, for instance, that when 
contemporary proponents of co-creation problematize not only the conditions 
under which value is created today, but also previously dominant conceptions of 
value creation, they do so by re-actualizing a specific value creation framework 
from the eighteenth century, according to which the creation of value was 
conceived as emanating from some kind of productive activity. While this early 
production-based view of value creation was problematized by economics from the 
end of the nineteenth century, a productive-based outlook of value creation has 
nevertheless resurfaced today (though often only implicitly) as central for scholars 
of co-creation. 
Sixth, the mode of analysis does not concern the history of ideas or behavior, 
but the history of thought. When analyzing problematizations and the historical 
processes through which they occur, it is important not to confuse this particular 
mode of study with related, and yet different, approaches such as the history of 
ideas and the history of mentalities (Foucault 1996a: 420). While the history of 
ideas is primarily concerned with tracing the birth of a particular notion, following 
its historical development, and situating it in relation to the wider conceptual 
network within which it is developed, the history of mentalities for its part studies 
the actual behavior and attitudes of people (Foucault 1996a: 420-421). In contrast 
to both of these approaches, the history of problematizations neither fixes its 
attention on ideas as such, nor on actual behavior or attitudes. Instead, the analysis 
simply charts how, under what circumstances, and in relation to which processes 
something begins to take on the character of a problem. In this sense, its point of 
reference is not reality as such, whether in the form of real behavior or real 
attitudes, nor their mode of appearance in sociological, economical or 
psychological representations.  
Equally, the present analysis does not attend to how value creation or the 
management of this is or has been actually organized within real-life organizations, 
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just as it does not seek to assess the representational worth or adequacy of specific 
previous or contemporary accounts of such matters. Rather, the analysis attends to  
“the specific work of thought” (Foucault 1997e: 118), that is, to the “level of 
reflection” (Foucault 2008: 2) at which such matters come into view as something 
urgent, as something inducing reflection, as something presenting obstacles and 
possibilities to which thought responds. Put differently, the way in which 
something comes to take on the appearance of a problem is through what Foucault 
refers to as “thought” understood as a “form of action” (Foucault 1997f: 201). 
Accordingly, thought is not merely something passive that represents, mirrors or 
expresses reality in a secondary or inferior way, it is rather something that 
intervenes in the world, raises issues, gives rise to concerns of various kinds, and 
therefore is also of central importance for the way in which specific problem-
response constellations come to appear and to be taken up. In spite of the fact that 
thought is always situated within specific political, social and economic contexts 
that are not irrelevant to its specific interventions, thought nevertheless has an 
“irreducibility” (Foucault 1997f: 201) to it that cannot be reduced to such contexts. 
The historical problematization analysis is therefore centrally preoccupied with this 
layer at which “specific events of thought” (ibid.) are situated, because it is through 
attending to the “specific work of thought” and to the events that constitute it 
(Foucault 1997e: 118) that it becomes possible to give an account of how, why and 
under what circumstances specific problematizations emerge. While such events of 
thought are obviously different from “the invention of a steam engine, or an 
epidemic”, they nevertheless belong to history just as much as these other kinds of 
events. (Foucault 2002d: 277). 
It is also in this sense that the dissertation is not concerned with how co-
creation is organized in a supposedly more real organization or real user-
community, just as it is not concerned with the representational worth or validity of 
a specific theory about how value is or ought to be created through a co-creation-
approach. This is not because such studies are irrelevant, unimportant or 
uninformative, it is rather because the mode of analysis mobilized here takes stock 
of the fact that co-creation has come into view as a widespread and multifaceted 
phenomenon, the conditions of possibility of which have to be examined through 
inquiring into the “events of thought” that have made this arrival possible.  
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Although the analysis does not take ideas or behaviors as its direct object of 
investigation, it must be emphasized that the process of problematization is not 
viewed as totally separate from them either, given the fact that a particular 
problematization will always be dependent upon and is articulated through “our 
knowledge, ideas, theories, techniques, social relations and economic processes” 
(Foucault 1996a: 418). The analysis therefore relates to and takes these into account 
to the extent that they are relevant to the problematization to which the analysis 
attends. Because of this, the analysis passes through and takes up material that also 
belongs to the history of ideas and the history of mentalities, but it always does so 
from the specific angle of a concrete problem which it seeks to make intelligible.  
Seventh, historical problematization analysis does not entail a historical account 
for its own sake but a history of the present, the actual. In spite of the fact that the 
analysis explicitly denotes the historical as its dimension of investigation, its point 
of departure and primary concern is not history per se. Its preoccupation with 
history rather springs from a concern with the present (Foucault 1991a: 31), from a 
concern with our present day actuality and the way in which this actuality marks 
out a horizon of experiences that we share and are immersed in. As such, the basic 
question the analysis starts out with is: what are we right now? What is it that is 
happening right now that has important implications for how we think of and 
relate to ourselves? This concern with what is happening, however, “is not so much 
inhabited by the desire to know how something can happen, always and all over 
the place; but rather by the desire to guess what is hidden under this exact, floating, 
mysterious and absolutely simple word: ‘Today’” (Foucault 2007f: 121-122). The 
historical problematization analysis is therefore a mode of inquiry that aims at 
grasping and making visible how something happening today marks and implies a 
difference in relation to yesterday (Foucault 2007d: 99). Not with the aim of 
celebrating this ‘current happening’ as the completion or exceptional turning point 
of a historical trajectory, nor, inversely, of denouncing it as a degeneration of our 
values or as the unfortunate arrival of a new system of enslavement and 
exploitation. Rather, the aim is to grasp what is happening today as a singular 
historical phenomenon that has to be analyzed in all its complexity. 
For the dissertation, analyzing the arrival of the phenomenon of co-creation 
as something that marks out and is distinctive for our actuality entails that it 
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becomes necessary to attend to history in a certain way. The historical material that 
comes into view as being of relevance for the analysis is therefore not necessarily in 
the form of well-established historical facts, but rather the dispositions or tendencies 
inherent in the historical material that show up as being relevant for the specific 
problematization investigated (see Raffnsøe et al. 2008: 345). Hence, just as 
Foucault’s description of Bentham’s Panopticon (Foucault 1991a: 200-209) can in 
no way be said to give a full and adequate representation of Bentham’s thought, the 
same can be said of the way in which the dissertation takes up prominent names 
within the history of management and economics. Just as Foucault is not aspiring 
to give a full account of Bentham’s thought, but rather to indicate how the 
conceived outline of the specific architectural device of the Panopticon could be 
considered a cleansed diagram of a more general, diffuse and prevalent mode of 
establishing and organizing surveillance, the analysis of the central conditions of 
possibility for the phenomenon of co-creation also entails highlighting specific 
aspects of former events of thought that only come into view as being of relevance 
from the perspective of the history of a specific actuality in the process of taking 
shape.  
It is in this light that Schumperter’s thought, for instance, in the present work 
comes into view not first and foremost as being of central relevance because of the 
way in which he depicted the entrepreneur as a vital and heroic figure in economic 
life, but rather because it is within Schumpeter’s thought that specific tendencies of 
central importance for the surfacing of co-creation begin to be become detectable. 
More specifically, as we will come to see, the way in which Schumpeter‘s 
theoretical account gradually slides from the entrepreneur to an ‘entrepreneurial 
function’, that is, as something that begins to be depersonalized and socialized, is 
of central importance for what today is hailed as essential for the co-creation of 
value.   
It is equally in the context of this analytical relationship with the historical 
that the analysis does not start out with, nor seeks to end up with, a firm theoretical 
position from which unambiguous judgments can be made, and it is in this sense 
that the analysis does not aim either to give an account of the phenomenon it 
investigates as a totalizing object or tendency. The historical problematization 
analysis endeavors to abstain from the temptation to make grand and all-
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encompassing claims on behalf of the object it studies, and instead focuses its 
attention on partial and local problems. The point is therefore not to detect a 
general principle or law that everything else owes its existence to or is determined 
by, nor to claim that nothing else is as important, or has as huge an impact, as the 
phenomenon the analysis investigates. Instead, the analysis seeks to map the 
occurrence of a historical and singular experience in all its fragility and complexity.  
In this sense, the perspective through which the historical problematization 
analysis establishes its field of analysis is preoccupied with a contemporary 
phenomenon which presents us today with certain difficulties and problems to 
which we try to respond through a wide variety of means. This implies that the 
analysis starts out with a preliminary charting of a phenomenon which seems 
urgent in the sense that it constantly reappears and makes itself felt through and 
across a wide range of practices. It is therefore a kind of analysis that seeks out “a 
field containing a number of points that are particularly fragile or sensitive at the 
present time” (Foucault 2007e: 137). 
It is through this prism, through this preoccupation with what is happening to 
us right now, that the historical dimension of the analysis finds its perspective and 
relevance. More precisely, the analysis investigates the processes through which a 
certain problematization emerges and begins to make itself felt. The proper object 
of the analysis is thus the way in which a problematization has been formed and 
comes into view as being something of central importance today. Since 
problematizations are always formed through historical processes, the analysis 
attends to the way in which these processes provides the conditions for the 
appearance of specific anxieties and questions which at certain historical moments 
emerge as problems to be attended to, worked through and answered. 
 
A final and complementary point which it is important to make in relation to the 
historical problematization analysis, as partially and sporadically construed in 
Foucault’s late work, is the close relationship between this mode of enquiry and a 
concomitant historical analysis of what he designated as the “the ‘focal points of 
experience’” (Foucault 2010: 3), or, more precisely, the “the foyers of experiences” 
(O’Leary 2010: 170). While Gudmand-Høyer (forthcoming) has demonstrated how 
this historical analysis – which correlates both synchronically and diachronically the 
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particular problematizations with the articulation of “forms of possible 
knowledge”, “normative frameworks of behavior”, and “potential models of 
existence for possible subjects” (Foucault 2010: 3) – could very well form a 
combined mode of enquiry entitled “historical problematization and experience 
analysis”, the present dissertation engages in a different but related interpretation 
and utilization of the analytical relationship between the categories of 
problematization and experience. Instead of directly merging the two categories 
into one single framework, the historical inquiry into the problematization of value 
creation through co-creation rather points to how this specific problematization 
activity in due course became related to the occurrence of a particular historical 
experience whose general matrix is to a great extent in accordance with O’Leary’s 
(2010) exposition of the both implicit and explicit ways in which Foucault was 
addressing experience as a wide-ranging object of analysis.  
Reading Foucault “as a philosopher of the historical transformation of 
experience”, O’Leary (2010: 163) first of all makes the point, which is also 
significant for the present application of this supplementary analytical category, that 
Foucault himself seems to use the notion of experience in a manner making 
allowance for two “general forms” (ibid: 165). On the one hand, experience can 
thus be taken “to indicate the general forms of thought, perception and practice 
that characterize a particular area of human life during a particular period” (ibid.). 
In this way, the category points “to the general background forms and structures 
that, in a general sense, determine, or at least set the parameters for, the everyday 
experience of people who live in a given period” (ibid.). On the other hand, 
however, O’Leary emphasizes that the notion of experience is also taken “to 
indicate an exceptional occurrence in the life of an individual (or, sometimes, a 
culture) which changes the way that individual (or culture) approaches a given area 
of human life”. Calling this aspect of the category “‘transformative experience’” 
(ibid.: 166), he therefore points to a frame of reference of the notion that, in partial 
opposition to the everyday experience, has to do with “an exceptional, perhaps 
unexpected, occurrence from which one emerges in some way changed (ibid.: 166).  
As also indicated by O’Leary with reference to Foucault’s philosophical work, 
it is both the identifiable difference between these two general forms and the 
possibility for them to occur simultaneously or concomitantly in relation to a 
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specific matter of concern that is significant for the particular experience that plays 
a central part in this dissertation. What is attended to by way of the historical 
problematization analysis is therefore not merely how a widely shared 
contemporary experience - which in the dissertation is called an experience of the 
outside - has come into view as a shared background uniting otherwise 
heterogeneous proponents of co-creation, but also how this experience has come 
to be born through a long history. Accounting for this history, the dissertation not 
only shows how value creation has become intimately interlinked with an 
experience of the outside through a specific and shared co-creation vocabulary, but 
also how this experience has come to be born through an extended 
problematization history that is intimately intertwined with specific events of 
thought pertaining to changing reflective prisms advanced within management 
theory and economics. By adapting and making creative use of O’Leary’s (2010) 
account of the double-sided nature of the concept of experience, the dissertation 
shows how the experience of the outside at one and the same time is to be seen as 
a shared background uniting otherwise disparate contemporary accounts, but at the 
same time how this experience of the outside has to be understood as a 
destabilizing matrix that persistently urges to change, transformation and 
transgressions of various kinds by way of an increasingly accelerated injunction ‘to 
go outside’ that at present is forcefully expressed in the co-creation vocabulary.   
It is also from this point of view that it becomes relevant to specify that the 
parallel inquiry into experiences is more precisely designated as the history of “the 
foyers of experiences” (O’Leary 2010: 170). What becomes discernible through the 
historical problematization analysis is thus equivalent to what O’Leary translates, 
initially, “with a range of meanings from hearth, home, and place of abode, to 
refuge, source, and even ‘hotbed’”, and, finally, as “a ‘matrix,’ primarily to indicate 
the conditions that makes possible a whole range of experiences (of both the 
everyday and the ‘limit’ varieties)” (O’Leary 2010: 171). Translating a foyer of 
experiences into a matrix of experiences would then refer to “a complex set of 
conditions that makes possible the experiences that occur, for example, around 
madness, sexuality, and so on”, or, more comprehensively, to “a source of those 
possible experiences, both making them possible for us and giving us the means 
with which to understand and interpret them when they occur” (ibid.: 171-72). It 
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was apparently in this sense that Foucault himself was able to maintain that “[t]he 
experience of madness, the experience of disease, the experience of criminality, and 
the experience of sexuality” all together represented “important focal points [foyers] 
of experience of our culture” (Foucault 2010: 5). Referring to the exact same 
collection of already examined experiential matrices, it was probably also with 
regard to this dual sense of the notion that Foucault could state that what is 
designated here as the historical problematization analysis is “a matter of analyzing, 
not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies’, but the problematizations 
through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the practices on 
the basis of which these problematizations are formed” (Foucault 1992: 11).  
Empirical material, positioning, and contributions 
In spite of the fact that there are certain overlaps between the empirical material 
analyzed and the literature to which the dissertation positions itself and presents its 
contributions, it is nevertheless both possible and useful to consider these three 
categories separately and consecutively. Consequently, firstly there follows some 
specification as to the textual-empirical material utilized in the dissertation, 
including some qualifying remarks regarding exactly why this literature has been 
chosen. Secondly, the dissertation positions itself by pointing to traditions and 
works which comprise its immediate context of contribution. Thirdly, this 
positioning finally paves the ground upon which the specific contributions of the 
dissertation are set forth.  
 
Primary and additional textual-empirical material  
The empirical material dealt with in the historical problematization analysis carried 
out in this dissertation first and foremost comprises texts coming out of the 
traditions of Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and Critical 
Management Studies; these texts comprise the primary textual-empirical material of 
the inquiry. Yet in addition to this material, a wide selection of supplementary and 
varied textual sources also plays a major role in answering the research questions 
posed; these latter texts comprise the additional empirical material which is made use 
of in the dissertation.  
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Accordingly, the literature which relates to Strategic Management Thought that the 
dissertation takes as its primary empirical material includes early and highly 
influential texts explicitly attending to co-creation (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 
1993b, 1994; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b)  as well as texts within Strategic 
Management Thought which are either explicitly discussed within the co-creation 
literature and/or constitute implicit dialogue partners. This latter group of texts is 
also characterized by the fact that, within the tradition itself, they are regarded as 
seminal contributions on which new paradigms have been built. Central among 
these are: Porter ([1985] 2004), which has given rise to the ‘value chain’-approach; 
Penrose ([1959] 2009), Wernerfelt (1984), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), comprising 
central texts upon which the ‘resource-based view’ has been built; and Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen (1997), which has been a starting point for the ‘dynamic 
capabilities perspective’. 
There are three reasons as to why the literature pertaining to Strategic 
Management Thought constitutes central and privileged empirical material for the 
dissertation. First, it is in this literature that reflections on co-creation (Normann 
and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c) first began to be set forth and have had a major impact on 
management thought. While co-creation research also comes out of the tradition of 
marketing, the growth of this perspective within marketing has to a considerable 
extent been built with references to or on the foundations laid out by earlier 
conceptualizations of co-creation within Strategic Management Thought (see for 
example Vargo and Lusch 2004: 9-10; Grönroos 2008: 303).  
Second, Strategic Management Thought, or ‘business policy’ as its early 
antecedent was designated (Hoskisson et al. 1999), has been  the discipline aspiring 
to guide “executive decisions of major importance”, to use Donhams phrase (1922: 
1), since its very inception in the first half of the twentieth century, and has been 
doing so in a manner that has sought to integrate all other disciplines within 
management thought and business administration (McKiernan 1996, Vol 1: xv; 
Hoskisson et al. 1999: 418; Ghemawat 2002: 40; Kiechel 2010). The literature with 
an affiliation to Strategic Management Thought therefore constitutes a central 
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source by which it becomes possible to attend to how scholars, at the highest 
integrative and general level within management thought, conceive of the 
fundamental challenges facing businesses, and how such challenges are to be 
handled and solved by real life managers and executives. As such, the co-creation 
literature with an affiliation to Strategic Management Thought also provides a 
privileged context for considering the reflective prism through which the 
topos/topology of the outside, in a more general way, has come to surface as a 
major and overriding concern, that is, as something that it has become imperative 
for businesses to relate to, inquire into and to harness in one way or the other.  
Third, given that value creation throughout the last three decades has been 
one of the most central concepts within Strategic Management Thought (see Foss 
and Stieglitz 2010: 3), and in light of the fact that the co-creation literature within 
this tradition explicitly criticizes previously dominant value creation conceptions, 
this collection of textual material also represent a highly relevant framework 
through which a number of interconnections between the two can been 
distinguished for the analysis.  
While the above mentioned texts are assembled and examined from the point 
of view of the historical problematization analysis, their interrelations and 
connections are not merely a construct of this mode of inquiry. Rather, 
connections between these texts are evident from the way in which they explicitly 
relate to, reflect upon or criticize each other. For instance, the co-creation literature 
not only explicitly criticizes Porter’s (2004) value chain-approach (Norman and 
Ramírez 1993a, 1993b; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 12-14) when setting forth 
its own contributions, but proponents of the co-creation perspective also utilize, 
add to and remain in a continued dialogue with the resource-based view (Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy 2000: 81-82, 2004b: 196-7), of which Prahalad (Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990) himself had contributed to the development. By implication, it is also 
an important aspect of the historical problematization analysis to explicate the 
constellations between diverse responses and problems relating to co-creation by 
following the lines of connection already articulated in the literature in question. 
Taken together, this mode of inquiry therefore endeavors to map out the 
conglomerated network of problem-response connections which are both explicitly 
and implicitly present in the empirical material concerning the phenomenon of co-
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creation. This dual approach is not only the case when analyzing texts from 
Strategic Management Thought, but also when attending to the literature from 
Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies, although in ways less 
directly appreciable. 
 
While literature coming out of Strategic Management Thought comprises a 
privileged place for considering how management thought, in a more general way, 
has come to be centrally preoccupied with co-creation, the literature affiliated with 
the traditions of Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies equally 
comprises empirical material which is central to the concerns of  the dissertation 
for a number of reasons.  
To begin with, the primary empirical material selected from exponents of 
Autonomist Marxism includes: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000), 
Multitude: War and Democracy in the age of Empire (2004), and Commonwealth (2009). In 
addition to these seminal books, texts by Maurizio Lazzarato (1996, 2004, 2005, 
2006), and Adam Arvidsson (2006, 2008, 2009, 2010), including Arvidsson, 
Bauwens and Peitersen (2008), are also utilized. Correspondently, the primary 
empirical material selected from the tradition of Critical Management Studies 
includes: Jacques 2000; Prichard 2000; Willmott 2010, 2010; Jaros 2007; 
Humphreys and Grayson 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Van 
Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Le Ber and Branzei 2010; Prichard and Mir 2010; 
Reinicke 2010.  
There are three reasons for privileging literature coming out of exactly these 
two traditions. Firstly, Autonomist Marxists, as well as scholars associated with 
Critical Management Studies, either explicitly utilize the concepts of co-creation 
(Lazzarato 2004: 197; Le Ber and Branzei 2010: 610), co-production (Böhm and 
Land 2009: 6), or equivalent terms, such as, for instance, “singularities acting in 
common” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 204, 348-9), or they criticize previously 
advanced understandings of value and value creation in ways that bear a more or 
less direct resemblance to co-creation accounts (Reinecke 2010).  
Secondly, a central criterion for selecting literature belonging to Autonomist 
Marxism and Critical Management Studies is that the normative inclinations of 
proponents of these two traditions are, if not directly adversarial/opposed to 
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Strategic Management Thought, then at least severely at odds with the aspirations 
pursued by exponents of this latter tradition. While Strategic Management Thought 
aims at offering support, practical advice and new tools to assists businesses-
managers in their strategic planning (see Kiechel 2010), thinkers coming out of the 
critical traditions aim at completely different objectives. Hence, by way of attending 
to literature from Strategic Management Thought in conjunction with accounts 
coming out of Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies, it thereby 
becomes possible to attend to the phenomenon of co-creation in a broader way 
than if literature from merely one of these traditions had been taken up to be 
scrutinized.  
Thirdly, and in conjunction with the previous point, in spite of being critical 
and thereby sharing an oppositional stance towards the aims pursued by 
proponents of Strategic Management Thought, the traditions of Autonomist 
Marxism and Critical Management Studies are nevertheless different theoretical 
perspectives that come out of diverse intellectual and institutional contexts and 
attend to different kinds of objects and practical-empirical problems. The critical 
approach effective in the literature coming out of the tradition conventionally 
designated as ‘Autonomist Marxism’ – in so far as this school of thought is known 
to place “at its center the self-activity of the working class” (Witheford 1994: 85) 
and from its early historical origins in the 1960s has been associated with “the 
struggles of Italian workers, students and feminists” (ibid.) – has in several of its 
more contemporary manifestations, including the material analyzed in the 
dissertation, been concerned predominantly with the changing conditions of value 
creation in conjunction with grander societal transformations, such as that from 
modern to post-modern capitalism, or from disciplinary societies to control 
societies, with a specific emphasis on the alternatives presenting themselves to the 
creative proletariat of today, that is, the multitude (Hardt and Negri 2000). Thus, a 
central ambition here has been to construct “concepts for theorizing and acting in 
and against” contemporary capitalism (Hardt and Negri 2000: xvi). In a different 
way, the literature situated within Critical Management Studies has as its 
geographical epicenter  the UK, where  from the late 1980s and early 1990s it has 
been rising as a field of study (Fournier and Grey 2000; Parker 2002; Adler et al. 
2008). Whereas contemporary Autonomist Marxists  have preferred generally a 
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meta-level critique of capitalism, thinkers coming out of Critical Management 
Studies question and contest not only the validity of the knowledge generated 
specifically within management thought, but also the legitimacy of the practice of 
management (see for example Grey 1996, Parker 2000). Central tenets within 
Critical Management Studies include its anti-performative stance as well as an 
aspiration to de-naturalize and provide more reflexive accounts of management 
(Fournier and Grey 2000). Hence, whereas Autonomist Marxist accounts have 
battled capitalism more readily, Critical Management Studies - although also being 
strongly connected to critiques of capitalism in various ways - has first and 
foremost been centrally preoccupied with explicitly criticizing management in its 
various forms, even - and perhaps especially - when such forms are presented as 
liberating, as reversing established hierarchies of power, or as promoting new kinds 
of equality (see for example Grey 1999).  
Consequently, by bringing together empirical textual material from the three 
diverse intellectual traditions - each intertwined with the pursuit of different 
theoretical and practical goals but nevertheless all inquiring into how something 
outside established organizations has come to play a key-role for the way in which 
value is created - the historical problematization analysis should make it possible to 
investigate the arrival of co-creation as a phenomenon inhabiting a broader 
historical transformation. Examining co-creation through this analytical 
perspective, it therefore becomes possible to attend to a level of investigation, 
comprising various problem-response constellations, in which theoretical 
instructions for business managers meet anti-capitalist utopian aspirations and 
various kinds of critique aimed at management – altogether comprising an 
extensive and multifarious field for co-creation to surface as a contemporary 
phenomenon of interest, which can  be scrutinized from the point of view of the 
historical problematization analysis developed in the present dissertation.  
 
In addition to this primary material, the dissertation also makes use of other texts 
as empirical sources in the pursuit of the set of main questions posed. However, 
the criterion of selection through which this latter kind of additional material comes 
into view as central for the present exploration is to a wide extent preconditioned 
by the analysis of the primary empirical material. Given that one of the key features 
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of the historical problematization analysis is its capability to bring together 
otherwise different and apparently unrelated sources, the weaving together of 
additional textual-empirical material with the primary sources is an integrated 
analytical operation through which the historical problematization analysis 
approaches the “intelligibility” of the phenomenon it investigates (Foucault 1991c: 
77). In respect to this analytical intelligibility, what Foucault is referring to as “a 
sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes” (ibid.) could therefore be regarded, 
from the point of view of choosing the empirical material for the investigation, as 
the process in which it becomes required to establish sources which are, in a certain 
sense, both the precondition for the analysis at hand and the outcome of the 
various connections between materials discovered by the analysis in effect. 
Consequently, since an essential characteristic of the different co-creation accounts 
is that value creation increasingly takes place outside of established organizations, it 
becomes necessary to pursue, by use of a wide range of eventually identified 
empirical materials, not only how this relates to previous accounts of value 
creation, but also how an outside reference could become established as a 
necessary precondition, and to inquire into when, where and under what 
circumstances the outside could begin to show up as a problem towards which 
responses can be made.  
Hence, in addition to literature coming out of Strategic Management 
Thought, Autonomist Marxism, and Critical Management Studies, the dissertation 
also utilizes textual-empirical material that ranges from the history of economic 
thought (notably Quesnay [1758] 1973, Smith [1776] 1999, and Schumpeter [1911] 
2011a) over to the history of management thought (particularly Taylor [1911] 1967; 
Mayo [1949] 1975, [1933] 2003 and Roethlisberger and Dickson [1939] 2000) as 
well as more contemporary sources pertaining to post-disciplinary management 
(for example Deleuze 1995a; Spicer 2010) and commons-based social production 
(for example Bollier 2008; Bruns 2009).  
Finally, Michel Foucault’s work not merely serves as the central resource by 
way of which the historical problematization analysis utilized in this dissertation is 
reconstructed; the inquiry also relies extensively on the “history of 
governmentality” which Foucault (2007a, 2008) investigated in the lectures he gave 
at the Collège de France in 1978 and 1979. The material covered in these lectures is 
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utilized at length in the dissertation due to its great importance for answering the 
second set of research questions concerning how co-creation has come to be born. 
As such, the history of governmentality portrayed by Foucault not only becomes a 
central resource, it also comes to provide a source of inspiration for what the 
dissertation explores as a history of managementality.   
 
Positioning, or context of contribution 
Following these specifications regarding the empirical material utilized, it is now 
possible to position the work undertaken in the dissertation. Given the nature of 
the analytical point of departure, however, such a positioning can perhaps more 
adequately be described as a specific set of relations and tensions which the 
dissertation establishes – first and foremost with the primary empirical-textual 
material it explicitly takes up and investigates, but also with already existing 
historical accounts of co-creation, as well as other scholarly works that the 
dissertation either explicitly or implicitly relates to, or with which it sees itself as 
having an intellectual affinity.  Consequently, the establishment of such relations 
and tensions might more adequately be described as a context of contribution in 
relation to and in terms of which the specific contributions of the dissertation are 
to be viewed.   
In light of the fact that a specific aim of the historical problematization 
analysis is to not merely investigate a specific phenomenon, but also to urge the 
reader (and the wider context into which such a work is written) to reconsider and 
reassess what the arrival of the analyzed phenomenon might entail and imply 
(Raffnsøe et al. 2008: 322, 327), the relations that this dissertation aspires to 
establish with the traditions it examines can be described as not merely assessing 
‘the costs’ of embracing the phenomenon of co-creation, but also, ideally, of 
attempting to shift the perspective through which the phenomenon of co-creation 
appears. In this sense, the work undertaken in the dissertation not merely speaks of 
how co-creation has come to appear within the analyzed traditions. It also speaks to 
co-creation scholars within these traditions – no matter whether their predominant 
inclination is to address co-creation as something to be cherished, extended, 
implemented and furthered in various ways, or, inversely, as something to be 
denounced and criticized. Although the dissertation ideally speaks to and has 
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something of relevance to say about all of the three analyzed traditions, its closest 
intellectual affinity is nevertheless with scholars coming out of Critical 
Management Studies. This intellectual affinity stems from the fact that the 
dissertation – as with works coming out of Critical Management Studies more 
generally – explicitly inquires into management thought in ways which are based on 
extensive reading of the literature at hand, but at the same time does so in a 
manner that remains critical towards its various effects and influences.  
In addition to scholars of co-creation within these three strands of thought, 
the dissertation in particular aspires to establish relations with historically oriented 
accounts of co-creation. While such accounts are already present within 
management thought (Ramírez 1999; Vargo and Lusch 2004), the dissertation 
views critically oriented historical accounts which inquire into the conditions under 
which co-creation has arisen in conjunction with changing conceptions of value 
creation and management (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Arvidsson 
2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Zwick et al. 2008; Cova and Dalli 2009; Ritzer and 
Jurgenson 2010; Cova et al. 2011) as its most immediate context of contribution. 
As can be seen, several of the accounts belonging to this context not only figure as 
intended recipients of the work undertaken here, but also comprise parts of the 
empirical material attended to in the dissertation.  
Finally, the dissertation also speaks to a range of implicit and explicit dialogue 
partners in various ways. These can be subdivided into three groups. The first of 
these comprises governmentality studies and Foucault-inspired studies within 
management and organization theory (see chapter five), especially those that have 
taken up Foucault’s notion of governmentality (for example Brewis 1996; Clegg et 
al. 2002; Triantafillou 2003; Skälen et al. 2006; Dixon 2007; Zwick et al. 2008; 
Bonsu and Polsa 2011; Weiskopf and Munro 2011). The second group within this 
collection to whom the dissertation aims to contribute is Deleuzian-inspired 
scholars on post-disciplinary management that have inquired into how 
management has begun to rely upon and utilize differences and open spaces 
(Munro 2000; Fleming and Spicer 2004; Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; Martinez 
2010; Spicer 2010). The reason for this is that scholars attending to this matter 
have done so in a way that bears a striking resemblance to several of the critical 
accounts of co-creation taken up in the dissertation. Third, the dissertation sees 
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itself as having a largely implicit but nevertheless crucial intellectual affinity with 
scholars that have questioned and criticized the ways in which contemporary 
thought – whether critical or not – has embraced flows, change, innovation and 
bottom-up movements as superior alternatives to bureaucratic and more formal 
modes of organizing (du Gay 2003, 2005; du Gay and Wikkelsø 2011, 2012; 
Villadsen and Dean 2012). In this way, they have criticized tendencies that are 
significantly overlapping with several of the tenets of proponents of co-creation.  
 
Contributions  
Not unlike the philosophical treatise, it is often difficult for a piece of work of 
historical orientation to declare in advance precisely in what way and to what 
exactly it contributes. Given that this difficulty also applies to the present 
dissertation as the proper presentation of its contributions would require familiarity 
with the historical argument not yet accounted for, it is therefore only possible at 
this juncture to disclose in advance a very general outline regarding these questions, 
appended with a few more specific points on the existent literature which examines 
co-creation from a historical point of view.     
 
First of all, concerning the three traditions comprising the primary empirical 
material of the dissertation and, to some extent, also the traditions with which the 
present work positions itself, it must be emphasized that the results of the 
historical problematization analysis do not provide a foundation upon which it 
becomes possible to set forth a new theory about how value is co-created, and how 
businesses can re-organize their strategic outlooks to take stock of and benefit 
from an emerging new paradigm of value creation (see Normann and Ramírez 
1993a, 1993b, 1994; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; 
Lusch and Vargo 2006; Berthon et al. 2007; Payne et al. 2008; Spohrer and Maglio 
2008; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b). Neither do the results of the 
problematization analysis tie in with or give rise to a new philosophy or overall 
theory concerning how value creation today has become dependent upon a creative 
multitude’s biopolitical production (see Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009), an 
ethical economy (see Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidsson et al. 2008), a 
cooperation between minds (see Lazzarato 2004), or something similar which 
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should by some means prove to be irreducible to or autonomous from business 
interests. Nor do the results of such a historical analysis provide the grounds upon 
which it would be possible to claim that a new mode of value creation has arisen, 
which is supposed to be centrally dependent upon management techniques capable 
of exploiting or harnessing an unpaid workforce comprising user-communities and 
externally located producers (see Banks and Humphreys 2008; Humphreys and 
Grayson 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Cova and Dalli 2009; 
Willmott 2010; Cova et al. 2011).  
What is provided instead is a historical contribution which assesses how co-
creation has come to be employed as a concept through which different theories, 
philosophies and claims of the kinds mentioned above have found nourishment in 
their pursuit of radically conflicting goals. What the dissertation provides is a 
historical account of how a general mode of problematization of the creation of 
value has come into being. The overall contribution amounts to a history of how 
this general mode of problematization has been born in conjunction with a certain 
experience of the outside, that is, an experiential matrix of societal relevance intimately 
interwoven with and expressed through the common and co-existing vocabulary by 
which value creation is currently problematized as co-creation. Accounting for this, 
the dissertation analyses co-creation as a historically singular phenomenon, the 
arrival of which not merely makes a difference in relation to yesterday, but also a 
phenomenon through which otherwise separate historical trajectories today come 
together. In light of this, it is possible to specify a range of more substantial 
contributions. 
Of major importance among such contributions is not least that co-creation 
scholars across the three analyzed traditions, implicitly or explicitly, draw 
nourishment from and re-actualize a conceptual value creation framework that 
dates back to the eighteenth century, while simultaneously undermining central 
preconditions on which this framework originally was established. Although this in 
no way entails the phenomenon of co-creation, including its various problem-
response constellations, being annulled, it nevertheless raises new and largely 
unresolved problems for proponents of the three traditions to the extent that they 
aspire to speak about value creation in a consistent manner. In this sense, co-
creation comes into view as a new concept through which value creation is 
 55 
 
problematized and re-articulated, but at the same time utilizing the concept of co-
creation also seems to undermine the very possibility of speaking consistently 
about value creation, when viewed against the backdrop of the central 
characteristics of the concepts’ preceding history. 
Moreover, the work undertaken in the dissertation is also a contribution to a 
history about how previously seminal conceptions of value creation and 
management, and the modes of knowledge supporting their formulation, have 
become crisis-ridden. By accounting for how an experience of the outside has 
come into view as something that has prescriptive effects and brings with it an 
obligation ‘to go outside’, the dissertation tells a history about how the organization 
as a self-contained locus of value creation and object of management has come to 
be viewed as something to be overcome and transgressed in various ways. Just as 
Foucault in 1979 spoke about how a prevalent ‘state-phobia’ was capable of uniting 
critics from left to right across the political spectrum (Foucault 2008: 76, see also 
2007a: 109), the historical problematization analysis set forth in the present 
dissertation in a like-minded way can be read as a history of the emergence of an 
‘organization-phobia’ that is currently widely disseminated and exemplarily 
expressed in contemporary co-creation accounts. By accounting for this history, 
the dissertation not merely contributes to and complements contemporary 
investigations into how the above mentioned state-phobia has reappeared in new 
and somewhat surprising ways within contemporary critical theories (Villadsen and 
Dean 2012), it also ties in with critiques of contemporary organization and social 
theories’ obsession with innovation, change and the denunciation of bureaucracies 
and formal organization (du Gay 2003, 2005; du Gay and Vikkelsø 2011, 2012). 
Whereas Villadsen and Dean (2012) revisit Foucault’s lectures from 1978 and 1979 
(Foucault 2007a, 2008) as a resource through which it becomes possible to explore 
and criticize how an anti-statist stance, in conjunction with a certain vitalism, has 
re-emerged today, the dissertation utilizes these same lectures as a resource to track 
how an experience of the outside, born in conjunction with a reformulated 
managementality, has come into view as a new, widely diffused normative 
injunction currently manifesting itself in forceful ways. It is also in light of this 
history that the dissertation aspires to contribute to du Gay (2003, 2005) and du 
Gay and Vikkelsø (2011, 2012) – not by taking a direct, oppositional stance against 
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various proponents of change, innovation, bottom-up organizing and critics of 
bureaucracy, but by accounting for a problematization history that partakes in and 
feeds into a context where such claims have become commonplace solutions and 
responses and, by extension, have emerged as something to be critically scrutinized 
and countered.  
Furthermore, the dissertation’s reconstruction and utilization of the historical 
problematization analysis, its utilization of Foucault’s history of governmentality 
and its unfolded history of managementality contribute at a more general level to 
studies of governmentality (Burchell 1991, Gordon 1991; Dean 1994, 1998, 1999, 
2003, 2011; Rose 1996, 1999a, 1999b) by making original use of material contained 
within Foucault’s lectures (2007a, 2008). In utilizing these lectures in new ways, 
however, the dissertation also contributes to already existing research within 
organization and management studies that has been inspired by and has relied upon 
material dealt with in Foucault’s lectures on governmentality (Brewis 1996; Clegg et 
al. 2002; Triantafillou 2003; Skälen et al. 2006; Dixon 2007; Zwick et al. 2008; 
Bonsu and Polsa 2011; Weiskopf and Munro 2011). The dissertation contributes to 
this reception and utilization of Foucault by constructing a specific history of 
managementality that, although intertwined with Foucault’s account, remains 
irreducible to a history of governmentality. Through the deployment of the notion 
of managementality, the dissertation insists on the centrality of Foucault’s work on 
governmentality for studies of organization and management, while at the same 
time showing how this work can be turned away from reflections and problems 
concerning the genealogy of the modern state and the rise of neoliberalism and 
instead turned more directly towards problems pertaining to management and 
organizations. 
 
In relation to the literature that has already provided a selection of historical 
accounts concerning the phenomenon of co-creation, the dissertation presents a 
number of more specific contributions which, although being mutually interrelated 
in various ways, for the sake of clarity are presented separately. First, whereas 
already existing historical accounts of co-creation have given weight to 
developments pertaining to the latter part of the twentieth century, this dissertation 
argues that the history of co-creation is more adequately viewed within a much 
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longer time-span, and with a particular emphasis on the first half of the twentieth 
century. While insightful and full of engaging and relevant material regarding 
developments in the second half of the twentieth century, already existing 
historically oriented accounts pertaining to the coming into being of co-creation 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; 
Arvidsson et al. 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Cova and Dalli 2009; Cova et al. 2011) 
nevertheless do not sufficiently appreciate the more encompassing historical 
trajectories through which co-creation  eventually began to take on the prevailing 
contours it has acquired today. This neglect is something they share with several of 
those who have followed Deleuze’s (1995a) description of a new form of post- or 
anti-disciplinary power emerging after WWII (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; 
Fleming and Spicer 2004; Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; Spicer 2010; Martinez 
2010), and several of those who have merely depicted co-creation as a 
predominantly contemporary phenomenon (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b; 
Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Vargo and Lusch 
2004, 2010; Lusch and Vargo 2006; Berthon et al. 2007; Rowley et al. 2007; Banks 
and Humphreys 2008; Bonsu and Darmody 2008; Humphreys and Grayson 2008; 
Payne et al. 2008; Spoher and Maglio 2008; Vargo et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 
2009; Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Helm and Jones 2010; Le Ber and Branzei 
2010; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b; Willmott 2010; Lusch and Webster 
2011). 
Second, and in continuation of the previous point, within all of the above 
mentioned accounts, it has not been sufficiently appreciated how central 
components of the co-creation vocabulary already begin to show up from the 
1920s to the 1940s as problems to which various solutions are proposed. The 
dissertation therefore contributes to the existent literature by pointing out how, 
from the 1930s, spontaneously formed social realities and communally based social 
values come to pose problems for management thought to which responses are 
made. It furthermore makes a contributution by pointing out how something 
outside established organizations, in the same period, also begins to come into view 
as a concern of overriding importance to which management thought responds by 
pointing out how this outside can be managed. Last but not least, the dissertation 
makes a contributution by showing how the concept of value creation, throughout 
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the 1920s and 1930s, begins to be reconceived along completely new lines, where it 
becomes dependent upon the creative impulse, the pleasure of activity itself, a 
continuous transgression of the already existing, and an increasingly depersonalized 
and socialized production of events. While the existent literature either ignores, 
overlooks, or alternatively ties together all of these characteristics with later 
developments pertaining to the second part of the twentieth century, the 
dissertation states that these significant transformations come into view and begin 
to interrelate much earlier than has been previously accounted for. Hence, whereas 
already existing accounts to a large extent presuppose that pre-1960s management 
thought had not yet “discovered the productivity of the social” (Arvidsson 2006: 
41) and should be seen as reducible to “Taylorist management” which seeks “to 
discipline an unruly labor force into adopting certain pre-programmed forms of 
behavior” (ibid.), from the perspective of the historical problematization analysis 
mobilized in this dissertation, it is rather in the first half of the twentieth century 
that a range of highly relevant preconditions for the emergence of co-creation 
come to the fore and begin to interrelate. 
Third, a further contribution from the work presented here is that its account 
of the history of co-creation neither relies upon a pre-existing moral schema that 
distributes good and bad from the outset (such as the multitude against Empire 
(Hardt and Negri 2000), nor true co-creation against corporate exploitation hereof 
(Lazzarato 2004)), nor sets forth or relies upon a grand ‘epochal transformation’ 
(such as one from disciplinary societies to control societies (Hardt and Negri 2000, 
Lazzarato 2004) with which the arrival of co-creation somehow should be 
intertwined. Instead, the history of co-creation presented here provides a historical 
account that attends to singular events of thought and local problem-response 
constellations, and at the same time aspires to do so from a perspective beyond 
good and evil. In opposition to already existing historical accounts coming out of 
Autonomist Marxism, this entails giving management thought a more formative 
role instead of being viewed as something predominantly reactive, that is, as 
something merely adapting to “the truly creative moment” brought about by the 
experiments in the 1960s (Hardt and Negri 2000: 276), and a herewith intertwined 
“new activation of civil society” (Arvidsson 2008: 327). Furthermore, since most of 
the critically oriented literature pertaining to the history of co-creation comes out 
 59 
 
of Autonomist Marxism (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Arvidsson 
2006, 2008, 2009) or is significantly influenced by this tradition (Zwick et al. 2008; 
Cova and Dalli 2009; Cova et al. 2011; for exceptions to this see Ramírez 1999; 
Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010), normative inclinations of the kind mentioned above, 
as well as ‘epochal theorizing’ such as that which diagnoses a transition from a 
disciplinary society to a society of control, also looms in the background here (for 
example Zwick et al. 2008). As should be clear, however, the problematization 
analysis pursued within the present dissertation does not entail a complete refusal 
of such normative propensities inherent in co-creation accounts or a reversal of 
their established hierarchies for that matter. It rather entails that such propensities 
are viewed as being intertwined with the particular ways in which their proponents 
aspire to have an impact on and shape the investigated phenomenon in specific 
ways.   
Fourth, the dissertation furthermore makes a contribution by providing a 
history of the emergence of co-creation that cuts across several disciplines 
(including economics, human relations and public relations), which brings diverse 
problem-response constellations together on the same level of analysis. Hence, it 
contributes to historically oriented studies of co-creation by attending to how 
central components of the co-creation vocabulary have been born out of a broad 
problematization history, encompassing more disciplines than has been previously 
accounted for. In spite of the fact that several accounts within the existent 
literature which inquires into the historical conditions of co-creation have been 
able to resist, to some extent, the normative inclination coloring Autonomist 
Marxist theories, and, consequently, have been able to account for a more active 
role played by management thought (Arvidsson 2006; Zwick et al. 2008; Cova and 
Dalli 2009), such accounts have nevertheless predominantly emphasized the 
changing role of the consumer within marketing, and thereby have not been able to 
appreciate sufficiently how co-creation was born out of a more complex pattern of 
trajectories in which the historical variables of management and value creation have come 
together in historically singular ways. Only by attending to these historical variables 
in conjunction and across a range of different disciplines, the dissertation claims, is 
it possible to provide an adequate historical account of the historical conditions of 
possibility through which co-creation has come to be born.  
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Exposition and outline of the argument  
Finally, it is with reference partly to the empirical material, the positioning and the 
contributions outlined above, and partly to a mode of inquiry organized in 
agreement with the historical problematization analysis, that the overall ambition of 
the present dissertation is broken down into two main objectives in accordance 
with the two sets of research questions posed above.  
The first objective is registering and taking stock of how co-creation has 
entered literature coming out of the traditions of Strategic Management Thought, 
Autonomist Marxism, and Critical Management Studies, and through this assess to 
what extent the arrival of co-creation brings with it a whole new mode of value 
creation. From the expositional point of view, this first objective, which is explored 
in Part One of the dissertation, is thus taken to correspond to the first set of 
research questions asking: How is it possible for co-creation to surface as a mutual 
concern with divergent inferences and prospects within the literature coming out 
of the three traditions mentioned? What exactly characterizes co-creation as a 
mode of value creation in order for this phenomenon to represent a mutually 
shared concern for exponents of these different traditions? And what kind of 
transformations and implications does the advent of a prevalent and transverse 
attention to co-creation seem to entail when seen in light of the history of seminal 
conceptions of value creation?   
The second objective, which is pursued in Part Two of the dissertation, 
concerns how co-creation, through a somewhat longer historical process, has come 
into being. Attending to the complex and wide-ranging historical trajectories 
through which co-creation has been born, this objective is therefore to be regarded 
as the expositional translation of the second set of research questions asking: How, 
why and in relation to what was it possible for co-creation to emerge as a specific 
mode of value creation which is currently the object of common but differing 
concerns? What kind of historical changes has been paving the way for the advent 
of co-creation as a common yet heterogeneous concern combining questions about 
value creation in general and the revaluation of the outside in particular? And how 
has the arrival of co-creation, discernibly merging the topic of the outside of 
organizations with value creation, been posing problems for the management of 
these matters?  
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As will become evident in the course of the dissertation, the two objectives 
are intended to be intimately intertwined, since pursuing the first opens the horizon 
through which pursuing the latter becomes possible. While both objectives are 
pursued through the historical problematization analysis, it can nevertheless, in 
relative accord with Foucault’s specifications (1992: 11-12), be stated that such a 
mode of inquiry entails an archeological as well as a genealogical analysis, 
respectively informing the first and the second objective being pursued. More 
precisely, in the present interpretation the archeological analysis charts how the 
concept of co-creation gradually made its entrance as a concept through which 
value creation began to be criticized and re-articulated, while the genealogical 
analysis maps the longer historical trajectories through which the components 
inherent in co-creation, as identified in the archeological analysis, gradually have 
surfaced, have been transformed, and, eventually have come together. Moreover, it 
is in accordance with this interpretation that the final subsections of the 
introduction will specify how the dissertation pursues the two objectives and what 
following them holds in store, with the intention of providing a general outline of 
arguments presented by the dissertation as well.      
 
First objective: An archeological analysis of the problematization of value creation through co-creation 
Whereas widespread agreement persists that value today is co-created, and that this 
renders previously dominant concepts of value creation inadequate, the historical 
grounds on which such claims are advanced vary enormously. While thinkers 
coming out of Strategic Management Thought develop this insight by 
problematizing the “firm-centric view of the world” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
2004c: 8) and, in particular, Michael Porter’s (2004) value creation framework 
(Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b, 1994), thinkers coming out of Autonomist 
Marxism and Critical Management Studies view this in conjunction with a deeper 
transformation of capitalism that needs to be grasped by either re-actualizing, 
updating, or overturning Marx’s ([1867] 1990) thought (Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Maurizio Lazzarato 2004, 2005; Adam Arvidsson 2008, 
2009, 2010; Arvidson et al. 2008; Humphreys and Grayson 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; 
Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 2010). Therefore, the different theoretical 
traditions utilize co-creation as a concept through which previous understandings 
 62 
 
of value creation can be problematized, but the way in which they do so is 
determined by different theoretical lineages and gives scarce attention, if any at all, 
to work undertaken in the ‘opposing camp’.  
This dissertation proposes another route. By pursuing its first objective, it 
strives to set forward a history that not merely accounts for how value creation is 
problematized within and across these different theoretical traditions, but it also 
strives to grasp the common ground that nourishes them in their - at first sight - 
radically conflicting accounts. By way of resituating the contemporary 
problematizations of value creation in a history that stretches from political 
economy, to economics, and on to today, the dissertation opens a longer and wider 
history that weaves thinkers from Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist 
Marxism, and Critical Management Studies together. Through attending to this 
history the dissertation excavates a number of particular findings.  
First, across these traditions value creation is viewed as deriving from some 
kind of productive activity. Hence, in spite of their different theoretical outlooks, in 
spite of their conflicting conceptualizations, thinkers across Strategic Management 
Thought, Autonomist Marxism, and Critical Management Studies can be seen to 
re-actualize a conceptual framework that dates back to the classical economists. 
While this framework informed the value creation concepts set forth by Quesnay 
([1758], 1973), Smith ([1776], 1999), Ricardo ([1817], 2010), and Marx ([1867], 
1990), it was displaced, with the coming into being of the Marginalist Revolution in 
the 1870s, by a new understanding according to which value became 
conceptualized as being created in exchange (Mirowski 1989). The dissertation 
inquires into how the concept of value creation, after this transformation, on the 
one hand disappeared from mainstream economics, but, on the other hand, 
somewhat later, came to be taken up as one of the most central concepts within 
Strategic Management Thought. Through this history, a more encompassing 
trajectory is located lurking behind otherwise conflicting contemporary accounts. 
The dissertation shows how value creation came into view as a central problem in 
political economy, how it was radically transformed in the 1870s, and how thinkers 
today coming out of Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and 
Critical Management Studies problematize it through the concept of co-creation in 
a way that descends from this long history. 
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Second, the dissertation shows how contemporary problematizations of value 
creation across Strategic Management Thought, Autonomist Marxism and Critical 
Management Studies have come to utilize a specific co-creation vocabulary, regarded as 
the constellation or pattern of components characterized by a family resemblance 
that recurrently seems to show up and inform otherwise heterogeneous accounts. 
The arrival of this vocabulary is first attended to within Strategic Management 
Thought and, afterwards, within Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management 
Studies. By way of following this double trail, the dissertation shows how these 
traditions in their respective ways have come to rely upon this co-creation 
vocabulary as a vocabulary through which value creation is problematized. This 
vocabulary is made up of four components and it is flexible enough to be utilized 
in the pursuit of largely conflicting political and economic goals.  
After having attended to the ways in which the respective traditions utilize 
this vocabulary, the dissertation, with inspiration from Foucault’s (1992: 26-27) 
delineation of the different categories identified as important for the study of the 
practices of ethical self-formation in relation to the codes of sexual morals in 
Antiquity, brings the different accounts together by way of showing how they 
problematize the locus of value creation, the attributes of the processes that lead to 
value creation, the primary activity through which value is created, and the substrate on 
which value is created. With these problematizations (a) the locus of value creation 
increasingly shifts from inside the organization towards its outside. This is the most 
important transformation. (b) The attributes of the processes leading to value 
creation shift from passive, calculable, and easily manipulated, to spontaneously self-forming. 
(c) The primary activity through which value is created shifts from managerially planned 
activities or labor to innovation and events. And (d) the substrate on which value is created 
shifts from the material and directly visible to the immateriality of knowledge, language and 
sociality. By attending to this vocabulary, and to the changes induced by its 
occurrence, the dissertation discloses a pattern that though easily overlooked brings 
otherwise dissimilar accounts together in ways that are productive for the further 
study of the phenomenon of co-creation.  
Having accounted for these changes, the dissertation proposes that they give 
rise to the formation of a particular and widely shared experience, an experience of the 
outside as a source of value creation, an experience which is expressed through the 
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components making up the co-creation vocabulary. This experience is what 
nourishes the different accounts, it is the common ground that at one and the same 
time holds them together and allows for their - at first sight - irreconcilable 
diversity. At the same time, however, the formation of this experience has 
detrimental effects on the possibility of conceptualizing a consistent concept of 
value creation. This is because, with the formation of this experience, the 
respective traditions’ re-actualization of the classical economist’s value creation 
framework simultaneously becomes undermined. By way of problematizing value 
creation through the co-creation vocabulary, the concept of value creation is so 
radically transformed that its former central characteristics are completely 
evacuated. The dissertation therefore considers what implications this has for the 
respective traditions. By way of doing so, it is suggested that while the formation of 
the experience of the outside as a source of value creation constitutes an important 
contemporary occurrence, its arrival, on the other hand, simultaneously 
undermines the possibility of formulating a consistent concept of value creation.  
Lastly, this history, which marks the end of Part One and of the first objective 
pursued, is distributed into three chapters only to be roughly sketched out here:  
Chapter one charts the historical foundation upon which contemporary 
conceptualizations of value creation depend.  It shows how value went from being 
created in some kind of productive activity to becoming created in exchange. 
Through this history it is shown how two fundamental yet incompatible ways of 
conceptualizing value creation have emerged.   
Chapter two states that value creation within Strategic Management Thought 
today has come to be problematized through the concept of co-creation, and 
through an associated co-creation vocabulary. The chapter shows that this 
contemporary occurrence is to be seen in light of the way in which Michael 
Porter’s value chain-framework has been problematized, and that central works 
within this tradition have provided important preconditions for the formation of 
the co-creation vocabulary.  
Chapter three shows how central components of the co-creation vocabulary 
have surfaced within the works of thinkers coming out of Autonomist Marxism 
and Critical Management Studies. It then states that the way in which value 
creation is problematized across these traditions and Strategic Management 
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Thought gives rise to the formation of an experience of the outside as a source of 
value creation. However, the problematizations through which this experience is 
formed have detrimental implications for the possibility of formulating a consistent 
concept of value creation, since they undermine the grounds upon which such a 
conceptualization had been dependent previously. This marks the end of Part One 
of the dissertation. 
 
Second objective: A genealogical analysis of the birth of co-creation  
Following the archeological analysis of the simultaneity of different traditions in 
their problematization of value-creation through co-creation, the dissertation turns 
to the second objective which is the genealogical analysis of the historical 
trajectories through which co-creation has been born. By way of pursuing this 
objective, the dissertation launches an exploration that cuts across already existing 
accounts of co-creation.  
Whereas already existing historical accounts of co-creation have restricted 
their analysis to occurrences pertaining to the latter part of the twentieth century 
(Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; 
Zwick et al. 2008; Cova and Dalli 2009; Cova et al. 2011; for exceptions to this see 
Ramírez 1999; Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010), the dissertation locates a history that 
reaches considerably beyond this time frame. It does this in two steps. First, it 
locates a small text by Gilles Deleuze (1995a) that has served as a direct or indirect 
guide for several of the already existing historical accounts of co-creation. By way 
of criticizing central postulates within Deleuze’s text, the dissertation proposes to 
cast a historical investigation of co-creation within a longer time frame. Second, by 
way of this operation, the dissertation opens a historical perspective in which a 
genealogy of co-creation can be undertaken. This genealogy is constructed as an 
investigation into the historical trajectories through which the components of the 
co-creation vocabulary, as identified in Part One, have surfaced, been modified, 
and come together.  
In opening up this route, Michel Foucault’s (2007a, 2008) Collège de France 
lectures from 1978 and 1979 are utilized extensively. Through exploring these 
lectures, the dissertation shows how the components of the co-creation vocabulary 
have to be grasped within a history that reaches significantly beyond the second 
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half of the twentieth century. The dissertation traces this genealogy as a history that 
spans from the political “government of men [sic]” (Foucault 2008: 2) in the 
eighteenth century to the management of people in the twentieth century. More 
precisely, this history is constructed as an exploration that crosses from Foucault’s 
history of governmentality to an associated, but nevertheless irreducible, history of 
mangementality.  
By way of accounting for three specific problematizations within this latter 
history, the dissertation exhibits how the components of the co-creation 
vocabulary, from the 1920s to the 1940s, show up as problems to which responses 
are made. Through these problematizations, something outside the organization 
comes into view as new and interesting objects to which management must attend.  
Through these problematizations, spontaneously self-forming processes that flow from 
inside the organization to its outside are also discovered. Through these 
problematizations, value creation comes to be rearticulated as dependent upon 
innovation, and an increasingly depersonalized, socialized production of events. And through 
these problematizations a new immaterial and hitherto overlooked social reality 
comes into view as central for the organization of production. By accounting for 
this history, it is shown how these problematizations not only constitute central 
historical preconditions through which co-creation comes to be born; these 
problematizations at the same time give rise to a reformulated managementality, a 
managementality through which an experience of the outside comes into view, an 
experience of the outside as a source of value creation and an object of 
management.  
Accordingly while Part One locates the arrival of the co-creation vocabulary 
within and across the traditions surveyed, Part Two explores the historical 
trajectories through which the components of this vocabulary have been born out 
of a history that ventures considerably beyond these traditions. More precisely, this 
second objective is pursued in the following three chapters:   
Chapter four criticizes the grounds upon which previously dominant historical 
accounts of co-creation have been set forth. It locates a small text by Gilles 
Deleuze that has served as a direct or indirect source of reference for several 
thinkers inquiring into the historical trajectories of co-creation. Through criticizing 
central postulates within Deleuze’s text, the chapter brings Michel Foucault’s 
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lectures from 1978 and 1979 into view as an alternative point of departure. On 
these grounds the chapter makes two claims. First, these lectures can serve as an 
alternative point of departure for a history of co-creation. Second, while Foucault’s 
thought has figured prominently within organization and management studies, the 
content of these lectures has not yet been sufficiently appreciated.  
Chapter five states that while Foucault’s lectures on governmentality do not 
explore co-creation, they nevertheless attend to historical trajectories through 
which central components that will later come together in the co-creation 
vocabulary emerge. In addition to showing how Foucault’s lectures surface 
problems of how to manage events and spontaneously forming processes outside 
disciplinary enclosures, the chapter argues that Foucault’s history can be tied in 
with a history of managementality, a history which is intimately intertwined with a 
history of governmentality, but which is nevertheless irreducible to this.  
Chapter six finally shows how a managementality grounded on engineering-
based management thought and neo-classical economics comes into being from 
the late nineteenth century. However, this managementality is challenged from the 
1920s to the 1940s and re-articulated through three problematizations. Through 
these, it is stated, co-creation eventually came to be born. By way of attending to 
this history, the chapter additionally presents how a more encompassing experience 
of the outside  has also come into being, not merely as a source of value creation 
and an object of management, but also as an obligation that has to be met, and an 
activity that has to be undertaken: that is, ‘to go outside’. This injunction, the 
chapter claims, has been accentuated throughout the twentieth century and is 
forcefully expressed today through the co-creation vocabulary.  
 
By pursuing these two main objectives, the dissertation not only tells a history of 
how co-creation has come into being and what consequences the arrival of co-
creation has for the concept of value creation. It also tells a history at a more 
comprehensive level; it tells the history of how the birth of the experience of the 
outside gradually comes to have a more encompassing and binding character. It 
tells the history of how a managementality, founded on enclosing, on exorcising 
the outside, on actualizing an already existing potential, gradually establishes 
relations to something outside. It tells the history of how management thought 
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discovers the productivity of events, how management thought problematizes 
previous modes of knowledge, how it comes to rely upon a new temporality, how 
it comes to rely upon the crossing of spatial borders, and discovers new and 
exciting detours to be taken in the pursuit of management goals and the creation of 
value. At this more comprehensive level, the dissertation tells a history of how the 
outside - which at first sight appears to be merely one component in the co-
creation vocabulary - comes into view not merely as a source of value creation and 
an object of management, but also as an obligation that has to be met and an activity 
that has to be undertaken. That is ‘to go outside’, to cross organizational borders, 
to rely upon a self-forming spontaneous sociality, to navigate the temporal and 
uncertain, to produce events, and to transgress the already existing in a way that 
creates value.  
At this somewhat more abstract level, the birth of the experience of the 
outside is therefore also a history about how the outside has come to appear as a 
challenge that thinkers within organization and management thought recurrently 
have encountered throughout the twentieth century; that is, as a persistent, 
recurring and accentuated challenge to which various sorts of responses have been 
made. Through encountering this experience, organization and management 
studies have come to abandon, gradually, and through a long historical process, the 
place from which this outside initially came into view as a source, object and 
concern to be taken into account. Through this history, the organization as a 
demarcated entity, as a demarcated inside, has been problematized to such an 
extent that it seems to have been turned inside out, not as an empirical fact, but as 
an accentuated normative injunction that throughout the twentieth century has 
been set forth within management thought, and through which organizations have 
been advised ‘to go outside’.  
Viewed in light of this history, co-creation comes to appear quite differently 
from the way in which it is set forth within contemporary accounts. It appears not 
merely as a new win-win mode of value creation, or as a new biopolitical mode of 
value creation. Nor does it first and foremost appear as a new mode of value 
creation tied to novel modes of management that have discovered just recently the 
productivity of the social. It rather appears as a concept and an associated 
vocabulary flexible enough to be utilized in the pursuit of radically conflicting 
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political goals: a vocabulary that has come into being through a long 
problematization history; a vocabulary intimately interwoven with a reformulated 
managmentality; a managementality with which an experience of the outside has 
been born; an experience which today is expressed forcefully through the co-
creation vocabulary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part One 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Value and value creation 
within political economy and economics 
 
 
“[F]rom no source do so many errors, and so much 
difference of opinion (…) proceed, as from the vague 
ideas which are attached to the word value.” 
David Ricardo ([1817] 2010: 4) 
The tricky concept of value 
Within the discipline of economics the concept of value has a fundamental, yet also 
highly ambivalent, position. On the one hand, it is clearly one of the central and 
defining concepts which holds economics together, and has done so since its 
inception and formation as a gradually emerging discipline in the eighteenth 
century. From the classical economists and onwards, one might even characterize 
the discipline of economics as being that which revolves around and seeks to give 
an account of the complexities of and mutual relations between the production, 
circulation, and consumption of value (Mirowski 1989). Owing to this, it is not 
surprising that the central figures of political economy, Adam Smith ([1776] 1999), 
David Ricardo ([1817] 2010), and Karl Marx ([1867] 1990), all accorded passages 
on value a central place in the very opening of their works. On the other hand, this 
stands in sharp contrast to the situation within which economics finds itself today. 
Here the concept of value has totally fallen out of use (Mirowski 1989: 2, 141), or 
at least been marginalized to the extent of being an unimportant, and even 
metaphysical (Robinson 1962), problem. In the textbooks with which first-year 
students today are introduced to the discipline of economics, it is therefore not 
uncommon to totally neglect elaborations and considerations hereof (Frank 1997; 
Krugman and Wells 2009). Here, economics is not defined as a science 
preoccupied with the creation, distribution, and consumption of value, but as the 
study of “how people choose under conditions of scarcity” (Frank 1997: 3). This 
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lack of attention to what used to be the economic concept par excellence is not 
merely visible from the relative lack of mention in the opening paragraphs of most 
contemporary works on economics, but also becomes painfully apparent when one 
turns to the index of the textbook just cited. Here one finds entries on ‘anabolic 
steroids,’ ‘Allen, Woody,’ ‘safe harbor in a storm,’ and ‘elite universities,’ but not a 
single separate entry on ‘value.’ 
Interestingly enough, this historical decline and current disregard of 
considerations pertaining to value within mainstream economics has been 
accompanied by an intensification of the way in which references are made to the 
concept of value within several of the neighboring and more practically oriented 
approaches – not least within the broad and highly diversified field of management 
thought. Thus, when one looks for instance across the area of strategic 
management (see for example Bowman and Ambrosini 2000; Porter 2004; Lepak et 
al. 2007; Foss and Stieglitz 2010), or to the theoretical frameworks of financial 
decision-making (see for example Koller et al. 2005; Wooley 2009), one detects a 
prevalent and recurring preoccupation with value that manifests itself in fine-
masked and highly specialized approaches that take into account what value is, how 
it is measured and created and how it should be organized and calculated, as well as 
how one ought to protect it in relation to actual or potential competitors. This is all 
the more interesting since several of these approaches – implicitly or explicitly – 
see themselves as being in continuation of and building upon the insights of 
economic theory (Pitelis 2009: xxxi). This of course creates some expositional 
difficulties, since a reference to economic-managerial conceptualizations of value 
and value creation as such becomes highly speculative and unpersuasive given the 
abovementioned differing tendencies with which the discipline of mainstream 
economics and the more practically oriented disciplines within management 
thought relate to (or, in the case of the former, abstains from) a direct 
confrontation with the problem of value and value creation.  
This chapter will map some important conceptual shifts within the history of 
political economy and economics. Attending to this history is intended to achieve 
two things. First and foremost, it provides a short overview of the historical 
emergence of the concept of value creation that figures prominently in the next 
couple of chapters. By way of situating the concept of value creation within the 
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wider historical trajectories through which value as such has been discussed, the 
chapter excavates conceptual layers that still resurface within contemporary 
discussions on value creation that is taken up in chapters two and three. While 
several contemporary conceptualizations present themselves as if they have left 
former approaches behind, their value creation concepts nevertheless reactivate 
and remain indebted to former conceptualizations. Hence, only by attending to the 
wider history of value and its creation, does it become possible to take stock of the 
complex continuity-discontinuity problem between former and contemporary 
conceptualizations of value creation. Second, besides providing an indispensable 
background for chapters two and three, furthermore this chapter provides an 
important and wide stretching thread that is weaved together with the genealogy of 
co-creation undertaken in Part Two of the dissertation. As becomes evident in 
chapters five and six, the history of value and its creation ties in with the history of 
managementality, which is also addressed in these later chapters.  
Following these clarifications, it is now possible to turn to some of the central 
conceptual shifts within the history of value and value creation, as these have been 
articulated within political economy and, later, economics.1 More precisely, firstly 
we follow the concept of value and see how it gradually crystallizes in a relatively 
stable substance conception of value. This conception largely remains unchallenged 
from François Quesnay to Adam Smith and David Ricardo and on to Karl Marx’s 
critique of political economy. In spite of disagreeing about what actually constitutes 
the substance and source of value, all of these authors conceptualize value in 
accordance with a framework according to which value is created in production, 
                                            
1 Since the historical transformations of the concept of value and value creation have already 
been covered within the history of economic thought, it is worth noting that this chapter 
draws on already existing accounts. In addition to Karl Pribram’s (1983) classic, 
posthumously published book as well as the work of Jürg Niehans (1990), Henry W. Spiegel 
(1991), and Margaret Schabas (2005), this chapter in particular draws on Philip Mirowski’s 
(1989) More Heat than Light. While an indispensable part of Mirowski’s story is tied up with the 
development of the energy concept within physics and the way this set the stage for 
theoretical groundwork within economics, this chapter predominantly employs Mirowski’s 
work because it covers the changing historical conceptions of value and value creation in a 
highly comprehensive manner, and with reference to a vast amount of literature. 
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preserved in exchange, and diminished or destroyed in consumption (Mirowski 
1989: 143). After attending to the continuities and discontinuities within eighteenth 
and nineteenth century political economy, we see how this shared understanding of 
value and value creation enters into a crisis with the emergence of the marginalist 
revolution in the 1870’s. From here on, value, to the extent that it remains in use, is 
viewed as being created in exchange, and production is henceforth stripped of all its 
former prerogatives. This transformation crucially hinges upon the way in which 
the discipline of economics begins to model itself by appropriating the terminology 
of mid-nineteenth century physics.  
Value and value creation within political economy 
Though economists usually refer to the year of 1776 as the year in which 
economics was born as a separate and autonomous discipline, it is important to 
note that Adam Smith did not himself regard The Wealth of Nations as such a 
founding text. Rather, the political economy to which Smith made his contribution 
was considered “as a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator” which 
consisted of “two distinct objects: first to provide a plentiful revenue or 
subsistence for the people (…); and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth 
with a revenue sufficient for the public services” (Smith 1999, book IV: 5; Pribram 
1983: 126). Owing to this, Smith’s contribution can be seen as a continuation of 
several works preceding his own (Quesnay [1758] 1973), just as much as it can be 
seen as pointing out new directions which were eventually to lead to the formation 
of economics as an increasingly autonomous field of study. However, in order to 
assess Smith’s contribution and especially the way in which he contributed to the 
conceptualization of value, it might be useful firstly to sketch some of the notions 
of value preceding his work.  
Up until the middle of the eighteenth century, several works had already been 
published which had treated the problem of the nature and sources of value. 
Aristotle had touched upon the issue already by way of the separation he drew 
between the self-sufficiency of the oikos on the one hand, and trade on the other. 
While the former had its distinct mode of ordering and hierarchy, the latter led to 
the problem of equalizing the unequal in the process of exchange (Dooley 2005: 7), 
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just as it raised the issue of which kinds of exchange were justifiable and in 
accordance with the natural needs of the household (Aristotle [fourth century BC] 
1981: 84-87). While the question of the justifiability of market transactions, 
especially those undertaken with the aim of acquiring money, became a huge 
problematic throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the problem of finding 
some measure which would permit an equalization of qualitatively heterogeneous 
objects, was one of the early forerunners of later discussions regarding how value 
should be conceptualized and measured. According to Aristotle, money not merely 
performs the role of measuring the unequal, but also acts as a store of value 
(Dooley 2005: 6). Though being central in this regard, money, however, is viewed 
as a purely conventional, and hence unnatural, medium according to which trade 
can be facilitated (Aristotle 1981: 82-83) and since it is of a conventional nature, the 
value represented by money cannot exhibit a law-like nature. For Aristotle, just as 
for later heirs of his thought, value is thus not a strict quantitative - but rather a 
qualitative - concept, reflecting the fact that it is inseparable from the wider and 
more primary concerns of the appropriateness of social and political relations 
within and in accordance with which its proper function is determined. Thus, as 
“long as the market was a subsidiary support for the organization of livelihood, it 
was the more qualitative connotation of value that predominated in Western 
thought” (Mirowski 1989: 146). 
The concept of value underwent important changes in the transition from 
Aristotle and the medieval philosophers to the mercantilist writers. This latter 
group first and foremost became recognizable as a coherent collective of authors 
due to the way in which they were presented and criticized by Adam Smith (for an 
overview of the various usages of the term ‘mercantilist,’ see Pribram 1983: 36). 
This heterogeneous group was a scattered collection of merchants, hired 
propagandists, pamphleteers, and administrators writing from the middle of the 
sixteenth century to, approximately, the middle of the eighteenth century. In their 
writings, they pursued a range of different and only partly overlapping agendas. In 
spite of the debatable legitimacy of grouping them together under the term 
mercantilism, important changes regarding the conceptualization of value 
nevertheless occurred in this “proto-economic literature,” as Mirowski (1989: 147) 
calls it. For one thing, the qualitative understanding of value became ever more 
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quantitative and substantial in nature due to those writers favoring a balance-of-
trade perspective on how the state was to enrich itself in competition with foreign 
states. In conjunction with this a new agenda emerged which centered on 
accumulating as many precious metals as possible, since these were viewed as the 
only way in which states could enrich themselves, i.e. as the only possible way in 
which value could be augmented for the nation. Due to this, foreign trade “was 
regarded as a kind of hidden warfare waged over the possession of monetary 
metals, and the connection between the acquisition of these metals and political 
considerations was reflected in various, often repeated phrases to the effect that 
money was the ‘nerves of the state,’ the ‘sinews of war,’ and the like” (Pribram 
1983: 46). By way of this transformation money went from being a purely 
conventionally established store and measure of value, to being an objective 
yardstick according to which the strength and political maneuverability of the 
respective countries could be determined in relation to one another. The more 
precious metals the country could accumulate, the richer and stronger it was. This 
way of viewing value entailed a rigorous competition between the European states, 
since it implied a zero-sum game, where the gain of some by necessity entailed the 
loss of others. According to Spiegel (1991: 171), the underlying principle guiding 
mercantilist policies was therefore most prominently expressed by one of 
Montaigne’s essays entitled: “the advantage of one is the damage of the other.”  
By way of promoting the balance-of-trade agenda and the associated 
understanding of value as a substance incarnated in precious metals, the 
mercantilist writers paved the way for later developments in the conceptualization 
of value, as these were to develop throughout the latter course of the eighteenth 
century. However, while this tendency to favor a balance-of-trade perspective 
remained strong among the mercantilist writers, it was developing in parallel to the 
works of Nicholas Barbon, John Houghton, and William Petty who held largely 
opposing views, especially regarding the restrictions which should regulate trade. 
This “free-trade school”, as Mirowski (1989: 150) calls it, was highly critical of 
views in favor of tying value to money and the balance-of-trade agenda. While on 
the one hand aspiring to natural philosophy and stressing rigorous quantification, 
the grounding of the free-trade school was on the other hand undermining its 
scientific aspirations, since the principle they refuted was not replaced by a 
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functionally equivalent principle according to which this school would be able to 
measure or prove that free trade would lead to improvements in national wealth. In 
other words, “when the free-trade mercantilists denied that money was a central 
value substance, they went so far as to deny the need for any value principle at all” 
(Mirowski 1989: 151).  
 
The Physiocrats 
Though various attempts were made at combining the different doctrines of the 
mercantilist writers, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that a 
free-trade perspective was successfully merged with the principle of a stable value 
substance. This happened within the thought of the Physiocrats, and especially in 
the writings of their most central figure, François Quesnay.  
Quesnay denounced the mercantilist writers who had equated value with 
money. Money, according to Quesnay, was “the idol of nations unacquainted with 
the genuine principles of political economy” (Quesnay 1973: 61). Accordingly, he 
wanted to “strip money of all the properties attributed to it by prejudice; for they 
are altogether imaginary” (Quesnay 1973: 145-6). This, however, was not because 
money was not useful in several different ways. Rather, it was merely to stress that 
money be given a less prominent and more derivative place than had hitherto been 
the case. Thus, from having been conceived central, money was now viewed as 
something that under specific circumstances played a supportive role in enhancing 
the wealth of the nation. But at the same time it merely reflected and stood in a 
subordinate relation to another value substance which made it possible for 
Quesnay to combine free trade with a substance conception of value. This latter, 
and far more important thing, was according to Quesnay “blé, best translated as 
‘corn’ or ‘wheat’” (Mirowski 1989: 154). 
This blé was essentially the product of the earth. As a result of this, the 
prominence previously accorded to the merchant, now shifted towards “the 
husbandman” who, as part of the productive class, constituted the true source of 
wealth (Quesnay 1973: 5). All the riches of the nation could therefore essentially be 
located back to this source and the way in which this wealth was circulated and 
augmented was dependent upon the production undertaken in the agricultural 
sector, and the way in which the outcome of this subsequently circulated between 
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the three classes making up society, i.e. the productive class consisting of farmers, the 
proprietary class consisting of landlords, and the sterile class consisting of merchants 
and manufactures. In what Niehans (1990: 39) describes as “the most celebrated 
single page in the history of economics” Quesnay set forth his Tableau Économique 
which graphically and quantitatively depicts the annual circulation and 
consumption of the value substance and the way its unhindered flow is a 
precondition for establishing the wealth of the nation.  
 
 
 
Quesnay’s (1973: vi) Tableau Économique  
 
Though later ridiculed by Adam Smith and other economists for stressing 
agriculture as the only productive sector of the economy, Quesnay’s Tableau is 
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important, because it can be seen as “the purest instance of the classical substance 
theory of value” (Mirowski 1989: 155), that is, the theory of value which makes up 
the underlying and recurring epistemological structure of all classical political 
economy. While the underlying substance did change, as we will come to see 
below, the analytical framework, based on the creation of a value substance in production, 
its conservation in the process of circulation, and its destruction or diminishment 
in consumption, remained intact for a little more than a century (Mirowski 1989: 
143).  
Since the Tableau can be seen as one of the foremost and most clearly spelled 
out instances of the substance theory of value, it is worth noting that an important 
source of inspiration for its construction came from principles Quesnay had 
previously set forth within his medical theories (Mirowski 1989: 155). Though a 
latecomer to political economy – Quesnay was over sixty when he first began 
writing on the subject – he was already an experienced surgeon who had previously 
written on medical subjects like bleeding and fevers (Niehans 1990: 39). Pertaining 
to the subject of bleeding, he had acquired considerable fame due to his 
involvement in and victorious exit from a controversy in 1730, where he had 
proved Jean Baptista Silva’s theory wrong. The latter had set forward the claim that 
“blood would rush away from a wound faster than it would flow toward it when a 
vein was opened”. The implication being “that the surgeon should locate the 
incisions conditional upon the specific malady being treated”. By way of setting up 
experiments with tubes and pumps, however, Quesnay proved this theory wrong 
and instead suggested that “incisions could be administered anywhere that was 
convenient for the surgeon and the patient” (Mirowski 1989: 155). Drawing on the 
research of Vernard Foley (1976), Mirowski (1989: 155-6) states that Quesnay’s 
view of the body as a machine and the “coronary system” as reducible to a “pump 
and some tubes” not only shows the Cartesian influence at work in relation to 
Quesnay’s experimental setup. More importantly, we see here the formation of the 
model which Quesnay would put to use in depicting the circulation of the value 
substance within the Tableau.  
Overall, Quesnay’s contribution was significant. Informed by his earlier 
writings on medical subjects, he substituted for “that trivial science, which has no 
other object but the cash and finances of a kingdom” (Quesnay 1973: 94) what he 
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himself regarded as a true economical science consisting in “the science of 
economical government of a kingdom” (Ibid: 5, 94). By way of identifying blé as the 
value that circulated and gave nourishment to the body of the state, Quesnay had 
not merely combined the notion of a clearly defined value substance with the 
principle of free trade, but also paved the way for viewing the economy as a sphere 
exhibiting the regularities of nature. Indeed, through this re-conceptualization of 
value “all the major themes of the classical theory of value fell into place. The 
natural law of society was reduced to physical law in form and content” (Mirowski 
1989: 158). Seen within a larger picture, Quesnay’s thought regarding this can be 
viewed as being in line with the prevailing assumption of the later part of the 
eighteenth century where it became commonplace to view political economy as 
pertaining to the same reality as that dealt with within natural philosophy (Schabas 
2005: 2). In conjunction with this, political economy was portrayed as intimately 
connected with nature. This is also the reason why Quesnay (1973: 5) spoke about 
political economy as “that great physical science of this earthly globe”, just as it is 
the reason why he criticized former attempts at laying out the principles of political 
economy as not taking cognizance of “the great advantages we might expect from a 
more regular conduct which nature never refuses to those, who allow things to 
follow her direction” (Quesnay 1973: 2). We return to Quesnay and the problem of 
government in accordance with nature in chapter five. For now, however, it is 
enough to take stock of Quesnay’s problematizations of value and its creation. 
 
Adam Smith 
Quesnay’s understanding of value and the wider conceptual network within which 
this was formulated was extended and elaborated by Adam Smith, who, however, 
also denounced important aspects of Quesnay’s work. On the one hand, Smith 
gave credit to Quesnay for having written “perhaps the nearest approximation to 
the truth that has yet been written upon the subject of political economy” (Smith 
1999, Book IV: 264), and Smith had furthermore planned to dedicate The Wealth of 
Nations to Quesnay (Heilbroner 2000: 49). On the other hand, he also criticized 
Quesnay’s system for serious shortcomings – not least the “capital error” by way of 
which it represented “the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants as 
altogether barren and unproductive” (Smith 1999, Book IV: 260).  
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While controversy reigns regarding the extent of Quesnay’s and the 
Physiocrats’ influence on Smith’s writings (cf. Dobb 1973: 41-2, 56; Heilbroner 
2000: 51; Schumpeter 1986: 183-4; Winch 1996: 35), what is important for the 
purpose of this chapter is not so much the originality of Smith’s ideas and the way 
these measure up with, add to, or totally overcome the problems encountered by 
earlier writers, but rather the conceptual continuity and development the concept 
of value underwent. In relation to this there are two problems that are focused 
upon. First, the discussions on value in the opening chapters of Book I of The 
Wealth of Nations that have roamed largely in the secondary literature and on behalf 
of which a clear discontinuity can be detected in relation to earlier writers. Second, 
the less noted continuity by way of which Smith’s notion of ‘stock’ performs an 
equivalent function to that of ‘blé’ in Quesnay’s Tableau (Mirowski 1989: 166-9).  
Regarding the first, that is, the explicit discussions on value, Smith (1999, 
Book I: 131-2) formulated the water-diamond paradox at the end of chapter four 
of Book I: according to this, objects that are highly useful often have little or no 
monetary value, just as objects that are really expensive often have no use value. 
Water is an example of the former, while diamonds are an example of the latter. In 
order to excavate this problem further, Smith pointed to the fact that the notion of 
value “has two different meanings”: one is called “value in use”, and relates to the 
usefulness of the item for the one who uses it, while the other is called “value in 
exchange” and refers to “the power of purchasing other goods which the 
possession of that object conveys.” On behalf of this double meaning of value, 
Smith hereafter set out (in chapters five, six and seven) to investigate the measure 
of value in exchange, and the parts that enter into the composition of this. 
According to Smith (1999, Book I: 133), labor is “the real measure of all 
exchangeable value”. As such, labor is not merely a historically determined 
yardstick through which the ratio of exchange between different commodities can 
be established, it is also a measure of the value of commodities across centuries 
(ibid: 139-40). In stating this, Smith not only distanced himself from the 
mercantilist writers, who held precious metals as the source of value, but also from 
the physiocratic conception of corn as being the only source of value. “[I]n 
describing the industrial sector as performing only a sterile manipulation,” 
Quesnay’s system “failed to see that labor could produce wealth wherever it 
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performed, not just on land. To see that labor, not nature, was the source of 
‘value,’ was one of smith’s greatest insights” (Heilbroner 2000: 49). 
As long as human beings lived in a primitive state, labor was the only factor 
which could be a source of value. With the advent of civilization, however, stock is 
accumulated just as private property is introduced. This gives rise to a new situation 
in which exchange value is no longer determined by the amount of labor that has 
gone into the production of a given commodity, but by the rent and profit which a 
landlord, on the one hand, and an undertaker, on the other, can now claim. Smith 
(1999, Book I: 155) was therefore able to claim that “wages, profit, and rent, are 
the three original sources of (…) all exchangeable value.”  
While these outlines and specifications of value left a huge imprint, attracted 
criticism and gave rise to many discussions later on (cf. Dobb 1973: 49), a shift 
occurring later in Smith’s work marks a continuation on another level, than that 
signaled in the early chapters of The Wealth of Nations. On the one hand, then, we 
are given an explicit account and refutation of the mercantilist and physiocratic 
conception of value. But if we stop the investigation of value here, then we would 
on the other hand fail to notice an underlying and important tendency at work in 
Smith’s book which on a deeper level exhibits a continuity of the principles that 
inform the doctrines of the writers whom he criticizes. In delving into this issue, 
Mirowski (1989: 166-7) states that the opening chapters of The Wealth of Nations are 
characterized by the fact that Smith “stared the problem [of value] briefly in the 
face and then waited a few hundred pages for the reader to get distracted, only to 
press onward without further ado.” Upon this rather cruel yet also humorous 
remark, Mirowski writes that while Smith did begin to elaborate “a number of 
potential value principles early on in Book 1”, the issue as to what constitutes the 
essence of value is not settled until Book 2 where it is stated that “value is stock 
(…) suitable for either consumption or investment.”  
Stock, however, as already stated, was not accumulated in that “rude state of 
society”, where all of the products of human labor were consumed within a 
relatively short time-span from the moment they were produced (Smith 1999, 
Book II: 371). Only with the expansion of the market and with the associated 
refinement of the division of labor do we see a rise in the accumulation of stock. 
This stock, according to Smith (1999, Book II: 373-4), falls within two categories: it 
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can either take the form of capital from which the holder expects to extract a 
revenue, or it can be consumed in various ways. The former of these - capital - can 
then again be subdivided into either circulating capital (capital which is “continually 
going from” its owner “in one shape, and returning to him in another”) or fixed 
capital (capital “employed in the improvement of land, in the purchase of useful 
machines and instruments of trade, or in such-like things as yield a revenue or 
profit without changing masters, or circulating any further”). On setting out these 
distinctions, Smith then, without further explanation, equated the “general stock of 
any country or society” with “that of all its inhabitants or members” (ibid: 375).  
This aggregated stock is what constitutes the wealth of the nation, and in spite 
of initially having comprised such heterogeneous components as talents, abilities, 
goods, and education (Mirowski 1989: 166), this stock gradually takes on more 
substantial, and hence less immaterial, characteristics throughout the course of 
Smith’s work. Gradually everything which does not exhibit or leave a material 
imprint (such as, for instance, ballet dancing, or the services performed by a waiter) 
is weeded out in favor of substantial matters. Owing to this, Smith was thus able to 
characterize such insubstantial forms of labor as unproductive. Utilizing such a term 
underscored the fact that “no economic progress could be expected from activities 
which did not contribute to the accumulation of ‘capital goods’” (Pribram 1983: 
148). 
According to Mirowski (1989: 167), shifting the perspective from the explicit 
statements on value in the opening chapters of the book to the notion of stock as 
the value substance not only makes “the latter two-thirds The Wealth of Nations” 
intelligible, but also provides Smith’s account of value with a more coherent and 
clear expression that bears a striking resemblance to Quesnay’s Tableau. However, 
while such a reading does provide for a way to see and follow the trajectory from 
the mercantilists via Quesnay to Smith, the latter’s “theory of value” remains “a 
weakened version of physiocracy because it retains a substance theory of value, but 
without the straightforward accounting system and quantitative pretentions of 
Quesnay” (Mirowski 1989: 165). 
With this overview of Smith’s value theories, we now turn to the way in 
which both of these streams of thought - that is, the explicit reflections on value 
made at the start of Book I of The Wealth of Nations, as well as the gradual sliding of 
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the argument leading to stock as the primary value substance in Book II - were 
revised, critiqued and prolonged by David Ricardo and Karl Marx. From here, 
attention is directed to the break which the emergence of neoclassical economics 
marked in relation to the conceptualization of value. Special focus is given to the 
way in which the emergence of neoclassical economics was dependent upon the 
utilization of a new underlying epistemological structure, whereby value as a 
substance created in the act of production, circulated through exchange, and 
destroyed in consumption, was replaced by a new conceptual constellation that 
emulated mid-nineteenth century physics. But before this latter subject is 
investigated let us turn to Ricardo and Marx. 
 
David Ricardo  
David Ricardo and Karl Marx took up the challenges of Smith’s work and tried to 
correct and critique it by looking at the shortcomings they respectively found in it – 
and, in the case of Marx, by examining the shortcomings and inadequacies he 
perceived in Ricardo’s theories. Smith’s work had definitively set political economy 
on the intellectual map, and the thoughts he had developed in The Wealth of Nations 
made a huge impact which manifested itself in various lines of reception. Indeed, 
his work made such an impact that it was not until Ricardo entered the scene that 
Smith’s work was challenged on its central premises.  
One of the most significant transformations of political economy exhibited in 
Ricardo’s work is the attempt at recasting political economy’s practical-theoretical 
problems in a more scientific approach by way of abstracting from what was 
regarded as mere empirical inessentials (Mirowski 1989: 171; Heilbroner 2000: 
103). In this sense, Ricardo’s work played an essential role in recasting the science 
of political economy within a more streamlined and rigorous prose, which 
foreshadowed later developments within economics. By way of increasing 
abstraction and formalization, Ricardo’s work set out “the substantive and 
methodological parameters of the discipline that we know today as economics” 
(Shcabas 2005: 102). This development crucially hinged on the accentuated role 
given to the laws which Ricardo (2010: 1) pointed to as the real determining factors 
characterizing economic phenomena, and on behalf of which all surface 
phenomena could legitimately be disregarded. While Smith already had begun to 
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take some minor steps in this direction, Ricardo’s theory marked a tremendous 
change of focus away from statesman-craft, historical reflection, and morally 
grounded problems, substituting for these a law-seeking scientific inquiry 
performing its analytical operations in accordance with deductive reasoning (Dobb 
1973:66-7; Pribram 1983: 143-6).  
However, while this tendency to abstraction and rhetorical gesture in the 
direction of the natural sciences helped political economy become established 
throughout the 1830s as a discipline which now began to appear side by side with 
articles on the hard sciences, the groundings on which this law-like behavior 
allegedly rested remained unproven and hence highly speculative (Schabas 2005: 
103). While Ricardo himself, along with a host of preceding economists, 
“possessed little or no familiarity with either the contemporary practices of 
scientists or the history of the sciences”, his writings nevertheless were marked by 
the promulgation of the already prevalent substance theory of value that also 
underpinned Quesnay’s and Smith’s political economy (Mirowski 1989: 171). Thus, 
the lack of familiarity with the history of science in no way barred specific scientific 
impulses. However, before taking up this latter subject, a few changes in the 
conceptualization of value occurring in the transition from Smith to Ricardo are 
dealt with. 
In the first chapter of his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ricardo 
(2010: 3-4) not only gave due acknowledgement to Adam Smith and his comments 
on value, but also positioned himself in relation to him. Firstly, use value was now 
made a necessary precondition for exchange value. While Smith had separated 
these entirely from each other, Ricardo connected them. He did this by arguing 
that if a good possesses no use value at all, it cannot have an exchange value. In 
this sense, use value becomes a necessary qualitative precondition, which, however, 
does not determine the quantitative exchange value of the good in question. 
Secondly, when this condition is met, goods, according to Ricardo, received their 
value from two sources: from their rarity and from the amount of labor required 
for their production. However, while this seems to be the general rule, Ricardo 
remarked that a number of very limited goods received their value only through 
their rarity, and hence without any relation to the amount of labor necessary for 
their production. Examples of these are very exceptional and unique statues, 
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paintings, books and wines. Nevertheless, since this latter group of objects is 
insignificant in relation to the totality of goods as such, they can be ignored. Thirdly, 
and on behalf of this clarification, Ricardo (2010: 3) was now able to make his 
object of investigation clear: “In speaking then of commodities, of their 
exchangeable value, and of the laws which regulate their relative prices, we mean 
always such commodities only as can be increased in quantity by the exertion of 
human industry, and on the production of which competition operates without 
restraint.”  
By and large, Ricardo agreed with the labor theory of value Smith had stated 
for primitive societies. Ricardo’s only addition here was that capital in the form of 
weapons and other hunting devices indeed was a prerequisite which equally had to 
be taken into account when specifying the ratios with which different goods would 
exchange for one another even in this primitive state. However, when it came to 
the ‘command-theory’, that is, Smith’s determination of exchange value as hinging 
upon the amount of labor a good could command in the marketplace of civilized 
societies, Ricardo disagreed. Thus, in opposition to Smith, he claimed that what 
determines the value of a good is not how much it could command in the market. 
Instead, this value “depends on the relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its 
production” (Ricardo quoted in Landreth and Colander 1994: 117). Instead of a 
monetary measure Ricardo therefore substituted a quantitative principle relying on 
the hours of work necessary. Accordingly, value is determined by the relative 
amount of time necessary for the production of commodities. Because of this, 
Ricardo did not have separate value theories for the primitive and civilized-
capitalist states respectively, as Adam Smith had had. Instead, he proposed a 
universal theory of value where the quantity of labor (including the labor spent on 
the making of tools necessary for production) was what regulated value (Dobb 
1973: 115).  
Critics and commentators have later disagreed as to whether Ricardo actually 
held on to a labor theory of value, watered it down, or gradually abandoned it. 
George Stiegler, for instance, “has labeled Ricardo’s theory a 93-percent labor 
theory of value” (quoted in Landreth and Colander 1994: 122). He has done this on 
behalf of Ricardo’s own estimates, according to which “93 percent of variations in 
relative prices can be explained by changes in the quantity of labor required to 
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produce commodities” (ibid: 122). Although Sraffa’s edition of Ricardo’s collected 
works seems to have settled the issue in favor of the fact that Ricardo did hold on 
to a labor theory of value (Dobb 1973: 80; Landreth & Colander 1994: 122), the 
important point to note here is not so much whether this was or was not the case, 
but rather to notice that in spite of problematizing earlier conceptions of value and 
value creation, Ricardo’s own account remained in accordance with the substance 
based approach that also had informed his predecessors’ writings.  
 
Karl Marx 
Within the conceptual history of value and value creation undertaken here, Marx 
has a special place. He not only undertook the tremendous task of analyzing and 
criticizing political economy, but also carried out important work which even today 
continually makes its presence and impact felt within debates about how value is 
created (see for example Jacques 2000; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 
2004; Böhm and Land 2009; Arvidsson 2009). In this sense, his work also occupies 
a central transitional position, since it is both recognizable as belonging to the 
discussions already surveyed here, but also points beyond these in several respects. 
Though there are several multifaceted reasons for this, it is important to note that 
Marx’s mature economic work is written simultaneously with the transformation by 
way of which the discipline of physics in the middle of the nineteenth century was 
beginning to be organized around the notion of the field (Mirowski 1989: 177). 
This is all the more interesting since this development was a crucial precondition 
for the later flourishing of neoclassical economics, which was leaving substance 
conceptions of value behind, and instead replacing them with contributions 
organized around the field metaphor. While Marx was highly skeptical of the 
reduction, naturalization, and rhetorical redescription of social relations as if these 
had a thing-like character, there is nevertheless at the same time a proliferation of 
“organic and physical analogies” detectable within his work (ibid: 176).  
Just as with Quesnay, Smith and Ricardo, there are several points of entry 
into the work of Marx. However, in line with the conceptual survey carried out 
here, the points to be elaborated on are limited to the notion of value, and the way 
in which Marx made a sharp break with the preceding political economists, while 
also continuing their work, in the sense that he can be seen as one of the last 
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defenders of the substance theory of value that had marked out the shared 
epistemological space for all political economy. This ambiguous position is played 
out by the way in which Marx both pushed forward with a reformulated substance 
theory of value that continued from where Ricardo had left political economy and, 
at the same time, set forth a ‘real cost approach’ which on the one hand was 
compatible with the emerging field theory then beginning to be articulated within 
mid-nineteen century physics, and on the other hand stood in a somewhat 
conflictual relation to his substance conception of value (Mirowski 1989: 180).  
Just as with Smith’s and Ricardo’s works, the very opening pages of Marx’s 
Capital go to the heart of the problem of value. By way of starting out with an 
analysis of the individual commodity, Marx (1990: 125) charted the use- and 
exchange-value inherent in this. The first of these, use-value, is “conditioned by the 
physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter”. 
In order to be recognized as a use-value, however, the object in question obviously 
has to be put to some kind of use. Thus, whatever the conditions under which an 
object has been produced, its use-value is “only realized [verwirklicht] in use or in 
consumption” (Marx 1990: 126). By way of relating to the use-value of particular 
objects we attend to their qualitative characteristics – to all that is immediately 
apparent to our sensuous experiences. This, however, tells us nothing about the 
way in which the object in question might be exchanged for other goods. In order 
to understand this, it is necessary to focus on the exchange value of the commodity 
that relates it to other commodities in a completely different way than does use 
value. Regarding this, Marx stated that considered as use values, “commodities 
differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, 
and therefore do not contain an atom of use-value” (Marx 1990: 128). This of 
course brings to the fore the question of what then determines this exchange value. 
In order to explain this, Marx stated that one has to look beyond the concrete 
labor which is the source of use values. By way of making this abstraction we see 
what is common in all commodities, namely “human labour in the abstract” (ibid: 
128). The exchange value of any given commodity is thus explained by the value 
inherent in this commodity, which again is nothing other than a precisely, yet 
historically varying, expression of “the labour-time socially necessary for its 
production” (ibid: 129).  
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In terms of this key point, Marx differentiated himself from earlier political 
economists. Whereas they merely pointed to labor as a source of value, Marx made 
the important distinction between concrete labor and abstract labor. Where Ricardo 
had insisted that it was labor time that was the principle according to which value 
could be measured, Marx introduced the notion of socially necessary labor time, which 
is a concept much better equipped at grasping the historically varying and socially 
determined circumstances of production that impinges on the amount of labor 
necessary for the production of commodities. In this sense, Marx’s notion of value 
becomes both more abstract, yet at the same time more receptive to the actual and 
historically changeable conditions of production which Ricardo had done more 
than his share to weed out of political economy.  
Though Marx provided important critiques which distinguish him from his 
predecessors within political economy, the overall framework within which these 
qualifications and differentiations are carried out remains compatible with the 
underlying substance conception of value underpinning the works of Quesnay, 
Smith, and Ricardo. Thus, even what Marx himself regarded as his most important 
contribution - the discovery of the notion of surplus value, revolutionary as it may 
have been, is by and large still compatible with the basic epistemological framework 
of all of political economy. This is not to say that Marx’s theory did not make any 
difference to political economy; it is rather to say that the intense critique aimed at 
the economists before him spelled out and attacked all the vulnerable areas within 
political economy, but did this by way of sticking to the exact same underlying 
epistemological substance-based framework, which had also informed his 
predecessors’ different attempts at giving an adequate description of what regulated 
the principles according to which value was produced, circulated and 
diminished/destroyed.  
However, as Mirowski (1989: 181) claims, this approach to the labor theory 
of value stands in a somewhat problematic relation to another conception of value, 
also surfacing in Marx’s work, which disregards viewing value as a substance in 
favor of the real-cost approach according to which “value is viewed as a contingent 
state. In this view, a commodity can only be said to possess a labor value in relation 
to the contemporary configuration of production.” Thus, in opposition to the 
crystallized or substance-based approach where the amount of socially necessary 
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labor time becomes embedded in and subsists in the commodity, determining its 
value, the real-cost approach opposes this by way of insisting that the value of 
commodities already produced may change, if the conditions of production for 
subsequently produced items change. As an example of this, Mirowski points to 
Marx’s (1990: 318) illustration of the way in which a failed harvest one year alters 
the value of previously harvested cotton. Whereas Marx here claimed that this 
resulted in a rise in the value of the already harvested cotton (owing to the change 
that has taken place in the socially necessary labor time for its production), the 
value of the commodity cotton should remain unaltered when seen from the 
crystallized or substance-based approach. This has the consequence that “all history 
is defined away as irrelevant”, and in this, the real cost approach “parallels the fledgling 
developments of the field concept in physics in the same period” (Mirowski 1989: 
181), which was to play such an enormous role for the development of political 
economy into economics as this transition unfolded throughout the 1870s.  
The subjective theory of value and the emergence of neoclassical economics 
As already hinted at several times above, one of the important changes taking place 
with the emergence of neoclassical economics is the simultaneous transformation 
of the epistemological and conceptual space within which the neoclassical 
revolution took place. In order to proceed from the concept of value within 
classical political economy to the one in neoclassical economics, it is therefore 
beneficial firstly to take a look at some of the preconditions which made it possible 
to recast economics on another plane than the one on which its preceding 
conceptualizations had been fashioned. Following from this, it is possible then to 
assess the actual changes taking place in the formalization of value and its creation.  
We have already witnessed how all of classical political economy disagreed on 
central matters regarding the true source and measure of value. Though essentially 
agreeing on displacing the mercantile writers’ attribution of money as being the 
ultimate value substance, the question as to what exactly constituted the true source 
and measure of value remained an issue of struggle and analytical dispute that 
preoccupied the thinkers surveyed until now. Yet, these concrete disagreements 
were all preconditioned on a widely shared agreement as to how value ought to be 
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conceptualized. Thus, from Quesnay to Smith and Ricardo and then further on to 
Marx, one finds mutual agreement on the fact that value is created or augmented in 
the act of production, preserved in distribution and exchange, and destroyed or 
diminished in consumption. Thus, from the perspective of the political economists 
it would be outright incomprehensible to state that value could be created in 
exchange (although Adam Smith took some serious steps in this direction with the 
central place he accorded to the market). Furthermore, the concept of value within 
political economy was essentially tied to material entities in the sense that the 
individualistic evaluation of any one economic actor was unrelated to and irrelevant 
for the exact specifications of the objectively determinable magnitude of the value 
of any particular good. With the emergence of neoclassical economics, however, 
this was presented as one of the most objectionable characteristics of political 
economy, since it completely neglected specifying the extent to which demand was 
constitutive (or at least co-constitutive) of value and its creation. 
Thus, with the neoclassical economists, value was no longer determinable as 
being located within, and inherently tied to, the commodities traded. Instead, it 
sprang from the subjective assessment of the economic actors’ own valuations. 
Stated in other words, value was no longer localizable in the world ‘out there’, but 
became founded upon the world ‘in here’. While being one of the uniting themes 
for these economists, the reversal of the principles according to which value could 
be specified nevertheless was played out in several different ways. W.S. Jevons 
(Jevons [1871] 2003) and Carl Menger ([1871] 1981), for instance, claimed that they 
had overthrown the labor theory of value by way of insisting that value was 
reducible to the subjective assessment of the economic agent. In the rather pointed 
words of Jevons, “value depends entirely upon utility” and it is only “prevailing opinions 
[which] make labour [sic] rather than utility the origin of value” (Jevons 2003: 415). 
Others, like Alfred Marshall ([1890] 1920) and Leon Walras ([1874] 1954), stated 
that although utility and demand were indispensable as the principles according to 
which value was determined, one also had to take the supply side into account.  
Though these differences are important, two key characteristics should be 
brought forth for our understanding of the changing conceptualizations of value 
and its creation. First and foremost, as already hinted at, all of the neoclassical 
economists abandoned the labor theory of value and replaced it with a new 
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conception which accorded utility or demand a central place in their models. With 
this problematization, the concept of value was significantly transformed, since the locus of its 
creation shifted from the sphere of production to the sphere of exchange. Furthermore, central 
to this problematization process was the fact that all of the neoclassical economists 
embraced this new reliance on utility or demand within a vocabulary which 
accorded a central place to marginal utility, satisfaction or want. Secondly, the 
expressions of this were to a large extent determined by the fact that almost all of 
the neoclassical economists were trained in the physical sciences. Thus, all of them 
(with the exception of Carl Menger and his followers) began to formalize 
economics through highly abstract mathematical symbols which copied the 
vocabulary of mid-nineteenth century physics, thereby replacing the until then 
prevailing substance conception of value with a new conception grounded on the 
field metaphor (Mirowski 1989). These developments are surveyed below, after 
which the status of the concept of value and the way in which it began to seem 
problematic are assessed in order to conclude the chapter.  
The turn towards marginal analysis, and the way in which this reconfigured 
the notion of value was, contrary to what the word neoclassical ‘revolution’ might 
suggest, not a radical discontinuity in late nineteenth-century thought (Niehans 
1990: 162-63). Rather, several of its important principles had already been 
prefigured in works that had come out before the 1870s (Pribram 1983: 278-9; 
Spiegel 1991: 507-12; Landreth and Colander 1994: 215). Not least all, among these 
was a work by a former Prussian public official, Hermann H. Gossen, who in his 
Die Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs from 1854 had made important 
inquiries into the satisfaction of wants in conjunction with his attempt to lay 
“down the principles of rational human behavior” (Pribram 1983: 280). While 
Gossen was neither an economist nor successful in his attempt at promoting the 
views of his work among his contemporaries, he was recognized approximately 
twenty years later by W.S. Jevons and Leon Walras as having done important 
groundwork on the principles upon which a reformed economics relying upon 
marginal utility could be elaborated (Spiegel 1991: 513).  
Important as this might be, however, it was not until the more or less 
simultaneous application of the principle of marginalism by Jevons in 1871 in 
England, Menger in 1871 in Austria, and the Frenchman Walras in 1874 in 
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Switzerland, that this mode of analysis gained momentum, and gradually began to 
make its impact felt in a wider way within the economics profession (Pribram 1983: 
280; Spiegel 1991: 507). While essentially coming out of different traditions and 
attacking the problem of value from different angles, these three economists all 
agreed that there was nothing inherent in commodities through which their value 
could be derived. Thus, as a substitute for explaining exchange value from a 
principle of value which either referred to a specific quantity of labor or to the 
socially necessary labor time that had gone into the production of any particular 
commodity, Jevons and Menger reversed the line of causation. Instead of starting 
from the past (the sphere of production), they started from the future (the utility or 
satisfaction the consumer would expect to derive from the consumption/possession 
of the good). In this way, the value of any particular input, such as labor for 
instance, could only be known ex post by way of working backwards from the 
price that the final product could be sold for in the market. This completely turned 
the problem around from the way in which the creation of value had formerly been 
determined. In conjunction with this, Jevons (2004: 101) expressed the unreliability 
of labor as a measure and source of value when he stated that the 
fact is, that labour once spent has no influence on the future value of any article: it is 
gone and lost forever. In commerce bygones are forever bygones; and we are 
always starting clear at each moment, judging the values of things with a view 
to future utility. Industry is essentially prospective, not retrospective; and 
seldom does the result of any undertaking exactly coincide with the first 
intentions of its founders.  
Thus, what constituted the value of any particular good was entirely unrelated to 
the amount of labor that had gone into its production. Instead, the value of any 
particular item was expressed as derivable from its marginal utility, understood as 
“the difference between the total utility of a stock of goods readily available and the 
utility achieved by adding another unit” (Pribram 1983: 278). Hence, instead of 
being derived from the sphere of production, value was now determined by the 
market and the various respective subjective evaluations made by a dispersed group 
of individuals exchanging within this market. Pribram (1983: 599) states that this 
completely recast the value problem, since it “definitively deprived the productive 
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process of its alleged power to create exchange values and attributed that function 
exclusively to processes connected with the exchange of goods.” 
As a result of the increasing preoccupation with the marginal unit, the 
economists turned their attention towards infinitesimal changes, instead of total 
quantities as had previously been the case (Spiegel 1991: 506). Furthermore, this 
resulted in a reorientation away from questions and concerns regarding how overall 
economic growth could be secured and maintained. With the diffusion of 
marginalism as the central concept, the question shifted from how the total amount 
of resources available could be augmented to how they could be optimally allocated. 
This search for optimum positions and the preoccupation with small changes thus 
made it possible to translate and express human decisions and wants into the 
mathematical language of equations, graphs and curves (ibid: 506). 
As Mirowski (1989) extensively documents, this gradual mathematization of 
the domain of economics was not reducible to a couple of inspirational impulses 
from which the new economists drew fresh angles of approach from 
mathematically minded scientists. Besides the fact that all of these economists (with 
the exception of Menger) were trained in the physical sciences and “recognized 
each other as mathematical theorists first and foremost” (ibid: 195), the 
conceptualizations and formalizations by way of which the transition from classical 
to neoclassical economics was made was a clear-cut case of “daylight robbery” 
where the new economists copied the models of mid-nineteenth century physics 
“term for term and symbol for symbol, and said so” (ibid: 9, 3). Whereas the 
primary concept within the physical models was called energy, the one within the 
new economists’ models was called utility. In this way, the notion of utility might 
have had its most central prehistory in English utilitarian philosophy and various 
strands of psychology (for example Gossen ([1854] 1889)), but only came to the 
fore to determine the concept of value and its creation by way of being recast and 
modeled in accordance with the physical theories of energy formulated around the 
middle of the nineteenth century (ibid: 213).  
Without going too deeply into the specificities of the physical theories, the 
important point to recognize when considering the change in the conceptualization 
of value is how a substance-based notion of value was replaced by one relying 
upon a field-based approach. The most widely used pedagogical exemplification of 
 95 
 
a field is the conventional classroom experiment, where small metal pieces are 
sprinkled over a piece of paper which is held over a magnet. This reveals the lines 
of force which were already there, but which nevertheless were undetectable until 
the metal pieces were sprinkled over the paper (ibid: 29). With the advent of the 
field metaphor in physics, the energy formerly inherent in objects were now de-
substantialized and made composites of the space in which these objects were 
located. Thus, with the advent of the notion of the field, energy was gradually 
liberated “from all dependence upon matter” (ibid: 66). 
According to Mirowski (ibid: 63), the neoclassical economists made their 
transition from a substance-based approach to one based on the field by relying 
upon what he calls proto-energetics, i.e. “a type of physical theory that includes the 
law of the conservation of energy and the bulk of rational mechanics, but excludes 
the entropy concept and most post-1860 developments in physics.” One of the key 
difference between proto-energetics and thermodynamics is that the former allows 
for perfect reversibility in a given systems operation whereas the latter does not if 
heat has been dissipated during the course in which the system has gone from one 
state to another. Thus, if a transition from one state to another involved the 
dissipation of heat, the system in question would not be capable of returning to its 
original state according to the second law of thermodynamics. Although later 
developments within physics replaced the impossibility of such a return with the 
claim that it would rather be highly unlikely (ibid: 63), the concept of energy was, 
with the development of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and particle physics, 
gradually torn in several different directions throughout the course of the twentieth 
century with the consequence that it, little by little, developed from being the 
ontological rock on which the discipline of physics rested to “an entity to a relation 
to, finally, a gestalt” (ibid: 93). 
Though differing to some degree in their exact formalizations, this copying 
and application of physics by the neoclassical economists is one of the defining 
tendencies within modern mainstream economics. To take just one example, Irving 
Fisher made the following critical translations between physics and economics in 
his doctoral thesis from 1892: a particle became an individual, space became a 
commodity, force became marginal utility or disutility, work became disutility, 
energy became utility, and so forth (ibid: 224). As Mirowski, points out, there is a 
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certain irony in the fact that the way in which Irving Fisher and the rest of the 
neoclassical economists turned the concept of value and its creation around was 
dependent upon the manner in which they took a model of the physical, external 
world and brought it to bear on the internal, subjective workings of the mind (ibid: 
222). Thus, at the same time as these economists refused to admit that the concept 
of value had any external, objective existence, they imported a model of the 
external world on which they grounded and elaborated the notion of subjective, 
marginal utility.  
In spite of this, what is relevant for the purpose of this chapter is not so 
much the specificities and highly complex technicalities of the physical theories, 
nor particularly the question as to whether the appropriations of these by the 
neoclassical economists were made in a proper and scientifically defensible manner 
(regarding this issue see ibid: 197, 279). What is important, however, is the new 
shape the concept of value took as a result of this transition. While still remaining 
in use, the concept was seriously challenged on its former undeniable and objective 
character. Whereas the classical economists had identified something behind market 
prices that served as an objective, explanatory principle for determining the value of 
the exchanged goods, that objective principle was lost with the onslaught of the 
marginalist revolution. Pribram (1983: 282) expresses this by stating that:  
[The] construction of economic systems of the Ricardian type was predicated 
on the assumption that all exchange values could be expressed in terms of a 
common standard unit of values. That standard was lost, however, when 
values were derived from individual estimates [and] changing tastes.  
This conclusion was not just one drawn by an economic historian, who with the 
benefit of hindsight might be predisposed to read such an event in light of the 
developments taking place afterwards; in 1891, the English economist William 
Smart had already coined the prevailing sentiment of several of his contemporaries 
when he stated that “it is almost impossible to use the term value without 
suggesting an inherent property” (quoted in Pribram 1983: 277). Indeed, there 
seemed to be inescapable metaphysical connotations clinging to the concept of 
value that in spite of all attempts at casting it in the language of science continually 
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returned to haunt this notion. This was perhaps most forcefully expressed by 
Jevons:  
I must, in the first place, point out the thoroughly ambiguous and unscientific 
character of the term value. Adam Smith noticed the extreme difference of 
meaning between value in use and value in exchange; and it is usual for writers on 
Economics to caution their reader against the confusion of thought to which 
they are liable. But I do not believe that either writers or readers can avoid the 
confusion so long as they use the word. In spite of the most acute feeling of 
the danger, I often detect myself using the word improperly; nor do I think 
that the best authors escape the danger (Jevons 2003: 424). 
Whereas price and value had formerly been differentiated from each other, the 
grounds on which this differentiation had been made were now eroded with the 
impossibility of pointing to an objective measure and source of value behind the 
myriad of dispersed, atomistic, subjective valuations. While some of the 
marginalists kept using the concept of value (though this now sprang from 
subjective evaluations), others had much less use for it. Thus, those more 
mathematically inclined from Walras and onwards, had much less need for any 
Archimedean point to which the concept could be linked, and therefore also no 
need of a concept impregnated with such connotations and burdened by such a 
long and theoretically loaded history. These economists “rejected the search for 
causal relationships between economic phenomena, and developed a conception of 
the economy as a system of interdependent prices, assumed to be entirely free from 
any connection with social relationships” (Pribram 1983: 630). This, together with 
twentieth century developments in macroeconomics and econometrics, 
accentuated the process by way of which value and value creation were stripped of 
their former prerogatives (ibid: 630).  
These developments are also good indicators as to why a former preeminent 
concept, central to the formation of political economy and appearing on the 
introductory pages of all the great works of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, gradually 
came to play a less prominent role and eventually disappeared from even the 
indexes of modern microeconomic textbooks, as illustrated at the beginning of this 
chapter. However, while value and value creation have certainly lost ground as the 
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central concepts holding the discipline of economics together, and while the labor 
theory of value (in all of its various shapes) has certainly been delegated to the 
dustbin of history by mainstream economics, this has not prevented either the 
concept of value or the production-based approach to value creation from 
springing forth and haunting the discipline of economics in various ways. In 
relation to modern attempts at formulating production theories, for instance (see 
Mirowski 1989: 276-353), mainstream economics has come across considerable 
problems, since its new theoretical groundings prohibited it from operating with 
any sort of value being created in production. With the appropriation of the 
vocabulary of mid-nineteenth century physics, and the premises this entailed for 
the formulation of the market as being the locus of value creation (what is now 
called price formation), production had been stripped of its former central place, 
that is, as an activity through which value was created. This has not only entailed 
that modern microeconomic theories of production have had difficulty with 
completely dispensing with production as a source of value creation (ibid: 276-353), 
it has also had consequences for more contemporary conceptualizations that in 
various ways, acknowledged or unacknowledged, have drawn intellectual 
nourishment from the otherwise displaced value creation framework of the 
classical economists’.  
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
From value chain to co-creation: 
Contemporary conceptualizations of value creation 
within Strategic Management Thought 
 
 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the concept of value creation has long and 
deep-seated roots in the historical development of political economy and 
economics. Although the concept has been declining and has gradually fallen out 
of use as a central concept within contemporary mainstream economics, this 
should not be taken as a sign that its economic importance has totally vanished. 
Rather, as we see in this chapter and the next, value creation is a central concept 
within contemporary discussions that ranges from Strategic Management Thought 
to social theory, Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies.  
While inspired by some of the earlier conceptualizations dealt with in the 
previous chapter, it is at the same time important to recognize that several of the 
conceptualizations of value creation investigated in this and the following chapter 
depart from the historically established traditions of political economy and 
economics due to the fact that their frame of reference also includes traditions 
from the humanities, as well as the social sciences at large. While at first sight this 
could be viewed as an example of traditions picking up on one of the most central 
concepts within the discipline of economics and, in so doing, transforming it 
beyond recognition in order to serve other purposes, it could also, and perhaps 
more interestingly, be viewed as an example of reopening the question regarding 
what actually falls within the sphere of ‘the economic’. Thus, the strategic 
management theorists considered in this chapter, as well as the philosophers, social 
theorists, and critical management scholars considered in the next chapter, can be 
seen as dealing with an important economic issue. In doing so, they once again 
bring the problem of value creation to the forefront by delving into the conditions 
under which it emanates from some kind of productive activity. In this sense, several 
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of them can – in their respective ways – be seen as reopening and retrieving the 
classical economists’ value creation framework and, once again, resurfacing 
questions such as ‘how is value created?’, ‘what constitutes its sources?’, ‘how can it 
be augmented?’, and ‘how can it be conceptualized?’ – that is, all those questions 
that mainstream economic theory today has delegated to the dustbin of history.  
While this chapter takes up how value creation has been problematized within 
Strategic Management Thought, chapter three explores how parallel processes of 
problematization have been undertaken within fields of study that are highly critical 
towards management thought. In spite of all their differences, however, these 
diverse traditions have begun problematizing value creation in highly similar ways. 
More precisely, they have begun to converge in their respective mobilizations of a 
concept of co-creation, and an associated co-creation vocabulary, through which 
value creation begins to be expressed. These problematization processes, as stated 
in the introduction, give rise to the formation of a particular experience, an 
experience of the outside as a source of value creation, which is expressed through 
the four components making up the co-creation vocabulary. As we come to see, 
this experience is formed through problematizations of (a) the locus of value 
creation, (b) the attributes of the processes leading to value creation, (c) the 
primary action through which value is created, and (d) the substrate through which 
value is created. With these problematizations, the locus of value creation moves 
from inside the firm to its outside; the attributes of the processes leading to value 
creation shift from being passive and manipulable to exhibiting a spontaneous, self-
forming character; the primary action through which value is created shifts from 
optimized, managerially planned activities or labor to innovation and events; and the 
substrate through which value is created shifts from the physical and material to 
the immaterialities of knowledge, language and sociality.  
In terms of accounting for the formation of the experience of the outside as a 
source of value creation at the end of the next chapter, Part One concludes by 
considering the complex continuity-discontinuity issue between former value 
creation concepts and those set forth within contemporary streams of thought 
pertaining to Strategic Management, Autonomist Marxism, and Critical 
Management Studies.  
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Having attended to this overall framing, the outline of this chapter can now be 
specified as follows. First, we will attend to some preconditions for the coming into 
being of contemporary Strategic Management Thought. After a brief overview of 
some early historical trajectories important to the constitution of this field, we take 
up the work of Michael Porter, and especially his value chain framework which 
explicitly brings the notion of value creation to the center stage of Strategic 
Management Thought. Second, it will be shown how the resource-based view 
gradually, from the middle of the 1980s, becomes a dominant perspective within 
Strategic Management Thought. We give attention here to a couple of key texts 
that are recognized as central within the field, and in so doing focus upon how they 
on the one hand continue the trajectory set out by Porter, and yet on the other 
hand simultaneously shift the perspective on what constitutes the most central 
preconditions for the creation of value. Emphasis is placed here upon how the 
components inherent in co-creation gradually begin to show up as problems 
towards which certain kinds of responses are made. Third, we take up the dynamic 
capabilities perspective that accentuates specific tendencies already present within 
the resource-based view. Central in this regard is not least the increased innovation-
emphasis and the fact that value creation begins to become preconditioned on 
something outside of the firm. Fourth, we see how value creation is explicitly recast 
and rearticulated in conjunction with the four components identified above. 
Through this, value creation is turned into value co-creation; that is, value creation 
becomes dependent upon that which comes from the outside and below, that 
which has a spontaneous and somewhat self-regulating capacity, that which 
increasingly comes to rely upon innovation and the transgression of the already 
existing, and that which has an immateriality to it.  
Finally, a word of caution: in spite of moving through central texts within 
Strategic Management Thought, the trajectory analyzed here is not a survey of the 
different problems and concepts central to the field or to its history as such. 
Rather, the history set forward here is an attempt to read central texts within this 
field seen through the contemporary problem of co-creation. This does not imply that co-
creation ‘was already there’, in embryonic form, just waiting to unfold, in the 
resource-based view, for instance. But it does imply that its central components 
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had already begun to make themselves felt, before value creation explicitly began to 
be expressed as value co-creation.  
From early Strategic Management Thought to Michael Porter’s value chain 
Within Strategic Management Thought there has been for a long time an ongoing 
discussion about whether and to what extent inputs from economics were a proper 
source of conceptual inspiration (Foss 1996). In spite of such discussions, however, 
there is little controversy regarding the fact that the economic concept of value 
creation is central to the discipline. Indeed, as Foss and Stieglitz point out (2010: 
3), the concept of value creation, together with “value appropriation and sustained 
competitive advantage”, are not just central to the area of Strategic Management 
Thought as such. Rather, these concepts and problems could more appropriately 
be considered “the central” constructs to such an extent that “all of strategic 
management ultimately boils down to creating and appropriating more value than 
the competition.”  
One significant source through which these problems explicitly came into 
view as particularly urgent was Michael Porter’s work. In 1980 and 1985 he 
published Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors and 
Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. Almost overnight, 
these books became bestsellers that had an overwhelming impact on the theoretical 
as well as the practical engagements with the notion of strategy. While these books 
pointed out new lines of research within the area of strategy, and fleshed out new 
tools that in a big way impacted on how managers began to think about 
recalibrating their strategic planning, it is also important to recognize that the 
books landed in an intellectual and business environment where ‘strategy’ had 
already gained ground as a concept of major importance (Kiechel 2010). In this 
sense, Porter’s work could be seen as a body of work that inscribed itself within a 
larger historical trajectory, while simultaneously also catapulting the notion of 
strategy into a new avenue of reflection infused with a yet unseen theoretical rigor 
that drew quite extensively on economic thought.  
While Porter’s two books altered the directions of the field of strategic 
management in significant ways, they nevertheless did so in relation to an already 
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existing and established tradition with roots stretching back to before the Second 
World War. As a teaching subject, business policy (as the antecedent of strategic 
management was called) dates back to the first half of the twentieth century 
(McKiernan 1996, Vol 1: xv). For several decades, business policy remained 
restricted in content and nothing more than a “capstone general management 
course in the business school curriculum” (Hoskisson et al. 1999: 418). As such, it 
“was designed to integrate the knowledge gained in functional areas like 
accounting, operations, and finance, thereby giving students a broader perspective 
on the strategic problems faced by corporate executives” (Ghemawat 2002: 40). In 
this sense, from its very beginning, Strategic Management Thought was conceived 
as a meta-perspective overlaying and integrating the already existing disciplines of 
business administration. While its theoretical bases initially were rather weak, a 
series of factors contributed to change this in the sixties. Accentuated by the 
academic reorganization effects that the arrival of the Ford Foundation Report 
(Gordon and Howel 1959) gave important impulses to, the area of strategy began 
to flourish as a research subject (Hoskisson et al. 1999: 418, 448 note 1), most 
notably with the publications of Alfred Chandler’s Strategy and Structure in 1962 and 
Igor Ansoff’s Corporate Strategy in 1965. Furthermore, this development was 
intensified by the way in which the big consulting companies in America, such as 
Boston Consulting Group, Bain & Company, and McKinsey & Company, began 
pushing the strategy agenda. On the one hand, these companies began developing 
tools designed to facilitate strategic analysis, and on the other hand they started 
selling their services and newly developed tools in a big way to a range of U.S. 
companies (Kiechel 2010). Thus, when Porter’s first book came out in 1980, it 
landed in an intellectual environment that had already been paved by theoretical 
work, but also in a corporate climate that was quite familiar with the notion of 
strategy from various engagements with the big consulting firms and it was these, 
more than anyone else, who promoted the strategy-agenda. Although Porter is 
probably the most well-known figure within Strategic Management Thought, in 
addition to being the man “whose work has had more effect on how companies 
chart their future than any other living scholar” (Kiechel 2010: 254), the reception 
of his analytical endeavors was in large part dependent upon and shaped by the 
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pioneering practical and theoretical work already undertaken by the strategy 
consultants. As Kiechel (2010: 133) pointedly states:  
[Porter] might dismiss their work, but (…) it was the consultants’ shoulders 
Porter stood on to catch the lightning he bottled in Competitive Strategy. It was 
they, particularly at BCG [Boston Consulting Group], who over the course of 
the prior fifteen years had pushed both the concept and the word strategy into 
the corporate consciousness. (If Porter’s book had been titled Competitive 
Industry Analysis, would it be in its sixtieth printing today?). 
Porter’s first book shifted the perspective of the discipline away from the individual 
firm, and away from the case-study approaches that previously had set the norm 
for strategy scholars (Hoskisson et al. 1999). By drawing on concepts and 
explanations from the subfield of economics called industrial organization, Porter 
developed new tools that could be utilized to map a specific firm’s possibilities of 
doing business as a function of the industry within which it was competing, or at 
least planned to be competing. Whereas the first book introduced the famous five 
forces (Porter 1980) as a framework through which the firm’s fundament for 
competing could be established, the second book, Competitive Advantage, took this 
framework as its point of departure and turned more directly towards the inner 
workings of firms by way of breaking down their mode of functioning into discrete 
activities that could be analyzed with a new tool introduced by Porter called the 
value chain. While the former book essentially depicted a firm’s strategy as 
something that could be derived from extensive analysis of the five forces of an 
industry’s structure (consisting of “competitive rivalry, bargaining power of 
suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, threat of new entrants, and threat of 
substitutes” (Porter et al. 2002: 44)), Competitive Advantage expands on and fine-
tunes this approach by way of adding value chain analysis to the mix in order to look 
more closely at how “a firm can actually create and sustain competitive advantage 
in its industry” (Porter 2004: 3). In investigating this problem, Porter states (ibid: 3) 
that competitive advantage “grows fundamentally out of value a firm is able to 
create for its buyers that exceeds the firm’s cost of creating it.” Value, Porter 
explains (ibid: 38), “is the amount buyers are willing to pay for what a firm provides 
them”. This value is measured “by total revenue”, that is, “the price a firm’s 
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product commands and the units it can sell.” In this sense, value becomes that 
which the whole book revolves around. Furthermore, this is underscored when 
Porter states (ibid: 38) that creating “value for buyers that exceeds the cost of doing 
so is the goal of any generic strategy.”  
Besides the obvious conceptual problem we encountered in the last chapter, 
that is, of blending a market oriented view of value creation with a production-
based one (something which will come back to at the end of Part One), how does 
Porter actually explain the value creation process going on within the firm? As 
already hinted at, it is here that the value chain comes into the picture. It is an 
analytical tool fashioned to keep track of and assess what happens within the firm, 
and how this impacts the overall value creation process. In order to proceed with 
such an analysis, however, the firm needs to be split up into analytically manageable 
entities. This is done through zooming in on activities, because they are “narrower 
than traditional functions such as marketing or R&D” and because they are “what 
generate cost and create value for buyers” (ibid: xv). Furthermore, due to the fact 
that activities simply are “what firms do”, and because they “are observable, 
tangible, and can be managed” (ibid: xviii), they are ideally suited to serve as the 
basic building blocks of that which can provide an overall and clear-cut picture of 
the firm’s value creating process. This is exactly what the value chain does.  
 
 
Porter’s Generic Value Chain (ibid: 37) 
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Porter states (ibid: 34) that every “firm’s value chain is composed of nine generic 
categories of activities which are linked together in characteristic ways.” The value 
chain is thus presented as a universally applicative conceptual framework which on 
the one hand breaks down the firm as a total entity, and on the other hand 
reconnects it as a specific organization of distinct value activities. More precisely, the 
value chain does this by way of depicting a firm as a specific interrelationship 
between what Porter refers to as primary and support activities, which together are 
considered as “the discrete building blocks of competitive advantage” (ibid: 38). 
The first of these - primary activities - consists of inbound logistics, operations, 
outbound logistics, marketing & sales, and service, while the second category - 
support activities - is made up of firm infrastructure, human resource management, 
technology development, and procurement.  
In order to apply Porter’s conceptual framework in the analysis of any 
particular firm’s value chain, it is necessary to break down the generic categories 
represented in the figure. The criterion which sets the standard according to which 
degree a disaggregation of the generic categories should be continued is regarded as 
a practical question that can only be specified by taking into account the degree to 
which various sub-activities impact on competitive advantage (ibid: 45). While 
some room for flexible adaption and judgment is required, it is important that 
“[e]verything a firm does should be captured in a primary or supplementary activity” 
(ibid: 48). Furthermore, it is necessary to relate the analysis of this to competitors’ 
value chains, as well as to upstream suppliers’ value chains and downstream 
customers’ value chains (ibid: 52-3). In this sense, we are presented with a particular 
modular conception of the creation of value that multiplies beyond the boundaries 
of the firm in question, rendering these other entities essentially identical with the 
firm.  
With Porter’s value chain we are presented with something that is at first sight 
somewhat analogous to Quesnay’s Tableau Économique, in the sense that what is 
provided is a graphical representation of how value is generated within, and 
circulating through, a specific entity. However, whereas Quesnay’s Tableau was a 
representation of the annual flow of a value substance within a country, warning 
against the destructive potential of untimely political intervention, conversely 
Porter’s value chain is a total representation of a firm’s value creation and a tool 
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that enables and explicitly encourages all kinds of managerial intervention that can 
decrease costs and serve the augmentation of the value that the firm creates. 
Furthermore, whereas value in Quesnay’s Tableau derived from a single source (the 
agricultural sector), value in Porter’s chain can come from all of the activities 
depicted in the model to the extent that the contribution which they deliver is 
recognized as being valuable by the buyers of the final products.  
If one looks beyond these similarities and differences it also becomes 
noticeable that there is a certain mechanistic assumption at work in Porter’s 
understanding of value creation as it is depicted in the value chain approach. Not 
only does the notion of a chain imply a unitary direction whereby value is 
sequentially added in an assembly line approach as the product-to-be flows through 
the firm (Normann and Ramirez 1993a: 65) – something which is furthermore 
underscored by the pointed arrow that graphically constitutes the model’s visual 
appearance to the right, but the value activities responsible for this gradual 
augmentation of value are also conceptualized as if they were independent 
components that in principle could be modified without altering the other activities 
constituting the chain. This not only has implicit consequences for the ways in 
which an organization can be conceived and changed, but also directly crosses over 
into the conception of the way in which such possible changes should be 
undertaken. Indeed, Porter himself presents the option that the value chain analysis 
should be guiding the principles according to which organizational changes could 
be made (Porter 2004: 59), thereby continuing and adding to the long tradition of 
conceiving of strategic management as a meta-discipline within business 
administration. In this sense, Porter’s value chain could be seen as an analytical 
framework that not only reinforces the manner in which Strategic Management 
Thought can claim and maintain this position in relation to all the other areas of 
business administration, but also as a particular framework that accounts for the 
specific and directly measurable value-creating capacities of all the other areas 
within business administration, as these make themselves manifest in the way in 
which their respective contributions become visible in the value chain’s various 
activities.  
As a consequence of Porter’s approach we are essentially faced with a 
conception of value where all of the activities producing this value can be derived 
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from their separate sources in a way that makes any emergent characteristics 
between the constituent parts impossible, while also leaving out of consideration 
the way in which external factors might directly contribute to the creation of value, 
e.g. in the form of customers knowledge or more generally in the form of positive 
externalities. In this sense, the whole is nothing more - and nothing less - than its 
constituent parts, though Porter at the same time claims that the way in which one 
activity is performed might have consequences for the way in which one or several 
others are performed (Porter 1995: 435). Following from this, the creation of value 
is not only restricted to the firm, but all of the firm’s processes and characteristics 
are essentially open to managerial intervention, the appropriability of which is 
determined by mapping and analyzing the firm’s value chain. In this sense, there is 
nothing uncontrollable, no delicate spontaneity, which has to be taken into 
account. Furthermore, following from the very definition of activities quoted 
above, knowledge - wherever it might come from - is probably barred from 
entering the conceptual framework in a significant way, since its characteristics are 
hardly ‘tangible’ or ‘observable’. As we see below, this also ties in with the critique 
that Porter’s approach does not specify what resources or competencies are 
actually needed to build, develop and sustain the activities that constitute the 
sources of value within his framework. 
While Porter certainly laid new ground for scholars, as well as practitioners, 
with the value chain approach, at the same time his perspective fitted into a 
conceptual structure that essentially posited the firm’s maneuverability and value-
creating potential as a function that to an overwhelming extent was determined by 
industry structure. Although he distanced his approach from one strictly adhering 
to mainstream economics, there were nevertheless remnants of this in his 
framework that allowed certain forms of conceptual modeling and disallowed 
others. Furthermore, this was consistent with his academic background, where as a 
Harvard doctoral student in the early 1970s he had studied in the economics 
department as well as the business school. As a consequence of the fact that the 
research going on within both of these places gave a prominent role to industries, 
yet at the same time did so in a non-compatible manner, Porter set himself the task 
of connecting the fields of industrial organization and strategy (Porter et al. 2002: 
43). On the one hand, this reflected an ambition to bring a more systematic, 
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theoretical approach to the then prevailing case-studies that severely hindered 
generalizations and the building of frameworks within the strategy area, and on the 
other hand, it reflected the ambition to make the more rigid economic models 
more applicable to real-life management problems where “ceteris paribus 
assumptions don’t work” due to the fact that managers “must consider everything” 
(ibid.). However, in spite of his ambition to dispense with some of the more rigid 
assumptions at work in economics, Porter’s resulting framework nevertheless 
remains modeled according to a rationality which leaves important managerial 
questions and problems regarding how to attend to and secure value creation 
unresolved. Even though he did fashion conceptual tools and frameworks that 
provided guidance for managers, as well as opening up new avenues of reflection 
for strategy scholars, there were still remnants of an almost mechanic optimizing 
framework at work in this new theoretical architecture.  
The resource-based view 
Owing to this, a group of management theorists began to develop new 
conceptualizations of value creation that could address the inadequacies inherent in 
Porter’s framework. While definitely breaking new ground on the one hand, their 
attempts at reconsidering the conditions for the creation of value should on the 
other hand not be seen as a total dismissal of Porter, but rather as an attempt at 
intensifying the change of direction Porter himself had initiated with the move 
from analyzing industries in the 1980 book to looking more carefully at the firm’s 
value chain in Competitive Advantage (Barney 1991: 105). Furthermore, this transition 
, to use Hoskisson et al.’s (1999) phrase, should be seen as part of a greater 
historical trajectory by way of which ‘the swing of the pendulum’ of Strategic 
Management Thought revisited its earlier roots, and shifted its focus back to once 
again look more closely at the individual firm and the specificities that 
characterized it.  
With the development from Porter onwards, the concept of value creation 
remained intact as one of the most central concepts within the area of Strategic 
Management Thought, while at the same time being reconfigured and marked out 
with new characteristics. Central to this development was the revival of the 
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otherwise forgotten thought of Edith Penrose on the theory of the growth of the 
firm ([1959] 2009), as well as a number of articles by Wernerfelt (1984), Barney 
(1991), Prahalad and Bettis (1986) and Prahalad and Hamel (1990), to name just a 
few of the most prominent and influential. However, while the resource-based 
view is the most widespread within the area of Strategic Management Thought, and 
has been so throughout the last couple of decades (Foss 2007: 30; Foss and 
Stieglitz 2010: 5), the sheer number of contributions makes it an almost impossible 
task to sum up in a couple of pages the directions of this rich research area (for 
overviews see Foss 1997a; 1997b; Barney and Arikan 2001). Nevertheless, in 
sticking to the notion of value creation, we will use this as a prism through which 
to pick up on a couple of important points within some of the most central texts in 
order to cast light on how the development from Porter onwards impacted the way 
in which the sources of value creation were conceptualized. But before considering 
this, it is necessary to inquire into what actually constitutes a resource in the first 
place, since it is only through attending to this that the problem of the value 
creating potential of these resources becomes urgent.  
In his seminal article “A Resource-based View of the Firm” (1984), 
Wernerfelt states that a resource is “anything which could be thought of as a 
strength or weakness of a given firm. More formally, a firm’s resources at a given 
time could be defined as those tangible and intangible assets which are tied 
semipermanently to the firm” (1984: 172). As examples, Wernerfelt (ibid.) mentions 
“brand-names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled 
personnel, machinery, efficient procedures, capital, etc.” In developing this 
conception of resources, two important points have to be attended to. On the one 
hand, this new concept of a resource is developed as a complementary analytical 
approach that could be placed side by side with Porter’s frameworks (Barney and 
Arikan 2001: 131). This is underlined by the fact that Wernerfelt in his article relies 
on Porter’s five forces and shows how they can be utilized to analyze resources, 
even though the five forces “were originally intended as tools for analysis of 
products only” (Wernerfelt 1984: 172). Thus, while Wernerfelt shifts the 
perspective from Porter’s, there is nevertheless clearly also a strong continuity 
between his work and Porter’s, just as both of them maintain strong connections 
with the discipline of economics – a fact which in Wernerfelt’s case becomes 
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directly visible through his rather strong reliance on abstract symbols and equations 
that, throughout the latter part of the nineteenth and all of the twentieth century, 
have been the reigning language within the discipline of economics.  
 However, Wernerfelt’s notion of resources seems at the same time to be not 
only at odds with conventional economics, but also with the basic notion at work 
within Porter’s value chain, that of activities. Regarding this latter issue, we can 
note that whereas activities were tangible and observable within Porter’s 
framework, we are now considering something which does not necessarily have the 
same kind of materiality and visibility to it. This seems to be related to the 
theoretical roots that inspire and provide the underlying structure for Wernerfelt’s 
conceptualization of resources. More precisely, it stems from the fact that his 
conceptualization draws heavily upon the until then almost neglected work of 
Edith Penrose, whose lack of impact within wider economic circles, according to 
Wernerfelt, probably stems from the fact that “looking at firms as a broader set of 
resources” has “received relatively little formal attention” due to the fact that it has 
“unpleasant properties (for modeling purposes)” (ibid: 171).  
In Penrose’s work great care is taken to distinguish a resource from a factor 
of production. Indeed, Penrose makes clear that she avoids the latter, because it 
does not allow for a distinction “between resources and services” (Penrose 2009: 
22). In line with this, she states that strictly speaking:  
it is never resources themselves that are ‘inputs’ in the production process, 
but only the services that the resources can render. The services yielded by 
resources are a function of the way they are used – exactly the same resource 
when used for different purposes or in different ways and in combination 
with different types or amounts of other resources provides a different set of 
services. (ibid.) 
Whereas the notion of a resource has a “bundle of potential services” associated 
with it, a service implies “a function, an activity” (ibid.). This marks a slight but 
nevertheless significant conceptual change from Porter’s framework, where 
activities were preferred as the basic units making up the generic value chain. This 
slight change of orientation is additionally underlined by the fact that whereas 
Penrose takes great care to distinguish her perspective from the factor of 
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production approach of conventional economics (Penrose 2009: 22), Porter comes 
much closer to such a terminology when he states that the value chain indeed could 
be conceived as “a collection of production functions, if production functions are 
defined as activities” (2004: 39, note 3). 
Furthermore, this problematic ties in with Penrose’s approach by way of 
which she seeks to give an account of the growth of firms, and in particular how 
she relies on innovation as an important issue in explaining this. Of special 
importance here is the way in which she stresses “entrepreneurial versatility” in a 
way that parallels Schumpeter. However, whereas Schumpeter’s explanations 
essentially consisted in viewing the entrepreneur or “innovator from the point of 
view of the economy as a whole”, Penrose is much more “interested in the growth 
of firms, and here the entrepreneur is an innovator from the point of view of the 
firm” (Penrose 2009: 33, note 35). Though there is a difference here in the entity 
considered on the one hand, there is a structural similarity on the other, which not 
only places Schumpeter’s problematic as central to the theory of the growth of the 
firm, but also takes us back to the growth- and value-creating problematic that we 
previously encountered as the central tenet of political economy. What we 
encounter, therefore, in Penrose’s approach is a resurfacing and revitalization not 
only of Schumpetarian discussions of ‘creative destruction’, but also of a long 
lineage that takes us right back to the epistemological framework of classical 
political economy.  
Whereas Porter, as we have seen, strove to cross over and unite Strategic 
Management Thought with economics, the resulting synthesis nevertheless retained 
aspects of the conventional economics framework. Contrary to this, Penrose’s view 
is much closer to, and could indeed be seen as resurfacing and revitalizing, the 
foundational growth- and production-based outlook of political economy (Pitelis 
2009: xxxiii-xxxiv). In picking up on Wernerfelt’s sentence regarding the relatively 
moderate or, to be more precise, almost non-existing reception of Penrose’s work 
within the economics profession, it was perhaps not merely due to the problems 
this posed for modeling purposes. While this was certainly the case, we can in 
addition to this add that it was probably also because her conception of firms as 
consisting of heterogeneous resources could be seen as partaking in and renewing a 
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perspective and approach to economics which the discipline thought it had left 
behind for good.  
Thus, with this relatively simple change in the vocabulary from activities to 
resources that emerges with Wernerfelt’s appropriation of Penrose’s conception, 
the basic building blocks of the firm’s value-creating capacities not merely became 
more immaterial, but also began to take on the appearance of something which in 
constituted a potentiality that could be applied in various ways, something which 
provided a substratum or foundation for the appearance of more concrete, 
material, and visible activities and/or services. This, in conjunction with Penrose’s 
insistence on the importance of entrepreneurial versatility as an important source 
of the growth of firms, essentially implied that the firm’s value-creating capacities 
were beginning to be infused with a certain potentiality. The uptake of the concept 
of resources within Strategic Management Thought therefore both widened the 
perimeters on which managerial action could be initiated, but somehow also 
blurred the tools and theoretical foundations that had previously reigned as guiding 
the formulations of the practical identification of and solution to problems of 
strategic management. In this sense, a new problem emerges that cannot be 
handled within Porter’s framework. The reason for this is that while it was 
necessary to depict everything a firm did within the value chain framework, 
whereas the crucial thing now becomes not so much what the firm actually does, 
but rather what it might be able to do given its idiosyncratic resources.    
Core competencies 
While Wernerfelt’s contribution on the one hand placed itself squarely within 
discussions that applied economic insights to the area of strategy, his revival of 
Penrose’s notion of resources on the other hand could also be viewed as a 
somehow destabilizing, or at least not unproblematic, addition as we have just seen. 
Nevertheless, this did not hinder the process through which the resource-based 
view gradually began to gain popularity. While being seen as a complementary 
approach to other theories within strategic management, the flourishing of this 
perspective, however, was perhaps first and foremost due to the fact that paying 
attention to and developing frameworks that investigated firms’ heterogeneous 
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resources was conceived as being a more thorough attempt to dig “deeper into the 
‘deep structure’ of competitive advantage” (Foss 2007: 3). One of the important 
catalysts for this development, which not only spread the gospel but also catapulted 
the approach far into the corporate world, was Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) highly 
popular Harvard Business Review-article “The Core Competencies of the 
Corporation”. While Prahalad and Hamel prefer to talk about competencies instead 
of resources, the terminology associated with this essentially works along the same 
lines as those already developed under the resource-based view (cf. McKiernan 
1996, Vol 2: xviii; Eisenhardt & Martin 2000: 1105; Ghemawat 2002: 68). Indeed, 
Wernerfelt - whose article from 1984 picked up on Penrose’s work and set the 
scene within the area of strategy for reconsidering how the firm’s value creation 
could be considered as dependent upon the resources of the firm - “admitted that 
the resource-based view did not gain credence until some years later in the work of 
Prahalad and Hamel and their paper on the ‘core competencies’ of the firm” (Wren 
2005: 421, see also Kiechel 2010: 237).  
 
 
Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990: 15) model of “The Roots of Competitiveness”  
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In their work, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) stressed the need to go beyond 
previously established notions of strategy and to dig deeper into the sources of 
competitive advantage. As such, they could be seen as reinforcing the tendency to 
look beyond the immediately visible and measureable. As a substitute for this, they 
proposed that what really drove competitive success, and what top-management 
consequently had to focus on, was the core competencies of the corporation. In 
order to depict the deep-seated, highly important, and yet easily overlooked nature 
of these core competencies, Prahalad and Hamel (ibid: 4) explain that these core 
competencies are like the roots of a tree (see model above), that is, they exist on a 
subterranean plane, where they provide the nourishment and preconditions 
necessary for the core products (the trunk), the individual businesses of the 
corporation (the smaller branches) and the end products (the flowers and the 
leaves).  
Whereas Porter’s value chain had all the mechanical connotations of a 
conveyer belt where the product-to-be had value added to it as it moved 
horizontally from left to right through the various activities constituting the firm, 
Prahalad and Hamel’s competence tree works on a vertical axis, where the direction 
is constituted by a bottom-up movement, where the underlying competencies 
provide the nourishment for the firm’s visible characteristics and the forms they 
take. According to Prahalad and Hamel (ibid: 1), these core competencies are 
essentially made up of “the company’s collective knowledge about how to 
coordinate diverse production skills and technologies.” Owing to this, core 
competencies are not like normal physical assets which can be worn out or used up 
in the production process. Rather, due to their immaterial nature, “the do not 
diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, 
competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared” (ibid: 5). This provides 
an immense challenge to managers who in their value-creating endeavors have to 
take this new asset into consideration in order to come to terms with not only 
mapping the dispersed nature of their company’s core competencies across a range 
of otherwise separated strategic business units, but also with what kinds of usages 
these competencies might be put to in the future. Shifting the perspective from 
previous notions of strategy to a resource-based or core competencies perspective 
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therefore implies that former well-established principles of management need to be 
reformed (ibid: 3), just as the image of the corporation needs to be rethought (ibid: 
2).  
More precisely, the problem with earlier modes of reasoning that, for 
instance, took Porter’s approach as the point of departure, was that they tended to 
become caught up in analyzing their own and their competitors’ businesses by 
merely taking into account “the price/performance of end products” which 
essentially implied that they were “courting the erosion of core competencies – or 
making to little effort to enhance them” (ibid: 7). In the preoccupation with 
minimizing costs and adding value, the question therefore arises as to whether the 
tools shaped to promote these goals actually are capable of delivering adequate 
results? In Hamel and Prahalad’s view they are not, since they tend to focus on the 
immediately visible and measureable, thereby leaving the true source of competitive 
advantage and value creation unattended to. Thus, they suggest a new approach 
which first and foremost requires that top-management becomes not merely 
preoccupied but ‘obsessed’ with building the core competencies of the corporation 
(ibid: 14). In doing so, they will widen the corporation’s “domain of innovation”, 
which will make it capable to “spawn unanticipated products” and furthermore 
make it possible to “adapt quickly to changing opportunities” (ibid: 11, 4).  
Just as Porter’s framework revolved around the creation of value and the way 
in which the firm could be analyzed as a particular organization of interrelated 
activities, the core competencies perspective mirrors this, since it is also about “the 
organization of work and the delivery of value” (ibid: 5). However, whereas Porter’s 
framework to a certain extent allowed (at least in principle) for quite specific 
assessments of the exact costs and value creating capacities of the various activities 
represented in the value chain, the core competencies perspective has a less 
thorough representational power due to the fact that its subject has something 
more immaterial to it, something that is highly difficult to calculate and predict 
with any relative certainty (ibid: 8). Whereas Porter had relatively clear definitions of 
‘value’ and ‘activities’, the equivalents of these within Prahalad and Hamel’s 
framework lacked the same definitional rigor (Kiechel 2010: 240). Thus, besides 
stressing the essential immaterial and hitherto overlooked core competencies of the 
corporation, the way in which people mattered to a larger extent than what had 
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previously been recognized, and the increasing centrality of “the commitment to 
work across boundaries” (Prahalad and Hamel 1990: 5), the core competencies 
perspective had severe difficulties in turning these insights into clear-cut 
conceptualizations. What the core competencies perspective therefore won in 
popularity on the one hand, it lacked in specificity on the other. What remains 
beyond doubt, however, is that the core competencies perspective seriously 
reconfigured the conception of the corporation. It not merely pointed to deeper 
and hitherto undetectable causes of the firm’s value-creating capacities, but its 
conceptual architecture also began blurring or erasing the clear-cut analytical 
distinctions depicted in Porter’s value chain. Thus, by stressing the importance of 
knowledge, innovation, and the commitment to work across boundaries, the 
representation of the sources of value creation became altered in significant ways.  
Accelerating the trajectory towards the outside: dynamic capabilities 
While Prahalad and Hamel’s article certainly made a huge impact both in the 
academic as well as the corporate world, it is necessary to appreciate the way in 
which it participated in prolonging and accelerating a trajectory already set in 
motion by other important contributions within Strategic Management Thought. 
To do so, it is imperative to recognize that even though it was perhaps the most 
identifiable single article that catapulted the resource- or competence-based 
perspective onto the scene of strategic management, the intellectual climate from 
which it sprang had already begun to pick up on the importance of invisible assets 
as central to firms’ value-creating capacities. Thus, when Prahalad and Hamel’s 
article came out, work had already been undertaken in order to come to terms with 
formulating the principles and concepts according to which competitive advantage 
could be seen as derivable from sources not particularly suitable for entering the 
more rigorous, economically-inspired frameworks. An early precursor to this was 
not least Prahalad and Bettis’s (1986) “The Dominant Logic: a New Linkage 
Between Diversity and Performance”, which set out to investigate top 
management’s representational maps and the way these impacted on firm 
performance. According to the authors, their attempt at developing a more 
thorough analysis of these mental models - what they call ‘the dominant logic’ - 
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was in large part motivated by the fact that “research in strategic management 
often ignored managerial explanations in favor of explanations based on purely 
economic forces” (Bettis and Prahalad 1995: 6). The result of this was that “the 
balance between economic and managerial explanations were becoming 
dramatically skewed. Managers, if they appeared at all in research, were largely seen 
as a faceless abstraction” (ibid: 6).  
This surge of interest in the immaterial sources of competitive advantage that 
could not be theorized within an economics framework was also one of the key 
areas of investigation in Itami and Roehl’s (1987) Mobilizing Invisible Assets. Here 
attention was also extended to those resources that had so far escaped more 
formalistic approaches. According to Itami and Roehl (1987: 1), analysts have 
defined “assets too narrowly” and as a result have been preoccupied with what 
could easily “be measured, such as plant and equipment.” This has had the 
unfortunate effect that “intangible assets such as particular technology, 
accumulated consumer information, brand name, reputation, and corporate 
culture” have been seriously underestimated, resulting in the fact that these assets 
“invaluable” contribution to the firm’s “competitive power” has been discarded.  
It is here possible to detect a rather long and lasting trajectory within the area 
of Strategic Management Thought that gradually gave more weight to an 
innovation-agenda in combination with a much more prevalent preoccupation with 
non-tangible, invisible and knowledge-based assets, neither of which were fit for 
‘modeling purposes’, nor could easily be integrated within narrow economically-
inspired strategic management frameworks. This trajectory gradually took off in the 
middle of the 1980’s, picked up momentum and gained considerable popularity 
with the publication of Prahalad and Hamel’s paper on core competencies in 1990, 
and from here on accelerated further into the 1990’s and the first decade of the 
new millennium, where extensions of the resource-based view were developed 
under new subheadings such as “the knowledge-based view” (see for example 
Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Grant 1996, 2003; Boisot 1999) and “dynamic 
capabilities” (see for example Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhard and Martin 2000). 
However, since these latter perspectives overlap (Foss 2005), they will not be 
accounted for separately. Instead, and in keeping with the overall goals of this 
chapter, we restrict ourselves again to looking at one of the important 
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contributions in order to see how it on the one hand advanced the discussions 
already mapped, and on the other how this advancement intensifies the direction 
by way of which the central resources of the firm became ever more immaterial, 
innovation-oriented, difficult to control, and moving closer towards the 
organization’s periphery, if not downright to its outside.  
One central and highly influential article where one can detect this 
development is “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management”, coauthored by 
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997). While already circulating as a working paper and 
generating lots of citations in the beginning of the 1990’s, it was not published until 
1997 (Augier 2004). Besides being the “single most cited paper in business and 
economics from 1995 to 2005” (Teece 2011), the paper also received the Strategic 
Management Journal’s Best Paper Award in 2003 (Augier 2004: 30, note 9), just as 
it gave rise to an immense amount of new articles, the number of which has 
exceeded one hundred a year in management and strategy journals since 2006 
(Teece 2011).  
On the very first page in the introduction of their article, Teece et al. (1997: 
509) make it clear that what they develop under the heading “the dynamic 
capabilities approach” is specifically constructed to address the fundamental 
theoretical and practical question in strategic management of “how firms achieve 
and sustain competitive advantage.” The authors explain that the dynamic 
capabilities approach “is especially relevant in a Schumpetarian world of 
innovation-based competition” that is characterized by “the ‘creative destruction’ 
of existing competencies.” What is striking at the very outset of the article is the 
explicit coupling of the innovation-based problematic with the already surveyed 
conceptualization of competencies. However, whereas Schumpeter’s notion of 
creative destruction was used to conceptualize the fact that capitalism’s central and 
most defining trait was its continual destruction of its own economic structure 
from within (Shcumpeter [1942] 2000: 83), Teece et al. rearticulate and utilize the 
concept of creative destruction along firm-level Penrosian lines and bring it to bear 
on the competence-vocabulary central to Prahalad and Hamel’s framework. If the 
perspective of core competencies therefore pointed to something below or more 
foundational than what could be represented within Porter’s diagram of value 
creation as depicted in the value chain, the dynamic capabilities approach seems to 
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repeat the exact same movement, only now in regards to the core competencies 
perspective.  
In positioning their contribution to the area of strategic management, the 
authors both distance their approach from Porter’s framework (ibid: 513), and at 
the same time make it clear that the dynamic capabilities framework should be seen 
as an extension and further development of a particular problematic already 
present within the resource-based view. Thus, whereas the resource-based view on 
the one hand sought to investigate the deep roots of competitive advantage by way 
of looking at the heterogeneous resources and competencies within the firm, on 
the other hand it also invited “considerations regarding the development of new 
capabilities” (ibid: 514). It is exactly this latter “dimension encompassing skill 
acquisition, learning, and accumulation of organizational and intangible or 
‘invisible’ assets” that the dynamic capabilities framework seeks to theorize. In 
defining their central construct and contribution to the existing strategic 
management literature (dynamic capabilities), Teece et al. (ibid: 515) explain that the 
“term ‘dynamic’ refers to the capacity to renew existing competences”, while  
the term ‘capabilities’ emphasizes the key role of strategic management in 
appropriately adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external 
organizational skills, resources, and competencies to match the requirements 
of a changing environment.  
Besides adding more weight to the already above mentioned tendency in which 
these dynamic capabilities were seen to be situated at a more foundational level 
than resources and competences, what is interesting to note about this definition is 
that there is a gradual sliding towards the outside, in the sense that resources and 
competencies are no longer merely situated at the firm level, but tend to be located 
externally as well. Reference to “external competencies” is thus made three times 
within approximately ¼ of a page in conjunction with the authors’ first relatively 
elaborated definition of their central construct (ibid: 515). A bit more light is cast 
on this problematic on the following pages, where the terminology is specified for 
several of the central concepts. Here, it is claimed that competencies “may extend 
outside the firm to embrace alliance partners” (ibid: 516), just as it is claimed that a 
firm’s “reputational assets”, “external linkages” and “institutional assets” must also 
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be taken into account. The latter of these comprises, among other things, “the 
system of higher education and national culture” (ibid: 521-2).  
What is important here is not so much the exact specification or validity of 
operating with the notion of ‘institutional assets’ or ‘external competences’. Rather, 
what is significant is that an analysis of firm-level conditions of creating and 
securing competitive advantage begins to reflect upon and conceptualize something 
that does not lie within, but rather on the border of (such as ‘reputational assets’ 
and ‘external linkages’) or completely outside the firm (such as is the case with 
‘institutional assets’). In the development of the dynamic capabilities framework, 
one can therefore detect a simultaneous double movement that gradually shifts and 
broadens the scope of what can actually play a role within the analytical 
frameworks of strategic management, and consequently enter as relevant sources of 
the firm’s value-creating conditions. On the one hand, the dynamic capabilities 
approach prolongs the vertical movement already set out with Prahalad and Hamel’s 
(1990) attempt at looking below the surface-phenomena of the immediately visible 
and measureable. What is at stake here is therefore an attempt to dig deeper into 
the sources of competitive advantage – from Porter’s activities, to core 
competencies and further on down to dynamic capabilities. On the other hand, this 
vertical movement is supplemented by a centrifugal one, where the assets deemed 
necessary for achieving competitive success begin to be difficult to conceptualize as 
something the firm controls in any ordinary sense of the term, since these assets 
begin to move from the center to the periphery, and even further on out into the 
firm’s external environment, as is the case with the externalities of national cultures 
and educational systems.  
In keeping with the tree analogy or diagram proposed by Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990), the double movement exhibited with the dynamic capabilities approach 
might be depicted as intensifying the aspiration of Prahalad and Hamel, but also 
seriously widening the scope of the analytical perspective in the process of doing 
so. Viewed through this prism, it is not merely sufficient to shift the point of 
attention from the visible to what lies beneath the surface. Rather, what is entailed 
with this shift is widening the scope of analysis in order to construct a much more 
encompassing framework that takes into account not merely the roots below the 
surface, but also the quality of the soil, the wider environmental conditions, and the 
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way in which these might be taken into consideration, intervened with, acted on, 
and utilized in order to augment the tree’s potential for flourishing. 
This double movement, however, and especially the centrifugal one, also 
entails that what formerly could be viewed as relatively clear-cut firm resources or 
competencies begins to take on a more problematic and uncontrollable nature that 
tends to make direct managerial intervention less impactful, perhaps even 
bordering on the futile or downright destructive in some instances. With the 
introduction of notions such as ‘institutional assets’ it is on the one hand becoming 
clear that the outside impacts on firm performance in a hitherto unprecedented way, 
but on the other hand, this broadening of the perspective also challenges the very 
preconditions of the analytical outset on behalf of which the resource-based 
perspective and its core-competencies-, knowledge-based view-, and dynamic 
capabilities offspring were developed.  
This extension and acceleration of the analytical trajectory furthermore seems 
to be tied together with various hints throughout the text that somehow destabilize 
or tend to diverge from the point of origin in the resource-based view. Thus, while 
taking their point of departure within this perspective, Teece et al. also seem to 
have certain reservations regarding some of the central concepts that make up the 
cornerstones of the resource-based view. First of all, the authors (Teece et al.: 516, 
note 23) “do not like the term ‘resources’” which is central to the resource-based 
view, as the name indicates. In fact, they find it downright “misleading”, and only 
stick to it because they want to “maintain links to the literature” where this concept 
is the dominating one. Instead of resources, they prefer “firm-specific assets”.  
Secondly, these resources or assets, as we have already seen, are not entirely 
like the resources controlled by the firm as this is usually depicted within the 
resource-based view, since these assets might extend outside the firm’s perimeters, 
and as a consequence of this be completely beyond managerial control. Thus, in 
dealing with ‘institutional assets’ for example, Teece et al. (ibid: 522) acknowledge 
that it might not be completely appropriate to characterize these “as being entirely 
firm specific”. As a consequence, the dynamic capabilities approach is potentially at 
odds with central tenets of the resource-based view as it is defined by major names 
within the field. Barney, who authored pioneering work within the resource-based 
view in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s (see for example 1991), thus presents a view 
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that is hardly in synch with the dynamic capabilities approach. According to him 
and Peteraf, what characterizes the resource-based view “is that it provides a 
resource-level and enterprise-level explanation of sustained competitive performance 
differences among firms” (Peteraf and Barney 2003: 312). By this they mean that 
theory within this perspective “focuses on the resources and capabilities controlled 
by an enterprise”, which they contrast with explanations that “attribute 
performance outcomes more directly to external factors”. Indeed, according to 
Peteraf and Barney (ibid: 313), the resource-based view considers “external 
environmental forces” and “the nature of interactions among multiple actors” as 
irrelevant to its level of explanation. It “holds constant all of these other factors, 
assuming frictionless competition outside its own narrow realm. In essence, it 
operates under a set of ceteris paribus assumptions.” However, as we have just seen, 
the clear-cut demarcation on which this assumption rests is exactly what is 
beginning to appear problematic, when notions such as ‘external competencies’ and 
‘institutional assets’ begin to figure prominently as sources of value creation. 
Thirdly, the gradual emergence of the outside in the form of ‘external 
competencies’, ‘institutional assets’, etc. is mirrored by the fact that the analytical 
tools necessary for building the framework of the dynamic capabilities approach 
are themselves drawn from disciplines that are viewed as being “outside the 
traditional boundaries of strategy” (ibid: 510). In this sense, the way in which value 
creation is conceptualized as being more clearly related to and dependent upon 
what lies at the limit of or beyond the boundaries of the firm is paralleled by the 
way in which the analytical constructions equally begin to relate to what lies beyond 
the boundaries of the discipline of strategic management as this had previously 
been conceived. Owing to this, insights from “the management of R&D, product 
and process development, technology transfer, intellectual property, 
manufacturing, human resources, and organizational learning” equally have to be 
mobilized to account for the strategic maneuverability of firms in a ‘Schumpeterian 
world’ (Teece et al.: 510). 
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Convergent or divergent directions? 
These developments within and extensions of the resource-based view have given 
rise to heated debates within the literature on strategic management. On the one 
hand, some scholars stress that the extension of the perspective beyond its point of 
departure in the early contributions is nothing more than a mere rhetorical 
redescription, essentially leaving central assumptions untouched and intact (Barney 
and Arikan 2001: 138-40). Thus, the development of approaches that stress the 
importance of ‘core competences’, ‘dynamic capabilities’, and ‘knowledge-based’ 
views should be seen as operating within the same perimeters as former 
conceptualizations. Indeed, the only problem here is recognized as one of 
superficial rhetorical redescriptions of what essentially constitutes a consistent 
underlying set of assumptions. Owing to this, these redescriptions represent 
nothing but “an extreme example of a classic academic ‘tempest in a tea pot’ – ‘full 
of sound and fury but signifying nothing’” (ibid: 140). On the other hand, and in 
contrast to this, other scholars insist that the divergence represented by these new 
modes of conceptualizing the sources of competitive advantage represent a severe 
challenge that potentially has the capacity to split the field of Strategic Management 
Thought into two separate and unrelated theoretical camps (Foss 1997b, 2007). 
Thus, if contributions such as Prahalad and Hamel’s notion of core competencies 
are not  
approached in a more precise and analytical way (…) there is a real danger 
that the RBP [Resource-Based Perspective] may split even more visibly into, 
first, a formal, stark, abstract branch strongly inspired by economics and 
gradually losing contact with the managerial reality, and, second, an 
increasingly loose and free-wheeling branch where almost anything goes on 
the analytical level (Foss 1997b: 359).  
The remedy to this problem is then either seen to be one which decomposes these 
collectively oriented approaches into more clear-cut analytical categories (ibid.), or it 
is seen as one where integration and convergence between the two opposing camps 
might be found in a mutual paradigmatic mode of theorizing that draws heavily on 
evolutionary economics, and particularly on the foundational contribution from 
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Nelson and Winter’s (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Gavetti and 
Levinthal 2004; Foss and Stieglitz 2010).  
However, while these discussions are surely central to the field as such, the 
point of relevance for the purposes of this chapter is not so much to assess 
whether and to what extent the developments within the resource-based view merit 
the label ‘science’, nor to what extent some of its contributions are more worthy of 
being considered as resting on well-established, legitimate, and empirically testable 
propositions. Rather, what is highly relevant is the fact that across the otherwise 
opposing camps there seems to be a wide-spread agreement that the sources of value creation have 
been considerably expanded. The problem is therefore not whether this development 
has actually taken place, nor whether these sources should be considered as 
essential for understanding the creation of value and competitive advantage. 
Instead, what is debated is the question as to how the diverse theories and 
frameworks should account for the way in which dynamic capabilities, core 
competencies, and knowledge-based assets might be formally modeled, carved up, 
and analytically handled in order to account for the contributions they 
unquestionably make to the creation of value.  
The above investigated central texts of Strategic Management Thought 
therefore attest to a long and gradually evolving tendency by way of which the key 
components of value creation have moved from visible and clearly manageable 
activities, and from here further on to firm-specific resources and competencies, 
and then again on to dynamic capabilities. In this process, the value-creating 
components have become increasingly immaterialized, just as they seem to have 
moved ever closer to the periphery of the firm. However, while gradually moving 
further away from what could be considered easily identifiable and exclusively firm-
controlled assets, the value-creating components have nevertheless continually 
been conceived as falling within the borders of the firm. Thus, in spite of the fact 
that the foundations on which these assets rest have become ever more porous, 
knowledge-dependent, drifting towards the outside and inscribed within an innovation 
problematic, they are still represented as ‘firm-specific assets’ that can be dealt with 
and manipulated in accordance with the conventional tools of managerial control. 
In essence, and in spite of the above analyzed trajectory, what therefore remained 
unchallenged and taken for granted – from value chain analysis through the core 
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competences framework and on to the dynamic capabilities perspective – was that 
value creation was fundamentally conceived as a firm-level activity. Although 
substantial calls for revision were set forth in relation to the way in which the 
corporation ought to be conceptualized (for example Prahalad and Hamel 1990), 
and in relation to the nature of the assets that should be taken into account (Itami 
and Roehl 1987; Teece et al. 1997), a clear conceptual distinction between the firm 
on the one hand, and its outside on the other was nevertheless kept in place. The 
firm was identified as the sole creator of value, and the customer was conceived as 
a passive and non-intervening consumer requesting or demanding a product, the 
production of which he or she had no part in. 
Co-Creation  
This central premise, however, has begun to be seriously questioned within recent 
years, where value has begun to be conceptualized as something that could no 
longer be conceived as created exclusively within the firm. Instead, it has 
increasingly been depicted as a relational process that is going on either on the 
outside of the firm, or at the interface between the firm and its environment. While 
initially developed by Normann and Ramírez (1993a, 1993b, 1994) and Ramírez 
(1999) under the concept of co-production, this perspective gained considerable 
momentum at the beginning of the new millennium with the publication of a 
number of articles by Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004c) where 
this new approach was coined under the term co-creation. It is also under this latter 
name that it has been theorized within the book-length treatments of Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2004b) and Ramaswamy and Gouillart (2010a). While central in the 
development of a new perspective on the challenges and possible solutions to 
organizing and conducting businesses, these texts are merely nodal points in a far 
wider net of contributions that also encompass more popular accounts with catchy 
titles such as Wikinomics (Tapscott and Williams 2006), We-Think (Leadbeater 
2009), Revolutionary Wealth (Toffler and Toffler 2006), and Here Comes Everybody: The 
Power of Organizing without Organizations (Shirky: 2008), just as they also should be 
seen as having close ties with developments within the innovation literature where 
the question of mobilizing outside capacities in firms’ innovative endeavors has 
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also been a recurring and central subject (see for example Chesbrough 2005, 2006; 
von Hippel 2006). In addition to this, the co-creation approach also has strong 
roots in the tradition of marketing (Vargo and Lusch 2004), where theoretical 
reflections on customer participation stretch even further back (Lovelock and 
Young 1979; Mills and Moberg 1982). The problem was already raised within these 
studies as to how customers could be a source of productivity gain that could be 
managed in the same way as employees (Bendapudi and Leone 2003: 14-18; 
Arvidsson 2006: 41-65).  
However, in sticking to the trajectory set out in this chapter, we primarily take 
stock of the subject of co-creation and the way this alters conceptualizations of 
value creation within Strategic Management Thought. The above mentioned texts 
by Prahalad, Ramaswamy, Normann, Ramírez, and Gouillart are not only central in 
this regard because they can be seen as early conceptualizations on which later 
theoretical work has been developed (both within and outside of Strategic 
Management Thought), but also because they are developed on behalf of and stick 
to the continuing problem of value creation so central to Strategic Management 
Thought. Nevertheless, while doing so, these texts at the same time begin to 
question several of the most important concepts within Strategic Management 
Thought, including markets, customers, firms, strategy and, not least, value and 
value creation. As we see, the new problematizations that spring from questioning 
hitherto established notions not merely prolongs and adds to the trajectory already 
surveyed from Porter onwards, but also brings this trajectory up against some of 
the most fundamental assumptions within Strategic Management Thought. 
In their 1993 article “From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing 
Interactive Strategy”, Normann and Ramírez argue for the necessity of moving 
beyond Strategic Management Thought as previously conceptualized. While 
starting out in the article’s very first sentence with the relatively uncontroversial 
claim that strategy “is the art of creating value”, they quickly move on to 
problematize and argue for the insufficiency of hitherto reigning conceptualizations 
of what this implies in a contemporary setting. More precisely, it is the highly 
turbulent conditions characteristic of this contemporary setting that necessitates a 
re-conceptualization of how value is created. After a somewhat high-charged 
introduction that stresses the inadequacy of planning and how the rules of business 
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can change overnight, Normann and Ramírez (1993a: 65) set forth their central 
proposition:  
successful companies do not just add value, they reinvent it. Their focus of 
strategic analysis is not the company or even the industry but the value-creating 
system itself, within which different economic actors – suppliers, business 
partners, allies, customers – work together to co-produce value. (…) To put it 
another way, successful companies conceive of strategy as systematic social 
innovation: the continuous design and redesign of complex business systems.  
With this sweeping formulation, the center of strategic thinking is at once placed 
both beyond Porter’s framework, but also beyond those of the resource-based view 
and its various extensions and successors. Neither industry-analysis (Porter 1980), 
nor the value chain (Porter 2004), nor the firm in its different representations 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Teece et al. 1997) are viewed here as 
the relevant foci for analyzing the sources of value creation. However, what is 
perhaps more significant is that the propositions on value creation set forth here 
not only go beyond the already surveyed respective streams of thought within 
strategic management. Rather, these propositions displace the common ground on 
which the previously surveyed strategic management-perspectives converged, 
namely in the fact that the sources of value creation were restricted to and 
localizable within the firm. This fundamental assumption is now being swept away 
in favor of an alternative view according to which value creation is conceptualized 
as something that comes from multiple sources within a complex system, where all 
kinds of economic actors have varying, potentially even multiple, tasks to perform 
(Ramírez 1999: 54).  
The first consequence of this problematization is that the metric according to 
which value is measured is multiplied in accordance with the number of 
contributors. Thus, whereas value within Porter’s (2004: 38) framework could be 
relatively unproblematically defined in monetary terms as “the amount buyers are 
willing to pay”, the co-production framework sets forth the proposal that value has 
to be measured according to multiple metrics (Ramírez 1999) that take a range of 
inherently non-quantifiable dimensions into account. Furthermore, this entails 
abandoning the way in which we usually think of products or services as “frozen 
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activities” in favor of looking at them as “offerings” that have a much more fluid 
nature. Normann and Ramírez (Normann and Ramírez 1993a: 68-69) principally 
demonstrate this through the examples of how IKEA and Automated Teller 
Machines (ATMs) have revolutionized the business systems of which they are a 
part. IKEA “has systematically redefined the roles, relationships, and 
organizational practices” within its industry (ibid.). As a result of this, it has created 
“an integrated business system that invents value by matching the various 
capabilities of participants more efficiently and effectively than was ever the case in 
the past” (ibid.). Similarly, with the introduction of ATMs, work that was previously 
done by the firm has now been handed over to the consumer. This not only 
implies cost savings for the banks, it also taps into and reconfigures the consumer’s 
way of being, since he or her is no longer forced to withdraw cash within opening 
hours. While these examples might seem a bit dated, Normann and Ramírez 
nevertheless use them to argue the case that the value inherent in such offerings lie 
in their “density” understood as the tightly packed information, knowledge and 
resources that they provide for the customer, and the way in which this density 
augments and mobilizes the consumer’s capacities and thereby heightens his or her 
own value-creating endeavors (ibid.). Furthermore, this implies that a clear-cut 
distinction between products and services is becoming impossible to uphold, just 
as it implies that value is no longer conserved in or residing in the product. Rather, 
value is beginning to take on the appearance of a multi-dimensional potentiality 
that keeps reappearing in new shapes dependent upon highly contextual settings.  
The implications of this for companies are, according to Normann and 
Ramírez, threefold (ibid: 69). First of all, when it is no longer a question of adding 
value in a chain-like manner within the firm and delivering it to a passive 
consumer, the company has to focus on how it can “mobilize customers to take 
advantage of proffered density and create value for themselves.” Secondly, it is not 
just individual offerings that are becoming more complex. It is also the entire 
system within which they are produced. As a consequence, “a company’s principal 
strategic task is the reconfiguration of its relationships and business systems.” 
Thirdly, and finally, with the new criterion of success according to which the 
mobilization of co-producing individuals becomes paramount, companies have to 
broaden their perspective to be able to “conceive the entire value-creating system”. 
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To succeed, and to keep on being successful, a company “must create a dialogue 
with its customers”. 
While these propositions were only early attempts at reconsidering the 
question of the gradual externalization of the value-creating process within 
Strategic Management Thought, they nevertheless caused considerable debate 
regarding the appropriateness of their central claims on the one hand, but also, on 
the other hand, helped to establish central concerns and thoughts regarding the 
externalization of the value creation process as these would later develop. Thus, in 
the Harvard Business Review issue following that where Normann and Ramírez’s 
article had been published, several scholars commented on and criticized their 
central assumptions, arguing especially that their new value constellation 
framework was essentially reducible to a set of interconnected value chains. To this 
allegation, the authors responded that as “the ‘round earth’ view of our planet is 
not the sum of ‘flat earth’ views, so our proposed value constellation cannot be 
reduced to the sum of interconnected value chains” (Normann and Ramírez 1993b: 
50). 
Without entering into debates about the appropriateness of the ‘flat earth-
round earth’ analogy, it is nevertheless significant how groundbreaking or 
revolutionary claims made in conjunction with the changing conditions of value 
creation seem to be a consistently recurring rhetorical strategy with which new 
contributions try to force their way into the spotlight (hence also the fact that any 
practitioner-oriented book that aspires to sell lots of copies must have ‘future’ 
somewhere in its title (see for example Prahalad and Hamel 1996; Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004b; Hamel and Breen 2007)). While such strong phrasing could 
certainly be seen in conjunction with the “faddishness” more generally inherent in 
management theory (Micklethwait and Wooldridge: 1996: 14), at the same time it 
ties in with and adds to the already surveyed trajectory whereby the deepening and 
widening of the value-creating problematic now finally seemed to have spilled over 
and become explicitly externalized and partly ‘de-organizationalized’ in a way that 
former conceptualizations kept hinting at but, for various reasons, still abstained 
from explicitly embracing. In the formulation of Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004c: 
8), this shift implies nothing less than a severe challenge to the “firm-centric view 
of the world, refined over the last 75 years”, and its gradual replacement with a new 
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networked reality where the consumer’s role is shifting “from isolated to 
connected, from unaware to informed, from passive to active” (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004a: 4). Reiterating Normann and Ramírez’s thesis, Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy (2003: 12) claim that these developments “have called into question 
our basic conception of value and the processes that lead to its creation”. 
In order to take stock of how these developments have more precisely 
impacted on the conceptualization of value creation, it is necessary to present them 
in relation to the four aspects identified in the beginning of this chapter: First of all, 
the move towards a view of value creation as dependent upon what comes from 
outside the organization is beginning to take center stage. This is the most central 
aspect of the co-creation vocabulary. It not only reconfigures the boundary 
formerly separating producer from consumer, but also gives rise to a whole new 
ecology of value creation. Secondly, the coming into being of a new spontaneous or 
self-regulating reality which on the one hand has to be respected, but on the other 
hand also needs to be attended to, and acted on. This presents managers within 
firms with a new range of problems such as the degree to which managerial 
intervention is fruitful, but also raises the issue of what actually constitutes 
appropriate managerial intervention in such a context. Thirdly, value creation 
increasingly comes to be inscribed within an innovation-vocabulary that is dependent 
upon the constant proliferation of events and the new. Thus, all points of 
interaction within the new value-creating ecology become potential sites for 
innovation as well. Fourthly, and finally, value is increasingly conceptualized as 
having an immaterial source and outcome. These are the four components of the 
co-creation vocabulary, and it is through them that value creation today 
increasingly becomes expressed. We now look at each of these in turn. 
 
1) From firm to ecology: value creation from outside and below 
Shifting the perspective beyond the perimeters of the firm necessarily raises the 
question of what exactly replaces the firm as the proper place of value creation. In 
other words, if value creation is no longer merely a firm-level activity, where is this 
value then produced? We have here already seen how Normann and Ramírez 
(1993a: 65) took some preliminary steps in pointing to what they called “complex 
business systems”. This view is supplemented and extended by Prahalad and 
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Ramaswamy (2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) and Ramaswamy and Gouillart 
(2010a, 2010b). With reference to Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) earlier work on 
core competencies, Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000: 81-82, 2004b: 196-7) claim 
that what has to be considered is no longer merely the firm’s core competencies, 
nor those of its trusted partners, but what they call here the ‘enhanced network’ – 
that is the competences of the firm, its partners and collaborators and those of its 
customers’. This new reality looks nothing like something that can be depicted 
within a regular value chain approach. Rather, it looks much more like a “social 
ecosystem” (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a: 112-127, 250) or a “web of life” 
(Hearn and Pace 2006: 59). As the connotations of ecosystem and web of life 
implies, the firm’s survival is dependent upon a wide and complex reality that it has 
to respect in several ways. Accordingly, the question as to how the company can 
create value is severely altered. Whereas previously it could rely on delivering the 
utmost value to the customer at the lowest possible cost as this could be measured 
through a single metric (e.g. through using the value chain framework), this agenda 
is now being replaced by a much wider concern that attends to maximizing the 
value of the whole ecosystem and all those implicated herein (Ramaswamy and 
Gouillart 2010a: 250).  
This, however, is no easy task, since value can no longer be measured 
according to a one-dimensional metric, but might take a range of different forms 
that includes psychological, social and economic variables (Ramaswamy and 
Gouillart 2010b: 104). As a consequence, the only way to create value is by 
maintaining and building close connections between all members of the ecosystem. 
This entails that the firm should be attentive to the heterogeneous goals and 
metrics the respective participants bring to the collaboration and it should strive to 
help participants achieve these various goals, while simultaneously trying to 
advance the well-being and vitality of the whole ecosystem. In essence, it therefore 
becomes a question of “growing the pie and maintaining the vibrancy of the 
ecosystem; maximizing the firm’s slice of the pie is secondary” (Ramaswamy and 
Gouillart 2010b: 106). Such a statement, however, is not merely made out of 
charitable concerns. Rather, it has to do with the fact that the maximization of 
profit is becoming dependent upon the whole complex system within which value 
is being created; a system the thriving of which is the most important criterion for 
 133 
 
the extraction of profits on the one hand, but also a system that, on the other hand, 
consists of multiple agents and relations that the firm might be able to give 
direction to, act on, and relate to, but in no way control in any ordinary sense. 
Hence, whereas value previously were created by the firm (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004b: 12-14), the locus of value creation has now shifted towards the 
outside, that is, to the all the interactions between the individuals making up the 
ecosystem (ibid: 15; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a: 250).   
 
2) The spontaneity and self-organization pertaining to value creation processes 
This impossibility of direct managerial control of outside forces and capacities 
brings us right into the second component associated with value co-creation. For 
whereas the firm was previously in control of value creation processes, these 
processes now begin to exhibit a self-organizing, spontaneous mode of ordering that 
the firm has to take into consideration and to respect. With all the former 
approaches – from the value chain to the resource- or competence-based view, and 
further on to the dynamic capabilities approach – there was no internal absolute 
criterion according to which managerial control or intervention might be limited, 
since there were no self-organizing or spontaneous processes that the managers of 
the firm had to respect. Or at least, if there were, they were beyond the scope of 
cognitive representation, positively located deep down in some unrecognized 
resources. With the new value-creating reality, however, the firm has to take into 
account all kinds of considerations, because the wider ecology of which the firm is 
a part has its own self-negating and self-reinforcing feedbacks (Hearn and Pace 
2006: 63). This is first and foremost recognizable in relation to the outside of the 
firm, where the former passive customers now begin to take on a much more 
active role that severely alters the conditions on which managerial intervention can 
be carried out. Thus, whereas managers previously could rely on a firm-centric 
view, whereby the only input from customers came from focus groups and other 
carefully executed firm-staged events, managers now have to listen to and learn 
from their customers, just as they have to come to terms with the fact that it is not 
only acceptable or tolerable, but indeed downright beneficial and desirable, for 
interactions between the firm and its new co-producers or co-creators to happen 
on the customers’ initiative (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b; Ramaswamy and 
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Gouillart 2010a). Even so, this in no way entails a hands-off approach to these 
spontaneously arising, customer-initiated interactions. Rather, it shifts the weight of 
the tasks and responsibilities of management from ordering and controlling, to 
listening and responding; from planning and unilaterally following through with the 
planned, to facilitating and making room for uninvited, vital contributions. As a 
consequence, managers now have to  
engage their customers in an active, explicit, and ongoing dialogue; they have 
to mobilize communities of customers; they have to manage customer 
diversity; and they have to cocreate personalized experiences with the 
customers (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000:81).  
This new logic, however, is not merely visible and detectable in the relations which 
the firm has with its outside. Rather, it is beginning to take on the character of a 
much more encompassing logic that traverses the outside as well as the inside, 
thereby potentially making this distinction superfluous or, at the very least, 
inadequate in several respects. This is due to the fact that the co-creation of value 
not only relies upon and seeks to utilize the spontaneously arising, self-organizing 
processes of user-communities and co-producers, but also re-conceives of the 
organization itself as being shot through with a not-yet-realized potential 
(Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a: 149-167). More precisely, the insufficiencies 
associated with a firm-centric view, as this becomes manifest in relation to people 
outside the organization, are paralleled by a critique of the way in which a top-
down, hierarchical chain of command obstructs or destroys the potential 
productivity associated with letting the spontaneity of employees reign. In this way, 
the co-creative organization needs to do away with its hierarchical and bureaucratic 
structures because they are a hindrance to establishing a dialogue, the vitality of 
which is a precondition for the creation of value (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010b: 
105). Gary Hamel, who co-authored the core competence-article with Prahalad in 
1990, perhaps expresses this tendentially all-encompassing, self-organizing, and 
spontaneous mode of ordering within the firm most pointedly when he states, with 
reference to open-source as a paradigmatic management system, that we are on  
the verge of a post-managerial society, even a post-organizational 
society—a future in which the work of managing will be less performed by 
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managers. The most bruising contests in the new millennium will be fought 
along the lines that separate those who wish to preserve the privileges and 
power of bureaucrats from those who hope to build less structured and 
tightly managed organizations. (Gary Hamel 2009: 5, emphasis in the original) 
Value creation therefore is not only dependent upon what comes from the outside 
or from below, the processes leading to its creation also have a spontaneity that 
severely challenges previous reigning modes of organization, forcing us to look for 
new principles according to which its potentials can be harnessed. Thus, 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart (2010a: 7) can claim that co-creation “involves both a 
profound democratization and decentralization of value creation, moving it from 
concentration inside the firm to interactions with its customers, customer 
communities, suppliers, partners, and employees”.  
 
3) Innovation and events as the primary action through which value is created  
Within the co-creation framework, harnessing the spontaneity of the social 
ecosystem’s widely distributed and decentralized capacities entails a new orientation 
to innovation. Indeed, one of the most acclaimed benefits of co-creation is the way 
in which it is said to drastically enhance the potential for innovation. Where firms 
were formerly limited in their innovation-range, this is now considerably widened 
as they begin to build and utilize closer connections with their customers on the 
one hand, and redesigning their organizational frameworks on the other. In this 
sense, value co-creation is closely tied in with an innovation problematic. This can 
even be formulated so sharply as to state that in this “new world, value creation 
(…) can come only from innovation” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2003: 12). While 
such innovations can come about through close collaborations between the firm 
and one or more of its customers, they can also come about with almost no direct 
involvement from the firm. In the latter instance, such innovations may emerge on 
platforms set up by the firm, or they may spring from sources neither planned nor 
anticipated by the firm. We take a look here at each of these decentralized 
innovation models. 
As an example of the former, the T-shirt producer Threadless has built an 
online platform where users can upload and vote on each other’s designs (Bollier 
2008: 149-150; Brabham 2010; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a: 74). The 
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company has created a platform for interaction between its users which not only 
allows for uploading and voting on designs, but also includes encouragement to 
become part of the community, tips and tricks on how to make a design, online 
video workshops, web-based design tools, interviews with some of the artists 
whose designs have received sufficiently high scores to go into production, etc. 
With their web-based business model, Threadless has created an environment 
where design-innovations can flourish, while simultaneously making it a 
community decision as to which designs are to be printed. This reduces the costs 
of design and marketing, just as it delegates decisions regarding the product-
portfolio from top-management to the users and customers. In this way, 
Threadless has built a community-based innovation-machine reliant on thousands 
of co-creators whose design-contributions add up to a continuous flow of possible 
innovations that passes through the platform, while at the same time ensuring that 
only the highest scoring designs transfer on to the T-shirts.  
As an example of the latter, the Danish toy manufacturer Lego launched a 
new line of products called Mindstorms which integrated the company’s classic 
brick with microcomputers, gears, wheels, sensors and software that “allowed users 
to create intelligent robots” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 52; see also 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a: 51-54). Mindstorms, however, not only became a 
huge commercial success. With their release followed the emergence of several 
independent, user-initiated websites, where “enthusiasts shared ideas and 
instructions for building countless Lego robots such as sorting machines, intruder 
alarms and land rovers” (ibid.). With the proliferation of more or less obscure user-
innovations, came even more foundational transformations that not only 
rearranged the separate components into new combinations, but also made more 
significant alterations to the product. Not least among these was the building of a 
new open source operating system that clearly violated Lego’s intellectual property 
rights. While at first contemplating legal action, Lego decided that “limiting 
creativity was contrary to its mission of encouraging exploration and ingenuity”; 
after considering how best to respond to this immediate violation, the company 
decided to write “a ‘right to hack’ into the Mindstorms software license, giving 
hobbyists explicit permission to let their imaginations run wild” (Koerner 2006). 
Lego Senior Vice President Mads Nipper states that the company discovered that 
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this uninvited creativity was not merely “a great way to make the product more 
exciting,” it was also “a totally different business paradigm” that allowed the 
company to jump onto and benefit from all kinds of innovations that the company 
would never have been able to conceive on its own (Nipper quoted in Koerner 
2006).  
In both of the above mentioned examples, we not only see the coming 
together of a wider system of value creation where an overwhelming part of the 
value creation process is actually spawned and conducted by people outside the 
firm, we also see that there is a spontaneity inherent in this mode of value creation 
that might materialize in downright illegal activities, that nevertheless at the same 
time gives rise to hitherto undreamed of business potentials. Thus, there is a high 
degree of uncertainty and a complex interpretative task to be undertaken by the 
firm in order to come to terms with whether a particular ‘innovation’ might be an 
attack on a company’s business or a fantastic contribution. This is furthermore tied 
in with the fact that the consumer communities that play such a foundational role 
in fostering new innovations constantly evolve and, as a consequence, “cannot be 
predicted a priori” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 54). Due to this, companies 
that want to build or maintain competitive advantage need to attend to the value-
creating potentials of a wide range of decentralized and spontaneously evolving 
milieus the future state of which cannot be predicted with any significant degree of 
certainty.  
While the core competences perspective sought to utilize and bring forth the 
innovative potential within the firm, the co-creation framework scales up the 
proportions of this approach, and begins to conceive of the entire ecosystem as a 
giant field generating both actual and possible future innovations which the firm 
might either appropriate, support, and/or set itself in a beneficial relation to. In this 
way, the co-creation framework also goes beyond the early examples described by 
Normann and Ramírez (1993a). Whereas the co-production framework sought to 
expand the value creation process to encompass the way in which already 
conceived and developed products entered into and made a difference in the lives 
of the customers, the co-creation framework takes this even further, since the 
customers now also conceive of, develop, add to, and become the sources of the 
very ideas that give rise to the products or services of the firm. Essentially, the 
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innovations that flow from multiple sources within the ecosystem are a result of 
interactions and engagements between participants within the system (Ramaswamy 
and Gouillart 2010a: 5). In this sense, it is less important whether the participants 
are located outside or inside the firm; what is important is that the encounter 
generates something new that is assessed as valuable by those involved in or 
affected by the encounter. Since such encounters are seen as the hotbed of 
potential future innovations, it becomes a crucial strategic agenda for the firm to 
facilitate, nurture, and enhance the quality and quantity of such event- and 
innovation-generating encounters. 
 
4) The immaterial substrate of value creation 
This finally brings us to the fourth transition associated with the changing 
circumstances and conditions of value creation. In addition to springing from 
relatively unpredictable innovations that emerge from the spontaneity of that which 
comes from below or outside the structured organization, the substrate from which 
value creation spring increasingly take on an immaterial appearance and with this, 
the outcomes of value creation are increasingly immaterialized too.  
As we have already seen, the trajectory from activities in the value chain to 
resources and competencies and, later, to dynamic capabilities, has continually 
shifted the accent of the most important assets from the visible to the invisible, 
from the rock-solid and representational to the ever lighter, more dispersed, and 
highly ephemeral nature of the conditions for the creation of value. Besides seeking 
to shape, adapt to, support and utilize the knowledge of a potentially global 
competence network (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 196-7), the firm has to 
come to terms with the fact that value ultimately resides not in the products 
produced, but in the experience the customers have when using a particular product 
(Prahalad and Ramawamy 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 
2010b). Here, however, one has to tread carefully, because a lot of conventional 
distinctions are rendered problematic within the co-creation framework, since there 
is a continuing blurring and erasing of boundaries between firm and environment, 
between producer and consumer, between products and services (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2003: 13). Nevertheless, in order to navigate analytically within this 
constantly blurring conceptual architecture, the co-creation approach relies on and 
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introduces other distinctions in order to account for the way in which it can point a 
way forward and still differentiate itself from earlier approaches. Among the central 
distinctions utilized is that between products and experiences. Thus, whereas value 
previously might have had immaterial sources, it was nevertheless unambiguously 
dependent upon, if not directly tied to, the product. Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
explain (2004b: 10) that in “the conventional value creation process, companies 
and consumers had distinct roles of production and consumption. Products and 
services contained value, and markets exchanged this value, from the producer to 
the consumer.” However, with the emergence of co-creation, “this distinction 
disappears. Increasingly, consumers engage in the processes of both defining and 
creating value. The co-creation experience of the consumer becomes the very basis 
of value” (ibid.). This implies that value now comes to reside in individual human 
experiences as these are co-created within ‘experience environments’ (ibid: 54-55).  
From this there follows a number of consequences. Firstly, value becomes 
highly personalized, inscribed in time, and dependent upon context, and yet at the 
same time should be seen as the outcome of a complex web of interconnected 
parts. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004b: 7-10) illustrate this with the example of a 
patient with a pacemaker. While the pacemaker surely augments the possibility of 
living longer, the experience the patient might have in conjunction with using the 
pacemaker is substantially augmented if his or her heart rhythm can be monitored 
remotely, thereby making it possible to alert the patient and his or her physician if 
the heart rhythm departs from its proper range. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (ibid.) 
explain how the company Medtronic has built a secure website where doctors and 
other caregivers can access all relevant information, thereby making it less 
troublesome and anxiety-producing for the patient to travel and, if necessary, visit a 
foreign physician who can access all the relevant and personal data of the patient. 
However, while a huge network is in place involving a range of actors and services, 
value is not inherent within this network. This is because value  
does not stem from the physical product, the pacemaker, or from the 
communication and IT network that supports the system, and not even from 
the social network that includes doctors, hospitals, the family, and the broader 
consumer community. Value lies in the co-creation experience of a specific patient, at a 
specific point in time, in a specific location, in the context of a specific event (ibid: 10).  
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Whereas companies have tended to focus on making their products “feature rich”, 
they ought to focus on making them “experience rich” (ibid: 40), while at the same 
time acknowledging that such experiences are highly diverse. This implies that 
value becomes severely destabilized since it fluctuates in accordance with 
experiences, the nature and intensity of which alters depending on time, place, 
social milieu, events, etc. “as well as the eagerness and level of involvement of the 
individual” (ibid: 11).  
Secondly, with this shift it is nothing less than human experience that comes 
to the fore as the real locus of value creation. As a consequence, this experience 
and its specific circumstances – that is, the way in which an experience is formed, 
shared, altered, increased, affected by others, etc. – comes to occupy the central 
strategic focus of the co-creative enterprise (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010b: 
109). More precisely, the central task of the co-creative enterprise becomes one of 
“providing rewarding experiences for customers, employees, suppliers, and other 
stakeholders” (ibid: 104). Thus, essentially what has to be produced is experiences. 
However, as we have already seen, such experiences, as well as the products that 
help bring them about, cannot be produced unilaterally, but need to be shaped and 
developed with all participants while taking into consideration their respective 
metrics of value. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004b: 54, 2003) therefore identify the 
challenge that co-creating companies face as “experience innovation”. Moving the 
innovation focus from products to experiences furthermore entails a shift from the 
firm to what Prahalad and Ramaswamy call “experience environments” – that is, 
environments that the firm either sets up, as seen in the Threadless example above, 
or supports and encourages, as in the case of the sudden emergence of user-
communities organized around Lego Mindstorms.  
Finally, products themselves change characteristics. Since products are now 
merely vehicles through which experiences might be had, they have to take on a 
less substantial and final form if they are to provide adequate and continual support 
for such experiences. Thus, products not only have to be co-created with users, 
they also have to be designed in a way that allows for “evolvability, thus enabling 
future modifications and extensions based on consumers’ changing needs and 
firm’s changing capabilities” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 211).  
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Having attended to these problematizations of value and its creation, it is now 
possible to ask whether, and to what extent, a new and coherent notion of value 
creation can be seen to emerge from the reflections and theories set forth within 
Strategic Management Thought. This question becomes all the more pertinent 
given the fact that the discipline of Strategic Management Thought clearly 
understands the concept of value creation as one of its foundational concepts. We 
have seen how value creation has been increasingly removed from the firm, as the 
sole creator of value, and displaced into the world or ecosystem within which the 
firm exists. While in several ways the firm seems to have lost direct authority and 
control over what is created and by whom, this accompanying loss of control has at 
the same time also enabled a much more detailed attention to processes beyond the 
perimeters of the firm. The innovative capacity existing on the outside, or at the 
border of the firm, has thus generated an awareness as to the importance of 
facilitating, directing, and guiding what can no longer be directly controlled, but 
which nevertheless, exactly as a consequence of its unruliness, is described as an 
almost unimaginable source of innovation. With this transformation value creation 
has been cast along completely new lines.  
Still, the concept of value creation is indeed a slippery one. The abandonment 
of a common yardstick, according to which it would be possible to assess how 
much value has been created, indeed raises the question as to whether and to what 
extent it is even possible or meaningful to keep on insisting on the fabulous new 
world of value creation. Indeed, one could speculate that the continually increasing 
intensity with which the creation of value is revolutionized and invested with ever-
more dramatic characteristics covers over the hollowness or emptiness that is 
simultaneously produced at the analytical level by this rhetorical dramatization. 
More precisely, the way in which the co-creation vocabulary stretches the concept 
of value creation beyond its historically loaded connotations at the same time 
seems to generate problems of logical consistency. For instance, when it is 
maintained that value is co-created within a value creating system (Normann and 
Ramiréz 1993a) or within a value creating ecology (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 
2010a), and yet at the same time bound to the experience of a particular person, at 
a particular place, in a particular point in time (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b), 
this generates a certain tension, according to which it is perfectly legitimate to ask 
 142 
 
whether the insistence on the relational, the social ecosystem, and the joint creation 
of value is not hereby undercut by the re-installment of the individual’s experience 
as a central nexus of value creation?  
Though this vocabulary indeed presents problems that can be criticized not 
only from the perspective of other theories of value, but also from the tensions it 
generates within itself, the path followed in this chapter here has insisted on 
following a trajectory present within the development of Strategic Management 
Thought that presently seems to culminate in the co-creation vocabulary. This, of 
course, is not the same as stating that the whole area of Strategic Management 
Thought is caught up in this trajectory. As we have seen, authors within the field 
have raised warning flags regarding what they perceive to be analytically 
indefensible developments pertaining to much of the literature surveyed in this 
chapter (Foss 1997b: 359). Nevertheless, when even Michael Porter, whom one can 
reasonably count among the hardliners of the field, has recently begun to argue that 
companies have to begin to focus on ‘creating shared value’ (Porter and Kramer 
2011), a more encompassing normative redirection of the field of strategic 
management indeed seems to be taking place.  
For now, however, it is enough to take stock of the fact that central texts 
within Strategic Management Thought have started problematizing value creation 
through a co-creation vocabulary, and that in doing so, they have transformed the 
concept of value creation into value co-creation. As promised at the beginning of 
this chapter, we return to the complex continuity-discontinuity issue between 
hitherto reigning concepts of value creation and contemporary co-creation 
accounts, but attending to this issue must wait until the end of the next chapter.  
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
From labor to co-creation: 
Contemporary conceptualizations of value creation 
within Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how the trajectory of Strategic Management 
Thought from the 1980s through to the 1990s implied a transformation in the 
conceptualization of value creation. From Michael Porter’s early work on the value 
chain, and further on to the resource-based view and its core-competences and 
dynamic capabilities offspring, a trajectory was located that increasingly shifted the 
sources of value creation from the visible to the invisible, and from the center of 
the firm towards the periphery. At the same time, value creation was furthermore 
conceptualized as being ever more dependent upon innovation, just as its most 
important sources became increasingly immaterial and knowledge-dependent. With 
the introduction of the co-production and co-creation frameworks, this trajectory 
accelerated to the point of coming up against and problematizing deep-seated, 
foundational principles within the literature on strategic management. Thus, with 
the co-creation approach, the firm was displaced from its position as the sole 
creator of value, just as the consumer, inversely, was conceptualized as becoming 
more active and productive. With this foundational conceptual rearticulation, the 
notion of value creation itself became increasingly dependent on something outside 
the firm, something beyond the sphere of direct control.  
In this chapter a parallel development is tracked, only now with a focus on 
lines of thought and theorizing on value creation that on the one hand can be seen 
to be at odds with, if not downright hostile towards, Strategic Management 
Thought, while on the other also sharing assumptions with Strategic Management 
Thought regarding the contemporary sources and conditions of value creation. 
Thus, as already foreshadowed in the beginning of the previous chapter, an outline 
of the contemporary phenomenon of value co-creation is set forth here as this can 
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be seen to emerge from conceptualizations of value creation within certain strands 
of Autonomist Marxism (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Lazzarato 1996, 2004, 
2005, 2006; Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidson et al. 2008) and Critical 
Management Studies (Zwick et al. 2008; Willmott 2010; Le Ber and Branzei 2010; 
Böhm and Land 2009). In attending to this, we not only try to assess the various 
tensions and overlaps between the writers analyzed here and those of the previous 
chapter, we also take stock of some of the contemporary lines of thought that are 
utilized in trying to set forth new reflections on how value creation has 
transgressed the perimeters of the firm. Of special interest here are a wide and 
varied collection of social theorists, hackers, and legal scholars that have primarily 
been concerned with mapping the implications of how forms of online 
collaboration, enabled by new web-based technologies, have altered the conditions 
for the creation of value (Raymond 2001; Himanen 2001; Stallman 2002; Weber 
2004; Benkler 2006, 2011; Boyle 2008; Bollier 2008; Bruns 2009).  
While they are surely a rather heterogeneous group, the philosophers and 
social theorists presented here have all begun problematizing value creation. 
However, before explicitly attending to this, we firstly take a look at a recent special 
issue that has picked up on the delicate issue of critically engaging with the 
problem of value and its creation and, not least, wresting it out of the hands of 
Strategic Management Thought.  
What happened to the problem of value creation within Critical 
Management Studies? 
In the editorial of an Organization-special issue on “Value”, Prichard and Mir (2010: 
507-515) reflect upon what happened to considerations of value within Critical 
Management Studies. In the midst of the financial crisis, looming ecological 
disaster, and increasing public outrage aimed at large financial institutions, they ask 
the question as to why there has not been any scholarly concern with value within 
critically informed studies of organization and management. To illustrate this, 
Prichard and Mir mention (ibid: 509) that a 2008 conference for organization 
scholars on ‘Contemporary Critical Theories’ (covering a rather broad spectra of 
diverse theoretical approaches such as “Deconstruction and Politics, 
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Poststructuralist Political Theory, Perspectives in Discourse Analysis, Philosophy 
of Social Science, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Critical Theory”, etc.) did not 
include any papers which gave consideration to the “swirling economic crisis”. 
While this might at first sight be seen as excusable due to the huge number of areas 
investigated within critically informed studies on organization and management, 
Prichard and Mir use this as a prism to point to a more substantial neglect:  
This was not an isolated incident. A review of articles presented at the 
following year’s Critical Management Studies Conference, EGOS Conference, 
or the Critical Management Division at the Academy of Management shows a 
similar pattern. The major economic events of the day and the changing 
character of organized economic relations were almost absent from the key 
gatherings of the critically-inclined management and organization studies 
community. (ibid.) 
This absence of engagement with the economic crisis, in particular, and with 
foundational economic categories more generally, according to Prichard and Mir 
(ibid: 510), stems from a deep-seated and problematic situation by way of which the 
field of Critical Management Studies has thrown considerations of basic economic 
problems overboard, and instead concentrated on problems pertaining to identity, 
discourse, and power. Thus, instead of attending to fundamental economic 
questions, these studies have become hung up with other concerns, thereby more 
or less leaving explicit considerations of value and value creation to Strategic 
Management Thought in general, and the resource-based view in particular (ibid: 
510). This unfortunate situation, together with the social, political, and economic 
turmoil that has arisen in the midst of the financial crisis, thus calls for the field of 
Critical Management Studies to engage with “regimes of value creation, 
appropriation and distribution in society and in corporations” (ibid: 511). Taking 
this overall diagnosis as a worthwhile framing of the problems pertaining to value 
and its creation, we can use this special issue of Organization as a point of departure 
in order to further investigate how value creation has been problematized within 
lines of theorizing that are critical towards economics and management thought.  
Beginning from here, an important issue to attend to is how critically 
informed organization and management scholars question how value is created, 
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attributed, and shared within economic practices, as well as how this is reflected 
within and nourished by theories that give explicit attention to value. In the special 
issue referred to above, we find two direct attacks on some of the 
conceptualizations of value creation already attended to in the previous chapters. 
The first of these (Reinecke 2010) takes critical aim at the historically conceived 
subjective theory of value, and the way in which it operates in conjunction with the 
globally reigning process of market-determined price formation. By way of 
combining an ethnographic case study on fair-trade price setting with a theoretical 
lens developed in conversation with the French pragmatist sociological tradition 
elaborated by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), Reinecke argues for the merits of 
confronting the reigning market-based pricing model with a new theory of value 
that brings the otherwise hidden inequalities of the anonymous power game of the 
market out into the open. While acknowledging that fair-trade price setting clearly 
remains within the boundaries of capitalism (Reinecke 2010: 577), and indeed may 
even extend the capitalist process to the point of translating “’fairness’ into a 
standardized commodity”, Reinecke nevertheless maintains that fair-trade price 
setting constitutes a viable model for value creation and distribution that challenges 
conventional models, since it is capable of addressing and making visible all the 
messy political and social problems that are rendered imperceptible by the market 
process. By way of giving voice to multiple stakeholders in the organization of 
what actually constitutes a fair price, Reinecke points to how the fair-trade 
minimum price setting approach is capable of integrating concerns with justice by 
relying on multiple metrics of value referring to different regimes of worth.  
The other of these attacks (Le Ber and Branzei 2010) challenges the resource-
based view, which we came across in the previous chapter. More precisely, Le Ber 
and Branzei (2010: 599) seek to build a critical theory of value creation that picks 
up on essential insights from three critical streams of thought in order to develop 
“a counterpoint to” what the authors designate as “the unapologetically under-
socialized RBV.” The three streams of thought mobilized in this endeavor are: 
firstly, Marxism, feminism, and environmentalism; secondly, what the authors refer 
to as pragmatism, consisting especially of the thought of Mary Parker Follet; and 
thirdly, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. In bringing these diverse 
streams of thought together, Le Ber and Branzei build a theoretical model that 
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challenges the dominant resource-based and company-centric view and the way in 
which it disregards what they refer to as the beneficiary (that is, “the intended 
‘target’ of value creation” (ibid: 601)) in cross-sector value-creating partnerships. 
Besides adding to the already existing literature on cross-sector value creation, the 
authors (ibid: 621) intend to add “to the theoretical toolkit of RBV theorists by 
enabling them to anticipate and incorporate the multi-vocal beneficiary as a key (if 
still neglected) contributor to value creation.” This is crucial, the authors argue, 
since not “only has RBV so far remained largely silent on the social processes of 
value creation (…), but it also lacks the theoretical tool-kit to explore value creation 
from alternative standpoints” (ibid.).  
While both of these articles deliver much needed and highly interesting 
critiques of their respective points of attack – that is, the market as a fair price 
setting mechanism and the subjective theory of value on the one hand (Reinecke 
2010), and value creation in cross-sector partnerships and the resource-based view 
on the other (Le Ber and Branzei 2010) - the relevance of their criticisms for the 
purposes of this chapter, however, are limited. The reason for this is that both of 
them identify a problem that, in spite of its timeliness, is somehow displaced from 
the problem attended to here. More precisely, both of them find it highly 
problematic that the voices of central actors in the overall value creation process 
are suppressed within practical settings, and that this suppression is legitimized by 
the theories of contemporary economics in one instance and the resource-based 
view in the other. However, while the problem identification developed by 
Reinecke (2010) and Le Ber and Branzei (2010) is somehow besides the problem of 
value co-creation, their respective attempts at countering the analyzed instances of 
unfairness interestingly could be seen to run along and embrace some of the 
normative aspects associated with the co-creation vocabulary, as this has 
conceptually been surveyed in the last chapter. This is so because both of them 
argue for the necessity of exploding the narrow conception of value creation and, 
in its place, providing a more adequate and fair conceptual framework that gives a 
say to the silenced voices of those that are not taken into account within the 
reigning contemporary understandings of value creation. Thus, no matter whether 
social, political, and ecological concerns should be brought to a negotiation process 
of how fair-trade prices should be set, or whether the voice of the beneficiary in 
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cross-sector partnerships should be taken into account, there is mutual agreement 
that a range of otherwise neglected metrics should be brought forward and should 
play a much more important role – either to displace and provide an alternative to 
how value is conceived in accordance with the subjective theory of value, or to 
critique and add to the framework of the resource-based view.  
As a starting point of surveying how value co-creation is conceptualized 
within critically inclined organization and management studies, it is therefore 
worthwhile to take stock of how alternative proposals to a subjective theory of 
value on the one hand, and the resource-based view on the other, can be said to 
develop alternatives that both embrace important components of the co-creation 
vocabulary. This is not to state that the two articles are merely promoting an 
agenda already advanced and incorporated within the co-creation vocabulary of 
Strategic Management Thought. Clearly this is not the case, since the way in which 
the components associated with the co-creation vocabulary are utilized within 
Reinecke’s (2010) and Le Ber and Branzei’s (2010) respective contributions aims at 
highly divergent goals from those sought out within the Strategic Management 
Thought approach to co-creation. To take just one, albeit rather noteworthy, 
example: fair-trade price setting directly regulates the price of the commodity, 
whereas this is not the case with the Strategic Management Thought approach to 
co-creation. Hence, the important point being set forth here is not that of identity 
between these different texts, but rather that value creation is being problematized 
along parallel lines within Strategic Management Thought on the one hand, and 
critically inclined organization and management studies on the other; and that the 
conventional understandings of value creation that have previously dominated 
economics and Strategic Management Thought are viewed as being in need of 
replacement by new approaches that seek to embrace more voices, generate an 
ongoing dialogue between participants, and begin to explicitly concern themselves 
with conditions that reach beyond narrow economic calculations. In this sense, co-
creation begins to take on the characteristics of a new and potentially overarching 
solution that can be mobilized to further a range of different goals. As shown here, 
it can be used to further and nourish the competitiveness of corporations, enhance 
their innovation-potential, and utilize productive capacities outside their 
boundaries; and it can also be mobilized as a vocabulary with which one can 
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challenge conventional and previously reigning economic practices and 
understandings of value, and substitute for these alternative models that integrate 
and acknowledge actors that are otherwise overheard or squeezed out of the field 
of visibility. That Le Ber and Branzei (2010: 610) actually use the concept of co-
creation in their development of an alternative value creation model to that of the 
resource-based view, therefore merely gives nourishment to the hypothesis that the 
vocabulary of co-creation, and its associated normative guidelines, tends to 
become, to paraphrase Michel Callon (1986), an obligatory conceptual passage 
point that otherwise antagonistic or adversary lines of thought have to pass 
through in order to reach their heterogeneous goals. To substantiate this 
hypothesis more thoroughly, let us take a look at some critically informed studies 
of value and value creation as these have been developed within social theory, the 
Autonomist Marxism of Hardt and Negri, Lazzarato, and Arvidsson, and Critical 
Management Studies.  
More precisely, the outline of this chapter is as follows: firstly, we attend to 
how ‘the common’ has made a recent re-appearance as a rich social, political, 
economic, and cultural phenomenon that a heterogeneous group – ranging from 
social theorists, and legal scholars to Autonomist Marxists – ascribe a considerable 
weight to. We give special attention here to the way in which this notion of the 
common has been developed in accordance with new articulations of value 
creation in general, and co-creation in particular within the writings of the 
Autonomist Marxists. Secondly, this will pave the way for assessing how the 
thoughts relating to this have been taken up, built upon and criticized within 
Critical Management Studies. Finally, the chapter concludes by stating that the 
problematizations followed in this chapter and the previous one come together and 
give rise to the formation of an experience of the outside as a source of value 
creation; an experience which is expressed through the components making up the 
co-creation vocabulary. After accounting for this experience, Part One ends by 
mapping the implications that this has when seen against the backdrop of the 
history of value and value creation set forth in chapter one.  
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The common: from tragedy to innovation 
Within the last couple of decades a renewed interest in the notion of the common 
has come to occupy a central position in a wide range of discussions and 
theoretical debates (Lessig 2004; Benkler 2006, 2011; Bollier 2008; Boyle 2008). 
This renewed interest marks a wider transition, whereby scholars have rethought, 
reconceptualized and moved beyond the problem associated with the suboptimal 
allocation of scarce common resources that arose in the aftermath of the ecologist 
Garrett Hardin’s highly influential article “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). 
In this article, Hardin explains the tragedy of the commons by way of pointing to 
the necessary tragic outcome of a situation where a group of herdsmen share a 
common pasture open to all. “As a rational being”, Hardin states, “each herdsman 
seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he 
asks, ‘What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?’” 
(1968:1244). By way of making this calculation, each herdsman recognizes that the 
utility to be gained from adding another animal to his herd far exceeds the costs of 
doing so for him as an individual. This, however, results in a situation where each 
herdsman adds yet more animals to his herd, and continues to do so, with the 
result that the common pasture is eventually destroyed due to overgrazing. As a 
function of rational actions on the part of each herdsman, the tragedy is inevitable:  
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which 
all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in 
the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (ibid: 
1244).  
While Hardin’s problem was motivated originally by a Malthusian-inspired concern 
with global overpopulation, economists were quick to zoom in on these remarks 
and to generalize them in a way that went far beyond what the evidence assembled 
in Hardin’s article could bear (Harvey 2011: 101). Thus, in order to prevent 
suboptimal resource allocation and, more generally, the doom of humanity, one 
would either have to impose strict government regulation, or enclose the still 
remaining commons, that is, to make them into private property (cf. Frank 1997: 
595-8). As already hinted at, however, this view has been seriously challenged 
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within recent years. In order to point to merely one important instance that attests 
to the impact of the widespread questioning of such narrow understandings of the 
commons, it is worthwhile mentioning that even within the economics profession 
this challenge has been felt. While perhaps merely coincidental, it is nevertheless 
significant that in tandem with the financial crisis and with Allan Greenspan 
admitting that an economic system relying on self-interest perhaps was not working 
that well (Benkler 2011: 3-4), the political scientist Elinor Ostrom received the 
2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in economics for her long-lasting work on the 
commons. Her contribution was identified by the prize committee as challenging 
“the conventional wisdom” of economics “by demonstrating how local property 
can be successfully managed by local commons without any regulation by central 
authorities or privatization” (www.nobelprize.org). What was perhaps most 
significant in Ostrom’s work was that she pointed to several concrete instances 
where scarce, material, common-held resources were not necessarily destined to the 
tragic outcome described by Hardin. According to Ostrom (1990), a system relying 
on common-pool resources not only constitute a viable option to state regulation 
or the imposition of a market system, but might indeed make up a superior 
alternative in several instances.  
While Ostrom’s empirical cases often revolved around the sharing and mutual 
governance of geographically limited, material common resources to which 
outsiders could not easily gain access, many contemporary approaches, influenced 
by her writings (cf. Bollier 2008; Boyle 2008; Benkler 2011), have focused more 
explicitly on freely accessible, global commons, the production, sharing, and 
consumption of which have been made possible with the extension of the internet. 
It is indeed also in conjunction with the theoretical reflections on what 
characterizes this emerging web-based commons that we find recurring 
conceptualizations that stress how we are confronted here by a distinctly different 
mode of value creation that is not subject to a logic of scarcity, as was still the case 
with the commons described by Ostrom. Whether this new mode of value creation 
is called “The Great Value Shift” by way of which market-based value creation 
increasingly is supplemented with or replaced by a process of “socially created value” 
(Bollier 2008: 6, 122-144), whether it is depicted as the transformation of “the 
production value chain (…) to the point of [it] being entirely unrecognizable” 
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(Bruns 2009: 21), or whether it is simply referred to as a new “political economy” 
understood as “a system of sustainable value creation and a new set of governance 
mechanisms” (Weber 2004: 1), all of these diagnostic attempts agree upon the fact 
that this new mode of value creation works according to principles that are clearly 
discernible from those of the market on the one hand, and those of the hierarchy 
on the other.  
Thus, no matter whether we are dealing with open-source software 
development (Weber 2004; Raymond 2001), non-commercial, blog-based citizen 
journalism (Bruns 2009: 69-96), or some other form of decentralized ‘commons-
based peer production’, to use Yochai Benkler’s (2006: 60) preferred term, there is 
a growing recognition that in spite of its many heterogeneous instantiations, this 
commons constitutes “a new paradigm for creating value and organizing a 
community of shared interest” (Bollier 2008: 4). The “commoners”, as Bollier calls 
them, make up “new sorts of self-organized publics” that “share an enthusiasm for 
innovation and change that burbles up from the bottom” (ibid.). While initially 
detectable in relation to the development of free and open source software (ibid: 
23-41), this new mode of value creation has, since its early first appearances in the 
late 1970’s, gradually spread to other contexts and inspired them in their 
development of cultural and technical artifacts. In this sense, the creation of free 
and open source software has not only helped establish a new viable model of 
value creation that in several instances can be said to outperform proprietary 
software developed within huge corporations (Raymond 2001: 19-63), it has also 
revitalized and shifted the mode of evaluating the potential performance of 
commons-based production more generally. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, this success has even been extended so far as to be embraced by one of 
the world’s most influential management theorists, Gary Hamel, according to 
whom the management system of the successful business enterprise of tomorrow 
will resemble that of an open source community (Hamel 2009: 5). 
Due to the almost overwhelming impact of the new web-based commons, 
attention has also been focused on how best to secure the legal and institutional 
preconditions for the flourishing of the innovative potential associated with the 
bottom-up creativity flowing from these (Lessig 2004; Boyle 2008), just as scholars 
have made a more general case by showing “how cooperation” in a wide variety of 
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instances, including many off-line ones, “triumphs over self-interest”, to cite the 
subtitle of Yochai Benkler’s (2011) latest book. Thus, from Ostrom’s early work, to 
free and open source software, to Wikipedia and beyond, the notion of 
cooperation, relying on some kind of commons, has today shown its merits in so 
many concrete instances that scholars have begun to depict it as a viable mode of 
value creation that perhaps more generally can be used to replace systems 
organized around self-interest (Siefkes 2007; Benkler 2011).  
Conceptualizing value creation within Autonomist Marxism 
It is with abundant reference to these issues that a range of contemporary 
Autonomist Marxists (Hardt and Negri 2004: 339-40; Lazzarato 2004: 197-99; 
Arvidsson: 2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidsson et al. 2008) have begun to re-conceptualize 
how value is created today. However, whereas some of the social theorists 
considered above have plenty of empirical examples of commons-based value 
creation, some of them admit that there still are not “well-accepted theoretical 
models for understanding this new ‘socioeconomic space’” (Bollier 2008: 127). 
Thus, in spite of quite extensive descriptions of the way in which the commons 
operate, and in spite of explicitly linking this functioning with the concept of value 
creation, a more thorough attempt at confronting this through sustained 
elaborations utilizing a vocabulary where value creation is depicted as more than a 
headline is somewhat sought after. However, if this is the case within some of the 
above mentioned theories, one certainly comes across an almost overwhelming 
attempt at redescribing a new paradigm of value creation anchored in the 
commons within the works of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), Lazzarato 
(1996, 2004, 2006), and Arvidsson (2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidsson et al. 2008). While 
surely drawing upon and referencing the open source movement and other forms 
of concrete commons-based production mentioned above, the conceptualization 
of value creation within these more philosophically inclined lines of thought also 
moves considerably beyond such concrete instantiations of commons-based 
production. More precisely, whereas Benkler (2006, 2011), Bruns (2009), Weber 
(2004), Bollier (2008), and the other scholars referenced above, connected their 
lines of thought with quite concrete examples of particular commons, the 
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philosophers considered here inscribe this social force within a much more widely-
encompassing framework, the description of which is explicitly formulated in a 
value creation vocabulary that draws on and remains in dialogue with the classical 
value creation framework surveyed in chapter one. Since it is these attempts by 
contemporary philosophers and sociologists to re-conceptualize value creation that 
have provided important impulses to recent considerations within Critical 
Management Studies, an outline of their thoughts needs to be attended to before 
we move on to Critical Management Studies. In doing so, we firstly take a closer 
look at the writings of Lazzarato and Hardt and Negri, after which Arvidsson’s 
work is taken up.  
Throughout their trilogy – jointly authored over a period of ten years and 
consisting of Empire (2000), Multitude (2004), and Commonwealth (2009) – Hardt and 
Negri have sought to provide a new political-philosophical theorizing capable of 
addressing and combating the nature of postmodern capitalism. Through the 
mobilization of an eclecticism which utilizes thought ranging from Spinoza over to 
Marx and then on to Foucault, Deleuze, and Guattari (not to mention Negri’s own 
early writings from the 1970’s and onwards as well as their first jointly authored 
book, Labor of Dionysos (1994)), Hardt and Negri have continually sought to 
revitalize our philosophical, political and economic concepts in order to account 
for a range of contemporary problems associated with what they in Empire, 
following Gilles Deleuze (1995a: 177-82), call the transition from a disciplinary 
society to a control society (Hardt and Negri 2000: 22-30, 328-332, see also 1994: 
259-260; Hardt 1995). In conjunction with this epochal passage, as it has gradually 
come to pass after the Second World War (Deleuze 1995a: 178), we have witnessed 
a reorganization of the way in which power operates. More precisely, the power 
characteristic of disciplinary society’s confines – schools, armies, factories, etc. – 
has increasingly become crisis ridden and as a consequence of this, has been 
gradually replaced by new forms of flexible power capable of functioning outside of 
such enclosures (Hardt and Negri 2000: 24; Deleuze 1995a; 177-182). While this 
shift from discipline to control rests upon a somewhat problematic reading of 
Foucault – a reading that we will come back to at length in the next chapter – what 
is important for now is that Hardt and Negri tie this shift together with a change in 
the way in which value is created.  
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Hence, whereas in disciplinary societies the factory was the place of value 
creation, as well as exploitation, the new social configuration entails that value is 
created and extracted throughout the entire social field (Hardt and Negri 2000: 27-
30). Through a rather encompassing reconceptualization of some concepts initially 
developed by Foucault (cf. 2003b: 239-263) – a reconceptualization allegedly 
necessitated by the fact that Foucault was not capable of grasping the “real 
dynamics of production” (Hardt and Negri 2000: 28) – Hardt and Negri claim that 
power has become a biopower traversing and regulating all of life from within (ibid: 
24), just as production simultaneously has become biopolitical, reflecting the fact that 
it not only produces objects (such as cars or TVs) within specific and spatially 
restricted organizations, but also social life itself conceived in the broadest sense, 
including knowledge, language, and affects (ibid: 2000: 27-30, 290-294).  
Hardt and Negri join forces here with Lazzarato, who coined the concept 
immaterial labor (Lazzarato 1996: 132), and who also bases several of his analyses on 
Deleuze’s account of a transition from the disciplinary society to the control 
society (Lazzarato 2004, 2006). More precisely, Hardt and Negri argue that whereas 
industrial production and industrial labor were the basis of value creation within 
disciplinary society, immaterial or biopolitical production has become central to the 
creation of value today (2000: 290-294; Hardt and Negri 2004: 108-15, 2009: 132). 
Following Marx, they state that whereas industrial production was becoming 
dominant in a qualitative sense in the middle of the nineteenth century, today 
immaterial or biopolitical production is becoming dominant – not because there 
are no longer people working in factories, but because immaterial or biopolitical 
production is beginning to impose its mode of operating on more traditional forms 
of industrial labor (Hardt and Negri 2004: 109). With this new concept of 
production we not only begin to see a blurring of the boundaries between what is 
inside and outside the sphere of production as traditionally conceived, we also see a 
more severe critique of political economy’s foundational concepts, since the very 
notion of biopolitical production “indicates that the traditional distinctions 
between the economic, the political, the social, and the cultural become 
increasingly blurred” (ibid: 109; Lazzarato 2004: 187). How, then, does this 
immaterial or biopolitical production relate to the common, and how does it tie in 
with the problem of value creation more specifically? 
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What is characteristic of immaterial or biopolitical production is that its 
outcome is immaterial. On the one hand its products are knowledge, codes, 
information, language, and culture as can be seen in “labor that is primarily 
intellectual or linguistic, such as problem solving, symbolic and analytical tasks, and 
linguistic expressions” (Hardt and Negri 2004: 108). On the other hand, its 
products are affective, that is, smiling, caring, nurturing, and other sorts of affective 
qualities involved in the work of, for example, “legal assistants, flight attendants, 
and fast food workers (service with a smile)” (ibid., see also 2000: 292-4, 2009: 131-
137 as well as Lazzarato 1996: 132). These two major forms taken by biopolitical 
production are common in the sense that although they might be immediately 
describable as products of individual labor, the real basis for and outcomes of the 
production process depends upon and exceeds the individual, since he or she only 
becomes a producer from having recourse to something more foundational:  
Our common knowledge is the foundation of all new production of 
knowledge; linguistic community is the basis of all linguistic innovation; our 
existing affective relationships ground all production of affect; and our 
common social image bank makes possible the creation of new images. All of 
these productions accrue to the common and in turn serve as foundation for 
new ones. The common, in fact, appears not only at the beginning and the 
end of production but also in the middle, since the production processes 
themselves are common, collaborative, and communicative. (Hardt and Negri 
2004: 148)  
Thus, Hardt and Negri claim that value creation is becoming so intimately 
interwoven with social life itself that the latter “becomes a productive machine” 
(ibid.). While labor remains the source of value, the labor theory of value in all of its 
diverse forms is completely incapable of describing the creation of value today, 
since measuring value through time expended cannot account for the common 
nature of the biopolitical production of value (Hardt and Negri 2004: 145; 
Lazzarato 2004: 187). Rather, the value produced through biopolitical production is 
immeasurable, since there is no longer any common yardstick from which such a 
measure can be derived (Hardt and Negri 2000: 356-9; 2004: 146; 2009: 317; for a 
critique see Toms 2008).  
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Thus, in order to explain how value is created today we are in need of nothing 
less than a completely new understanding of economics that goes beyond any of its 
previously reigning forms. Hardt and Negri capture this by stating that economics 
“must become a biopolical science” (ibid: 157), where value “must refer to life activity 
as a whole” (Hardt and Negri 2009: 317, see also Lazzarato 1996: 146-147). In 
order to illustrate this, they claim that the contemporary regime of value creation 
ought to be depicted in analogy to Quesnay’s famous portrayal of the flow of the 
value substance in eighteenth century France. Thus, in order to depict value 
creation today we are in need of a new and revised Tableau Économicue that is 
capable of taking into account the inherently common nature of biopolitical 
production. Such an updated Tableau should be “able to describe where value is 
created and where it goes in the national and global economy” (Hardt and Negri: 
2004: 149, see also 2009: 285-290). 
Whereas labor in the nineteenth century was in need of capital to ensure the 
organization of co-operation (Marx 1976: 447), biopolitical or immaterial labor is 
capable of organizing itself without capital’s intervention (Lazzarato 1996: 137-8; 
Hardt and Negri 2009: 140-141). Thus, whereas capital was a precondition, though 
not a source, for the creation of value previously, this is no longer the case today. 
The free and essentially commons-based production has an autonomy to its mode 
of creating and organizing value that Lazzarato calls “cooperation between minds” 
(2004: 187) and Hardt and Negri call “singularities acting in common” (2004: 204, 
348-9). Looming in the background here is Deleuze’s notion of a qualitative 
multiplicity (Deleuze 2002a; Deleuze and Guattari 2002) that, in the hands of the 
Autonomists, is translated into a distinctly political-economic (and to some extent 
also quite a normative) concept that stands as the real and most important source 
of value creation today. This should be seen in conjunction with the fact that Hardt 
and Negri, as well as Lazzarato, more fundamentally can be said to translate central 
concepts from Deleuze’s ontology into their respective, yet overlapping, value 
creation vocabularies. Thus, besides relying on the epochal passage identified in 
Deleuze’s essay on the control societies, they simultaneously also qualify their 
descriptions of the foundations of value creation with concepts such as difference 
(Deleuze 1983, 1994), repetition (Deleuze 1994), and event (Deleuze 1990b), as 
these are developed within a range of Deleuze’s works (see also Deleuze and 
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Guattari 1996, 2002). While the uptake and utilization of Deleuze’s philosophical 
concepts in Hardt and Negri’s work surely plays an important role (see for example 
Hardt and Negri 2000: 25, 28; 2009: 59-63) (something which is furthermore 
underlined by the fact that Hardt and Negri claim that Deleuze and Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaues together with Marx’s Capital have “served as models” for them in 
their writing (2000: 415, note 4)), it is nevertheless Lazzarato who utilizes this 
Deleuzian inspired vocabulary most explicitly, when he for example refers to the 
new conditions for the creation of value as “the paradigm of difference” (2004: 
201), or when he depicts labor as “a set of events”, and the organization of labor as 
“literally ‘difference and repetition’” (ibid: 192). However, the important thing here 
is not to begin a long exegesis of Deleuze’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s) concepts. 
Rather, what is significant is the fact that value creation begins to take on several of 
the connotations already detected in the previous chapter. Even though Lazzarato, 
Hardt and Negri utilize a much more philosophical vocabulary, their conceptual 
specification of value creation tends to converge with those set out within Strategic 
Management Thought. This not only shows up in an overlap between what is 
identified as the sources of value, but it also shows up when the notion of co-
creation is utilized to conceptualize the characteristics of the immaterial production 
constituting the cooperation between minds.   
 
The power of co-creation 
What is characteristic of this cooperation between minds, these singularities acting 
in common, this productive multiplicity (and here Lazzarato uses the development 
of free software as an example to make a more general point) is that “it expresses a 
power of co-creation and co-realization” (Lazzarato 2004: 197). It relies on the 
creative collaboration between minds and commonly shared ‘materials of 
production’ consisting of language, science, web infrastructure, etc. This co-creation, 
also referred to as co-production (ibid: 207-8), is the inherently creative and inventive 
force constituting the real dynamics of commons-based value creation today. By 
way of collaborating, by way of ‘co-adapting’, the forces inherent in co-creation 
generate “a new plane of immanence” and “discover ‘a way not yet paved’” (ibid: 207). 
These singularities acting in common thus co-create and invent something that 
goes beyond their immediate capacities. In joining forces they remain singular, yet 
 159 
 
at the same time come together in an event from which “series of possible worlds” 
flow (ibid: 197, 207).  
For the purposes of this chapter, it is quite significant that Lazzarato gives a 
prominent place to the notion of co-creation. To be more precise, in the text 
“From Capital-Labour [sic] to Capital-Life” (originally a chapter in his book Les 
Révolutions du Capitalisme), the concept of co-creation is used five times (2004: 197-
199), while the associated, if not equivalent, concept of co-production is used six times 
(ibid: 206-207). Just as the strategic management scholars began to conceptualize 
co-production (Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Ramírez 1999) and co-
creation (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Ramaswamy 
and Guillart 2010a, 2010b) as the overarching new paradigm of value creation that 
goes beyond that of the firm-centric value chain approach, Lazzarato equally 
utilizes these concepts in his portrayal of the workings of the cooperation between 
minds. In this sense, there is a fundamental agreement on the concepts utilized to 
express the new nature of value creation within these otherwise diverging regimes 
of thought. As should be clear from the presentation above this is not merely a 
superficial agreement. Thus, whereas Prahalad, Ramaswamy, and Gouillart claim 
that value creation can no longer be confined within the boundaries of the firm, 
that it moves outside into the social ecosystem within which the firm operates, this 
argument runs along the same lines as those framing it through the explosion of 
the disciplinary organization, and the emergence of decentralized, immaterial or 
biopolitical production.1 Similarly, when a growing recognition is established by the 
                                            
1 Here, it is worth noting that the outside is a complex concept which Hardt and Negri utilize in 
several, rather different, ways. It is possible to detect, at least, three different usages. First of all, 
value creation, as well as power, has moved outside disciplinary enclosures, as has been described 
above. Secondly, the transition to a society of control also entails that power, on a macro scale, 
has become all pervasive, such that there is no longer a place outside of what Hardt and Negri (2000: 
xiv-xv) call Empire. Nevertheless, and this is the third way in which the concept is used, the 
modern creative proletariat, ‘the multitude’, is to rise up from within, to liberate itself from the 
rule established by Empire and, in so doing, to constitute “new bodies outside of exploitation” 
(ibid: 410, emphasis added). Across and within these different usages of ‘the outside’, looms a deep-
seated philosophical problematic (see for example Deleuze 1988: 94-123) that Hardt and Negri 
utilize in their own way.  
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Strategic Management theorists that the new value creating social ecology is 
permeated by spontaneously self-forming processes (outside as well as within the 
firm), this can be seen in close conjunction with the fact that immaterial or 
biopolitical labor has a capacity to organize itself. Indeed, this capacity for self-
organization is so encompassing that it “seems to provide the potential for a kind 
of spontaneous and elementary communism”, as Hardt and Negri state (2000: 
294).  
Furthermore, whereas the focus on innovation and the transgression of the 
already established is identified as the most important precondition of and path to 
value creation within Strategic Management Thought, this is to a large extent also 
stressed within the Autonomists’ texts, where the innovation-emphasis runs along 
the same lines (see for example Hardt and Negri 2000: 411, 2004: 338). In the 
perspective developed by Hardt, Negri, and Lazzarato, however, this innovation-
emphasis is additionally developed in conjunction with more philosophically 
inclined concepts such as event, difference, new plane of immanence, series of 
possible worlds, etc. Finally, stressing the immaterial sources, means, and outcomes 
of value creation is also a trait shared on both sides (cf. Terranova 2000: 46). While 
the Strategic Management scholars talk here about ‘external competences’ and 
‘immaterial assets’ as things that must be mobilized in order to create deeply 
valuable experiences for all implicated in the value co-creation process, Lazzarato, 
Hardt and Negri stresses the immateriality of knowledge, language, codes, etc. that 
serve as the substrate, means, and products of the creation of value.  
Such parallelisms, or points of convergence, however, are not stated in order 
to claim that the vocabularies of Strategic Management scholars on the one hand, 
and contemporary Autonomist Marxists on the other, are completely identical. 
Indeed, there is one highly significant point which so far has been neglected in this 
chapter, namely the notion of who captures the value produced. Thus, if we shift the 
perspective from the sources of value and its creation to that of the appropriation 
of what is produced, a highly conflictual situation comes to the fore. On the one 
hand, this conflictual situation is actually recognized by Prahalad, Ramaswamy, and 
Gouillart as the challenge brought about by the fact that the firm is collaborating 
with people outside the firm, in order to ‘augment the size of the pie’, while 
simultaneously competing with them for the fruits of this collaborative relationship 
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(Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b: 122). Co-creation, in this line of thought, 
therefore both entails a collaborative mode of value creation and a significant, 
though rhetorically downplayed, struggle over who can reap the monetary rewards 
of the jointly created value. This particular fusion of collaboration and competition 
is thus a form of ‘co-opetition’ (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Hearn and 
Pace 2006: 61).  
On the other hand, this conflictual situation is reflected by Lazzarato, Hardt 
and Negri as a new and far reaching exploitation not only of the labor performed 
within the organization, but as an exploitation that capitalizes on the common 
process of co-creation. In essence, this new exploitation works by “putting life to 
work” (Lazzarato: 2004: 205) and by doing so, it actually obstructs and decreases the 
value-creating capacities of the cooperation between minds. Thus, the firm, instead 
of being a partner in co-creation, is viewed here as an illegitimate parasite or 
adversary that obstructs co-creation by imposing private property in the form of 
intellectual property rights on what is commonly created (ibid: 204-5). From this 
perspective, co-creation - or co-production - is viewed as the unpolluted 
cooperation and creation of value that is exploited by corporations. In this sense, 
the common, the process of co-creation, is taking the place labor had previously 
held within political economy. It is becoming the source of value creation and it is 
becoming that which is exploited in contemporary capitalism.  
However, whereas the value created by labor as analyzed by Smith, Ricardo, 
and Marx was clearly restricted to production, this is not the case with commons-
based co-created value, since value is created throughout the circuit of production, 
circulation, and consumption, to the extent that these notions can be maintained as 
proper designators of the circuits within which value is created today (Lazzarato 
2004: 199; cf. Bruns 2009: 21). Furthermore, just as value co-creation cannot be 
understood through a labor theory of value, neither can it be understood through 
the paradigm of a subjective theory of value.  
Now, with the emergence of co-creation as a new paradigm of value creation, 
proponents of Strategic Management Thought, as well as the Autonomist Marxists, 
find both of these historically competing conceptions inadequate. Thus, the 
longstanding struggle between proponents of a labor theory of value and a market-
based understanding of value creation is with the emergence of co-creation swept 
 162 
 
away in favor of a completely new understanding of value creation. In spite of their 
differences as to whether the firm is to be seen as a central and legitimate 
contributor to the co-creation process or whether it is rather to be seen as an 
illegitimate parasite and obstruction to the development of singularities acting in 
common, the value created through co-creation is conceptualized within both of 
these otherwise adversary traditions as being dependent upon: that which comes 
from the outside; that which comes from below and has a spontaneous self-organizing 
capacity to it; and that which brings about the transgression of what already exists 
through its innovative, and immaterial production.  
Though essentially agreeing upon these specifications of value creation, there 
still seems, however, to be an insurmountable difference between their respective 
understandings of how the co-creation of value is best organized. While the 
strategy theorists find it unproblematic that the firm profits from the co-creation of 
value, the Autonomists view this private appropriation of what is co-created not 
only as illegitimate, but also as obstructing and destroying the true common 
sources of value creation. The question therefore becomes whether and to what 
extent co-creation as conceptualized within Strategic Management Thought on the 
one hand, and the Autonomist tradition on the other, can be brought together 
within a more systematic account? Or more specifically, is it possible, for example, 
to conceptualize customer co-creation and the development of free and open 
source software as belonging to the same economy, to the same mode of value 
creation? 
Co-creation as part of an ethical economy 
One important place where questions such as these has been taken up is within the 
writings of Adam Arvidsson. Throughout a number of articles he has proposed the 
concept of an ethical economy (Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010; Arvidsson et al. 2008). 
With this he designates the emergence of a new economy that is not only 
irreducible to capitalism, but might indeed be seen as a post-capitalistic form of value 
creation (Arvidsson 2009). While it is still uncertain how much of an impact this new 
ethical economy will have on contemporary societies (Arvidson et al. 2008: 16-18), 
it is nevertheless proposed that this new form of value creation “might become 
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hegemonic” within the “economic ecology of the information society”, and if it 
does, that “would amount to nothing less than a mutation in the dominant value 
form” (Arvidsson 2010: 638). However, while it remains irreducible to capitalism, 
has its own distinct mode of value creation, and in important ways remain opposed 
to capitalist value-creating practices, this ethical economy is nevertheless also 
detectable and plays an increasingly important role within more conventional 
valorization processes. But before turning to this, the characteristics of this ethical 
economy are outlined below. 
Arvidsson sets forth the notion of an ethical economy in order to depict how 
ethically significant relationships have come to occupy the center of value creation 
processes in such a profound way that it has now become appropriate to provide 
this economy with a name of its own. Ethics is here understood as being related to 
the problem of how free men and women can find ways of constructing a 
community (Arvidsson et al. 2008: 11). The ethics in the ethical economy are 
therefore  
less about the elaboration of universal moral laws (such as the Kantian 
imperative) and more about creating the values and norms that keep a 
particular web of social relations together. Ethics is about producing however 
transitory forms of communion (Arvidsson 2010: 638).  
At the center of the value creation processes of the ethical economy is the 
production of what Arvidsson (2008: 33), with reference to Lazzarato, designates 
as an “ethical surplus.” The production of this ethical surplus is what drives the 
ethical economy, as this can be seen not only in social production processes outside 
the firm, such as for example open-source programming, organizing underground 
parties, or customer coproduction (Arvidsson 2008), but also within firms, as this 
can be seen with the increasing importance of employees’ “ability to network, share 
knowledge and (…) to co-create a good working environment” (Arvidsson et al. 
2008: 10). The ethical economy is therefore not to be viewed as something that is 
outside of capitalism, but rather as a distinct new form of value creation that is 
discernible both within and outside private, as well as public, organizations.  
What is significant in this account is that it brings several of the above 
presented positions and problems pertaining to value creation together. According 
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to Arvidsson (2008), what motivates customers, or outsiders in general, to 
participate in processes of co-creation (as in the examples of Threadless or Lego 
presented in chapter two) is identical to what motivates programmers to spend 
their “evening hours coding away at the Linux kernel” (Arvidsson 2009: 22). In this 
sense, we see the problems pertaining to co-creation as explored within Strategic 
Management Thought being brought together with those of the above-described 
contributions on commons-based production (Benkler 2006; Boyle 2008; Weber 
2004) and immaterial labor (Lazzarato 1996, 2004; Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004). 
To illustrate the difference between value creation within the ethical economy 
and its capitalist counterpart, Arvidsson (2008: 331-333) uses the examples of the 
development of software, as this is organized within Microsoft on the one hand, 
and Linux on the other. People who develop software for Microsoft have to be 
paid, just as they have to be controlled by managers who, on their part, are also 
paid for their supervision of the employees. Following this, Microsoft sells its 
products  
at a price that is roughly related to the investments of such salaried labor 
(research, development, programming, debugging, etc.). And the company 
struggles mightily to uphold the juridical status of the artificial property rights 
that allow it to charge such a price (Arvidsson 2008: 332; cf. also Lazzarato 
2004: 197-198).  
In contrast to this, Linux does not rely on salaried labor. Indeed, labor is abundant 
(Arvidsson 2009: 19), and the problem is therefore not attracting sufficient 
amounts of labor to ensure the development of the software, but to keep labor out 
and only to accept the contributions of those who are highly capable programmers. 
Accordingly,  
the (…) management model of Linux is extremely wasteful in relation to 
labor time. People are allowed to do what they want and to initiate projects of 
their own. Management has neither the interest nor the mandate to intervene. 
The result is a number of half-finished projects, most of which amount to 
nothing. Such a management style would be completely inconceivable if labor 
power had a value (Arvidsson 2008: 332). 
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As we saw above, what is conceived of as being valuable within this alternative 
economy is not money, since money does not enter the picture, but the production 
of an ethical surplus. What motivates people instead of money is the social 
recognition we get from those considered to be our significant peers on the one 
hand, as well as a sense of purposefulness, enjoyment, playfulness and self-
realization on the other (Arvidsson 2008: 332, 2009: 20; Stallman 2002). In the case 
of free and open-source software, this is “the ineffably geeky joys of writing the 
slickest code you can” and at the same time having your contribution recognized 
by other programmers within the community as a “code that represents an elegant 
solution to a complex problem” (Dibbel quoted in Arvidsson 2008: 332). Richard 
Stallman comes close to making the same claim, when he states that “what most 
‘hacks’ have in common is playfulness, cleverness, and exploration. Thus, hacking 
means exploring the limits of what is possible, in a spirit of playful cleverness. 
Activities that display playful cleverness have ‘hack value’” (Stallman 2002: 17, note 
1; see also Raymond 2001: 61). 
Owing to this, the value of such contributions cannot be said to merely reside 
in the ‘product’. First of all, there is never a finished product, but rather a 
processual and always ongoing production process (Arvidsson 2008: 332; cf. Bruns 
2009: 21). Secondly, the value produced is as much a function of the community 
creating process itself, i.e. the work done in collaboration whereby the community 
organizes itself as a community (Arvidsson 2008: 333). For this latter reason, 
people who are capable of contributing to community-building processes in 
significant ways are highly valued within the community. Thus, being able to 
organize and to attract community contribution and being able to manage self-
management, generate peer respect and are ascribed significant value (Raymond 
2001: 52-53). The ability to build strong, affective ties between the members of the 
community amounts to the creation of value in this ethical economy. Hence, what 
creates value is “an ability to organize (…) and give direction, purpose and 
coherence to” a productive flow coming from the bottom-up. In the case of Linux, 
it is “the managerial genius of Linus Torvalds and his colleagues, who have built a 
social organization able to channel these diffuse energies into the completion of 
such a task”, that is the most valuable contribution (Arvidsson 2009: 19). Thus, 
Arvidsson (2008: 333) states that the ethical economy has its own currencies in the 
 166 
 
form of networks and respect/reputation: Whereas networks are a quantitative measure 
according to which it can be assessed “how many people” one has an impact on 
and matters to, reputation  
is a measure of the quality of that impact: essentially, it reflects a person’s 
ability to contribute to a particular scene, both by creating actual products 
(…) and, more important, by strengthening the scene itself by (…) 
contributing to its productive organization.  
While being distinct, these two currencies nevertheless “tend to converge in a 
mutually reinforcing process,” just as they begin to function as “a kind of capital – 
ethical capital – that makes it possible to initiate and organize productive processes.” 
It is exactly due to the fact that the ethical economy has its own value form and its 
own currencies that its production and operations are irreducible to capitalism 
(Arvidsson 2008, 2009). However, this does not mean that the ethical economy is 
not entering into close circuits with capitalism. Thus, on the one hand, the powers 
of social production can be utilized to enhance the profits of a corporation, as for 
example within processes of customer co-creation. But on the other hand, capital 
can also be utilized to enhance our ethical standing within a community, as when 
DJs or promoters organize parties, where the aim is not to make a profit, but to 
create a great event where costs and revenues, ideally, break-even (Arvidsson 2009: 
21). However, no matter which concrete and multiple connections these two 
different economies may entertain with one another, for Arvidsson it is clear that 
the ethical economy has begun to play an increasingly central role that is not only 
detectable when it functions relatively autonomously (as, for instance, in relation to 
the development of free and open-source software), but also as can be seen from 
the way in which the pressure from the ethical economy forces capitalism to begin 
to adjust itself to a range of social demands such as, for instance, corporate social 
responsibility, fair-trade, sustainable production, etc.  
Now, having attended to how co-creation has made its forceful appearance as 
a prevalent contemporary vocabulary through which value creation is expressed 
within these streams of Autonomist Marxism, we now finally turn to how these 
discussions have been taken up by scholars within Critical Management Studies. 
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Co-creation within Critical Management Studies 
While discussions within Critical Management Studies have picked up on these 
themes in rather significant ways that we explore below, it is necessary first to point 
to debates on the creation of value preceding and informing the uptake of the 
above-investigated thoughts. This is so because debates about the appropriateness 
of viewing knowledge as a contributor to the creation of value (Kenney 1997; 
Jacques 2000), and how such a view is to be seen as compatible with the labor 
theory of value, had already been an important point of investigation within Critical 
Management Studies at the time of the publication of Hardt and Negri’s Empire. 
This issue was not least developed by Jacques (2000), who argued for the necessity 
of a knowledge theory of value that was capable of accounting for the way in which 
knowledge could be seen to be a source of value. While the labor theory of value, 
according to Jacques, was quite apt at describing the value creation processes of 
industrial capitalism, the contemporary landscape of production has changed to 
such an extent that significant value creation processes are neglected if viewed 
through a Marxian-inspired lens. Thus, Jacques proposes that while “the labour [sic] 
theory was an appropriate metaphor for the epoch of a machine production which 
produced it, perhaps a knowledge theory is needed for understanding the emergent 
epoch” (ibid: 213). In order to illustrate the shortcomings of a traditional labor 
theory of value, Jacques not merely points to the fact that it would not be able to 
give a satisfactory account of how to measure “the value to a fishing trawler of a 
radar system that senses fish that unaided humans would not know were there” 
(ibid: 212), he also states that knowledge-workers, such as managers, accountants, 
product developers and marketers, usually considered to be central cogs in the 
machine expropriating value created by laborers, also have to be taken into account 
as contributing to the process of value creation (ibid: 211-212). Accordingly, 
Jacques calls for a new theory of value that gives knowledge, and especially the 
creation of new knowledge in the form of learning, a significant place. 
While the proposal to replace the labor theory of value with a knowledge 
theory of value was surely objectionable from a Marxian inspired perspective, it 
was also criticized from other sources (see Willmott 2000; Hull 2000; Chumer 
2000; and Prichard 2000 for objections to Jacques’ proposal). Thus, Willmott 
(2000), for example, questioned whether the basic foundations of capitalism had 
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changed to such an extent that a knowledge theory of value was to be set forth as 
an adequate response. In raising this issue, Willmott pointed to the fact that what 
had changed the most was perhaps not the underlying economic reality, but rather 
the “regime of truth” made up by the widespread managerial discourses on what 
constituted the nature and sources of value creation (ibid: 222, note 4). From these 
disputes also came proposals that recognized insights from Jacques’ proposal of a 
knowledge theory of value, and yet at the same time withdrew from a full embrace 
of this position. Jaros (2007), for instance, has argued for a balanced position that 
both seeks to take important insights from a knowledge theory of value on board, 
while at the same time restricting a complete embracement of such a theory. Even 
if the labor theory of value has its shortcomings, and a knowledge theory of value 
in some instances would be better equipped at explaining contemporary value 
creation, processes of labor exploitation nevertheless still takes place on a major 
scale, not least outside North America and the EU. Thus, low-paid Mexican auto-
workers and “teenage girls” working in sweatshops “in Bangladesh or Vietnam (…) 
can hardly be called ‘knowledge-workers’ and it is likely that labor, not knowledge, 
is what is being leveraged to produce value-added in these production processes” 
(Jaros 2007: 412-3). 
Discussions such as these had therefore already prefigured the way in which 
knowledge, immaterial labor, and biopolitical production could eventually be taken 
up within Critical Management Studies. However, in spite of the fact that these 
early discussions clearly should be seen as important forerunners for the reception 
of Autonomist Marxism, their focus of attention still remained relatively confined 
to the context of the workplace, thereby essentially bypassing the ever more 
prevalent externalized and common nature of immaterial production, cooperation 
between minds, and the ethical economy stressed by Hardt and Negri, Lazzarato, 
and Arvidsson. This is perhaps no surprise, since these early debates within Critical 
Management Studies were largely carried out within, or in close dialogue with, the 
tradition of labor process theory that since Braverman’s (1974) foundational 
contribution had taken up and further elaborated Marx’s early study of the labor 
process, organized within the factory as the locus of value creation and 
exploitation.  
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It is exactly at the intersection of these two traditions – labor process theory 
and Autonomist Marxism – that Böhm and Land (2009) claim we have to 
understand the process of the co-creation of value. More precisely, Böhm and 
Land argue that labor process theory and the Autonomist Marxism of Lazzarato, 
Arvidsson, and Hardt and Negri can mutually complement and enrich one another 
in the analysis of how value is created today. Since both of these traditions are 
identified as having their respective strengths and shortcomings, the combination is 
proposed to be one where the fusion of the respective strengths has a potential to 
remedy the otherwise separate shortcomings. While Labor Process Theory 
throughout the last thirty years has revolved around investigating “the struggles 
between capital and labour [sic] in the capitalist workplace”, and the way in which 
these struggles are inseparably tied to the formation of surplus value (Böhm and 
Land 2009: 4), the thoughts of Lazzarato, Arvidsson, Hardt and Negri have 
brought much needed attention to how contemporary value creation exceeds the 
spatial and temporal boundaries of the workplace. From this Böhm and Land 
suggest that an adequate contemporary understanding of value creation would have 
to be conceived as one where the attention to managerial control, exploitation, and 
organization, as this is analyzed within Labor Process Theory, should be brought to 
bear on the tendency by way of which the creation of value is no longer restricted 
to the workplace, but also encompasses a diverse range of cultural-economic 
practices such as the consumption of brands, for example. Böhm and Land claim 
(2009: 12-13) that the combination of these two respective streams of thought can 
be successfully carried out by attending to something both of them have thrown 
overboard, namely Marx’s labor theory of value and what they term ‘the new 
hidden abode of production’, that is, the new, largely invisible value-creating sphere 
that exists outside the organization. Through this analytical operation it becomes 
possible to maintain the problematic of exploitation of the new consumer-
producers, while at the same time extending this problematic beyond the confines 
of the organization. This analytical operation also helps establish a starting point 
for future research, including much needed empirical studies of “the new control 
mechanisms and regimes of measurement that render labour in the social factory 
determinate” (ibid: 14).  
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This analysis ties in with other equally critical approaches that have also 
pointed to the inherently exploitative nature of co-creation. Also drawing on 
Autonomist Marxism, Zwick et al. (2008) have provided an account of how the 
emergence of co-creation represents a new governmental logic by way of which 
marketers have cleverly transformed consumers into producers. According to 
Zwick et al. (2008: 168), co-creation therefore “represents an effort to re-
operationalize the key drivers of economic growth, innovation and new product 
development, by bringing within the confines of the company walls an 
autonomous, unpaid and creative consumer workforce.” However, just as in Böhm 
and Land’s (2009) article, the examples drawn on here are also primarily centered 
around how consumers are mobilized within a marketing setting developed by 
corporations, thereby essentially bypassing discussions about what Lazzarato has 
called the power of co-creation, or co-production, inherent in the production, 
distribution and consumption of free and open source software.  
Reflecting on this issue, Humphreys and Grayson (2008) claim that there has 
been a tendency in the literature to conflate the two meanings of co-creation or co-
production. In order to counter this, they propose the separate concepts of 
“collective production” and “company-consumer production”. “Collective 
production”, they state, “can and often does take place without company 
involvement, whereas company-consumer production is a collaboration between 
an organization and its consumers” (ibid: 15). By way of utilizing Marx’s distinction 
between use value and exchange value, Humphreys and Grayson (ibid: 15-16) argue 
that what is significant is not so much the wide-spread and generalized claim that 
producers and consumers are becoming indistinguishable. Rather, the significant 
difference is to be established by the demarcation provided by those who create 
use value on the one hand, and those who create exchange value on the other: if 
users collaborate to create use values, no significant change has occurred in relation 
to a value creating problematic; however, if consumers are leveraged to create 
exchange value, we do begin to see a blurring that “raises novel normative and 
ethical issues” (ibid: 16). 
Within conceptualizations such as these (Böhm and Land 2009; Zwick et al. 
2008; Humphreys and Grayson 2008), value co-creation therefore really does not 
alter the foundational notion of value and the way it is created. By way of utilizing 
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Autonomist Marxism, value creation, while no longer restricted to the workplace, 
has merely been spatially relocated so that it now takes place throughout the ‘social 
factory’. However, while utilizing the thought of Lazzarato, Arvidsson, and Hardt 
and Negri, the potential subversiveness of the cooperation between brains, 
singularities acting in common, and the ethical economy is considerably 
downplayed, if not labeled outright as “entirely fantastic” and “hopelessly utopian” 
(Böhm and Land 2009: 7, 14). From the outset, co-creation is therefore viewed as a 
range of practices that cleverly extracts the value created by consumer-producers, 
turns it into capital, and rhetorically presents it as a fair, empowering and win-win 
process. This latter element is significantly nourished by the fact that not only 
popular strategic management texts, such as those analyzed in the last chapter, but 
also cultural and media studies more generally, are fusing the groundbreaking 
claims of paradigm shifts, enhanced creativity, communality, and decentralized 
decision-making with the promotion of business interests and capitalization on the 
value co-created (Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009). Thus, instead of embracing co-
creation, what we are in need of is “a more critical awareness of the socioeconomic 
implications” of co-creation (ibid: 870-871), just as we need to attend to the way in 
which new techniques and modes of managing and controlling this new 
decentralized and creative source of value creation actually turns customer co-
creation into capital. 
This is exactly what Willmott (2010) has provided in his article “Creating 
‘value’ beyond the point of production: branding, financialization and market 
capitalization”. Here he gives an account of how “value creation extends to the 
sphere of circulation where the labour [sic] of unwaged user-consumers is seen to 
participate in providing the content” that companies translate into privately 
appropriable wealth (2010: 518). In doing so, Willmott gives an account of how the 
full economic circuit from customer co-creation and the building of brand equity 
translates into brand value – something which constitutes a significant percentage 
of the stock value of contemporary corporations. Contrary to Böhm and Land 
(2009), Willmott does not seek to defend a Marxian perspective. Instead, his 
ambition is to give an account of how co-creation is being leveraged to create value 
through what he designates as a post-Marxist perspective that relies on the notion 
of “ethico-political complexes” (Willmott 2010: 518). With this notion Willmott, 
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on the one hand, abstains from conceptualizing value as something that has an 
essence that can be accounted for outside specific, historically varying complexes 
(ibid: 520-521), while on the other hand, he utilizes this notion to give an account 
of how co-creation can be analyzed as a process contributing to value creation 
within a contemporary setting where user-consumers contribute to the creation of 
brand equity. Willmott therefore makes a rather detailed and noteworthy 
description of a process that in several of the above mentioned texts had merely 
been postulated or implied, but not unfolded. At the same time he does this 
without scientific presumptions whereby a notion of value would have to be 
grounded in some particular theory of value.  
While Willmott’s (2010) attempt at investigating value creation without 
grounding it in a specific theory of value represents an interesting move, whereby it 
distinguishes itself from most of the other texts investigated above; at the same 
time, it nevertheless still confirms that co-creation has become a significant source 
of value creation within our contemporary setting. In this sense, the notion of 
‘ethico-political complexes’ does indeed make it possible to bypass questions of 
false consciousness and their associated problems, but this does not change the fact 
that even this “post-structuralist, post-foundationalist approach” (Willmott 2010: 
520) explicitly attends to the way in which co-creation – within a particular ethico-
political complex – begins to be depicted as a prism through which contemporary 
discussions of value creation increasingly must pass. 
Formation of an experience: The outside as a source of value creation 
Whether co-creation can or cannot be grounded in a specific theory of value, 
whether it holds the potential to overthrow capitalism, or whether it is simply 
reducible to an extension of the exploitative mechanism now also encompassing 
the value-creating capacities of creative consumer-producers, what is significant is 
that all the conceptualizations investigated so far – from the strategy scholars to the 
social theorists, the Autonomist Marxists, and the critical management scholars – 
begin to problematize value creation through a co-creation vocabulary. In all of the 
surveyed problematizations, the outside has risen as a key contributor to value 
creation. Several questions therefore arise: How come this is so? How can it be that 
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theorists and scholars holding directly opposing views on core political and 
economic issues all begin to discuss value creation through the concept of co-
creation? Why is it that, in spite of their differences, these theorists are united in an 
attempt at coming to terms with contemporary conditions of value creation by 
describing these within a co-creation vocabulary? Before we leave Part One behind, 
it is necessary to take stock of these questions, and to map the implications of the 
analysis undertaken throughout the preceding chapters.  
In so doing, it is first of all obvious that the concept of co-creation has 
become a site of fierce intellectual disputes. Thus, the fact that the concept, and the 
connotations attached to the concept, has surfaced within such heterogeneous 
settings seems to imply that co-creation is conceived as being tied to something of 
utmost importance within present-day discussions. Co-creation has become a 
conceptual prism through which contemporary debates on value creation 
increasingly must flow, no matter whether its respective proponents seek to extend 
the competitiveness of enterprises or to challenge capitalism’s most basic premises. 
In this sense, the concept not only reflects a particular organization of value 
creation, it is also to be viewed as a tool or weapon through which the charting of a 
future horizon is at stake. Co-creation not only becomes a conceptual registration 
of what is already taking place, but also something that points to competing and 
irreconcilable futures over which theoretical battles are fought. More precisely, 
what is significant is that the same concept can be mobilized to further such 
heterogeneous and conflicting goals. Hence the fact that the concept, on the one 
hand, seems to be torn in so many different directions that a logical implosion 
seems inevitable, and yet, on the other hand, it is exactly this lack of a coherent and 
unquestionable meaning that allows various theorists to deploy the concept in their 
own, sometimes rather idiosyncratic, ways. Nevertheless, in spite of all their 
differences, in spite of their respective agendas, the fact that co-creation continually 
comes into view as a concept through which value creation has to pass, points to 
something of utmost importance. This, the dissertation claims, is the formation of 
a particular experience, an experience of the outside as a source of value creation.  
The formation of this experience becomes detectable through the respective 
problematizations surveyed so far. These problematizations can now be 
systematized as transformations taking place along four dimensions that together 
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make up this experience. That is, they are problematizations of: (1) the locus of value 
creation; (2) the attributes of the processes that lead to value creation; (3) the 
primary action through which value is created; and (4) the substrate through which 
value is created. The culmination points of the transformations along these four 
dimensions correspond exactly with the four components already identified as 
those that make up the co-creation vocabulary. By accounting for the analyzed 
problematizations along these four dimensions it becomes possible to map the 
formation of the experience of the outside as a source of value creation, while it 
also becomes possible to reflect on the consequences of this transformation seen 
against the backdrop of earlier conceptualizations of value creation that we came 
across in chapter one. Firstly, we consider this experience, before then taking stock 
of the implications of this for the conceptualization of value creation. 
 
As has been shown in this chapter and the previous one, the last couple of decades 
have been marked by recurring problematizations of the organization as a stable 
point of reference. Within Strategic Management Thought, the assumptions 
inherent in Michel Porter’s value chain-approach have been exposed to 
considerable critique. In Porter’s approach, the locus of value creation was the firm 
as a self-enclosed entity, as this was made visible by the graphical representation of 
the value chain. The value chain made it possible to get a grip on the totality of the 
firm as a value creating unit. This representational tool furthermore depicted the 
attributes of the processes leading to value creation as something that was visible, 
calculable, decomposable and directly manipulable. In this sense, they were passive, 
awaiting the optimal orchestration as laid out by managers informed by the value 
chain approach. More precisely, such processes were in Porter’s terminology 
named activities, and these, Porter claimed, were the primary action through which 
value was created. Finally, the substrate of these activities was their very tangibility 
and physicality. It was this that rendered them visible and manipulable.  
All of these characteristics, however, became targets of critique. While the 
Autonomist Marxists and Critical Management Scholars did not refer to Porter’s 
framework, the organizational form they claimed we were leaving behind - the 
disciplinary organization - displayed many of the same characteristics as those 
depicted within Porter’s value chain. As we have seen, the problematizations of the 
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organization as a stable point of value creation exhibited a remarkable parallelism 
among these otherwise highly different traditions. Charting this in relation to the 
four dimensions described above, we see the formation of the experience of the 
outside as a source of value creation, an experience which is expressed through the 
components making up the co-creation vocabulary.  
More precisely, the locus of value creation was radically transformed. From 
something created within the organization, value creation became decentralized, 
and its locus shifted towards the outside. Whether expressed as the emergence of a 
value creating system (Normann and Ramírez 1993a), a new value creating ecology 
(Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b), “cooperation between minds” 
(Lazzarato 2004: 197), singularities acting in common (Hardt and Negri 2004), the 
‘new hidden abode’ (Böhm and Land 2009), or something similar, the locus of 
value creation was becoming dependent upon something uncontainable, something 
which could not be enclosed within either the value chain approach or the 
disciplinary organization, something which problematized the very space of the 
organization as an autonomous value creating unit, something which pointed to the 
outside. In this sense, as Ramaswamy and Gouillart (2010a: 7) state, value creation 
became “democratized and decentralized”, that is, given an outside reference that 
rendered a “firm-centric view” obsolete (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004a: 4).  
Simultaneously with this, the attributes of the processes of value creation also 
underwent significant changes. Whereas the disciplinary model, as well as Porter’s 
value chain–approach, rendered such processes visible, decomposable, calculable, 
and manipulable, the move towards the outside was accompanied by new 
attributions whereby these processes now came to exhibit a much more active, self-
forming, and spontaneous character. These processes were no longer something 
that could easily be manipulated, but now came to exhibit a distinct self-organizing 
capacity that had to be respected and allowed to unfold. Within Strategic 
Management Thought, user-producers and user-communities with their own 
agendas now emerged as active, self-organizing, and networked entities that had to 
be taken into account. Within the Autonomist Marxists’ accounts, whether 
conceived as the multitude’s “biopolitical self-organization” (Hardt and Negri 
2000: 411), the immaterial labor of the cooperation between minds (Lazzarato 
2004), or as a community-based ethical economy (Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010), 
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such processes also emerged as highly complex, decentralized processes that were 
attributed with similar characteristics.  
Furthermore, the move towards the outside and the new attributions of the 
processes leading to value creation were also accompanied by problematizations of 
the primary action through which value was said to be created. From the middle of 
the 1980’s, over to the 1990’s and further on into the first decade of the twenty 
first century, it was shown how the innovation-emphasis was accentuated within 
Strategic Management Thought, firstly with the resource-based view, then with the 
dynamic capabilities perspective and, finally, culminating in the co-creation 
approach, where Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2003: 12) claimed that value creation 
could now “come only from innovation”. Swept away was the tedious option of 
competing on cost-reduction and optimization of the firm’s value chain and this 
trajectory, too, found its parallel in the problematizations carried out within the 
critical literature. Whether formulated as the multitude’s capability of collective 
entrepreneurship (Hardt and Negri 2000: 411), the common basis of innovation 
(Hardt and Negri 2004: 338), the event through which a “series of possible worlds” 
flow (Lazzarato 2004: 207), or as the clever exploitation of innovative, creative 
consumers (Zwick et al. 2008), the primary action through which value was created 
was also recast here in an innovation vocabulary, although in these traditions it was 
often expressed through more philosophically inclined concepts.   
Finally, the transformations along these three dimensions were also 
supplemented by problematizations of the substrate of value creation. Here, the 
physical substrate of value creation, whether in the form of Porter’s activities or, 
more generally, the materiality of industrial production, was being discarded in 
favor of core competences (Prahalad and Hamel 1990), dynamic capabilities (Teece 
et al. 1997), knowledge (Itami and Roehl 1987; Jacques 2000; Jaros 2007), 
immaterial labor (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 1996, 2004), sociality and 
ethics (Arvidsson 2009, 2010), intangibles (Willmott 2010) and so on, which all 
pointed to a much more fluid, invisible, and immaterial substrate on which the 
creation of value now increasingly depended. Whereas the strategic management 
scholars here claimed that the individual’s unique experience, as this could be 
shaped in ‘experience environments’, was a key-feature (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
2004a, 2004b), the critical literature embraced a more commons-based substrate.  
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Through the problematizations of the locus of value creation, through the 
problematizations of the attributes of the processes leading to value creation, 
through the problematizations of the action and substrate through which value is 
created, a new experience has formed, an experience of the outside as a source of 
value creation. This experience is articulated through the concept of co-creation, 
and through the components making up the co-creation vocabulary. This 
experience is at one and the same time what unites and what allows for, at first 
sight, the radically different accounts of contemporary conceptualizations of value 
creation. On the one hand, it is constituted and formed through the 
problematizations accounted for here, and on the other hand, it also appears as that 
which they somehow presupposed, as that which allowed these various 
formulations to become accepted statements that took up the problem of value 
creation, as that which rendered them possible. In this way, the experience 
accounted for could be seen to nourish and to provide a field of support for all of 
the different problematizations tracked in this and the previous chapter, as 
something which provides the integrative background that holds the respective 
problematizaions together in all their diversity. Yet, at the same time, its formation 
only emerges through the trajectories made up by these problematizations.  
The formation of this experience, however, should also be seen in light of the 
larger historical trajectory through which the concept of value creation has passed. 
The final section of this chapter considers the implications of the formation of this 
experience for contemporary conceptualizations of value creation. These 
considerations also conclude Part One of the dissertation.  
Implications for the concept of value creation 
In order to assess the implications for the contemporary conceptualizations of 
value creation, however, it is necessary to set the history charted in chapters two 
and three in relation to the history of value and its creation sketched in chapter 
one. In the latter, it was shown how a substance conception of value emerged 
within political economy in the middle of the eighteenth century. From Quesnay, 
over to Smith, Ricardo, and Marx, the concept of value was shown to be the central 
one around which political economy constituted itself as a discipline. In spite of 
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disagreeing about the exact sources and measure of value, all of these thinkers 
agreed that value was created in some kind of productive activity, preserved in 
exchange, and destroyed or diminished in consumption. With the coming of the 
marginal revolution in the 1870’s, however, the hitherto privileging of production 
as the locus of value creation was swept away, and the sphere of exchange – the 
market - was put in its place. 
This transformation was made possible by a range of problematizations. First 
of all, the creation of value was becoming dependent upon utility, satisfaction, or 
want. From having been shot through with nature and material processes, value 
creation, and the wider economy within which it was formulated, was de-
materialized and de-naturalized (Schabas 2005). It was no longer dependent upon 
and embedded within an objective world ‘out there’, but now became dependent 
upon the subjective world ‘in here’. Secondly, with this, the past in the form of the 
foregoing labor process through which the commodity in question was produced, 
was no longer relevant to the explanation of how value was created. From now on, 
the relevant horizon for value creation became the future, that is, the utility 
expected to be derived from the consumption of the commodity as this was 
expressed in the market. Though the past could no longer provide an explanatory 
reference for value creation, the future, in the form of expected utility, essentially 
was a timeless, static future. This was due to the fact that the transformations of 
the epistemological space through which value creation was expressed crucially 
hinged on the appropriation of a physical theory that allowed perfect reversibility in 
a given systems operations. In conjunction with this, political economy - its 
historical reflection, its explicit political connotations - now gave way to the 
rigorous discipline of economics, which was modeled on mid-nineteenth century 
physics, and which had mathematics as its principle language. Central in this regard 
was the introduction of marginal analysis which shifted the primary concern of the 
discipline from growth, augmentation, and the wealth of nations, to questions 
concerning attainment of equilibrium and optimal allocation that now could be 
calculated, because time had been displaced from the newly invented economic 
models.  
With all of these transformations, an erosion of the distinction between value 
and price gradually began to appear. Though value and its creation had been one of 
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the central problems within political economy, the way in which this was taken up 
by the new economists essentially rendered the problem futile. Since there was no 
longer a stable, objective principle (be it labor, socially necessary labor time, or 
something else) behind value creation, but only the fluctuating prices in the market, 
as these were generated by the subjective, irreducible evaluations of dispersed, 
economic agents, why, then, still cling to a concept burdened with such a history 
and so many metaphysical connotations? Hence, from being the central concept, 
value was gradually transformed to a relic and, eventually, left on the dustbin of 
history by mainstream economics.  
 
While this early history of value creation has only surfaced sporadically as an 
explicit point of discussion throughout chapters two and three, it has nevertheless 
continually hovered in the background. In spite of attempts at formulating new 
concepts of value creation, the problematizations surveyed in the preceding 
chapters have remained in a continuing, acknowledged or unacknowledged, 
inspirational line of descent from these earlier conceptualizations. Hence, the 
conceptualizations of value creation within Strategic Management Thought, within 
Autonomist Marxism, and within Critical Management Studies, have readily 
borrowed from these earlier conceptualizations in order to present their own new 
value creation concepts. Even though none of these contemporary traditions 
should be held accountable to one unitary value creation-index, it is nevertheless 
possible to assess how they - explicitly or implicitly - utilize terminologies from 
former value creation concepts in order to advance their own conceptual 
endeavors. Therefore, this raises the issue of the extent to which one can borrow 
and utilize terminologies from former value creation concepts without accepting 
the limits within which these were formulated? More precisely, two problems 
preoccupy our center of attention here.  
The first concerns the way in which Michael Porter has blended irreconcilable 
theoretical conceptualizations of value creation within his value chain approach. 
On the one hand, this clearly points to an analytical inconsistency within Porter’s 
framework, but on the other hand, the way in which Porter does this nevertheless 
remains in accordance with central tenets running through the value creation 
concepts of political economy, as well as economics. That is, Porter still maintains 
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clear-cut distinctions between production, circulation, and consumption, just as he 
also maintains a yardstick according to which value creation can be measured. 
These central premises, however, are exactly what is being undermined with the 
formation of the experience of the outside as a source of value creation. Hence, the 
second problem to be taken up is the way in which several of the thinkers associated 
with the formation of this experience have re-actualized and drawn nourishment 
from the classical economists’ value creation framework, yet have simultaneously 
problematized the very preconditions on which this framework was established to 
begin with. This has considerable consequences. More precisely, it is claimed that 
the historical trajectories through which the formation of the experience of the 
outside as a source of value creation has become possible, have simultaneously 
eroded central preconditions for conceptualizing value creation. That is, these 
trajectories have eroded the possibility of the establishment of a yardstick according 
to which it is possible to assess how much value has been created. Each of these 
problems will be considered in turn after which Part One will be rounded off.  
 
Blending irreconcilable conceptions of value creation: Michael Porter’s value chain 
One particular way in which contemporary conceptualizations of value creation 
have inherited earlier ones is the way in which Michael Porter’s value chain blends 
what used to be irreconcilable frameworks of value creation. More precisely, as we 
have already seen in chapter two, Porter (2004: xv) on the one hand claims that 
value is created through the activities constituting the value chain, and on the other 
hand it is claimed (ibid: 38) that value is measured by total revenue, that is, the total 
amount buyers pay for the products sold by the firm. This, however, is only 
possible by way of simultaneously insisting on the fact that value is created in 
production (in the firm) and in the market. The operation essentially entails that of 
taking the sphere of production (as conceptualized within political economy), 
enclosing it within the firm, renaming its constituent processes as activities (instead 
of labor), and then simultaneously claiming that the value created by these activities 
can be measured with a yardstick made possible by developments pertaining to 
post-1870’s economics. Whereas the classical economists explained the creation of 
value by referring to the sphere of production and to an associated objective 
yardstick (be it labor, labor time, or socially necessary labor time), the neo-classical 
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economists explained the creation of value by dispensing with an objective 
yardstick and in its place put the subjective, atomistic evaluations that nevertheless 
came together in the market where they gave rise to the formation of prices.  
Within Porter’s framework, previously irreconcilable value creation 
conceptions therefore blend. Several of the characteristics of the classical political 
economists’ conceptions of value creation reappear. We see production being drawn 
forward as the locus of value creation. We see an underlining of the fact that the 
substrate on which value creation depends is the very materiality and physicality of, 
not labor, but activities. Furthermore, we see a graphical representation of these 
physical processes – no longer in the form of a Tableau Économique, but now in 
the form of the value chain. However, Porter’s close intellectual affinity with 
economics at the same time implies that the value created is measured by total 
revenue. 
This blending is at one and the same time a consequence of how Porter has 
constructed his value creation framework and a consequence of the fact that parts 
of post-1870s mainstream economics had difficulty with totally displacing 
production as a creator of value. More precisely, as was hinted at in the end of 
chapter one, given the fact that microeconomic production theories have smuggled 
illegitimate premises in through the backdoor (from political economy’s substance-
based conception of value creation) and given the fact that Porter (2004: 39, note 
3) states that the activities making up the value chain could indeed be seen as 
production functions, it is perhaps not that surprising that a blending between the 
different value conceptions occurs. Nevertheless, and in spite of such analytical 
inconsistencies, Porter’s conception of value creation was fashioned in accordance 
with premises that were central to political economy, as well as economics.  
In spite of the fact that theoretically irreconcilable notions of value creation 
are presented and in spite of disagreements about whether value was created in 
production or in exchange, the classical and the neo-classical economists 
maintained clear-cut distinctions between production, exchange, and consumption, 
just as they all maintained that a conception of value creation was inseparably tied 
to some kind of yardstick according to which the amount of value created could be 
determined. Yet while the neo-classical revolution undermined the objective 
character of this yardstick, it nevertheless kept a unitary, quantitative measure in the 
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form of prices generated on behalf of subjective utility calculations made by 
dispersed economic agents.  
By way of combining these premises, Porter was able to give definitions and, 
not least, practical managerial advice on how value could be created. Hence, in 
spite of blending otherwise irreconcilable value creation conceptions, measuring 
value creation through total revenue indeed provides a rather clear and 
managerially applicable criterion according to which value creation can be defined 
and measured for practical purposes.   
 
 
Have the problematizations making up the formation of the experience of the outside as a source 
of value creation undermined the possibility of a consistent conceptualization of value creation? 
With the formation of the outside as a source of value creation, however, the 
foundations on which this specificity was established seems to have been eroded. 
In spite of the fact that several of those utilizing the co-creation vocabulary see 
themselves, once again, as taking up and building upon the value creation 
perspective developed within the classical economists’ approach, the way in which 
they do so nevertheless entails that central premises, on which this perspective 
rested, are swept away.  
Throughout chapters two and three, we have seen how the otherwise 
displaced framework of the classical economists’ substance conception of value 
had a revival. Within Strategic Management Thought, Edith Penrose’s work (2009), 
which re-actualized the classical economists growth- and production-based outlook 
(Pitelis 2009: xxxiii-xxxiv), was from the 1980’s recovered as a hitherto lost 
foundation upon which the resource-based view began to build (Wernerfelt 1984). 
And while disagreement subsisted within the research-based view regarding how 
value creation ought to be conceptualized and analytically handled, and regarding 
whether and to what extent economics-based frameworks ought to be utilized 
(Bettis and Prahalad 1986; Barney 1991; Foss 1996, 1997b, 2007), the insistence on 
the centrality of value creation as something inseparably tied to some kind of 
productive capacity or activity nevertheless subsisted throughout later works 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990) and all the way up to the Strategic Management 
Thought approach to co-creation. In spite of the fact that a number of co-creation 
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scholars have sought to break free of previously reigning value creation concepts, 
their attempts at doing so have remained within a limbo where a production based 
approach to value creation have been central, but where parts of post-1870s 
conceptions have nevertheless also resurfaced. Due to this, the way in which the 
co-creation vocabulary stretches the concept of value creation beyond its 
historically loaded connotations seems to generate problems of logical consistency. 
For instance, when it is maintained that value on the one hand is co-created within 
a value creating system (Normann and Ramiréz 1993a), and that “value creation 
(…) can come only from innovation” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2003: 12), that is, 
from some kind of productive activity, this seems to be at odds with at the same 
time stating that value creation is bound to the subjective experience of a particular 
person, at a particular place, in a particular point in time (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
2004b). This generates a certain tension according to which it is perfectly legitimate 
to ask whether the insistence on the relational, the social ecosystem, and the 
creation of value through innovation is not hereby undercut by the re-installment 
of the individual’s experience as a central nexus of value creation? And in 
conjunction with this it furthermore becomes necessary to  ask what is actually 
gained by positing the individuals experience as central for the creation of value, if 
the notion of utility, which was central to the neo-classicals’ value creation concept, 
is simultaneously thrown overboard?  
Within Autonomist Marxism and Critical Management Studies, we also saw 
recurring attempts at conceptualizing value creation in accordance with the classical 
economists’ framework. Here, however, the explicit dialogue partner was first and 
foremost Marx and the reception which had built upon his work. And while there 
was disagreement about the extent to which Marx’s theory was still valid (see for 
example Jacques 2000; Hardt and Negri 2004: 140-153; Jaros 2007; Arvidsson 
2009; Böhm and Land 2009), widespread agreement nevertheless also prevailed 
here concerning the fact that value creation had to be grasped as emanating from 
some kind of productive activity which now, however, increasingly took place 
beyond the borders of the organization, was conditioned upon spontaneous and 
self-forming processes, was endowed with an innovative potentiality, and was 
increasingly immaterialized.  
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As was shown in chapter one, however, the classical economists’ 
conceptualization of value creation was dependent upon a model which had highly 
material connotations. That is, value creation was dependent upon some kind of 
substance which was embedded within a material product. Whether in the form of 
Quesnay’s blé, Smith’s material stock, or the crystallization of socially necessary 
labor time within the commodity as described by Marx, all of these approaches 
referred back to a specific framework according to which value was created in 
production, preserved in circulation, and diminished or destroyed in consumption. 
With this model, a strict quantitative yardstick also followed according to which it 
became possible to determine how much value had been created. While the specific 
contents of this yardstick varied, it nevertheless remained an inseparable and 
constituent factor, not only for the classical economists’ conceptualization of value 
creation, but equally for their critical followers who, from the 1870’s onwards, 
dispensed with the objectivity of hitherto reigning yardsticks and in their place 
simply provided the quantitative measure of prices that fluctuated in accordance 
with dispersed, utility-calculating economic agents.  
Hence, with the formation of the experience of the outside as a source of 
value creation the classical economists’ framework was re-actualized. Once again, 
value creation was not to be explained as deriving from the sphere of exchange, but 
had to be located within some kind of productive activity. Nevertheless, 
simultaneously, this model was also completely undermined as a consequence of 
several of the problematizations making up this experience.  
First of all, it has become entirely unclear as to where exactly value is created. 
With the move towards the outside, the traditional distinctions between 
production, circulation and consumption have been completely overturned 
(Lazzarato 2004: 199; Bruns 2009: 21). Now, value is no longer created in 
production, preserved in exchange, and destroyed or diminished in consumption. 
Rather, value is created throughout a generalized and wide-stretching productive 
process which also pervades the sphere of exchange and the sphere of 
consumption (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004b:122; Böhm and Land 2009; 
Willmott 2010).  
Secondly, it has become entirely unclear whether value has been created and, if 
so, how much. With social, psychological, and community- based values now 
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entering the value creation frameworks (Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010; Ramaswamy 
and Gouillart 2010b: 104), we not only see a multiplication of values, but also the 
undermining of what previously reigning conceptions of value creation were 
inseparable from - a yardstick or scale which made it possible to specify the extent 
to which, if at all, value had been created. With the explosion of such a scale, value 
creation in the singular, is replaced by heterogeneous value creation prisms that are 
each measured according to local and irreducible scales. Within Strategic 
Management Thought, this problem undermines the pie-analogy presented by 
Ramaswamy and Gouillart. On the one hand they claim that social and 
psychological values of consumers, users and communities now also have to be 
taken into account. Yet on the other hand they claim that value creation becomes a 
question of “growing the pie and maintaining the vibrancy of the ecosystem; 
maximizing the firm’s slice of the pie is secondary” (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 
2010b: 106). However, when various social and psychological values enter the 
picture, value creation is pluralized. To the extent that value creation is pluralized 
and to the extent that it is measured according to different, local and irreducible 
scales, there is no one pie that can be grown. If there was, the recipe to this pie would 
make up a new formula that could mediate and integrate the heterogeneous scales 
and translate their unique values into a new, unitary scale.  
This problem of a loss of a unitary scale also becomes manifest with 
Arvidsson’s description of the rise of an ethical economy. Instead of speaking of 
value creation in the singular, Arvidsson claims that value is measured in 
completely different ways within the capitalist economy and its ethical counterpart. 
While Arvidsson, by and large, accepts Marx’s labor theory of value when it comes 
to capitalism, according to Arvidsson Marx’s theory is completely incapable of 
accounting for the value created within the ethical economy. Here, labor is 
abundant (Arvidsson 2009: 19), and labor power therefore has no value (Arvidsson 
2008: 332). While there is no unitary scale (such as socially necessary labor time) 
according to which the amount of value created can be measured, there are 
nevertheless substitutes such as ability to mobilize community effort which in turn can be 
approximated as a function of the number of people we have in our networks and 
the intensity or quality of these connections. Separating the scales from each other, 
however, not only entails the loss of a common measure: as pointed out by 
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Willmott (2010: 527), it also risks presenting an “uneconomized” conception that 
“marginalizes consideration of how” the value created within the ethical economy 
“is embedded in capitalist economies”. Nevertheless, as was also pointed out at the 
beginning of chapter two, the new conceptualizations of value creation could, 
against Willmott’s claim, just the same be viewed as pertaining to a trajectory that 
questions the very nature of what ‘the economic’ consists of today. No matter 
which way we turn this problem, however, the fact remains that a unitary yardstick, 
according to which the amount of value created can be measured, has been lost. 
This marks an enormous break from earlier conceptualizations, not only from how 
value creation was conceptualized within the classical and the neo-classical 
economists’ approach, but also from the way in which value creation was 
conceptualized within Michael Porter’s approach. Across all of these different 
conceptualizations of value creation, a unitary quantitative scale was present as an 
indispensable part, although the principles behind its establishment varied 
considerably. Now, however, with the formation of the experience of the outside 
as a source of value creation, the establishment of such a scale is no longer 
possible. There is no one objective principle according to which the amount of 
value created can be measured, and there is no one unitary, monetary scale through 
which dispersed, atomistic utility-calculations can meet up and be expressed.   
Thirdly, the loss of a unitary yardstick or scale is furthermore accentuated by 
the innovation-emphasis that marks the formation of the experience of the outside 
as a source of value creation. With this innovation-emphasis, value creation has 
become endowed with a hitherto unprecedented potentiality and futurity, 
something that cannot be reconciled with a quantitative measure. It is in 
conjunction with this that Hardt and Negri claim (2000: 356) that contemporary 
value creation is beyond measure: “Beyond measure refers to the new place in the non-
place, (…) to a virtuality that invests the entire biopolitical fabric” (ibid: 357). The 
virtual is “the set of powers to act (being, loving, transforming, creating) that reside 
in the multitude” (ibid: 357). It is a capacity to do something that doesn’t 
correspond with something already existing; it is a pure capacity to create that 
cannot be measured, that cannot be reconciled with a quantitative scale. The 
centrality that this virtuality comes to play for the creation of value not merely 
overthrows the quantitative scales of political economy and economics, but also the 
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“great Western metaphysical tradition that has always abhorred the immeasurable” 
(ibid: 355).  
In spite of the fact that Hardt and Negri have now completely undermined an 
essential component of the classical economists’ framework, they readily utilize 
Quesnay’s Tableau Économique to invoke an image of how the creation, circulation 
and consumption of value ought to be depicted today (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 149, 
2009: 285-290). However, Quesnay’s tableau which, according to Mirowski (1989: 
155), represented the purest instance of the classical economists’ substance 
conception of value, is only conceivable if one does not dispense with the fact that 
value here is created in production, preserved in exchange, and 
diminished/destroyed in consumption. Yet when all of life and all social relations 
become a giant productive machine, such distinctions are increasingly difficult to 
uphold. Furthermore, Quesnay’s tableau is only conceivable if one does not 
dispense with the quantitative measures according to which it becomes possible to 
follow the flow of the value substance (blé) throughout and across the three classes 
making up the tableau. If one dispenses with these central characteristics, it is 
highly questionable as to what explanatory or analogical function invoking the 
image of the tableau might serve. If it does show something, however, it is 
probably that in spite of dispensing with former value creation concepts and their 
central characteristics, Hardt and Negri’s own attempt at re-conceptualizing value 
creation simultaneously remains indebted to a tradition they think they have left 
behind.  
Thus, it can be stated more generally that while several of the 
problematizations accounted for in the preceding chapters have sought to reinstall 
and redeploy an outlook that utilized a production-based approach to value 
creation, these very same problematizations have simultaneously eroded the ground 
upon which such an understanding of value creation was conceptualized to begin 
with.  
 
 
 
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Consequences of the erosion of the ground upon which a consistent concept of value creation can be formulated 
Seen in light of the history of value creation followed in Part One, the formation of 
the experience of the outside as a source of value creation has a number of 
important consequences. These consequences, however, manifest themselves in 
different ways for the respective traditions that we have come across. For Strategic 
Management Thought, which throughout its entire history has aspired to formulate 
knowledge and models that could be utilized by managers for practical purposes, 
the formation of the experience of the outside as a source of value creation tends 
to undermine the authority with which such practical advice can be given. In light 
of the fact that value creation is stated to be one of the most central concepts 
within Strategic Management Thought and in light of the fact that the foundation 
of a consistent concept of value creation has been eroded with the formation of 
the experience accounted for here, the authority with which the co-creation 
scholars within Strategic Management Thought can inform practitioners on matters 
of value creation can necessarily be questioned. Through the trajectory from 
Porter’s value chain approach to contemporary co-creation, the concept of value 
creation has been problematized to such an extent that it has become rather 
unclear exactly what value is and how it, specifically, can be created. Dispensing 
with the distinctions between production, circulation and consumption, and 
dispensing with a unitary yardstick, both of which had remained integral parts of 
former conceptualizations of value creation (from the classical economists’ 
substance-based framework, over to the neoclassical economists’ approach, and on 
to Porter’s value chain), necessarily raises the question about whether the concept 
of value creation has been stretched beyond its limits? On the one hand, the 
concept of value creation and the way in which it has been utilized within Strategic 
Management Thought, has bestowed the discipline with an economic aura which 
stems from the fact that, throughout the last couple of decades, it has installed 
what used to be the economic concept par excellence as one of its foundational 
concepts. On the other hand, however, the way in which the problematizations 
through which the experience of the outside as a source of value creation has 
formed has simultaneously implied that important preconditions upon which this 
aura of the economic rested have been evacuated.  
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For several of the critical accounts investigated here, the consequences of the 
erosion of the ground upon which a consistent concept of value creation can be 
fashioned present themselves in a slightly different manner. Here, the formation of 
the experience of the outside as a source of value creation and the complex 
continuity-discontinuity problem this implies in relation to former 
conceptualizations of value creation, raises other questions. One important 
question that keeps surfacing here is whether the formation of this experience 
marks the arrival of a new and irreducible logic of value creation - for example,the 
“power of co-creation” (Lazzarato 2004), “biopolitical value creation” (Hardt and 
Negri 2004), or an ethical economy (Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010) - or whether the 
formation of this experience should be seen in conjunction with an extension of 
modes of management that now, additionally, leverage the value created by user-
producers? While noteworthy attempts at arguing for the latter position have been 
set forth within Critical Management Studies (see for example Humphreys and 
Grayson 2008; Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 
2010), the grounds upon which such accounts have been set forth have lacked a 
historical perspective according to which it would be possible to describe how the 
experience of the outside as a source of value creation has been born.  
Instead of doing so, Böhm and Land (2009), for instance, propose that we 
have to hold on to Marx’s labor theory of value, and with this give an account of 
how value creation has moved outside of existing organizations, so that it now 
traverses “the full circuit of production, consumption and social reproduction” 
(ibid: 13), while Willmott (2010), on his part, dispenses with any such theory, and in 
its place puts a detailed empirical study of how value is being created and leveraged 
within historically varying “ethico-political complexes”. 
Neither of these proposals, however, seem completely satisfactory. In order 
to rescue Marx’s theory from the loss implied by the undermining of a yardstick 
according to which the amount of value created can be measured, Böhm and Land 
claim (2009: 13) that “the actual measurability of exchange value was never the key 
driving force of Marx’s (1976) ‘labour theory of value’”. Such an attempt at 
restoration seems highly problematic in light of the way in which the formation of 
the experience of the outside as a source of value creation has undermined the 
classical economists’ framework and, with this, also Marx’s labor theory of value. 
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While Willmott’s (2010) account tries to bypass the problem of formulating a 
consistent concept of value creation by insisting that any such notion would have 
to be situated within historically varying ethico-political complexes, the empirical 
description he makes of a concrete case does not have much to say about the 
historical trajectories that have made this specific ethico-political complex possible.  
Attending to such historical trajectories, however, is exactly what Part Two of 
this dissertation will do. By way of tracing the history of the components that have 
come together in the formation of the experience of the outside as a source of 
value creation, it is possible to give a more adequate reply as to whether co-creation 
marks the arrival of a new, irreducible logic of value creation, or whether it is to be 
seen as inseparably tied to new modes of management. Hence, instead of 
grounding such a reply in an attempt at restoring the labor theory of value and 
defending a specific value creation theory (Böhm and Land 2009) or, for that 
matter, in a contemporary case study of how value is co-produced and leveraged 
(Willmott 2010), the dissertation proposes to establish the basis for answering such 
a question in a genealogical investigation of the components that make up the co-
creation vocabulary, that is, the components through which the experience of the 
outside as a source of value creation is expressed. Through such a genealogical 
investigation Part Two attends to how this currently reigning experience has been 
born. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Control or government? 
Critical interrogations of the ground upon which 
a history of co-creation should be launched 
 
Toward a history of co-creation 
In Part One of the dissertation, it was described how value and its creation went 
from being the foundational and most important subject of political economy to 
becoming a largely marginalized concept within twentieth century economics. In 
addition to this, it was also established how the concept of value creation rose to 
prominence within the discipline of Strategic Management Thought, just as it was 
tracked how descriptions of what were depicted as the sources of value gradually 
changed towards a view whereby value was seen as being co-created by groups and 
individuals outside established organizations. This line of investigation was then set 
in relation to developments within social theorists’ conceptualizations of 
commons-based peer production as well as thought coming out of the Autonomist 
Marxist tradition and recent contributions within Critical Management Studies. It 
was proposed that discussions on what actually constitutes the contemporary 
sources of value creation within these otherwise diverging streams of thought 
tended to converge in descriptions that relied heavily on the co-creation concept 
and, in particular, on the components this concept was articulated in accordance 
with. More precisely, the central components within the co-creation vocabulary 
were identified as the following: value creation was increasingly being viewed as 
dependent upon that which comes from the outside; the processes through which 
value was created were depicted as having a somewhat spontaneous, self-organizing 
capacity that to a large extent rendered long-term planning and conventional 
managerial control obsolete; this new mode of value creation was furthermore 
characterized as being fueled by an inherent cooperative inventiveness that 
manifested itself in a decentralized and ongoing process of innovation; and finally, 
the substrate on which this value creation took place were increasingly 
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immaterialized. While scholars within Strategic Management Thought, as well as 
those coming out of the Autonomist tradition, embraced these conditions – either 
because firms could profit from them or, adversely, because they were identified as 
having an irreducibility to them that challenged capitalism – the critical 
management scholars accepted that value creation to a large extent had become 
dependent on something outside of the organization, while simultaneously raising 
concerns about the extent to which – if at all – this transformation posed any 
significant challenge to capitalism. Following this the dissertation claimed that the 
different traditions, in spite of their conflicting agendas, could be viewed as 
carrying out parallel problematization processes that gave rise to the formation of 
an experience of the outside as a source of value creation.  
However, while charting the formation of this experience, the primary 
concerns in Part One did not allow for a treatment of the issue regarding how the 
components making up the co-creation vocabulary could begin to take on the 
importance they have come to have for conceptualizing the creation of value. In 
other words, while Part One made it clear how value creation was problematized 
and rearticulated through the utilization of a co-creation vocabulary, it did not 
account for the historical emergence of the components making up this 
vocabulary. This is exactly what Part Two investigates.  
More precisely, as stated in the introduction of the dissertation, this 
investigation will be organized as a genealogy that traces the historical roots of the 
components that have come together in the experience of the outside as a source 
of value creation. As was also stated, this history will draw significantly on 
Foucault’s (2007a, 2008) history of governmentality. However, before attending to 
this genealogy, which will be launched in chapters five and six, the grounds upon 
which such a historical investigation should be cast will first have to be attended to. 
Establishing this ground is the prime purpose of the present chapter and this 
purpose is to be achieved by carrying out two tasks. Firstly, by criticizing the 
foundations upon which scholars within Autonomist Marxism and Critical 
Management Studies have launched histories pertaining to the coming into being 
of co-creation. As will become evident, Deleuze’s (1995a) small text on the passage 
from disciplinary societies to the societies of control plays a key role here. 
Secondly, by way of criticizing three central postulates within this text, a trajectory 
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will be opened up to Foucault’s thought, and to the proposition that not only have 
Foucault’s (2007a, 2008) lectures from 1978 and 1979 not been appreciated 
sufficiently within Critical Management Studies, but that also, and more 
importantly, these lectures contain material that is significant for a genealogy of co-
creation. However, before undertaking these tasks, it is necessary to show how 
Deleuze’s (1995a) text has played a major role for the way in which critical 
accounts have sought to come to terms with co-creation.  
 
On the influence of Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Control Societies” 
We have in the last couple of chapters seen how the different components 
associated with co-creation have been continually expressed in accordance with 
changing conceptions of management. Indeed, co-creation continually comes into 
view as a specific kind of management problem whereby the organization of co-
creation processes is inseparably tied to the question of how such processes are, or 
ought to be, managed. Thus, from Prahalad, Ramaswamy, and Gouillart’s engaging, 
dialoging, and facilitative management of the co-creative enterprise (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004b; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b), over to Hardt and 
Negri’s (2009: viii) multitude “learning the art of self-rule”, and on to Arvidsson’s 
(2009) account of how Linus Thorvalds’s managerial genius is of major importance 
to the organization of the social production processes inherent in the ethical 
economy of Linux, the question of how one should manage or govern co-creation 
continually surfaces.  
The problem of co-creation, when viewed from the perspective of Critical 
Management Studies, unsurprisingly also turns up as a problem inseparably tied to 
the notion of management. Here, however, the question of management does not 
run along the lines of which management or government system would be 
appropriate and legitimate as a facilitator of co-creation. Instead, co-creation is 
depicted as something that is entirely, and inescapably, tied to capitalist valorization 
processes – only now with the addition that the value created through co-creation 
is subject to new forms of management that act on consumer-producers outside of the 
organization (Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 2010). Thus, the 
way in which the co-creation problematic is viewed within Critical Management 
Studies ties in with and extends the long-lasting trajectory within this field whereby 
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management as such, no matter which practical, beneficial or idealistic goals it is set 
to promote, is viewed as illegitimate, or at the very least as something that must be 
critically scrutinized (see for example Grey 1996, 1999; Parker 2002).  
Still, what is interesting to note is that this new view of management as 
something that reaches beyond the boundaries of the organization and taps into 
the productive capacities of co-creation processes also raises the question as to 
whether, and to what extent, such interventions are even capable of being 
described within a vocabulary which is critical of management and management 
thought? How is it possible to exercise control over and to exploit people who are 
not even employed by the organizations they contribute to, but merely do what 
they do because they find it rewarding, interesting or fun? In other words, how is it 
possible to manage something that is considered to be ‘free’ (both in the sense of 
being unpaid and not being subjected to a direct managerial authority)?  
This problem has received considerable attention within Critical Management 
Studies. Besides some of the contributions explicitly dealing with the co-creation 
problematic that we came across in the last chapter (Zwick et al. 2008; Banks and 
Humphreys 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 2010), this problem has also 
been taken up by scholars keen on exploring how former clear-cut demarcations 
between organizations/institutions and their outsides have become increasingly 
difficult to uphold. This blurring of boundaries has happened in conjunction with 
the rise of post-disciplinary modes of management that have been able to utilize 
differences both within and outside established organizations (see for example 
Munro 2000; Fleming and Spicer 2004; Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; Spicer 2010; 
Martinez 2010).  
André Spicer (2010) has proposed here that what we are witnessing is the rise 
of a new mode of relating to what he calls extitutions. Extitutions are, according to 
Spicer (2010: 26), “a formless life”, that is, something that “exceeds, disturbs and 
does not fit with an institution.” As such, extitutions have always been a challenge 
for the functioning of institutions. Still, the way in which institutions have sought 
to manage extitutions has been recast recently. Whereas “disciplinary institutions” 
sought to “confine and normalize extitutions (…), post-modern controlling 
institutions are more permissive and seek to harness extitutions” (ibid: 27). Spicer 
points here to how this change both implies that the borders of the institution 
 196 
 
become increasingly blurred, and that the new mode of managing these extitutional 
capacities is characterized by toleration, if not downright celebration, exactly 
because extitutions begin to be seen as sources of innovation and as something that 
can be capitalized upon. Utilizing extitutional capacities, however, necessitates 
establishing new principles of management and organization: “Instead of being 
designed around principles of closure and capture, the new institutional archetype 
seems to be one of facilitation, boundary crossing and dialogue. The total 
institution is out. The open institution is in” (ibid: 37).  
This description clearly picks up on the themes we came across in the 
previous chapters. Thus, the co-creative enterprise (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 
2010a, 2010b) is clearly describable as something that utilizes and controls the 
productive capacities of extitutions and whereas Prahalad, Ramaswamy and 
Gouillart depicted how the principles of co-creation entailed shifting the 
perspective from a ‘company-centric view’ to a ‘social ecosystem approach’, Spicer 
(2010: 35) adds – albeit from a less celebratory perspective – how even state 
bureaucracies have begun to “encourage citizens to get involved.”  
What is significant in this respect is not just the fact that Spicer’s article is 
quite interesting, and that the conceptual specification of the changing nature of 
the management of extitutions - from discipline to control - has a richness to it that 
adds to the understanding of co-creation. Equally significant is also the fact that the 
conceptual resources with which this change is described tie in with a greater 
theoretical transformation whereby Gilles Deleuze’s ([1990a] 1995a) small and yet 
highly influential essay, “Postscript on Control Societies,” has been mobilized to an 
almost overwhelming extent as a prism through which the changing nature of 
power in general, and the management of co-creation in particular, has been 
described. In this regard, Spicer’s article – in spite of its merits – is symptomatic of 
a much wider tendency whereby Deleuze’s “Postscript on Control Societies” has 
been guiding contemporary studies pertaining to the changing nature of 
management and power in a post-disciplinary setting. It is therefore worthwhile 
taking a closer look at Deleuze’s text. But before we do so, it is necessary to expand 
a bit upon why it is necessary to take this apparent detour, how this ties in with 
what we came across in the previous chapter, and how this detour will serve us in 
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relation to mapping the history of the central components inherent in the co-
creation vocabulary.  
First and foremost, the reason why it is significant to spend some time on this 
essay on control societies is, as already hinted at, that it has played such an 
enormous role within the way in which co-creation has been conceptualized in 
conjunction with changing modes of management. The shift from a disciplinary 
society to a society of control plays a significant role within the works of Hardt, 
Negri, and Lazzarato. They have not only taken Deleuze’s description on board, as 
we have seen, but also acted as accelerators, or points of diffusion, for the way in 
which the essay on control society has been taken up within other lines of inquiry, 
not least within Critical Management Studies. Furthermore, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, Hardt and Negri’s Empire kicks off by investigating what this 
passage to a control society implies for the changing nature of power (2000: 22-30; 
see also Hardt and Negri 2000: 328-332, 1994: 259-260; Hardt 1995), just as 
Lazzarato (2004, 2005, 2006) gives it a prominent place within several of his 
articles. Owing to this, Deleuze’s small essay plays an important role for the way in 
which the problem of co-creation appears and is articulated within these strands of 
Autonomist Marxism.  
Secondly, since the emergence of the co-creation problematic within 
Arvidsson’s work (2006, 2008, 2009; Arvidsson et al. 2008), as well as within 
Critical Management Studies (Zwick et al. 2008; Banks and Humphreys 2008; 
Böhm and Land 2009), has to a large extent been built upon the contributions 
made by Hardt, Negri and Lazzarato (and especially on the way in which they have 
continually stressed how the creation of value exceeds the sphere of the 
workplace), the transition to a control society also roams in the background here, 
when not referenced directly (see for example Zwick et al. 2008: 182, 185, 186). To 
the extent that these contributions take up the history of how co-creation emerged 
as a management problem, they predominantly do so from a perspective according 
to which it shows up as a marketing phenomenon (Zwick et al. 2008; Arvidsson 
2006, 2008) that should be seen in light of historical transformations that have 
occurred throughout the latter half of the twentieth century (Arvidsson 2006, 2008; 
Zwick et al. 2008). In so doing, these latter contributions can be characterized by 
the assumption that pre-1960 management and management thought is reducible 
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to “Taylorist management” and “discipline” that had not yet “discovered the 
productivity of the social” (Arvidsson 2006: 41).  
Furthermore, such accounts are in line with the historical drama set up within 
Empire. Here, management thought is depicted as being completely reactionary, and 
all creative capacity is bestowed upon a creative multitude. As Hardt and Negri 
claim, the shift from discipline to control societies, and the associated shift in value 
creation practices, only came about as a result of experiments with new forms of 
“cooperation and communication” emanating from the whole panoply of lifestyle 
experiments within the counterculture movement. The fruits of these experiments 
not only “anticipated the capitalist awareness of a need for a paradigm shift in 
production”, they also, more fundamentally, implied that capital “did not need to 
invent a new paradigm (…) because the truly creative moment had already taken place” 
(Hardt and Negri 2000: 275-276; see also Arvidsson 2008: 327). Hence, according 
to this account, we see a shift in the conditions of value creation on the one hand, 
and management thought on the other. The lifestyle experiments of the 
counterculture gave birth to the new conditions of value creation, and management 
thought, then, allegedly responded to this by appropriating the resulting modes of 
organization and, in the process, turned them into new means of capital 
accumulation. As we will see, however, this is a much too superficial and reductive 
historical account. It not only brushes over fundamental transformations before 
WWII that are central to the coming into being of co-creation, it also considerably 
underestimates how management thought played a much more active role in forming the 
historical trajectories through which the experience of the outside as a source of 
value creation could emerge. To the extent that some of these accounts (see for 
example Arvidsson 2006; Zwick et al. 2008) do give management thought a more 
active role than Hardt and Negri do, the coming into being of co-creation is merely 
conceived as a management phenomenon that was born in relation to 
transformations within the discipline of marketing. As will be shown, however, the 
coming into being of co-creation has to be grasped through trajectories that reach 
considerably beyond transformations within the discipline of marketing. Whether 
made with reference to Deleuze’s essay or not, these tendencies are in agreement 
with postulates set forward within the “Postscript on Control Societies”.  
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Additionally, as already pointed to above, contributions within Critical 
Management Studies have taken up Deleuze’s diagnosis and utilized it to 
characterize how new forms of post-disciplinary management begin to regulate, 
make up, and control productive subjects without having recourse to disciplinary 
enclosures (Munro 2000; Fleming and Spicer 2004; Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; 
Spicer 2010; Martinez 2010). Though these contributions do not revolve explicitly 
around the concepts of co-creation or co-production, their analytical concerns, as 
exemplified above with Spicer’s (2010) notion of the extitution, clearly tie in with 
the way in which the management of co-creation has been conceptualized.  
Finally, this detour through Deleuze’s little essay serves as a trajectory 
through which it will be possible to resituate and gain a more adequate foothold in 
relation to launching a genealogy of the components of the co-creation vocabulary. 
More precisely, it is argued that the notion of control should be given a less 
prominent role, since the previous privileging of the notion of control relies on the 
somewhat problematic way in which Deleuze has read Foucault. This reading has 
not only had questionable consequences for the conceptualizations of the changing 
nature of power, but also, and more importantly, it relies upon a periodization that 
makes it difficult to conceive of co-creation as a phenomenon with historical roots 
that reaches beyond the middle of the twentieth century.  
With these specifications in place, the outline of the chapter can be presented 
as follows. Firstly, Deleuze’s essay on the control society is taken up. Special 
attention is given to his proposition that Foucault allegedly proposed that we were 
about to enter a control society. It is argued that Deleuze’s reading of Foucault is 
built upon a triple misattribution.1 Secondly, this paves the way for shifting the 
                                            
1 The problem identified with Deleuze’s reading of Foucault is primarily attributable to 
“Postscript on Control Societies” viewed as a relatively self-standing text. Hence, if one, for 
instance, reads Deleuze’s little text in conjunction with and informed by the themes taken up in 
Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) and A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 2002), 
several of the problems identified below will – if not dissolve – then at least seem less clear-cut 
and more ambiguous. However, since the detour through Deleuze’s essay only becomes relevant 
in the thesis because it (a) is often read out of the context of Deleuze’s oeuvre as such, and (b) 
has had such an overwhelming impact on the conceptualization of a form of power that operates 
beyond the sphere of the organization as a separate entity, countering several of the claims made 
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conceptual prism marked out in Deleuze’s essay, and the literature following him, 
with that of governmentality elaborated by Michel Foucault (2007a, 2008) in his 
lectures from 1978 and 1979. Thirdly, while Foucault has already been taken up in 
a major way within studies pertaining to organization and management, it is argued 
that the problems dealt with in his lectures from 1978 and 1979 have not yet been 
fully appreciated, and that a history of co-creation can gain important insights by 
picking up on some of the themes elaborated within these lectures. These remarks 
then pave the way for charting the history of the components of the co-creation 
vocabulary that is attended to in the following two chapters. But first thing is first, 
let us start with Deleuze’s little essay.  
From discipline to control? 
Towards the end of his life, Gilles Deleuze wrote the small text “Postscript on 
Control Societies” (1995a). In it he proposed that a major societal transition was 
taking place and that a new form of power - control - had “made rapid advances 
after the Second World War” (Deleuze 1995a: 178, see also Deleuze 1992, 1995b). 
More specifically, Deleuze states that this major change becomes apparent in 
Michel Foucault’s work (ibid: 177). According to Deleuze, Foucault analyzed the 
transition from a society of sovereignty to a disciplinary society that took place 
gradually throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of 
the nineteenth century. Whereas the power characteristic of sovereign societies 
largely operated by appropriating that which had been produced, the power 
characteristic of disciplinary societies operates by intervening in production, by 
splitting up a multiplicity, rearranging and correcting it, and thereby augmenting the 
powers of production beyond the sum of its component parts (ibid: 177; Foucault 
1991a). The spread of discipline was simultaneously dependent upon the setting up 
of enclosures within which this augmentation of forces could be managed and 
organized. These spaces – schools, armies, factories, prisons – however, have 
                                                                                                                                   
within the “Postscript on Control Societies” can be legitimized. In this sense, the intended target 
of critique is indeed Deleuze’s essay, but first and foremost Deleuze’s essay viewed in light of the 
reception it has had in relation to conceptualizing themes pertaining to the problem of co-creation.  
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become crisis ridden and, according to Deleuze, we are now “in the middle of a 
general breakdown of all sites of confinement” (Deleuze 1995a: 178). Thus, he 
sketches loosely how a new form of power is beginning to replace discipline, just as 
he points to the theoretical sources within which the analysis of this new form of 
power has been taken up. We look at each of these in turn now. 
Regarding the first - what characterizes this new form of power in contrast to 
discipline - Deleuze states that whereas disciplinary society’s confines “are molds”, 
controls are “modulations”, that is, “a self-transmuting molding continually changing 
from one moment to the next” (ibid: 178-179). Whereas production in disciplinary 
societies was emblematically organized within factories characterized by a high 
degree of standardization, regimentation, and predictability, the dominant mode of 
organizing within control societies is what Deleuze calls businesses, and “a business 
is a soul, a gas” [“l'entreprise est une âme, un gaz”] (ibid: 179/1990a: 242). Here it is 
worth noting not only the immateriality signaled by the characterization of the 
business as being a soul or gas, something also echoed in Spicer’s text on 
extitutions (2010: 37), but equally that in the original French text, Deleuze 
persistently uses the notion l’entreprise, which perhaps more appropriately could 
have been translated as ‘an enterprise’ instead of ‘a business’. This is quite a 
noteworthy point that we come back to below. For now, however, it is sufficient to 
take stock of the fact that this business, this soul, this gas, according to Deleuze, is 
to be seen as something that increasingly replaces the factory. With the 
transformation from disciplinary societies to control societies, the “sales 
department becomes a business’ center or ‘soul.’” That businesses have souls, 
however, is “surely the most terrifying news in the world” and it is in relation to 
this that marketing now becomes “the instrument of social control” (Deleuze 
1995a: 181). 
Regarding the second of the theoretical sources Deleuze draws upon when he 
describes the coming into being of the control society, the following sentence is 
significant: 
‘Control’ is the name proposed by Burroughs to characterize the new 
monster, and Foucault sees it fast approaching. Paul Virilio too is constantly 
analyzing the ultrarapid forms of apparently free-floating control that are 
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taking over from the old disciplines at work within the time scales of closed 
systems (Deleuze 1995a: 178).  
In bringing Burroughs, Foucault, and Virilio together (as one author who, named 
the control society, one who sees it fast approaching, and another who constantly 
analyzes it), it is important first of all to appreciate the way in which Deleuze ‘reads’ 
other thinkers. It has often been stated that his works on other philosophers 
contain as much of his own thought as they do of others’ (see Massumi 1992: 2; 
Colebrook 2002: 73). Such comments have not least been made with reference to 
Deleuze’s own infamous description of how his reading of major philosophers 
could be characterized as a kind of ‘buggery’: “I saw myself as taking an author 
from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet 
monstrous” (Deleuze 1995c: 6). While such a statement certainly ties in with and 
colorfully depicts Deleuze’s highly original books on major philosophers such as, 
for instance, Nietzsche and Bergson (Deleuze 1983, 2002), it at the same time 
should not be overstated. Or at least, it would be a bad starting point for assessing 
a claim like the one made with reference to control society.  
Thus, if we take Deleuze’s remark on Burroughs, Foucault and Virilio 
seriously, the question arises as to what, more specifically, merits a reference to 
exactly these three authors? Answering such a question, however, is complicated by 
the fact that there are no explicit references in Deleuze’s text that point to the 
specific works and pages where these authors allegedly have mentioned or analyzed 
the rise of a control society. While this is not the place to begin a major textual 
exegesis of the respective works of Burroughs, Foucault and Virilio, we merely 
point here to the fact that Virilio is utilized quite extensively within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus ([1980] 2002, see for instance: 212, 231, 386-387, 
395-396, 462, 467) and while Burroughs (1985) did indeed write an essay where the 
notion of control figures prominently, for the purposes of the present chapter it is 
worthwhile restricting the attention to Deleuze’s point that Foucault sees the 
control society as “fast approaching”. Concentrating explicitly on Foucault is not 
only merited by the fact that Foucault plays a more significant role within the 
writings of Deleuze, not least in the book-length study entitled Foucault (Deleuze 
1988), but more prominently because the place in the essay on the control societies 
where the unspecified reference (to Burroughs, Foucault and Virilio) is made is 
 203 
 
within the second paragraph that follows immediately after the introductory one 
where Deleuze points to Foucault’s analysis of the historical transition from a 
sovereign society to a disciplinary society. In this sense, Deleuze’s remark is 
situated within a textual context that is already set up as pertaining to Foucault’s 
work. 
However, since the essay on control society does not explicitly state where 
Foucault allegedly should have pointed towards the rise of control as an 
overarching new mode of power, it is necessary to look for other clues of evidence 
as to where Deleuze could be said to qualify his rather loose remark. One place to 
attend to is his final public lecture “What is a Dispositif?”, which was held in 1988 
and published in 1992. Here Deleuze (1992: 350-352) elaborates a bit more on this 
problem, just as he, more importantly, points us in a direction that perhaps 
provides a bit of guidance as to where Foucault has taken up this notion of control.  
In his lecture, Deleuze identifies the notion of the dispositif as a central 
analytical device with which Foucault conducts his analysis. According to Deleuze, 
we have to recognize that what is remarkable about Foucault’s investigations is that 
they are, on the one hand, orchestrated around a historical analysis of what “we 
already no longer are”, that is, what we are leaving behind, and on the other hand, 
though often only implicitly, they contain another part that is attentive to what we 
are in the process of becoming, “to the unknown knocking at the door” (ibid: 350, 
a phrasing that is repeated in his essay on control society 1995a: 178). This latter 
part the diagnostic that pertains to “our actuality”, and though it is of central 
importance, it is often almost entirely absent from Foucault’s major books. While 
Foucault’s books contain important investigations into the historical dimensions of 
the dispositive, Deleuze claims that we have to look to Foucault’s interviews in 
order to get a grasp of the problem pertaining to our actuality. Following from this, 
the various interviews Foucault gave throughout his life are, according to Deleuze 
(1992: 352), to be considered as being just as important as Foucault’s books. The 
reason for this is that in these interviews Foucault “traced lines of actualization that 
required another mode of expression” than the one utilized in his books. In order 
to describe this relation, Deleuze likens the relation of Foucault’s books and 
interviews to Nietzsche, “whose works are difficult to read without the Nachlass 
that is contemporary to each” (ibid: 352). It is in conjunction with these 
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specifications of the double nature of dispositives (usually translated as 
apparatuses) that Deleuze stipulates how this relates to the notion of control:  
Some have thought that Foucault was painting the portrait of modern 
societies as disciplinary apparatuses in opposition to the old apparatuses of 
sovereignty. This is not the case: the disciplines Foucault described are the 
history of what we are slowly ceasing to be and our current apparatus is 
taking shape in attitudes of open and constant control that are very different 
from the recent closed disciplines. Foucault agrees with Burroughs who 
announced that our future would be more controlled than disciplined (ibid: 
350). 
The fast-approaching society of control is thus allegedly detectable within the 
numerous interviews given by Foucault. Here Deleuze is probably first of all 
alluding to a discussion between himself, Foucault and Guattari that took place in 
1973 (Foucault et al. 1996, see especially p. 106-108), where the notion of control 
certainly surfaces and ties in with several of the issues touched upon in “Postscript 
on the Control Societies.” Foucault, for instance, mentions marketing here, new 
pharmaceutical products and a new type of “control of the normal” (ibid: 108), all 
issues reflected upon in Deleuze’s later essay. Still, in spite of the fact that it is 
possible to supply such a reading with additional direct qualifications (see for 
example Foucault’s 1973-lectures from Rio 2002a: 76, 81), it is nevertheless 
pushing the point too far to state that Foucault sees the control society as fast 
approaching.  
One of the strongest reasons for not accepting Deleuze’s characterization of a 
passage from sovereignty to discipline, and then on to control, is perhaps that 
Foucault’s own elaborations on this never revolve around a control society, or a 
new dispositive of control taking over from a disciplinary society or a disciplinary 
dispositive. More precisely, it can be argued, that there is a triple misattribution at 
stake here. What is of significant interest here, and this is where the first part of the 
triple misattribution becomes manifest, is that whereas Deleuze, and a lot of the 
secondary literature following him, speaks of sovereignty being replaced by 
discipline, which again is replaced by control, Foucault speaks of “sovereignty, 
discipline and governmental management [gestion gouvernemental]” (Foucault 2007a: 
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107/2004: 111, emphasis added). Whereas Deleuze privileges the concept of 
control, Foucault (2007a, 2008) persistently foregrounds the notions of 
government and governmental rationality. This ties in with a rather encompassing 
rearticulation in Foucault’s conceptualization of power. Whereas in Discipline and 
Punish he had been preoccupied with putting Nietzsche’s (2009) genealogical 
approach to bear upon the genealogy of the modern soul (Foucault 1991a: 29), 
Foucault’s explorations increasingly begin to add another register to these 
investigations. One can follow a trajectory here whereby he picks up on a problem 
he had already come across in conjunction with his investigations into social 
medicine presented at a seminar in Rio de Janeiro in 1974 (Foucault 2002b). 
Whereas discipline breaks down a multiplicity into its component parts, augments 
them, and reassembles them again, the investigations into social medicine gradually 
expand into a problematic where the irreducibility of a group of living beings, 
making up a population, comes into view as a separate, and yet at the same time 
parallel, development. Thus, Foucault loosely sketches what he calls biopower, that 
is, a new form of power that both encompass the anatomo-politics of discipline 
and a biopolitics pertaining to a population (Foucault 1998a: 140; 2003b: 253).  
It is with these rather sketchy conceptualizations that Foucault (2007a: 1) 
initiates his lectures in 1978: “This year I would like to begin studying something 
that I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio-power.” This vagueness is underlined by 
the fact that in The Will to Knowledge (1998a: 139-140), as well as in the final lecture 
of his 1976 Collège de France lecture-series, “Society Must be Defended” (2003b: 253), 
biopower denoted an overarching concept encompassing the discipline of the body 
as well as the biopolitics of the population, it gradually evolves into a problematic 
of government and governmental rationality. This is not because biopower or 
biopolitics become equated with government and governmental rationality, but 
because the biopolitical problematic, according to Foucault (2008: 22), needs to be 
grasped within and on behalf of an investigation of liberalism as a distinct, and yet 
historically varying, art of government1 Furthermore, while Foucault throughout 
                                            
1 See Gudmand-Høyer and Lopdrup-Hjorth (2009) for a description of how the notion of 
biopolitics is unfolded in relation to the problematic of government; see also Lemke (2011b) for a 
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this searching and slowly evolving investigation of a new form of power, repeatedly 
stresses that biopolitics, biopower, apparatuses of security and/or the political art 
of government are tied together with the notion of control (see for example 1998a: 
139; 2007a: 65; 2008: 64, 67), the connotations of control are at the same time 
continually stressed as pertaining to the operations of discipline (see for example 
Foucault 1991a: 211; 2007a: 4, 16, 32, 39, 95, 351, 353) with which Foucault 
contrasts the art of government. Thus, while there may be several instances we can 
point to where Foucault uses the notion of control in relation to his newly 
developed research subject, we can equally point to just as many instances where 
the connotations of control are utilized to separate the workings of discipline from 
those of government. This latter point, for example, comes through when Foucault 
in the final lecture from 1978 characterizes the art of government pertaining to 
liberalism in the following way:  
It will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to 
manage and no longer control through rules and regulations. The essential 
objective of this management will be not so much to prevent things as to 
ensure that the necessary and natural regulations work, or even create 
regulations that enable natural regulations to work (Foucault 2007a: 353).  
The important point to draw forward here, however, is not so much whether 
Foucault does or does not attend to control, or whether it is something he is 
concerned with. The important point is that the notion of control is used in highly 
different and rather unsystematic ways, and that it never takes center stage. Due to 
this the grounds upon which it becomes possible to state that Foucault “sees the 
control society fast approaching” seems somewhat frail. If one wanted to force 
Foucault’s descriptions on to a prefix attached to society, the notions of ‘security’ 
(ibid: 10) or ‘government’ (ibid: 107) would indeed be more appropriate.  
The second part of Deleuze’s triple misattribution can be stated in the 
following manner: whereas Deleuze (1995a: 177) depicts sovereignty, discipline and 
control as replacing one another in a sequential fashion, Foucault speaks of a co-
                                                                                                                                   
general survey of the concept of biopolitics that charts the radically different conceptions 
advanced by Foucault on the one hand, and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) on the other.  
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existence between sovereignty, discipline and government: “we should not see things 
as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of 
a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle” 
(Foucault 2007a: 107). Foucault continually stresses that, in spite of the fact that a 
new mode of power gradually comes into being and begins to reorganize the way in 
which social interactions are handled, this does not imply the making obsolete of 
other forms of power (Foucault 2007a: 6-10). In conjunction with the coming into 
being of the art of government, Foucault, for example, makes the observation that 
“sovereignty is not eliminated; on the contrary, it is made more acute than ever.” 
The same can be said of discipline, which “was never more important or valued 
than when the attempt was made to manage the population” (Foucault 2007a: 107). 
Thus, there is no simple replacement between one form of power and another. 
Instead, it would be more appropriate to state that there is a continuous 
reorganization at stake, whereby the coming into being of a new mode of power 
can be seen as developing alongside a gradual transformation taking place in other 
dispositional modalities. Thus, the coming into being of discipline, or government 
for that matter, clearly does not make the exercise of sovereignty redundant. 
Rather, the exercise of sovereignty is redeployed by the giving of new laws that 
support or enter into close relationships with disciplining workers, pupils, and 
inmates on the one hand, and the management of populations on the other.  
Thirdly, whereas Deleuze (1995a: 178) marks the shift from discipline to 
control as, approximately, taking place after the Second World War, Foucault’s 
reflections on government are unfolded in relation to material that stretches from 
early Antiquity to the end of the 1970s. While Foucault (2003a: 177-180) already 
touches upon the notion of government in his lecture-series from 1975, it is 
nevertheless not until his fourth lecture in 1978 that it begins to come into view as 
a separate problematic. In fact, from this moment and until his death in 1984, the 
notion of government remains a recurring problematic for Foucault, though the 
way in which this notion is applied is considerably expanded. Thus, whereas the 
accent in the 1978- and the 1979-lectures is on “the government of men as (…) it 
appears as the exercise of political sovereignty” (2008: 2), the center of gravity 
increasingly shifts towards the government of the self on the one hand (Foucault 
1997c: 81, 1997d: 87), and to the meeting place where the political government of 
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men links up with the government of the self on the other (Foucault 2002c: 300). 
In this sense, the notions of government and governmentality are continually 
modified in conjunction with the material under investigation. In spite of such 
changes, however, government and governmentality remain continually recurring 
notions that surface in relation to material that spans a period of approximately 
2500 years.  
Still, at this point it is important to briefly touch upon the remark made above 
about the translation of the French word ‘entreprise’ in Deleuze’s essay. It is 
important because, in spite of the just-unfolded triple misattribution, the notion of 
entreprise provides a point of convergence between Deleuze’s reflections in the text 
on the control society on the one hand, and a theme unfolded by Foucault, within 
his governmental framework, on the other. However, whereas Deleuze targets the 
enterprise as a gaseous ‘thing’ spreading throughout the social fabric, Foucault 
investigates the rise of a new ‘enterprising’ way of being as this emerges within the 
texts of two twentieth century strands of neoliberalism. More precisely, Foucault 
locates how the German Ordoliberals seek to make enterprise into “the formative 
power of society” on the one hand (Foucault: 2008: 148), and how the American 
neoliberals begin to depict each human being as an entrepreneur of him or herself 
on the other (ibid: 225). While it is difficult to assess whether Deleuze was 
knowledgeable about this, or whether he attended Foucault’s lectures at the Collège 
de France in 1979, or became aware through other channels of Foucault’s 
preoccupation with German and American strands of neoliberalism, it is 
nevertheless significant that the notion of enterprise begins to preoccupy both of 
them, and that their respective, yet highly different, ways of approaching the 
problematic clearly belong to a period that stretches from just before the Second 
World War to the time in which they respectively take up this notion.  
Moreover, in spite of Deleuze’s triple misattribution, his observation about 
Foucault being attentive to what is ‘knocking at the door’, could probably be 
extended here to not only encompass the numerous interviews Foucault gave, but 
also his lectures in general, and The Birth of Biopolitics in particular. Indeed, the most 
obvious reason for doing so would be that the 1979-lectures contain the most 
extended explorations of what we are in the process of becoming within all of 
Foucault’s work as such. It is the one and only time Foucault takes up problems 
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pertaining to the latter half of the twentieth century in such an explicit and direct 
way and one of the reasons for him doing so is probably due to the fact that he 
detected something knocking at the door, something important, something 
pertaining to our actuality (Foucault 2007a: 6, 9-11; 2008: 22, 192; see also Gordon 
1991: 6; Senellart 2007: 371-377; Villadsen and Dean 2012: 402-406).  
Following from this little detour through Deleuze’s essay it is therefore 
possible to flesh out a longer and more complex historically grounded problematic 
pertaining to the emergence of a new form of power. On the one hand, as we have 
already seen, the attractiveness of Deleuze’s essay and the reason for its almost 
overwhelming reception is to a large extent due to the fact that it is explicitly 
concerned with a form of power that reaches beyond the organization or 
institution as a self-standing entity. On the other hand, the genealogy of what 
Deleuze labels “control” can now be rearticulated within Foucault’s vocabulary of 
“government and governmentality”, whereby a much longer historical trajectory is 
opened up. The perspective opened up by this displacement, however, is not 
merely a question of textual exegesis, and of whom conceptualized the operations 
of power in the most adequate way. Indeed, one may argue, that such elaborations 
easily slide into irrelevance if they remain at the level of abstract discussions of how 
power should be conceptualized. What is significant for the purposes of the 
present dissertation is that both Deleuze and Foucault have begun to elaborate 
upon a form of management and organization that functions within the open, and 
is not bound up by closed spaces. For now, we will merely take stock of the fact 
that the passage through Deleuze’s essay to Foucault’s problematic of government 
necessarily recasts the historical time span to be considered for an enquiry into a 
history of co-creation. The question of what we can gain from Foucault’s lectures 
in relation to a history of co-creation, however, necessarily raises the query: to what 
extent might it be possible to draw insights from Foucault pertaining to a history of 
co-creation that are not already developed within studies of management and 
organization? Here, special attention is given to Critical Management Studies, since 
it is primarily within this field that Foucault’s impact on the study of management 
and organization has been felt.  
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The reception of Foucault within studies of organization and management 
While the reception of Foucault within studies of organization and management 
has been almost overwhelming, there is nevertheless an important line pertaining to 
his work that has not been reflected and taken up in the way it deserves – especially 
for the purposes of a history of co-creation. Hence, in spite of the fact that 
Foucault has been drawn forward as one of the foremost thinkers by way of which 
Critical Management Studies became established as a separate line of enquiry 
(Parker 2002: 116), important parts of his work have still not been sufficiently 
appreciated.  
While Foucault has surely been taken up together with other French postwar 
thinkers within Critical Management Studies (Adler et al. 2008: 129), the 
prominence given to Foucault is so special that he has been called “the pin-up boy 
of poststructuralism” due to his lasting and significant impact on Critical 
Management Studies (Jones 2009: 77). Thus, at first sight it seems somewhat 
surprising that an important part of his work has been neglected within this line of 
research. However, before specifying the exact contours of this neglect, we have to 
take a short look at the reception of Foucault within Critical Management Studies. 
In conjunction with this, it is imperative to stress that this review will not in any 
way amount to a comprehensive examination of the reception of Foucault within 
this line of thinking. Rather, it will merely point to a couple of important ways in 
which Foucault’s work has been taken up (for more comprehensive reviews see 
Jones 2002; Barratt 2008; Munro 2011).  
 
From around the mid-1980s Foucault’s work was beginning to appear within 
articles that primarily attended to organization and management studies. This 
development was spawned not least by a group of organization and management 
scholars who began exploring and utilizing Foucault’s work to critically scrutinize 
accounting (Hoskin and Macve 1986; Miller and O’Leary 1987). From these early 
developments, further studies were added throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s. 
While additional work on accounting continued (Grey 1994; Armstrong 1994; 
Miller and O’Leary 1994; Hopwood and Miller 1994), the pallet of areas to which 
Foucault’s work was applied significantly increased. Thus, in addition to 
accounting, Foucault’s thought was applied historical inquiries into the 
 211 
 
‘manufacturing of the employee’ (Jacques 1996), over to studies of strategy 
(Knights and Morgan 1991; Knights 1992), subjectivity (Knights and Willmott 
1989) and Human Resource Management (HRM) (Townley 1993, 1994), to the 
articles collected in the anthology edited by Mckinley and Stark (1998), Foucault, 
Management and Organization Theory.  
In relation to this wide reception, two things should be noted. First of all, 
while Foucault was given rather early on a prominent place within what gradually 
came to be known as Critical Management Studies, the center of gravity for this 
reception was predominantly located around studies that drew on work published 
up until the middle of the 1970s, first and foremost Discipline and Punish (Foucault 
1991a). Here, special emphasis was given to the complex interplay of power-
knowledge, just as the notions of surveillance, discipline and the Panopticon were 
extensively utilized (for an overview of this, see Munro 2011). One of the reasons 
for this was probably that the rather detailed outlines with which Foucault (1991a) 
describes the functioning of discipline, within the enclosures of factories, schools, 
and armies, had a certain familiarity to them that perhaps even bore a perceived 
resemblance to contemporary organizations. This resemblance between 
‘organizations’ back then and our modern organizations today was probably 
assessed as being so close that Foucault’s analysis was easily transferable to 
contemporary arenas of work. Thus, scholars inclined towards critical descriptions 
of management and organizations could show how discipline played an important 
role in management technologies stretching from Just-in-Time manufacturing 
(Sewell and Wilkinson 1992), over to performance appraisals (Findlay and Newton 
1998) and further on to HRM more generally (Townley 1993). Moreover, the fact 
that the British tradition of Critical Management Studies could be described as 
being significantly influenced by a certain tension between Marx and Foucault 
(Parker 2002: 116) probably also made Discipline and Punish highly interesting to 
scholars of a Marxist or post-Marxist persuasion. This was due not least to the fact 
that many of Foucault’s descriptions of the regimentation, surveillance, and 
optimization of the human body could easily be seen as complementary to the 
exploitation of workers described by Marx (1976), as well as to later studies 
developed within labor process theory (Braverman 1974).  
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In addition to this tradition, a partly overlapping trajectory was initiated that 
was not as centered on Discipline and Punish, but instead attended to notions of 
government and governmentality. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
not least spurred by the publication of The Foucault Effect in 1991 (Burchell et al. 
1991), the notions of government and governmentality were extensively utilized 
within what would later come to be known as governmentality studies, primarily 
associated with scholars coming out of English and Australian Universities (Rose, 
1996, 1999a, 1999b; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1994: 174-
193, 1999). These analyses were not only intertwined with the initial reception of 
Foucault’s work within organization and management studies (see for example 
Miller and O’Leary 1987; Miller and Rose 1990), but also provided a highly fertile 
breeding ground for lines of reflection that critically scrutinized management and 
the culture of enterprise (du Gay and Salam 1992; du Gay 1994, 2000).  
 
Lacunas and problems within the reception of Foucault 
While this tradition flourished and provided rich and interesting analyses of the 
genealogy of the modern soul (Rose 1999a), the psy-sciences (Rose 1996), 
liberalism and neoliberalism (Barry et al. 1996; Rose 1999b, Dean 1999), and the 
enterprise culture (du Gay 1991, 1994; Rose 1996: 150-168), its reception of 
Foucault’s work was significantly shaped by the fact that the sources on which this 
reception was built, that is, Foucault’s lectures from 1978 and 1979, were neither 
published nor easily accessible. Besides the published course summaries (Foucault 
1997a, 1997b), an early translation from 1979 of Foucault’s fourth 1978-lecture in 
the journal Ideology & Consciousness (the lecture that was later re-published in The 
Foucault Effect, edited by Burchell et al. 1991), and a couple of small texts and 
lectures picking up on the same issues in a less comprehensive manner (see for 
example Foucault 2002e, 2002f), the only possibility for accessing the material dealt 
with in these lectures was to go to the Foucault Archive at the Bibliothèque du 
Saulchoir in Paris and to listen to the original recordings. This, however, in no way 
detracts from the often original utilizations Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
was put to within governmentality studies. But it certainly implied that only those 
who attended the 1978 and 1979 lectures or listened to the recordings were able to 
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fully appreciate the wider setting within which Foucault developed his notion of 
governmentality (Gordon 1991; Burchell 1991).  
As a consequence, it is possible to detect a range of lacunas not yet attended 
to within Foucault’s lectures from 1978 and 1979. The existence of such lacunas 
has furthermore implied that several of the investigations cast not only within 
governmentality studies, but also within studies of organization and management 
working along similar lines (for example Brewis 1996; Clegg et al. 2002; 
Triantafillou 2003; Skälen et al. 2006; Dixon 2007) have only been able to draw on 
a negligible part of the material which these studies were launched on to begin 
with. While this is not the place to begin a major exegesis of these lacunas, we 
restrict ourselves here by merely pointing to a couple of recent articles by Munro 
(2011) and Weiskopf and Munro (2011) that have picked up on exactly this issue. 
In both of these articles it is argued that the content of Foucault’s lectures has not 
been appreciated sufficiently – first and foremost due to the fact that they have 
only recently been published in English. Whereas Munro (2011) makes a survey of 
the way in which Foucault’s work has and has not been used within management 
studies and the social sciences more generally, Weiskopf and Munro (2011) apply 
Foucault’s (2007a) descriptions of the ‘apparatuses of security’ to contemporary 
HRM. While we return more thoroughly to the apparatuses of security in the next 
chapter, for now it is important to point merely to the fact that Weiskopf and 
Munro utilize the description of these apparatuses to make an important and highly 
interesting addition to the otherwise disciplinary-focused stream of HRM-studies. 
More precisely, they show how contemporary management is not restricted to 
confining, disciplining and training the modern employee, but increasingly also 
benefits from allowing things to unfold and circulate in a much more open-ended 
manner, which is exactly one of the characteristics pertaining to the apparatuses of 
security (Foucault 2007a: 20). Furthermore, by paying explicit attention to the 
notion of human capital analyzed by Foucault (2008: 215-238) in The Birth of 
Biopolitics, Weiskopf and Munro’s (2011: 15) analysis shows “how the neoliberal 
discourse of enterprise is operationalized and inscribed in the reality of 
organizations through the specific mechanism of HCM [Human Capital 
Management].” Through undertaking this analysis they state how their investigation 
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more generally “contributes to an understanding of a fundamental shift of the role 
of management and organizing in post-disciplinary regimes.”  
While definitely advancing the reception of Foucault within studies of 
management and organization by bringing a hitherto neglected and highly 
important part of Foucault’s work to bear on contemporary problems, Weiskopf 
and Munro’s (2011) utilization of Foucault nevertheless also raises a couple of 
questions. First of all, the fact that human capital analysis was advanced by people 
associated with American neoliberalism (Mincer 1958; Schultz 1961; Becker 1962), 
does not necessarily imply that the way in which human capital management has 
been emerging as a major concern within contemporary organizations entails that 
neoliberal discourse “is inscribed into the reality of organizations” (Weiskopf and 
Munro 2011: 2). This is not least due to the fact that a genealogy of the linkage 
between humans and capital can be traced back to problems that to a considerable 
extent predate the conceptualization of human capital attended to by Foucault, and 
governmentality studies more generally (see Bröckling 2011 for an extended 
genealogy of the connection between humans and capital), but also because such 
descriptions tend to come exceedingly close to making neoliberalism an 
overarching single mover and cause of concrete organizational appearances of 
managerial techniques that have their own complex genealogies. While not denying 
a clear connection between neoliberalism and contemporary forms of human 
capital management, it is nevertheless significant to regard neoliberalism (Mirowski 
and Plehwe 2009) on the one hand, and contemporary management techniques on 
the other, as clearly associated yet separate phenomena.  
Secondly, and more importantly for the present dissertation, the way in which 
the anti-disciplinary centrifugal forces of the apparatuses of security is described as 
pertaining to the management of human capital within organizations raises a couple 
of questions. One of these is whether the description of the facilitative, open-
ended management of the eighteenth century operations of the apparatuses of 
security is directly applicable to contemporary human capital management? While 
perhaps merely a minor issue, the way in which Weiskopf and Munro characterize 
the contemporary management of human capital by quoting Foucault on 
something he describes as belonging to the eighteenth century, again, raises the 
problem we encountered with discipline above. Thus, whereas earlier attempts 
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within Critical Management Studies brought the notion of discipline to bear on 
contemporary organizational problems, Weiskopf and Munro repeat this, though 
now only through applying a description of the functioning of the apparatuses of 
security to twenty first century human capital management. More precisely, they 
write:  
In the post-disciplinary context organizations of all types are increasingly 
constructed as dynamic and flexible enterprises in a competitive environment. 
Management’s role here is one ‘of allowing circulations to take place, of 
controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always 
in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to 
another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are 
canceled out’ (Foucault, 2007: 65) (Weiskopf and Munro 2011: 15).  
This raises the question as to the way in which Foucault’s historical analysis speaks 
to contemporary concerns and problems. Indeed, the resemblance between 
historical descriptions of the operations of discipline and government with that of 
contemporary operations of power seems so close that the historical distance 
between then and now almost inevitably collapses.  
Another question surfacing in conjunction with this is whether the application 
of the description of the apparatuses of security to a contemporary organizational 
setting constitutes the most adequate use of Foucault’s analysis of this specific 
mode of power? While on the one hand appreciating the analysis undertaken in 
Weiskopf and Munro’s article, it is nevertheless at the same time possible to 
speculate as to whether it would not be more appropriate to apply Foucault’s 
descriptions to something that transgresses the boundaries of organizations in a more 
radical way than what is at stake within Weiskopf and Munro’s analysis? Indeed, 
Weiskopf and Munro already seem to be on their way to making this extension 
when they end their paper by pointing to how their work might tie in with future 
research on the genealogy of the concept of the network (ibid: 15).  
Still, in spite of the fact that a couple of questions can be raised regarding 
Weiskopf and Munro’s (2011) application of Foucault’s descriptions to twenty first 
century human capital management problems, this dissertation nevertheless agrees 
with their insight that an understanding of management today somehow stands in a 
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relationship to, and can benefit from, the issues touched upon within Foucault’s 
lectures. However, whereas Weiskopf and Munro (2011) apply Foucault’s analysis 
to contemporary HRM, the utilization of Foucault’s investigations within the 
following chapters picks up on some of his themes due to the fact that they are 
viewed as being central to a history of co-creation. Nevertheless, in establishing this 
relationship to Foucault’s lectures, it is imperative not to confuse what he set out to 
do with a history of co-creation. While some of the problems attended to by 
Foucault (such as, for instance, the workings of the apparatuses of security) might 
tie in with and add to a history of co-creation, his problems, nevertheless, are 
different from those dealt with here. Accordingly, we should not think that 
Foucault’s analysis can provide answers to, or adequate descriptions of, problems 
that are not his, and we should be careful with applying notions originally 
developed to describe specific historical phenomena as easily transferable to 
contemporary concerns. In this sense, there is no point in ‘finding’ discipline or 
neoliberal governmentality at work within this or that organizational context.  
Following from this, the question to be attended to in the next chapter is, 
therefore, in what way Foucault’s lectures can be seen as pertaining to a history of 
co-creation, and also how the material dealt with in Security, Territory, Population and 
The Birth of Biopolitics can be utilized to cast light on a genealogy of the components 
of the co-creation vocabulary. The delicate issue here is maintaining the balance of 
showing how the material dealt with in Foucault’s lectures brings important themes 
to the surface pertaining to a history of co-creation, while at the same time 
abstaining from collapsing the historical and thematic distance between the 
concerns and problems Foucault attends to and those of co-creation as it has come 
to pass within the last couple of decades. By moving along this path, it will become 
clear how material dealt with in Foucault’s lectures is significant for the history of 
co-creation, and yet at the same time needs to be dealt with cautiously in order not 
to collapse the historical and thematic distance between his work and the 
description of the coming into being of co-creation. As we will see, one key notion 
that makes it possible to utilize Foucault’s lectures as resources while 
simultaneously integrating them into a history of co-creation is that of 
managementality.  
 
Chapter 5 
 
Managing freedom: a deep-seated, 
recurring historical problematic 
 
 
 
The last chapter identified Deleuze’s essay on the control societies as an important 
text that had been utilized by scholars enquiring into co-creation and post-
disciplinary modes of management more generally. Through attending to one of 
Deleuze’s central claims – that Foucault allegedly should have seen the control 
society fast approaching – a triple misattribution was identified. First of all, whereas 
Deleuze highlights control, Foucault speaks of government and governmental 
rationality. Secondly, whereas Deleuze’s essay underlined a successive replacement 
between the different apparatuses, Foucault argued for a co-existence. Thirdly, 
whereas Deleuze saw the society of control as coming into being after the Second 
World War, Foucault opens up a much longer timeframe whereby a crisis of 
governmentality in the twentieth century needs to be grasped in terms of a series of 
mutations in, and developments of, the art of government that spans from early 
Antiquity to the present. Thus, it was suggested that the notion of government 
could more appropriately be attributed to Foucault, that the lectures within which 
he primarily developed this notion have been underappreciated within studies of 
management and organization, and that a history of co-creation, though distinct 
from Foucault’s genealogy of the art of government, could benefit significantly 
from attending to some of the themes taken up in Security, Territory, Population 
(Foucault 2007a) and The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault 2008).  
Following from this, however, the issue of how to utilize the problems and 
historical material attended to by Foucault becomes manifest. Thus, if we aim at 
taking some steps towards a history of co-creation, then how is it possible to draw 
inspiration from Foucault without applying his concepts directly to material that is 
foreign to its original and historically specific points of anchorage? In conjunction 
with this, we have already seen here how Weiskopf and Munro (2011) made a 
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highly original contribution to the otherwise disciplinary power-oriented focus of 
Foucault-inspired HRM-studies by applying Foucault’s descriptions of the 
apparatuses of security to human capital management. Still, in spite of casting light 
on a hitherto overlooked and highly important part of Foucault’s work and 
bringing it into dialogue with contemporary problems of management and 
organization, Weiskopf and Munro’s contribution nevertheless tended towards 
collapsing the historical and thematic distance between Foucault’s descriptions of 
the apparatuses of security and neoliberalism into their own matters of concern.  
Another danger faced here is bringing Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
directly to bear on a history of co-creation, while at the same time relying upon an 
underlying philosophy or theory adapted from the tradition of Autonomist 
Marxism. While Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) were shown to draw extensively on 
Deleuze’s essay on the control society, and while a point of convergence between 
Deleuze’s essay and Foucault’s analysis of governmentality was indeed identified as 
revolving around the notion of enterprise, attempts at bringing together 
governmentality with Autonomist Marxism nevertheless inevitably run into major 
obstacles. Such an unholy marriage is exactly what is arranged within Zwick et al.’s 
(2008) otherwise highly interesting and insightful description of co-creation as a 
new marketing governmentality. As Mitchell Dean (2003) has shown, such 
accounts remain incompatible due to the fact that Foucault’s genealogical approach 
abstains from totalizing narratives and remains obliged to the meticulous labor of 
unfolding the complex historical trajectories of a range of problems pertaining to 
our actuality, while Hardt and Negri’s account more readily identifies an 
overarching drama whereby the development towards a society of control sets up 
the tension between Empire and capital on the one hand and the multitude on the 
other. The consequence of this for Zwick et al. (2008) is that Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality is being deployed in order to sketch a history of the emergence of 
co-creation that runs much more along the lines of Autonomist Marxist accounts – 
albeit without the utopianism that often accompanies these – than it does of 
Foucault’s. Still, this does not detract from some of the important tendencies 
pointed to by Zwick et al. Indeed, their description of marketing’s historically 
changing conception of the customer is highly interesting (Zwick et al. 2008: 169-
172). Together with other historical accounts of co-creation (Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 
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2009, 2010; Cova and Dalli 2009; Cova et al. 2011) they attend to the ways in which 
consumers, throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, have come to be 
central to the creation of value. Nevertheless, as was also spelled out in the last 
chapter, the descriptions of the coming into being of co-creation set forward 
within these works significantly underplays developments from the beginning of 
the twentieth century, just as they predominantly view co-creation as a 
phenomenon that comes out of developments within the discipline of marketing. 
While in the next chapter we see how the components of co-creation begin to 
already show up as problems within management thought from the 1920s and 
1930s, for now it is enough to take cognizance of the fact that although Arvidsson 
(2006, 2008, 2009, 2010), Zwick et al. (2008), and Cova and Dalli (2009) indeed 
provide relevant inputs to the post-WWII history of co-creation, their analytical 
framework takes its point of departure from within Autonomist Marxism, thereby 
privileging a particular perspective that is at odds with a genealogical investigation 
of the coming into being of co-creation.  
In attending to a history of co-creation, it is therefore worthwhile to take 
Foucault’s investigations into the art of government as a point of departure. This 
investigation opens up a historical trajectory that on the one hand takes up the 
problem of post-disciplinary management, and on the other hand attends to this as 
a far reaching and more deep-seated historical problematic that, to a considerable 
extent, prefigures contemporary accounts of post-disciplinary management in 
general, and co-creation in particular. However, in taking this point of departure, it 
is imperative to try to steer free of the double pitfall of taking Foucault’s analysis as 
being directly applicable to a contemporary phenomenon, and of trying to lodge his 
genealogical analysis within an already developed theoretical approach that would 
either view co-creation as reducible to a new form of exploitation (Zwick et al. 
2008; Böhm and Land 2009), or as holding out the opportunity of a non-capitalist 
value logic in the form of “the power of co-creation” (Lazzarato 2004) or an 
“ethical economy” (Arvidsson 2009). Indeed, it is only by refusing to subscribe to 
either of these theoretically loaded accounts that it becomes possible to chart a 
genealogy of the components of the co-creation vocabulary and, by extension, to 
give an account of how the experience of the outside as a source of value creation 
has come into being.  
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Following from this, the outline of the chapter is as follows. Firstly, the 
chapter relocates the problem of co-creation from its late-twentieth century 
appearance to the middle of the eighteenth century. By taking up Foucault’s 
lectures from 1978, it is argued that several of the themes identified as originating 
in the late twentieth century have more far-stretching historical roots than scholars 
of post-disciplinary management and co-creation currently recognize. Attention is 
predominantly given here to how managing outside of disciplinary enclosures and 
the management of events already surface as problems in the eighteenth century. 
Secondly, the hypothesis is established that while Foucault does not depict 
anything like an eighteenth century proto-co-creation problematic, his lectures 
nevertheless attend to a complex crisis of management that resurfaces in the 
twentieth century in relation to the management of something outside the 
organization, the management of something traversed by processes that have an 
inherent spontaneous character, and the management of events. Following from 
this, it is argued that the crisis and transformation of the art of government in the 
eighteenth century, described by Foucault, should indeed be seen as an important 
part of a genealogy of co-creation. Finally, this paves the way for attending to the 
contours of the shift from a disciplinary form of management, as described in the 
literature on reason of state, to a liberal art of government that utilizes and 
functions through the management of freedom. Through this history, we begin to 
see the coming together of the components central within the co-creation 
vocabulary. Thus, in the next chapter we see how these components begin to take 
on the character of problems towards which specific kinds of responses were made 
within management thought and economics in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
 
As we have seen, one of the continually recurring themes associated with the co-
creation vocabulary is that of being able to not merely accept and tolerate the 
unexpected, but of actually making room for it and utilizing it for productive 
purposes. From the strategic management scholars, to theorists keen on exploring 
the character of open-source software development, and further on to the 
Autonomist Marxists, the disruptive creativeness associated with the unexpected 
has given rise to a range of considerations. Whether viewed as a source of profit or 
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as constituting something irreducible to business interests, this unexpectedness was 
viewed as having a potential that could be utilized to further otherwise diverging 
political goals. In relation to Critical Management Studies, we have seen how André 
Spicer (2010) conceptualized this as a change from a disciplinary mode of relating 
to extitutions, to one based on control. Instead of trying to prescribe, and make 
everything fit into pre-existing categories, such controlling institutions increasingly 
accepted and made room for the unexpected, just as they began to be organized 
around the welcoming of a certain form of unruliness, unpredictability and 
transgression. As Lazzarato points to, such an organization departs sharply from a 
disciplinary organization of labor which he characterizes as “anti-event”, because 
“it has to subordinate event and invention to reproduction” (Lazzarato 2004: 192). 
Following from this, the notion of the event begins to take center stage in the 
contemporary organization of production (ibid.). It joins up here with the problem 
of how to manage and relate to external, innovative capacities without subjecting 
these to disciplinary techniques. Thus, what we are dealing with here is essentially 
the management of what in Part One was described as the first and the third 
components of the co-creation vocabulary.  
However, whereas all of the theorists and scholars attended to until now have 
depicted this as a relatively recent transformation gradually taking place throughout 
the latter part of the twentieth century, Foucault’s (2007a) investigations into the 
art of government allow us to relocate this problem within a longer historical 
timeframe. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at Foucault’s descriptions 
of a form of management that, on the one hand, organizes within an open space, 
that is, that manages something outside of disciplinary enclosures, and on the other 
hand, does so in a manner that seeks to work with the future, the unforeseen, and 
thereby allows for the unfolding and the harnessing of events. Such a mode of 
management is exactly what Foucault begins to investigate in his 1978-lectures 
through the notion “apparatuses of security” (Foucault 2007a: lecture 1, 2 and 3).  
Managing outside of disciplinary enclosures 
In order to characterize their specific mode of functioning, Foucault contrasts the 
apparatuses of security with the apparatuses of sovereignty and discipline. 
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However, the way in which he does so is through three concrete examples that 
juxtapose the distinct ways in which these different apparatuses relate to concrete 
problems. More precisely, these problems consist in the problem of the town, the 
problem of the scarcity of corn, and the problem of smallpox. We predominantly 
focus here on the first two of these, and the way in which the apparatuses of 
discipline and security relate to them, since Foucault’s unfolding of these issues 
opens up highly relevant lines pertaining to a history of co-creation. Specifically, 
whereas the problem of the town raises concerns that later resurface in conjunction 
with problems relevant for managing an open space without relying on disciplinary 
techniques, the scarcity of corn example opens up a new way of relating to the 
event.  
In relation to the problem of the town, Foucault contrasts the building of the 
small French town Richelieu, initiated in 1631, with the development and gradual 
reorganization of Nantes in the eighteenth century (Foucault 2007a: 15-17). 
Whereas the process of building Richelieu was initiated from scratch, from the 
destruction and clearing of what had previously been there, the reorganization of 
Nantes was conceived according to a plan of attack that took into account the 
already existing town. More precisely, the planning involved in the construction of 
Richelieu took its cue from the form of the Roman camp – a disciplinary model 
that had been rediscovered in Europe in the sixteenth century (ibid.). Here, the 
town is thought of and planned on the basis of a “geometrical figure, which is a 
kind of architectural module, namely the square or rectangle, which is in turn 
subdivided into other squares and rectangles” (Foucault 2007a: 16). While this 
implies a specific kind of symmetry, Foucault nevertheless explains that it is not a 
perfect symmetry in the sense of such squares or rectangles being broken down in 
a uniform manner across the whole town area. Thus, in order to facilitate trade, for 
example, the squares, rectangles and streets at one end of the town where the 
shops are located, might be smaller than at the other end of the town, thereby 
making a larger area of facades possible. Conversely, at the other end of the town 
comprising places for living, the rectangles or squares might be bigger, with the 
wealthiest and those of a higher social status living in the bigger houses placed 
along the largest streets, while those of a lesser social standing might live “in the 
streets perpendicular to the main street” (ibid: 17). In this way, one could conceive 
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of and construct from scratch ideal spaces for trade, and ideal spaces for housing, 
which were simultaneously conceived to entertain specific relations with one 
another – on the one hand segregating and subdividing the town according to 
carefully laid out patterns, and on the other hand synthesizing such patterns to 
accommodate adequate forms of couplings, and mutually enforcing interactions.  
This description of the disciplinary city plan of the town of Richelieu, of the 
construction of an artificial space from scratch designed according to an 
overarching and ideal diagram specifying exact functional subdivisions, is now 
contrasted with that of Nantes. Foucault describes how immensely expanding trade 
put pressure on the already existing infrastructure of Nantes, and how several 
development plans from the eighteenth century sought to suggest proper ways of 
responding to this. The problem consisted in making room and allowing for 
circulations. This was not least made visible by one, albeit unrealized, suggestion 
that conceived of reconstructing certain parts of the inner city of Nantes along a 
heart-shaped boulevard (ibid.). Just as with Quesnay’s early experiments with tubes 
and pumps, and the way in which these paved the way for him to conceive of the 
Tableau Économique, we see here city development proposals operating along the 
same lines of reasoning, that is, of taking the body and the flow of blood 
throughout the body, and applying this as a model according to which one can 
conceive of the organization of the economy or, in this instance, the associated and 
supportive architectural development of an already existing infrastructure.  
While this proposal could be seen to be in accordance with other architectural 
development schemes of the eighteenth century, Foucault nevertheless fixes his 
attention to the city development plans for Nantes as these were described by a city 
planner named Vigné de Vigny (ibid: 18). According to Vigny, it was important to 
ensure the proper wideness of the streets and to cut a couple of new routes 
through the city in order to accommodate the infrastructure to some important 
functions: first of all, to ensure proper hygiene and ventilation by way of “opening 
up all kinds of pockets where morbid miasmas accumulated in crowded quarters, 
where dwellings were to densely packed” (ibid.); secondly, to ensure trade within 
the town, and the proper means of circulation necessary for this; thirdly, to 
facilitate the flow of goods in and out of the city, thereby establishing adequate 
relations to the outside, to other cities – both within and outside of France; and 
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finally, to be able to devise new ways of regulating and inspecting a range of 
circulations that on the one hand flowed within the city, as well as in and out of the 
city, and on the other hand was made up of heterogeneous entities consisting not 
only of goods, sellers and buyers, but also of beggars, thieves, murderers, and 
vagrants. This latter issue had become an increasingly pertinent one with the 
generalized removal of city walls, and with the search for new ways of regulating 
flows in and out of the city that could no longer rely on older practices that 
depended on the inspections and controls made possible by the existence of city 
walls, clearly separating the town from its outside (ibid.). Vigny’s development plan 
was therefore to a large extent a matter of “organizing circulation, eliminating its 
dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and 
maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (ibid.).  
In this scheme, the town is conceived as something that is under 
development, something that gradually changes in a more or less predictable 
manner, something that has a future that one has to take into consideration 
without being able to predict in any specific detail. For instance, in relation to 
expanding trade, the problem arises of how to enlarge the city and integrate the 
harbor area in a way that does not stretch this too far along one side of the river, 
creating a large distance that would be suboptimal in relation to some of the 
beneficial circulations described above. Vigny devised here a plan which utilized 
both sides of the river, the construction of bridges across the river and the 
utilization of a couple of formerly unused islands, just as he devised how this could 
be set in relation to the development of a new quarter of the town. (ibid: 19).  
Following from this, Foucault begins to outline some important 
characteristics pertaining to the apparatuses of security as these can be seen to 
emerge around the middle of the eighteenth century. First of all, whereas the town 
of Richelieu was established on a cleared and empty space, artificially constructed 
from one end to the other through the deployment of the disciplinary model, the 
development plan of Nantes relied and built upon the already given conditions – 
be they natural (e.g. rivers, islands, mountains, the air) or human made (the already 
existing town). Furthermore, “this given will not be reconstructed to arrive at a 
point of perfection, as in the disciplinary town. It is simply a matter of maximizing 
the positive elements (…) and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient” (ibid: 
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19). Hence, it is not a question of totally reducing, and at any cost preventing, the 
negative and unwanted, but of arranging for it to remain within an acceptable and 
tolerable range. This again ties in with the way in which the streets of the city are 
conceived. Foucault states that there is an increasing awareness of their “poly-
functionality”, that is, the streets are designed as a material substratum supporting 
various kinds of circulation, good as well as bad, and with the augmentation of the 
former, and the minimization of the latter as the heuristic architectural ideal (ibid.). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the space of security established through 
such measures, is attentive to the future in another way than discipline. It is not a 
matter of predicting and prescribing the exact functionality and operations of the 
town and of controlling it down to its most delicate details, but rather a matter of 
working with the future, of navigating the temporal and uncertain, of managing the 
unfolding of a range of open-ended and unpredictable series consisting of a range 
of elements that continually circulates: “x number of carts, x number of passers-by, 
x number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on. (…) [T]he management of 
these series”, Foucault concludes, “is pretty much the essential characteristics of 
the mechanism of security” (ibid: 20).  
Managing events 
These descriptions furthermore tie in with a new way of relating to the event that 
also begins to be detectable from around the middle of the eighteenth century. 
Foucault picks the example here of the scarcity of corn that constituted a major 
and recurring problematic throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
and which correspondingly stimulated the appearance of a burgeoning literature. 
Scarcity of corn was a major problem due to the way in which it signaled a 
potential catastrophe in the form of famine, a catastrophe that not merely resulted 
in the death of many inhabitants, but also in riots and political instability. What is 
significant here is that we can see a shift from the way in which disciplinary and 
sovereign apparatuses relate to the event on the one hand, and the way in which 
the apparatuses of security relate to the event on the other. The disciplinary 
apparatus is in this regard characterized by trying to ward off the potential 
catastrophe induced by a bad harvest and the resulting scarcity of corn. Since a 
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scarcity of corn will induce sellers to withdraw it from the market, in order to make 
an even larger profit, it is mandatory for governmental regulation to prohibit such a 
behavior. Furthermore, in order to make sure that even the poorest part of the 
population will be able to buy corn, it is necessary to reduce the price of corn to a 
level where it is affordable. Foucault describes this as being exactly what the 
mercantilist policies of the seventeenth and eighteenth century tried to do. In this 
sense, Mercantilism can be seen as a particular system aiming to ward of a potential 
event, taking the form of a crisis or catastrophe, which could seriously destabilize 
the state. As Foucault (2007a: 33) says: “This anti-scarcity system is basically 
focused on a possible event, an event that could take place, and which one tries to 
prevent before it becomes reality”. 
In the eighteenth century, however, this minute and detailed regulation is 
exposed to considerable critique. First of all, the fixed low price on corn makes the 
profit of corn fall to a minimum – possibly even below the cost of production for 
the farmers. Secondly, when this profit falls to a minimum, the farmers will not be 
able to sow as much as they could, had they been given a higher price. Accordingly, 
there will be a shrinkage in the total amount of corn available, which will be 
exposed furthermore to changing climatic fluctuations: if the weather becomes a 
bit too cold in the winter, if it rains too much, or becomes a bit too dry, it will have 
disastrous consequences. Thus, what was supposed to be prevented has now 
occurred as a consequence of the modes of regulation which were to prevent this 
event from occurring in the first place (ibid: 33).  
It is in contrast to this disciplinary and juridical regulation which aimed to 
prevent such an event from happening that Foucault analyses how a group of 
theorists began to devise a new way of relating to the event that the scarcity of corn 
signaled. Instead of arranging for this event not to happen or instead of making all 
sorts of interventions aimed at preventing this event from occurring, one should 
instead let things run their course, and permit the price of corn to rise. This surely 
entails certain people dying, but by allowing this, the population as such will in fact 
survive, the reason for this being that as a consequence of the initial price-raise, 
corn from neighboring states will begin to flow into the country, thereby offsetting 
further price-raises, and ultimately cancelling the final and potentially devastating 
event by simply allowing its processes to unfold. Thus, instead of regulating the 
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social corpus in its most minute detail, one should instead rely upon and utilize 
such price-fluctuations. Foucault (2007a: 47) states that with this new way of 
relating to the event one responds to “reality in such a way that this response 
cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies it, or limits, checks, or 
regulates it.” 
This new way of managing the event found theoretical support in arguments 
developed around the middle of the eighteenth century, specifically within the 
writings of the Physiocrats in France. In chapter one, we have already seen how the 
science of political economy, as viewed by Quesnay, was seen as being permeated 
by nature and that nature, within his work, was depicted as a reliable source of 
assistance for the political ruler who was attentive to its subtle hints of guidance 
(Quesnay 1973: 2). In conjunction with this, the fluctuating conditions which 
control the price of corn begin to be viewed as inseparably associated with a 
naturalness beyond good and evil. Whereas the scarcity of corn had been conceived 
previously as an intolerable and entirely negative event one had to prevent by a 
range of prescriptive and prohibitive disciplinary and juridical devices, the event 
now began to be viewed as something natural, something one should not try to 
prevent, something one should merely take into account and accept as a natural 
and neutral occurrence. As Foucault (ibid: 37) states:  
by working with the reality of fluctuations between abundance / scarcity, 
dearness / cheapness, and not by trying to prevent it in advance, an apparatus 
is installed, which is (…) precisely an apparatus of security and no longer a 
juridical-disciplinary system. 
These two examples - the problem of the town and the problem of scarcity of corn 
- point to and are to be viewed in accordance with a wider transformation within 
the art of government and its supporting knowledge, political economy. Whereas it 
previously had been necessary to undertake a detailed regulation of the social 
corpus in its finest details, a new way of relating to the space of governmental 
regulation, and a new way of relating to the event, began to come into existence. It 
is not because the apparatuses of sovereignty or discipline are totally displaced 
from the way in which social regulation is practiced; it is rather a question of them 
becoming linked up with and being deployed within the apparatuses of security 
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(Foucault 2007a: 107). Though being linked up and joined together in their 
practical operations, however, their respective functionalities can nevertheless be 
analytically separated from each other.  
One of the central differences between discipline and the apparatuses of 
security is that whereas the former is centripetal, the latter is centrifugal: “Discipline 
concentrates, focuses, and encloses. The first action of discipline is in fact to 
circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of its power will 
function fully and without limit” (ibid: 44-45). This clearly separates discipline from 
the apparatuses of security that instead of zooming in on a particular area, 
constantly subdividing and being attentive to the detailed regulation of spatial and 
behavioral circumstances, rather works in the other direction. It constantly 
expands, draws in new elements, opens up towards the outside, the future, and the 
unpredictable, and essentially brings the market of the local town into contact with 
the world and the world market (ibid.). Furthermore, whereas discipline prescribes 
exactly what must be done, the apparatuses of security  
‘let[s] things happen.’ Not that everything is left alone, but laisser-faire is 
indispensable at a certain level: allowing prices to rise, allowing scarcity to 
develop, and letting people go hungry so as to prevent something else 
happening, namely the introduction of the general scourge of scarcity 
(Foucault 2007a: 45).  
By way of doing so, the apparatuses of security are clearly distinguishable not only 
from legal prohibitions but also from disciplinary prescriptions. Whereas the law 
fixes on the negative, on all those things that must not be done, thereby leaving a 
field of positive or allowed actions unspecified and unattended to, discipline 
supplements this by filling out this positive, unspecified space through stipulating 
exactly what has to be done, the way in which it is to be done, and the exact, 
detailed circumstances under which this is to be done. In contrast to this, the 
apparatuses of security stand back so as to grasp “the point at which things are 
taking place, whether or not they are desirable. This means trying to grasp them at 
the level of their (…) effective reality” (ibid: 46-47).  
It is in conjunction with this intricate linkage of apparatuses of security, the 
new mode of reflection carried out within political economy, and the emergent and 
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irreducible object of the population (understood as a complex entity that stretches 
from the biological rootedness of the species all the way up to the public with its 
opinions, habits and customs (ibid: 75)), that Foucault fleshes out the notion of 
governmentality and conceives of his overall ambition as attending to the history of 
this governmentality (ibid: 108). Furthermore, it is as an outflow of the above 
mentioned examples that Foucault begins to reflect upon liberalism as a particular 
way of governing men that depends upon freedom. Freedom is not only taken into 
account as something that must be respected in terms of legalistically grounded 
rights or principles, but rather because liberalism is a particular governmental 
technology whose internal workings are dependent upon freedom, dependent upon 
taking into account what people do, as well as their desires and ways of acting, and 
of putting these to work, of allowing these to develop and unfold, through the 
deployment of apparatuses of security. In this sense, the liberal art of government 
is characterized by the tight bonds established between freedom on the one hand 
and security on the other (Foucault 2008: 65). Indeed, Foucault even describes 
liberalism’s particular governmental characteristic as “the management of freedom” 
(ibid: 63).  
From liberalism to co-creation: a recurring problem and response to a crisis 
of management? 
In relation to a history of co-creation, the problematic attended to by Foucault, and 
especially the way in which he marks out the particular forms of management of 
freedom pertaining to the apparatuses of security, is of significant interest. This is 
so because the range of themes surfacing with the development of this liberal art of 
government can equally be seen as early appearances of several of the components 
identified as significant for the co-creation vocabulary, as examined in chapters two 
and three. Again, and this is important, we are not seeing a proto-co-creation mode 
of organizing in the mid-eighteenth century. What we are seeing, however, within 
political economy and within city development plans, is the coming into being of a 
new range of objects, of a new set of principles and modes of reflection, according 
to which the problem of how to govern people begins to be laid out in such a way 
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that it bears a striking resemblance to what we came across in Part One of the 
dissertation.  
More precisely, what is at stake here seems to imply at least three of the four 
components identified as significant for the co-creation vocabulary. First of all, that 
which comes from the outside or below can be linked up here with the way in 
which the centrifugal functionality of the apparatuses of security continuously 
expands and draws in new elements. Secondly, the spontaneous self-regulating 
capacity pertaining to the social ecosystem (Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 
2010b) and to the cooperation between minds (Lazzarato 2004) equally stands in a 
particular relationship to the self-regulating and natural processes described within 
the writings of the political economists of the eighteenth century. Thirdly, the anti-
disciplinary way of relating to the event as something that should not be eliminated 
at all costs, but instead ought to be viewed as something one could utilize and rely 
upon for the attainment of specific goals, clearly also bears a certain resemblance to 
what we previously came across. However, while recognizing such overlap and 
points of resemblance, it is at the same time clear that what we are dealing with 
here are nevertheless still different economies of power, different ways of 
organizing and managing freedom. Thus, to take just three, albeit highly important, 
differences. Firstly, the natural and self-regulating capacities detected within the 
functioning of the market, as depicted by eighteenth century political economists, is 
clearly not the same as the non-monetary cooperation between minds pertaining to 
the development of free and open source software. Equally, the shift with which 
one begins to relate to the event of scarcity, the way in which, from around the 
middle of the eighteenth century, it shifts from being viewed as something to be 
avoided and instead becomes something natural and neutral which has to unfold in 
order to cancel itself, clearly does not fit with the positive valorization of events, 
with the attempts at constantly producing events, characteristic of the co-creation 
vocabulary. Finally, whereas Foucault’s descriptions essentially revolve around the 
government of men as this shows up in “the exercise of political sovereignty” 
(Foucault 2008: 2), the problem of co-creation, as depicted here, primarily shows 
up as a problem pertaining to a specific relationship established between 
organizations on the one hand and communities of users and consumers on the 
other. The question is therefore not whether and to what extent Foucault’s 
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descriptions are directly applicable to co-creation; the question is, rather, why these 
descriptions bear such a strong resemblance to the components of co-creation 
when they, simultaneously, are clearly different from these?  
One important hypothesis that might be followed in order to unravel this 
question is that, although different in several respects, the problem pertaining to 
the government of men in the eighteenth century involves a problem that also 
shows up in relation to managing co-creation. More precisely, what we see in both 
instances is that previous ways of governing or managing begin to be viewed as not 
merely poor and insufficient, but potentially destructive, and that an adequate 
response to this situation is conceived as one where government or management 
on the one hand has to rely on freedom, on the development and flourishing of 
something escaping direct, disciplinary regulation, and on the other hand, has to try 
to frame the conditions under which this freedom can unfold in ways beneficial to 
enriching and augmenting the powers of the state or the organization. The problem 
showing up is thus, in both instances, linked to the emergence of new, less all-
encompassing modes of regulating collectives or communities that exist with their 
own self-sustaining or self-regulating dynamics beyond the threshold of direct 
governmental or managerial authority. In this sense, it is the simultaneous 
occurrence of the loss of direct control, the loss of authority, the loss of the ability 
to regulate in detail, but also the emergence of an expanded sphere of intervention, 
of a larger sphere of influence, and of attending to and benefitting from something 
that had previously been conceived as being outside the realm of government and 
management when viewed from the perspective of a disciplinary or juridical 
conception of power. 
Following from this hypothesis of a shared problem pertaining to the 
conditions under which one can manage or govern, the problematic attended to by 
Foucault in Security, Territory, Population (2007a) and The Birth of Biopolitics (2008) can 
be taken up and unfolded as an important chapter in a history of co-creation. By 
relating to this complex problem of managing or governing outside of disciplinary 
enclosures as the most important within Foucault’s lectures, it becomes possible to 
sidestep or at least pay less attention to other concerns usually brought forward as 
highly relevant, such as, for instance, the implications of a change from liberalism 
to neoliberalism. While certainly an important theme, and one that has received 
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noteworthy attention within governmentality studies (see for example Barry et al. 
1996; Rose 1999b, Dean 1999), it is of a lesser significance for the present 
dissertation. While much of the literature following Foucault has explored this 
change from liberalism to neo-liberalism, how it impacts on the way in which the 
state and public institutions can be governed (Dean 1998: Rose 1999b), how it 
gives rise to a new conception of the market (Dean 1999: 155-159), and so on, the 
dissertation reorients Foucault’s explorations and turn them more explicitly 
towards a history of co-creation while being especially attentive to how the 
principles of management associated with the apparatuses of security and the 
liberal art of government, in displaced form, gradually shows up within reflections 
pertaining to management as these unfold in the early twentieth century.  
There are several good reasons for doing so. First of all, as we have already 
seen in the previous chapter, Foucault’s lectures have not been given adequate 
attention within studies of management and organization. While other parts of his 
work, not least Discipline and Punish (1991a), have had a huge influence within 
studies of management and organization, several of the themes explored in his 
lectures from 1978 and 1979 have not been appreciated sufficiently.  
Secondly, the notion of government is not only often used in conjunction 
with management (as when Foucault (2007a: 107) speaks of “governmental 
management”), but furthermore has a flexibility to it that readily ventures and 
stretches beyond the relatively narrow, and yet at the same time quite extensive, 
realm explored by Foucault in his lectures. The relatively open-ended nature of the 
concept of government perhaps comes out most clearly in the opening paragraph 
from the 1979-lectures where Foucault explains that the way in which he explores 
the theme of government within Security, Territory, Population (2007a) as well as The 
Birth of Biopolitics (2008) leaves “out the thousand and one different modalities and 
possible ways that exist for guiding men” (Foucault 2008: 1). Thus, while Foucault 
limits his study to exploring “the government of men as it appears as the exercise 
of political sovereignty” (ibid: 2), he nevertheless at the same time points to the fact 
that the notion of government opens up a field of analysis that reaches far beyond 
his own investigations (ibid: 1-2; see also Dean 1999: 10-16). Indeed, as briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the further unfolding of this problem of 
government within Foucault’s lectures in the 1980s (see for example 2010: 42, 261; 
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2011: 8-9) could be seen to take up an additional two or three of the thousand and 
one modalities that exist for the government of men.  
Thirdly, the gap between the political government of men as analyzed by 
Foucault and the management of people within organizations is connected by 
practical as well as theoretical bonds. Besides the fact that it is possible to read 
twentieth century management thought as an extension and further development 
of political philosophy and theorizing (Waring 1991: 1), historians have also shown 
how the management and organization of state institutions provided important 
inputs to the formation of modern management principles. While Chandler (1996: 
54) denies such relations and claims that management was invented “almost 
overnight” in the 1850s by the American railroad and telegraph companies, it is 
nevertheless possible to point to preceding instances where, to take just one 
example, US Army personnel and paper-forms had already begun to flow from the 
army into some of the early railroad companies by the end of the 1820s (O’Connell 
1985). However, and more importantly, besides quarrels about whether such 
imports did or did not take place, what is perhaps most significant is that a clear 
preoccupation with national and political concerns permeates the arguments of 
several of the early great names within management thought. To take just two 
prominent examples that are usually contrasted with one another, and whom we 
will come back to at length in the next chapter, Fredrick W. Taylor and Elton Mayo 
both connected to the problems of politics and the political government of people 
in their respective contributions to management thought. While Taylor started and 
ended his inquiry into scientific management with considerations of how his 
system could help bring about national efficiency and prosperity, while 
simultaneously bringing an end to social strife (1967: 5-6, 141-144), Mayo on his 
part enters into explicit dialogue with Quesnay and several other political 
economists, not least concerning the questions of self-regulation and social order 
(Mayo 1975: 33-34; 2003: 145-147) that he himself views as problems that need to 
be reflected within management thought.  
Finally, and in continuation of the previous point, while Foucault explores the 
problem of the political government of men, one could conceive of an 
investigation of the management of people that would run in parallel to his 
investigations. Besides the fact that a history of co-creation picks up on some of 
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the themes pertaining to the management of freedom and the apparatuses of 
security already attended to above, it is equally possible to see several themes 
associated with the management of people outside of disciplinary enclosures as 
running in parallel to some of the historical events that Foucault points to as 
significant for the formation of neoliberalism. More precisely, Foucault (2008: 68-
70, 215-218) locates the emergence of neoliberalism as a particular response to the 
political and economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s. The delicate interplay 
between freedom and security, so central to a liberal governmentality, is exactly 
what is becoming problematic with the development of a range of policies that 
seek to secure a variety of basic freedoms. Roosevelt’s welfare policies, for 
instance, are described by Foucault as trying to produce “more freedom in a 
dangerous situation of unemployment: freedom to work, freedom of consumption, 
political freedom, and so on”. However, the price of this was a range of 
interventions in the market that were themselves conceived as “threats of a new 
despotism” (ibid: 68), and it is exactly on behalf of such attempts at securing a 
range of freedoms through interventions in the market to which the German and 
American neoliberals object and react (ibid: 69). While Foucault is concerned with 
unfolding how this political and economic crisis manifests itself as a crisis of 
governmentality - to which neoliberalism emerges as a response - it is equally 
possible to show how a parallel trajectory, pertaining to a crisis of managementality 
(Fougère et al. 2008), is developed alongside and in response to some of the same 
political and economic problems. Thus, in addition to the above-mentioned close 
relationship between the political government of men on the one hand and 
management thought on the other, it is also possible to describe how, for instance, 
a range of new PR-practices, that will be explored in the next chapter, developed in 
close conjunction with reflections initially set forth by Walter Lippmann (Ewen 
1996: 159, 163-164), who also played a central role in the formation of 
neoliberalism (Foucault 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). While Foucault 
underlines the interrelationship between crises of capitalism on the one hand and 
crises of liberalism on the other, he nevertheless at the same time insists that the 
latter cannot be deduced from the former (Foucault 2008: 70). Equally, it is 
possible to view changing conceptions of management as standing in a particular 
and yet irreducible relationship to crises of capitalism and crises of 
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governmentality. In this sense, the crisis of governmentality attended to by 
Foucault could be seen as developing alongside a somewhat interrelated crisis of 
managementality, reacting to some of the same problems, but nevertheless in need of 
being explored as a singular phenomenon that can neither be reduced to changes in 
capitalism or to changes in governmentality. Following from this, the history of co-
creation crosses into some of the same themes attended to by Foucault and 
scholars of governmentality. Still, the way in which it does so is not by focusing on 
the change from classical liberalism to neoliberalism, but rather on the way in 
which the components of the co-creation vocabulary entered management thought 
as problems towards which certain kinds of responses were made. As we see in the 
next chapter, this entailed a mutation of the previous form of managementality, 
which had been articulated in conjunction with engineering-based management 
thought and post-1870s economics. 
However, before turning towards the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, it is necessary to attend to trajectories within political thought that predate 
problematizations surfacing in relation to the coming into being of co-creation. 
More precisely, it is necessary to attend to the birth of a liberal art of government, 
as well as the conditions and problems that provided the immediate circumstances 
for its appearance in the late eighteenth century. Thus, in order to qualify the 
hypothesis of a shared and recurring problem of management – first encountered 
in relation to the reflective prism pertaining to the problem of government in the 
eighteenth century, and then in relation to management thought in the twentieth 
century – we need to unpack the background of the two examples drawn on in the 
beginning of this chapter (that is, the regulation of the town and the management 
of scarcity) and show how these are handled in accordance with different 
governmental regimes. Following from this, it is possible to leap from Foucault’s 
lectures to the birth of co-creation in the twentieth century; that is, from a history 
of governmentality to an associated, but nevertheless irreducible, history of 
managementality. 
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From reason of state to liberalism 
While Foucault’s reflections on government span a time distance comprising 
approximately 2500 years, his attention within the lectures from 1978 and 1979 
nevertheless centers on the period from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.1 
One of the reasons for this is that from the sixteenth century onwards, the art of 
government begins to crystallize as a relatively separate and autonomous rationality. 
More precisely, Foucault (2007a: lecture 4 and 9-13, 2008: lecture 1) gives quite a 
considerable amount of attention to the literature on reason of state surfacing in 
France, Germany and Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, because it is 
with this literature that one for the first time encounters a thoroughly rationalized 
and secular conception of the state and its forces. This literature is characterized by 
the fact that it takes as its telos the conservation and augmentation of the state and 
its forces. In this way, the literature on reason of state distinguishes itself by the 
fact that it does not take a particular ruler’s preservation of his power as its point of 
departure. On the one hand, this literature breaks free from a conception of the 
political government of men dating from Antiquity and the Middle Ages where 
politics was inscribed within a cosmological-theological continuum (Foucault 
2007a: 347-349), and on the other hand it equally departs from Machiavelli’s 
thoughts according to which the prince’s maintenance of his principality 
constituted the overall aim (ibid: lecture 4). In contrast to these traditions, reason of 
state can be characterized as a “perfect knowledge of the means through which 
states form, strengthen themselves, endure and grow” (Giovanni Botero quoted in 
Foucault 2002e: 314).  
On an overall level, reason of state therefore marked a discontinuity in 
political thought, because it gradually displaced a conception of politics according 
to which the overall aim was ruling in accordance with justice, morals or religious 
imperatives. With the transition to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these 
former reigning conceptions of politics were replaced by the new calculating and 
practical-realist conception of reason of state:  
                                            
1 This and the next paragraph draw upon previously unpublished material from my master’s thesis 
(Lopdrup-Hjorth 2007: 33-35). 
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Instead of speaking the language of politics, the rulers and their counselors, as 
well as the scholars, began to speak openly the language of the art of the state. 
Originally regarded as an inferior practice, the art of the state had, by the end 
of the sixteenth century, assumed a respectable role. It was recognized as ‘the 
new politics’, later simply as ‘politics’ (Viroli 1992: 5).  
Accordingly, politics, which had been conceived formerly as one of the noblest 
pursuits, was now recast as an entirely different undertaking that revolved wholly 
around the state and the augmentation of the state’s forces. Following from this, 
reason of state takes the state as it is into consideration, and at the same time 
attends to it as something that does not yet exist in a proper way. In this way, one 
can conceive of the state as “at once that which exists, but which does not yet exist 
enough.” Hence, to govern “according to the principle of raison d’État is to arrange 
things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, 
and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it” 
(Foucault 2008: 4). 
In conjunction with this new governmental rationality, we find both externally 
and internally oriented technologies with which the preservation and augmentation 
of the state’s forces can be secured. Externally, the interests of the state were 
handled through a gradually emerging diplomacy and, if necessary, through the 
deployment of military forces (Foucault 2007a: 300-306). Internally, preservation 
and augmentation were secured through what was known as police. Foucault 
describes here how the combination of these two technologies was not only the 
principal means of securing and building the state’s forces, but also made up 
“precisely what will later be called a mechanism of security” (Foucault 2007a: 296). 
In spite of the fact that both of them are important, we primarily attend here to the 
latter - police - since it ties in with the disciplinary planning and regulation of the 
town attended to above, but also because the formalization of the principles 
according to which police regulations are laid out gave rise to many of the 
administrative principles and techniques that later resurface as highly important 
organizational devices within the context of the management of people in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, before attending to the concrete 
regulations of police, a couple of pointers as to its connotations are needed. 
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In attending to the specific form of internal regulation of police, it is 
important not to conflate this term with the limited sense in which it is used today, 
i.e. as a law enforcing entity. In the seventeenth century, the connotations attached 
to police were much more encompassing. Here police referred to “the set of means 
by which the state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good 
order” (Foucault 2007a: 313). It was thus not merely a negative institution to be 
deployed when laws were broken; police rather had a much more positive aim that 
essentially was oriented towards the perfection of the state. Foucault quotes a text 
by Turquet de Mayerne from 1611 according to which it is stated that police “must 
be concerned with ‘Everything that gives ornament, form and splendor to the city’” 
(ibid.).  
While police regulations were common on the European continent, Foucault 
gives particular attention to the way in which the principles pertaining to the object 
of police was developed as a particular form of administrative knowledge within 
many of the German states from around the middle of the seventeenth century. 
Due to the way in which these states were born and reorganized after the treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, Foucault views them as “small micro-state laboratories that 
could serve both as models and sites of experimentation” (ibid: 317). What became 
known as “Polizeiwissenschaft, the science of police”, was developed accordingly and 
this not only proliferated within the German states, but equally came to influence 
the prism through which governmental regulation began to be conceived 
throughout Europe (ibid: 318).  
The science of police and its practical modalities attends to people’s activity, 
their occupation, and the way they live together. This is first and foremost due to 
the fact that these elements and their relations begin to be conceived as something 
that impacts on the forces of the state (ibid: 322). More precisely, the specific 
objects attended to by police include a range of elements, and interrelationships 
between these elements, that can be characterized as ‘urban objects’, since the 
towns, and the markets of the towns, are the places where these urban objects 
circulate and have an impact on one another (ibid: 335). While these things interact 
and come together in the city, it is nevertheless possible to single out their 
respective components. First of all, a concern for police is the number of people. 
While already a concern for political rulers in the Middle Ages, the way in which 
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the problem of the number of people arises as a problem pertaining to the forces 
of the state is from the seventeenth century onwards qualified in relation to a range 
of environmental circumstances (ibid: 323-324). Secondly, while the number of 
people constitutes a vital concern, the conditions for upholding the lives of the 
population also surfaces as something that must be regulated. As a consequence, it 
becomes necessary to develop agricultural policies, but also to be attentive to the 
production, circulation and selling of food, the regulation of prices, etc. (ibid: 324). 
Thirdly, and in conjunction with securing the necessities for upholding the life of 
the population, health becomes a major concern. If the population is to thrive, to 
be able to work, and to reproduce itself, it is crucial that the processes necessary for 
this are not obstructed through various kinds of diseases (ibid: 324-325). Fourthly, 
it is necessary to make sure that the population is a working population, and that all 
the trades and “professions needed by the state are in fact practiced” (ibid: 325). 
Finally, circulations will have to be attended to, and this is not only understood as 
the material substratum, i.e. roads, bridges, and canals, but also the regulations 
according to which people and products circulate (ibid.).  
As already stated, all of these objects can essentially be characterized as urban 
objects. They pertain to the way in which people live together, to the way in which 
they coexist within an urban sphere, to the way in which they communicate and 
entertain all sorts of relations with one another, that is, to what is simply later 
referred to as ‘sociality’ or society (ibid: 326). The biopolitical problematic that 
Foucault (2000a, 1998a, 2003b) had been sketching, continually returning to, and 
developing from 1974 onwards, comes explicitly into view here, since the 
regulations of police essentially revolve around not merely securing the survival of 
the inhabitants of the state, but also in securing their living, their living well, their 
well-being and their happiness, and connecting this thriving of the life of the 
population with the augmentation of the forces of the state (ibid: 327-328). In this 
sense, power and life begin to enter into new and close relations with one another. 
With the flourishing of all sorts of police regulations aimed at securing and 
augmenting the conditions of the life of the population, with the development of 
the knowledge laid out in all the tracts on the science of police throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, people living together and police begin to refer 
mutually to one another. Police attends to and seeks to secure the more-than-just-
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living of people, but at the same time people are only able to live and coexist 
because all of these police regulations make this life, this urban existence, possible.  
Besides connecting these police regulations and the science of police with the 
biopolitical problematic, Foucault also combines it with his studies from Discipline 
and Punish (1991a). For what is it exactly that all of these police regulations do? 
Basically, they attend to everything, to every little detail pertaining to the social 
existence of the population to the extent that such details are relevant to the 
augmentation of the forces of the state. In this sense, the “object of police is 
almost infinite” (Foucault 2008: 7). The power exercised through all of these police 
regulations can therefore be characterized as belonging to “the world of discipline”, 
that is, “a world of indefinite regulation, of permanent, continually renewed, and 
increasingly detailed regulation” (Foucault 2007a: 340).  
This detailed regulation of the social corpus down to its most minute details 
should be seen in accordance with the emergence of a new reflective prism 
according to which governmental management began to be conceived and 
reinterpreted as a political economy in its pre-eighteenth century sense. More 
precisely, this can be seen as the governmental space opened up by the application 
of the ancient Greek conception of the oikos to the level of the management of the 
state. In this sense, what Aristotle ([fourth century BC] 1981) had reflected on as 
separate domains (characterized by the hierarchical, male-dominated, authority-
structure pertaining to the management of the household on the one hand, and the 
sphere of politics on the other) now becomes fused:  
To govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the 
establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to 
say, [exercising] supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the 
conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father’s over his household 
and goods (Foucault 2007a: 95).  
Thus, in order to secure the forces of the state, in order to make the state prosper 
in competition with other states, a highly detailed regulation was necessary. All of 
these police regulations and all of these tracts on police science proliferating in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century could thus be seen as being conceived 
within a space marked out by the application of the ancient conception of the oikos 
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to the management of the state. If one did not attend to the management of the 
state in a sufficiently rigorous and extensive way, the state would simply lose its 
strength. This follows from a particular understanding according to which the 
political body is viewed as  
an aggregate of persons who require, for the achievement of order, welfare 
and harmony, a constant work of regulation. Social morality does not arise 
spontaneously, but must needs be constructed by a deliberate work of 
regulation. In a society conceived in these terms, there are no laws of motion 
inhering in the regularities of autonomous economic activity; without 
regulation the social order would stagnate or collapse, consequent upon an 
insufficiency of good government (Tribe 1995: 24).  
Following from this, one can conceive of a network of interrelated themes and 
objects comprising a new reflective prism through which the art of government is 
conceived, the emergence of a new set of governmental objects, and the coming 
into being of specific policies and strategies aiming at particular objectives. Reason 
of state, encompassing externally oriented relations to other states, in the form of 
diplomacy and warfare, are linked up with the highly detailed and rigorous internal 
regulation of police. Both of these are again connected to the whole ensemble of 
mercantilist policies that we came across in chapter one, and according to which 
the goals were minimizing imports, maximizing exports, and accumulating precious 
metals.  
However, this whole ensemble is exactly what is beginning to break up and to 
be questioned throughout the eighteenth century. In chapter one we saw how 
precious metals, as the ultimate source of value, was replaced by the earth and 
agricultural production in the writings of the Physiocrats, and with labor in the 
writings of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. Furthermore, in conjunction with this, we 
have seen previously in this chapter how the planning of the town and the policing 
of grain was organized through the deployment of a disciplinary apparatus coupled 
with legal prohibitions, and how the modes of control and orchestration pertaining 
to these were replaced by new modes of managing that, instead of prohibiting and 
prescribing, accepted reality, took its fluctuations into account, worked with its 
circumstances, and allowed its unfolding. It is precisely because of this that 
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Foucault depicts how the birth of political economy in its modern sense entails the 
break-up of police as the internal technology of reason of state that aims at 
maximizing the strength of the state through detailed interventions and all-
encompassing regulations. It is precisely in relation to the critique of the 
economists and the political thinkers coming out of France and Scotland that 
Foucault begins to chart the transformation by way of which the governmental 
rationality of reason of state is gradually replaced by a liberal art of government, a 
liberal governmentality.  
Significant to this transformation is the appearance of a range of objects that 
are viewed as having a naturalness and spontaneous, self-regulatory capacity to them that 
one has to take into account and respect if one wants to govern well. Besides the 
economy, in its modern sense, this transformation also brings to the surface a new 
conception of the population and a new conception of civil society (Foucault 
2007a: 344-354; 2008: 277-316). The emergence of these objects on the one hand 
paves the way for the later flourishing of the social sciences of economics, 
demography, and sociology, and on the other hand it opens up a new space in the 
art of government that is constituted through a simultaneous intensification, 
critique and alteration of reason of state. In conjunction with the above-described 
hypothesis according to which it is possible to view the problem of the 
government of men in the eighteenth century as foreshadowing a problem that will 
later resurface, albeit in a displaced and mutated form, in relation to co-creation, 
this chapter is rounded off by taking into consideration a couple of important 
aspects of this eighteenth century experience of a crisis, critique and reorganization 
of the art of government.  
 
Governmental self-limitation and objects exhibiting a spontaneous, self-forming order 
Although different in several respects to reason of state, the liberal art of 
government, which emerges from around the middle of the eighteenth century, is 
nevertheless also a continuation of reason of state, since it takes as its aim many of 
the same goals: the enrichment of the state, a thriving population, securing the 
conditions for the life of the population, and so on (Foucault 2008: 14). However, 
the way in which it does so and the principles and knowledge with which these 
goals are pursued, change considerably. Thus, the new governmental space opened 
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up in the eighteenth century is a space that, contrary to the rationality of reason of 
state, is moderated and organized by the constantly resurfacing question of the 
internal limits of governmental intervention. The question between ‘too much’ and 
‘too little’ intervention surfaces as a new problem that replaces the ‘never enough 
intervention’ problem guiding police regulations (Foucault 2008: 22). Whereas 
reason of state and police regulations operated from the proposition that there 
were always details escaping regulation, thereby sapping the state of its potential 
strength, the new regulatory governmental guideline emerges as essentially one of 
self-limitation (ibid: 10, 16, 296). Yet why is this new liberal art of government 
preoccupied with self-limitation? Exactly because what it has to govern is no longer 
conceived as something that must be constructed from scratch and managed in all 
its details, but rather as something that has its own dynamics and its own capacity 
to generate a spontaneous order, that needs to be taken into account, respected 
and, indeed, even relied upon and secured if one is to govern appropriately 
(Foucault 2007a: 352). The question therefore becomes how one can manage 
something that already possesses an inherent logic and an internal order-generating 
capacity? In relation to answering this question, particular emphasis is given to the 
surfacing of the objects of the economy in its modern sense, and the emergence of 
a civil society that begins to be conceived as the already and always existing natural 
habitat of humankind.  
Whereas economy formerly designated a particular mode of government, 
modeled on the Greek conception of the oikos, it gradually develops as a particular 
sphere of reality characterized by a naturalness that runs through human beings’ 
productive and commercial undertakings (Schabas 2005, Foucault 2008). With the 
French Physiocrats, and first and foremost in conjunction with Quesnay’s Tableau 
Économique, we not only see the first total representation of the annual flow of a 
value substance circulating through the three classes making up the social body, we 
also see a new form of knowledge emerging that provides guidance and full 
visibility of the flow of the economy to the (French) sovereign. This visibility, 
however, severely restricts the interventions the sovereign can make (Foucault 
2008: 285), not because he is unauthorized to intervene, but because his 
interventions would destroy the delicate spontaneity that exists and with which the 
commercial ‘blood-flow’ generated by the free trade between individuals nourishes 
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the social body. This marks a clear discontinuity in relation to police science and 
the detailed police-regulations characterizing the governmental rationality of reason 
of state. The aspiration to gain as much knowledge as possible about everything 
impacting on the forces of the state was combined here with the maximization of 
interventions into the social corpus. Yet with Quesnay’s Tableau, a full knowledge 
and a complete overview of the economy and its processes is now exactly what 
makes intervention if not impossible, than at least futile, inconsiderate, clumsy and 
destructive (2008: 31, 285). The knowledge generated by this political economy 
therefore makes a new reality visible to those who govern and the content of what 
is disclosed by this knowledge has prescriptive effects, since it essentially makes 
visible a naturalness running “under, through, and in the exercise of 
governmentality” (ibid: 16). Following from this, the knowledge generated by the 
political economy of the Physiocrats, the knowledge of these natural processes that 
has a particular logic to them, opens up a whole space of inquiry that ties together 
the rivers, the soil, rain, and other natural elements necessary for the generation of 
wealth (Schabas 2005: 48), with the principle of laissez-faire. Instead of policing and 
instead of regulating everything in order to construct an ordre artificial, as in the case 
of the mercantilist policies, one has to take into account and allow for the 
emergence of an ordre naturel arising from the free trade between individuals as 
depicted in the Tableau Économique (Pribram 1983: 103-104). Instead of fighting 
nature and instead of disciplining and seeking to arrange for things to happen 
contrary to their nature, as we saw with the example of the policing of grain, it 
becomes necessary to let things run their course and to let processes unfold, while 
simultaneously making sure that the conditions are in place for the unfolding of 
these natural processes (Foucault 2007a: 353). 
Although the Physiocrats provided an important stimulus to the formation of 
a new art of government, the most important geographical center for the 
flourishing of new thoughts pertaining to the formation of a liberal art of 
government was Scotland. While Adam Smith, of course, is the most well-known 
figure, the intellectual milieu within which he wrote was also marked by 
contributions from writers such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam 
Ferguson, and several others (Herman 2002). Whereas Hume’s work receives some 
notice in Foucault’s lectures, it is nevertheless Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1999) The 
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Wealth of Nations and Adam Ferguson’s ([1767] 1995) An Essay on the History of Civil 
Society that receives the lion’s share of attention. Foucault is especially attentive to 
the way in which Smith’s conception of the invisible hand (Smith 1999, Book IV: 
32) prolongs and adds to the critique of economic interventions set forth by the 
Physiocratic school, and yet at the same time completely overthrows their most 
celebrated invention, the Tableau Économique (Foucault 2008: 286). This delicate 
combination of continuity and discontinuity stems from the fact that although the 
Physiocrats argued for free trade, they nevertheless at the same time insisted on the 
necessity of combining this with a ‘legal despotism’, as opposed to ‘arbitrary 
despotism’ (Hirschman 1997: 98). Following from this view is the installment of 
the sovereign as someone who oversees and formally ‘allows’ the unfolding of the 
economic process. With the aid of the Tableau Économique, the sovereign is able to 
allow the unfolding of these processes, while still keeping an eye on and 
supervising the way in which this unfolding takes place. In this way, the sovereign 
is not only able to see what takes place, what will happen, he is also able to predict 
how things will unfold if he acts in accordance with the knowledge generated by 
the Tableau.  
As we have already seen in chapter one, Quesnay conceived the circulation in 
the economy as an upscaled version of the circulation of blood in the human body. 
Yet, in accordance with a long-lasting and wide spread fascination on the European 
continent, he also took inspiration from a particular technical device originally 
invented around the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century: 
the mechanical clock (Mayr 1989: 3; Schabas 2005: 47). Besides the important 
social and cultural changes the invention of the clock brought with it, such as, for 
instance, a new regulation of time, a new fascination that fused the magical with the 
mechanical, and a new representation of the universe (Mayr 1989: 26), the clock 
also held a sway over European thinkers and statesmen, especially on the 
continent.  
The clock was utilized, not least in conjunction with the governmental 
rationality of reason of state, as a metaphor according to which the ideal 
functionality of the state could be described. One of the most important 
contributors to this view was King Frederick II of Prussia. In a work from 1736, he 
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set out this analogy in a way that is in perfect correspondence with the principles of 
police described above:  
As an able mechanic is not satisfied with looking at the outside of a watch, 
but opens it, and examines its springs and wheels, so an able politician exerts 
himself to understand the permanent principles of courts, the engines of the 
politics of each prince, and the sources of future events. He leaves nothing to 
chance; his transcendent mind foresees the future, and from the chain of 
causes penetrates even the most distant ages (King Frederick II quoted in 
Mayr 1989: 108).  
Equally in the writings of von Justi, one of the most important and influential 
scholars of Polizeiwissenschaft (Foucault 2007a: 314, 327), this analogy between 
clocks and machines on the one hand and the state on the other is also relied on 
extensively. According to Mayr (1989: 111), the two principle characteristics that 
von Justi focuses on with this analogy are order and centralized control. The “well-
constituted state”, von Justi says, should  
perfectly resemble a machine where all wheels and gears fit each other with 
the utmost precision; and the ruler must be the engineer (…) that sets 
everything in motion.” In conjunction with this, von Justi derives the 
obligation of the ruler as being “the governor of the machine of the body of 
the state (von Justi quoted in Mayr 1989: 111). 
Such analogies, both contemporary with and preceding the writings of the 
Physiocrats, were widespread on the European continent where they had 
influenced the thinking on politics from approximately the beginning of the 
seventeenth century (ibid: 102-121).Thus, it is perhaps possible to view Qusnay’s 
Tableau as a particular threshold experience that depicted and gave a full account of 
the economy of the state as a perfectly functioning flow of blood, and also as a 
perfectly functioning clock. However, this latter analogy of the state as a clock and 
the political ruler as an engineer that attends to it, adjusting and trimming the 
machine of the state was also becoming a problematic analogy, since the laws 
governing the economy, as laid out in the Tableau Économique, were clearly not 
something constructed or something artificially built from pieces, but had the 
character of something natural, capable of generating a spontaneous order, with 
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which one should not act against. This inbuilt tension in the writings of Quesnay, 
this singular conception that fuses economic freedom with a political or legal 
despotism, therefore pointed to the old conception of maximum and full visibility 
of the state as a perfectly functioning machine cast under a single authority and 
visual center of control, while simultaneously pointing to a new sphere that had the 
capacity to regulate itself and with which the ruler ought not to interfere.  
It is exactly regarding this that we find the continuity/discontinuity-tension 
between Quesnay and Smith. As we saw in chapter one, Smith both maintained 
that Quesnay’s writings were “perhaps the nearest approximation to the truth that 
has yet been written upon the subject of political economy” (Smith 1999, IV: 264), 
while at the same time criticizing several of the arguments and conclusions 
advanced by Quesnay. However, whereas the point of difference attended to in 
chapter one was the divergence in their respective conceptions of the sources of 
value, what Foucault calls attention to is the problem pertaining to whether or not 
the economy can be made visible to the sovereign ruler in the format of a Tableau 
and whether, more fundamentally, it is possible to govern economic subjects. 
Regarding the latter, Foucault maintains that there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between the legal subject of rights on the one hand, and the subject of interest, 
economic man, on the other. More precisely, the un-governability of economic 
subjects arises from the fact that in order to harvest the benefits of the deep-seated 
“propensity” of human beings “to truck, barter and exchange” (Smith 1999, Book 
I: 117), it is necessary to rely upon their self-interest. This reliance upon self-
interest, however, is exactly what makes it impossible not only to govern the 
economy, but also to gain an adequate knowledge and overview of its processes as 
these were generated within the Tableau. Hence, the possibility of establishing a 
representational grid that would make a formal overview of the totality of the 
economy possible is swept away with Adam Smith’s political economy. With 
Smith’s (1999, Book IV: 32) conception of an invisible hand, the visibility and 
overview generated by the Tableau is exactly what is rendered impossible. From this 
moment on, the sovereign is barred from having access to the totality, as previously 
conceived. The knowledge concentrated in a single point is exploded into a 
multiplicity of views that renders impossible an overarching gaze (Foucault 2008: 
292). In this sense, establishing and founding the possibility of an all-encompassing 
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view is lost, and political economy becomes “an atheistic discipline”, “a discipline 
without God”, a “discipline without totality” (ibid: 282). This of course raises the 
question as to how it is possible to govern something which is essentially un-
governable, or manage something unmanageable? 
 
Managing the unmanageable 
In Foucault’s reading, society becomes established as something within which 
economic man can be managed and within which the otherwise incompatible 
notions of the subject of rights and an economic subject of interest can be 
reconciled (ibid: 295). More precisely, civil society emerges as “something that 
cannot be thought of as simply the product and result of the state”. Although not a 
product of the state, noran artificial entity built by the state, civil society is 
nevertheless at the same time conceived as a “necessary correlate of the state”; as 
something the state “must see to the management of” (Foucault 2007a: 350). Civil 
society is thus to be conceived of as something which is born more or less at the 
same time as the economy receives its particular modern connotations, that is, of a 
system that regulates itself and generates an order where economic agents are 
allowed to follow their self-interest. At the same time as the economy emerges as 
an object, the functioning of which is preconditioned on non-intervention, civil 
society thus emerges as a complex sphere within which economic man is placed, 
and within which he can be managed.  
While civil society, or just society, as it will later be called, is from the end of 
the eighteenth century onwards continually referred to “as a reality which asserts 
itself, struggles, and rises up, which revolts against and is outside the state”, 
Foucault, however, maintains that this civil society “is not a primary and immediate 
reality”, but rather something that is born in conjunction with the emergence of a 
liberal art of government (Foucault 2008: 297). In this sense, civil society, just like 
madness (1988) and sexuality (1998a), is what Foucault calls a “transactional” 
reality; something which has not always existed, and yet at the same time is 
something which becomes real, comes into existence, at a particular historical point in 
time, where it has real effects, and where it comes to play the role of “an interface” 
between “governors and governed” (Foucault 2008: 297, see also ibid: 3). It is 
precisely in attending to the birth of this notion of civil society in its modern form 
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that Foucault sets forward some remarks on how this notion begins to receive a 
new set of connotations in Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society 
(1995)that are completely different from how the concept was understood by John 
Locke. Foucault brings forward here the way in which civil society is depicted as a 
‘historical-natural constant’ that is not entered into by agreement or contract, but 
which has always existed (Foucault 298-300), just as he also points to how civil 
society assures “the spontaneous synthesis of individuals” (ibid: 300), and gives rise 
to “a spontaneous formation of power” (ibid: 303). Through this brief overview, 
Foucault sketches the contours of our modern experience of society as something 
which is not the product of the state, but which nevertheless is still born in 
conjunction with the emergence of a liberal art of government. Society thus comes 
to constitute a particular sphere within which the un-governable subject of interest 
can both be reconciled with the subject of rights, and managed through various 
forms of regulations that later take on the name of ‘social policies’. In this way, the 
emerging sphere of society becomes an object with its own laws, which it is 
possible to produce knowledge about, hence the rise of the ‘social sciences’, and it 
also becomes a sphere which governmental interventions and policies can target in 
order to pursue a range of heterogeneous goals.  
After having attended to this long and complex history of governmentality, it 
is now time to turn to the dawn and historical problematizations of a modern 
managementality, as this takes place from the end of the nineteenth century up 
until the first half of the twentieth century. The introductory remarks in the next 
chapter tie the transition from Foucault’s history of governmentality together with 
the way in which the components of the co-creation vocabulary begin to show up 
as problems to which management thought responds. Through this history it 
isshown how the experience of the outside as a source of value creation and an 
object of management eventually could be born.  
 
Chapter 6 
 
The birth of co-creation in the twentieth century 
 
 
 
Foucault’s genealogy of the art of government exhibited how liberalism as a 
particular form of governmentality was born in conjunction with the emergence of 
a range of new objects that, from around the middle of the eighteenth century, 
carved their way into reality. Among these were a new understanding of the 
population, a new conception of the economy, and the emergence of society as an 
all-encompassing sphere within which the population, as well as economic man, 
was located. In laying out this genealogy, emphasis was placed on how the 
transition from reason of state to a liberal art of government entailed a crisis and 
re-articulation of the reflective prism of government. More precisely, the all-
encompassing government associated with police, and systematized within 
Polizeiwissenschaft, was becoming highly problematic, since the detailed 
disciplinary regulation pertaining to this began to be considered inadequate, if not 
downright destructive, in relation to achieving governmental aims.  
In conjunction with laying out this transformation, it was proposed that the 
problematic attended to by Foucault could be seen as an important chapter in a 
history of co-creation. While several scholars reflecting on co-creation have 
claimed that contemporary organizations and institutions have shifted just recently 
from a disciplinary mode of management to one based on control (Deleuze 1995a; 
Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Zwick et al. 2008; Spicer 2010), it was 
with Foucault possible to recast several of the characteristics associated with this 
alleged recent transformation within a longer timeframe. In opening up this longer 
timeframe, we encountered a non-disciplinary mode of regulating and managing 
the town, as well as a non-disciplinary way of managing events. Hence, instead of 
prohibiting and policing, instead of regulating everything down to its most minute 
details, it was shown how the apparatuses of security began working with 
circulations, with the nature of human beings, with the spontaneity, self-regulation 
and naturalness inherent in the population and the economy, and with the 
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unfolding of events that had been conceived previously as something to be avoided 
through all kinds of disciplinary and legal measures. Hence, reliance upon the 
centripetal functionality of disciplinary regulation increasingly was replaced, or 
supplemented, by a centrifugal form of management that reached outside disciplinary 
enclosures, took reality into account and began working with its fluctuations, 
tendencies and circumstances. 
In this chapter, we attend to the coming into being of co-creation in the 
twentieth century. Special consideration is given here to the way in which the 
components associated with co-creation gradually begin to take on the appearance 
of problems and responses that show up within management thought. More 
precisely, the chapter is concerned with registering and mapping the coming into 
being of the outside, the emergence of previously undetected spontaneous 
processes, the event as something which transgresses previously existing 
conditions, and the increased immaterialization of the conditions of production; all 
of these show up as problems to which management thought begins to respond. 
As already stated, this transformation can be viewed as a recurrence of the problem 
pertaining to the crisis and re-articulation of governmentality in the eighteenth 
century, only now played out in the register of managementality. Yet, in order to 
account for the way in which the components inherent in co-creation gradually 
begin to come together, it is necessary to attend to the way in which they 
respectively enter the sphere of management thought and begin to take on the 
character of problems towards which particular responses are made. A major 
ambition for the chapter is to show how the components of the co-creation 
vocabulary enter the sphere of management thought much earlier than any of the 
accounts previously surveyed are willing to admit, and that the historical 
trajectories eventually culminating in co-creation should be seen against the 
backdrop of the coming together of three different problematization processes of a 
managementality that had come into being in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  
The outline of the chapter is therefore as follows: first, we attend to the birth 
of modern management. Special attention is given to how management began to be 
formalized in conjunction with engineering principles, and how this formalization 
process culminated in the most well-known management text ever published, 
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Fredrick W. Taylor’s infamous little book from 1911, The Principles of Scientific 
Management (Taylor 1967). This, together with the discipline of economics as it had 
developed from the 1870s, gives rise to a particular managementality. In light of this, 
the chapter takes up three problematization processes that are central for the 
emergence of the components inherent in co-creation. These, in their respective 
ways, respond to and criticize the prism laid out by the engineers and the 
neoclassical economists. It is through these problematizations that we see the 
management of value creation becoming preconditioned on: something outside of 
the organization; something that has a spontaneity to it that has to be taken into 
account; something that has an immateriality to it; and, not least, something that 
breaks free of the repetition of the same, that is, something that is innovative and 
creates value through transgressing the already-existing.  
Second, we attend therefore to how the management principles advanced by 
Taylor and his fellow engineers are criticized by Elton Mayo, Fritz J. Roethlisberger 
and William J. Dickson. Explicit attention is given here to how spontaneous social 
processes, communally formed social values, and something outside the 
organization begin to appear as new irreducible realities that impinge on 
production, and to which management thought therefore has to relate.  
Third, this movement is paralleled by the way in which public relations 
professionals from the late 1920s begin to conceive of non-disciplinary ways of 
managing something outside the organization in order to attain business goals. Just 
as with Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson, we also see here how an irreducible 
social reality emerges, a social reality that cannot be grasped or managed through 
the knowledge of neoclassical economic theory and engineering-based management 
thought. In both instances, management becomes preconditioned on viewing 
humans as social beings whose modes of acting and thinking are dependent upon 
and entangled within a social fabric that has its own dynamisms and its own 
somewhat spontaneous mechanisms, that need to be taken into account in order to 
manage appropriately.  
Fourth, more or less concurrently with these transformations, a new way of 
relating to the event, also comes to the fore. Within the works of Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, we see a highly important transformation that ties in with the one we 
came across in the previous chapter. However, whereas the event in the eighteenth 
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century went from being an evil to be avoided to being something natural and 
neutral which had to be left to unfold, the event now comes to be seen as the 
permanent transgression of the already existing, and as the most essential 
precondition for the creation of value. Thus, from ‘preventing’ events over ‘allowing 
and relying’ upon events, we now see a fundamental change according to which the 
‘production’ of events becomes paramount. Furthermore, whereas Schumpeter in 
his early work conceives of the source of such events as being tied to the 
individual, to the entrepreneur, his later work gradually begins to depict this source 
as being more dispersed and social in nature, hence paving the way for what could 
be called the socialization or democratization of innovation.  
Fifth, and finally, the chapter ends with the proposition that these three 
problematizations not only provide central preconditions for the coming into being 
of co-creation, but also, more fundamentally, they give rise to an experience of the 
outside as a source of value creation and an object of management, an experience 
that is born out of transformations immanent to a history of managementality.  
Considering the implications of this in light of the history followed in the 
dissertation also concludes this work.  
The birth of a modern managementality 
The coming into being of management as a separate function has several, rather 
heterogeneous roots. First of all, it is necessary to acknowledge that the particular 
circumstances pertaining to the emergence of management have varied 
considerably and been marked out by different trajectories within different nations 
(Chandler 1996; Bendix 2001; Guillén 1994). Nonetheless, for the purposes of 
accounting for the coming into being of co-creation, the U.S. experience is the 
center of attention here, not only because the coming into being of the co-creation 
vocabulary was shaped to a large extent by management theorists coming out of or 
employed at business schools within the United States, as we saw in chapter two, 
but first and foremost because it “was in the United States that a new class of 
salaried management first emerged in significant numbers (…) and set the blueprint 
for American management theory” (Shenhav 2003: 184, note 1). 
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However, even by limiting the exploration in this way, a couple of further 
restrictions also have to be set up. Thus, in accounting for the coming into being of 
management in the United States, one would ideally have to take into consideration 
a range of transformations that can only be mentioned briefly here. Among these is 
not least the establishment of the first major railroad and telegraph companies. As 
Chandler (1996, 1999) has shown, these companies not only established the 
infrastructural preconditions for communication and transportation necessary for 
the growth of other companies, they were also pioneers of management techniques 
later utilized within other large industrial corporations. While Chandler’s account 
has been rightly criticized, not least due to its overemphasis on efficiency as a 
factor of explanation, its total neglect of power (Roy 1997; Perrow 2002), and its 
denial of the military origins of the early management models taken up in the 
railroads (O’Connel 1985), it nevertheless still contains a range of details important 
to understanding the birth of modern management in America. 
The establishment of railroads, the diffusion of management techniques from 
the railroads to other industrial firms, previously developed modes of organizing 
within the U.S. Military, and a range of other factors all constitute important 
preconditions that come together and flow into the complex birth of management 
in the United States. For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is first of all 
necessary to attend to management as a specific, and somewhat later-developed, 
corpus of knowledge, because it is in conjunction with this that the legitimacy, 
principles, and overall aims of management are beginning to be formalized in a 
broad way. It is in conjunction with this formalization that problems of 
management begin to be depicted as problems of a more general kind that make 
their impact felt beyond the context of any one particular organization. Thus, it is 
here that the reflective prism of management is established; it is here that we see 
the birth of a relatively autonomous managementality. 
 
Engineers and systems 
One of the most important early sources from which formalized reflection on 
management began to flow was within the engineering community and its 
associated journals (Guillén 1994; Shenhav 1995, 1999, 2003). Throughout the final 
decades of the nineteenth century, industrial engineers embarked upon a journey to 
 255 
 
systematize and seek out a new consistency to the management of organizations in 
order to flesh out principles and guidelines from what was then considered a 
relatively underdeveloped, diffuse and haphazard area. In a paper entitled “The 
Engineer as Economist”, presented at a gathering at the The American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers in 1886, Henry R. Towne argued for the necessity of 
formalizing management in accordance with engineering principles. If such 
principles could be combined with a practical knowledge of business and, ideally, 
could be combined in one person, it would qualify such a person to supervise “the 
operations of all departments of a business, and to subordinate each to the 
harmonious development of the whole” (Towne 2011: 61). The reasons for setting 
forward such a proposition were that management as a practical endeavor suffered 
from the fact that its knowledge, in contrast to engineering, was “unorganized”, 
“almost without literature” and had no “association or organization of any kind” 
(ibid.). The solution to remedy this neglect should not come from businessmen, but 
rather from those who had knowledge of business as well as mechanical 
engineering. Accordingly, Towne proposed to organize such an undertaking under 
the roof of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ibid: 62).  
Towne’s proposal, as well as his paper, was met with some ambiguity. On the 
one hand his “paper had been accepted only with misgivings by the society’s 
publications committee” (Kanigel 2000: 235), and several engineers viewed its 
preoccupation with management as an inappropriate subject for the developing 
profession. However, on the other hand, it certainly also struck a chord among 
several likeminded engineers, not least Fredrick W. Taylor who also attended the 
meeting (ibid: 234). Thus, in spite of initial hesitation regarding the appropriateness 
of fusing engineering with business problems, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century such reservations became less prevalent. Symptomatic of the withering of 
such concerns, one writer, in an 1899-issue of Engineering News, could even define 
engineering as “the art of making a dollar earn the most interest” (quoted in Stabile 
1986: 38).  
Towne’s address was made at a time when the number of engineers was 
increasing at a rapid speed. As Shenhav (1999: 25) points to, there were no more 
than two dozen engineers in the United States around 1800. However, from 1880 
to 1930 that figure increased from 7000 to 230000. In conjunction with this rapid 
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increase, the United States became the country in the world with the highest 
“number of engineers relative to industrial employment, and its advantage over the 
closest competitor, Germany, widened during the 1910’s and 1920’s” (Guillén 
1994: 40). With this rise, the label ‘civil engineer’ became broken down into further 
subspecialties such as “mining, metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and chemical 
engineers”, and from the years 1884-1924 approximately two-thirds of those 
graduating as engineers “became managers within fifteen years of leaving college” 
(Shenhav 1999: 25). Indicative of the increasing frequency with which engineers 
turned to problems of management was also the change in title of Engineering 
Magazine to Industrial Management in 1916 (Kaufman 2008: 67). 
Simultaneously with this transformation, a wider ideological transition also 
occurred. Not least informed by theoretical impulses coming from such prominent 
sources as William James, Charles Sanders Pierce and Thorstein Veblen in 
particular (Stabile 1986), a new agenda of handling and solving social problems 
through the application of science became widespread (Jordan 1994: 13-16). In 
conjunction with this, the engineer rose to star status, and was depicted as an 
extraordinary being within various cultural products. As Jordan (ibid: 21) notes, 
engineers “appeared as heroes in over one hundred silent movies and in novels that 
sold roughly 5 million copies between 1897 and 1920.” Furthermore, the public 
esteem bestowed upon the engineer was not entirely out of synch with the self-
image promoted by some practitioners within the discipline. Indeed, according to 
some of its more grandiose formulations, engineering was depicted as nothing less 
than the creator of the modern world: “Take away engineering, and we are what 
our predecessors were. Add engineering, and the modern world is” (anonymous 
engineer quoted in Jordan 1994: 21). While such numbers and statements are 
indicative of the rapid increase of trained engineers, as well as the significant and 
widespread place engineers began to occupy within industry and American society 
at large, they do not tell us much about how the utilization of an engineering 
vocabulary gave birth to a whole “new epistemology (…) through which industrial 
reality was filtered” (Shenhav 1999: 4). However, in order to get a grasp of this, it is 
necessary to attend to what issues were taken up as urgent within the developing 
language of the industrially minded engineers.  
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One of the major problems which management thought in America sought to 
respond to was the prevalent and fierce conflicts between labor and employers. 
While surely also a problem throughout the rest of the industrialized world, the 
conflict in the United States, however, was “more savage and bloody” than 
anywhere else (Zieger quoted in Guillén 1994: 39), and the tensions between labor 
and employers remained a recurring problem until the middle of the twentieth 
century (ibid: 80-81). Before the engineers entered the scene and sought to devise 
new ways of minimizing such tensions, various proponents of what was known as 
industrial betterment sought to promote community building and industrial 
partnership as a means of preventing social upheaval (Buder 1967; Brandes 1976; 
Barley and Kunda 1992). Such experiments were initiated in the railroad industry, 
and from here they spread to other industries in the 1880s and 1890s.  
Reformers argued that if the firm could become the hub around which the 
employee’s life revolved, communal order and industrial peace could be 
achieved. Accordingly, the most celebrated experiments sought to create total 
institutions by furnishing the infrastructure of community: houses, schools, 
churches, libraries, stores and recreational facilities (Barley and Kunda 1992: 
368).  
Hence, before the engineers began devising conceptions as to how management 
ought to be practiced, a range of practical attempts had already been implemented 
and tried with various degrees of success. Such attempts were, contrary to the 
engineers’ later focus of attention, less concerned with efficiency within the 
workplace, and much more preoccupied with establishing adequate communal 
surroundings through which the danger of social upheaval could be minimized.  
While the historiography of management and organizationshas often followed 
the trajectory of explaining how organizations gradually changed from being closed 
to open systems (Scott 1981), it is nevertheless more precise to reverse this initial 
transformation. Thus, before the coming of the engineers, those preoccupied with 
business focused on a wide array of issues that went beyond the narrow confines of 
the workplace. In this sense, as Shenhav (1999: 200) argues, it would be more 
precise to state that what later came to be known as an ‘open system’ approach to 
organizing flourished before the engineering discourse became the prism through 
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which management was reflected, and that the initial transformation, although an 
anachronism, could therefore more appropriately be described as a movement 
from an ‘open systems approach’ to a ‘closed systems approach’.  
Nevertheless, the fierce conflict between labor and employers remained the 
center of attention with the advent of the engineers (Guillén 1994: 40), but while 
proponents of industrial betterment had sought to overcome this through co-
operation and partnership-building between laborers and employers, the engineers 
located the problem not in the social surroundings, but inside the organization. 
More precisely, the problem consisted of a lack of control and haphazard 
management practices that led to inefficient production. On the one hand, such a 
lack of control and inefficient production stemmed from the fact that industrial 
corporations had grown much larger than they had previously been, and on the 
other hand, this stemmed from the fact that the conflict between labor and 
employers remained a recurring problem that manifested itself in strikes, the 
destruction of machinery and, not least, “soldiering” (Taylor 1967: 13-25) - the 
intentional decrease of output and the deliberate restriction of the speed with 
which operations of work were performed.  
In order to remedy this, several engineers took up the vocabularies and 
frameworks used to describe technical systems and began applying them to 
management and the organization of work (Shenhav 1995: 559-562). The concepts 
of ‘system’ and ‘systematization’ figured here as “key ideological tropes” (Shenhav 
1999: 4) with which the gradually developing vocabulary of management thought 
began to carve its way into reality. By way of applying and utilizing such terms, 
industrial reality emerged as an object to be scrutinized, analyzed, measured, 
calculated and synthesized in accordance with a scientific rationality that rested 
upon “clearly defined laws, rules, and principles”, which were “applicable to all 
kinds of human activities, from our simplest acts to the work of our great 
corporations” (Taylor 1967: 7).  
Although Taylor became the most famous and controversial spokesperson 
for this approach, the language of systems and systematization was more generally 
flourishing within engineering journals such as the American Machinist and the 
Engineering Magazine at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century (Shenhav 1995, 1999, 2003). On the one hand, the language of systems and 
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systematization sought to take everything into account. Just as with the detailed 
police regulations described by Foucault, nothing should be beyond the sphere of 
attention and regulation. As Shenhav (2003: 189) quotes an engineer as saying from 
a 1902-issue of the Engineering Magazine: “the important details of factory work are 
cared for by systems which are homogenous, flexible and efficient; systems which 
leave nothing to chance, but which care for the smallest and the most important 
details of factory work alike”. This attention to details was at the same time 
coupled with an ambition to bring the separate and manifold details together in an 
integrative manner. Hence, “there is not a man, machine, operation or system in 
the shop that stands entirely alone. Each one, to be valued rightly, must be viewed 
as part of a whole” (a 1904-issue of the American Machinist, quoted in Shenhav 
2003: 189).  
Thus, by way of utilizing the vocabulary of systems and systematization it 
became possible to rearticulate the processes of work, the different responsibilities 
pertaining to production, and the ideal way in which production should be 
reorganized. In order to attain this, it was necessary to address the employee as an 
individual, and not as part of a group. More precisely, addressing the individual 
instead of the group was preferable due to the fact that personal “ambition always 
has been and will remain a more powerful incentive to exertion than a desire for 
the general welfare” (Taylor 1967: 95). In this sense, clearly defined individual tasks 
combined with clearly defined individual rewards were much more preferable than 
group-specified tasks and profit-sharing. The very fact of being in a group made 
the productivity of the individual spiral in a downward manner. When unmediated 
by proper principles of scientific management, working in a group, according to 
Taylor, made the individuals’ efficiency fall “almost invariably down to or below 
the level of the worst man in the gang” (ibid: 73). Hence, in order to secure 
increased productivity, management had to enforce “standardization”, “adoption of 
best implements”, and “cooperation” (ibid: 83). With this also came one of the 
most loathed components of Taylor’s system: the clear and unambiguous 
separation between planning and execution. Only through taking existing 
productive relations apart, optimizing the details of their operations in accordance 
with the laws of science, and reassembling them again, could a new, fine-tuned and 
well-calibrated whole emerge. On behalf of this analytic-synthetic operation, 
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specified in accordance with foundational principles of mechanical engineering, 
one could calculate and specify the “one best method” for any operation to be 
performed (ibid: 25). In this way, the organization and the work done within it 
emerged in the image of a machine, the optimal functioning of which could be 
formally articulated through the application of mathematical principles and 
equations (ibid: 107).  
Much as proponents of Polizeiwissenschaft in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century had depicted the state as a mechanical entity which had to be constructed, 
attended to and handled as a giant machine, the systematic engineering-based 
approach brought to the surface a vocabulary and approach to management and 
organization that utilized several of the same analogies. Whereas King Frederick II 
of Prussia and von Justi, among others, utilized the metaphor of the machine in 
order to attain predictability, order and control in relation to matters of the state 
(see the previous chapter), the systematization efforts developed by the engineers 
aimed at many of the same goals. Just as King Frederick II of Prussia dreamt about 
foreseeing “the future” and penetrating the chain of causes of “even the most 
distant ages” (quoted in Mayr 1989: 108), the engineers’ systematization efforts 
aimed at penetrating the deep causes of enhanced productivity, and in so doing 
aimed to “annihilate time” and “to look into the future” (quote from Engineering 
Magazine in Shenhav 1995: 579). Still, whereas the analogies made in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries largely remained that - that is, analogies - the 
engineers’ transportation of mechanical descriptions and mathematical equations to 
the sphere of work was much more elaborate. Indeed, the metal cutting performed 
by a machinist, for instance, could not just be depicted by analogy as a technical 
system or a machine. Rather, it could be given a precise, and in principle solvable, 
equation consisting of twelve variables (Taylor 1967: 109).  
Through this problematization process, the engineers not only legitimized the 
need for their rapidly growing profession, but they also claimed to be able to make 
production more efficient while simultaneously bringing an end to the conflicts 
between laborers and manufacturers. Scientific management thereby claimed to 
bypass political strife and access the deep truth of enhanced productivity. Through 
its systematic approach, through its reliance upon facts generated in accordance 
with science, through its optimization of the productive process, scientific 
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management opened up a new world of hitherto unimaginable levels of 
productivity. By so doing, everyone, allegedly, stood to gain. The previously 
existing fierce conflicts were seen, from the perspective of Taylor and his like-
minded fellow engineers, as deriving from a misrepresentation of the actual 
interests of employees on the one hand and employers on the other. While 
depicted as antagonistic, Taylor claimed “that the true interests” of employers and 
employees are in reality “one and the same” (Taylor 1967: 10). By way of increasing 
the productive capacity of the employee, a win-win situation could be created 
which allowed simultaneously for higher wages and decreased labor costs (ibid.). 
Finally, to top things off, one could furthermore expect the implementation of 
such a system to bring with it new and morally improved men. They would not just 
be putting out more work and receiving a higher pay, they would also be “better 
men in every way”, i.e. they would “live better, begin to save money, become more 
sober, and work more steadily” (ibid: 74). 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the engineering-based approach 
to management in general and Taylor’s system in particular. As Rabinbach (1992: 
238) remarks: “Apart from the advent of machine-driven production, no other 
development in the history of industrial work had an impact equivalent to 
Frederick Winslow Taylor’s ideas of industrial organization.” Peter Drucker even 
goes so far as to state that Taylor’s scientific management “may well be the most 
powerful as well as the most lasting contribution America has made to Western 
thought since the Federalist Papers” (Drucker 2006: 274). This, however, was not 
because the principles of scientific management were implemented in their totality 
across all industrial organizations, nor because they were uncritically embraced. 
Indeed, the ideas promoted by the engineers were not only opposed by workers 
and their unions, but also by several manufacturers, who perceived the engineer-
designed systems “as costly and superfluous” (Shenhav 1999: 105). Nevertheless, 
the engineering-based problematization of management had an overwhelming 
impact. It constructed the foundations of formalized management thought and 
constituted the way of thinking about management that one had to relate to 
whether one was in agreement with or critical towards its principles.  
One of the primary reasons for the overwhelming success of systematic 
management was that it was promoted as delivering an impartial, technical solution 
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to a more general social, political and economic problem, a solution that was 
capable of reaching across an otherwise deep divide within American political 
culture (Shenhav 1995: 564). On the one hand, these systematizing rearticulations 
were compatible with an ideal of progress as promoted by engineers, scientists, 
economists, and managers at large. Here, progress was often bent around 
technological and commercial values, according to which it was identified with a 
rise in productivity, more efficient administration, raising profits and the like. On 
the other hand, the engineers’ systematic approach to management and the 
organization of work was also compatible with an ideal of equality and fairness that 
was not expressed in technical but rather in moral terms, and often advanced by 
workers, progressive journalists, intellectuals, and unions. Indeed, by way of 
depoliticizing the otherwise highly sensitive issue of the wage-question, Taylor’s 
notion of “a fair day’s work” (Taylor 1967: 142, emphasis added) could be seen as not 
merely fixing a technical - but also a moral and political - question, through appeals 
to science and objectivity. “Systems”, as Shenhav (1999: 186) writes, were therefore 
perceived as producing  
harmony rather than conflict, cooperation rather than tension. They 
attempted to bind individuals in mutual relations of responsibility and 
accountability. The system was perceived as a blueprint for rationality, to 
produce consistency, predictability, and stability.  
Furthermore, the birth of the principles upon which modern management became 
articulated should also be seen in conjunction with the principles according to 
which economics, from the 1870’s and onwards, was recast. As shown in chapter 
one, the abandonment of the framework of classical political economy in favor of a 
new mathematically-based and static conception of the economy entailed a shift in 
perspective from questions of growth and production to questions of optimal 
allocation and the attainment of equilibrium. Whereas the economists stressed how 
these could be achieved through the market-process, Taylor and his fellow 
engineers raised and sought to tackle the problem of optimal allocation of 
resources within the organization. While it is certainly true that the emergence of 
the huge industrial corporation from the latter half of the nineteenth century 
increasingly implied a substitution of the invisible hand of the market with the 
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visible hand of management (Chandler 1996, 1999), it is also important to recognize 
that the principles upon which the functionality of the latter was formalized in the 
hands of the engineers could be seen to be in perfect correspondence with the 
principles around which economics was rearticulated. Thus, the economy, as well 
as the organization, was viewed as something the workings of which could be 
optimized by relying upon principles and modes of understanding derived from 
physics and their practical application within the emerging disciplines of economics 
and engineering. In conjunction with this, it is worth adding, as Hoskin and Macve 
(1993: 48) do, that Alfred Marshall, Leon Walras, and several of the other 
economists who figured prominently in recasting the discipline of economics  
undertook their work specifically as a response to the new economic power 
unleashed by the invention of the modern business enterprise. (…) [I]t was 
their desire to understand the success of this new kind of economic activity 
that led to their new microeconomic focus.  
Thus, in spite of the fact that the economists predominantly concentrated on 
explaining economic allocations and decisions as being coordinated by the invisible 
hand of the market, and the engineers, on their part, sought to explain how 
economic allocations and efficiency could be attained through the controlling, 
visible hand of management, their attempts were, to a large extent, complementary, 
not least because their respective frameworks were derived from the translation 
and practical utilization of mathematics and physics. Both within the economists’ 
frameworks and within Taylor’s scientific management, human beings were 
conceptualized as acting in accordance with the establishment of incentives that 
relied upon them being both rational and self-interested actors. Both of them relied 
upon an understanding of their subject matter as something that was to attain 
equilibrium and optimal functionality in a way that was, or ought to be describable 
as, an exact mathematical equation. Both of them placed human beings within a 
static, unchanging universe that rested upon scientific laws on behalf of which 
optimal allocations could be described. It is therefore not surprising that 
economics, spurred by the de-naturalization that its subject matter underwent in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century (Shcabas 2005), began to be conceived as 
an engineering project in the twentieth century. Henceforth it became possible to 
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speak of the economy as something which should be “managed” (Morgan 2003: 
276). 
Accordingly, a range of phenomena begin to come together in a mutually 
reinforcing manner. The establishment of the modern business enterprise, its mass-
production of standardized commodities at ‘economies of scale’, the changing 
epistemological frameworks of economics, the coming into being of management 
as a discipline formalized in accordance with the systematic approach promoted by 
the mechanical engineers, the conviction that social and political problems could be 
solved objectively by application of the principles of science - all of these come 
together and lean on each other for support. Reflecting this in the register of 
managementality, one could state that a generalized rationality pertaining to the 
management of ‘the economic’ was beginning to emerge in a rather forceful 
manner. This rationality essentially split the world into the actual on the one hand, 
and the potential on the other and the task of management became that of setting up 
the preconditions by way of which individual productive subjects, organizations, 
and economies could be brought from their actual to their potential state, the latter 
being defined as their ideal or optimal functionality as calculated through principles 
derived from mathematics and physics. Here, the outside was barred from entering 
the equation, because the preconditions for attaining optimality or efficiency were 
premised on the fact that the system within which this was to be attained 
necessarily had to be viewed as a closed and timeless system. Here, there was no 
room for any spontaneous sociality bubbling up from below, nor for allowing and 
harnessing the power of unpredictable events.  
In this way, a particular managerial rationality, a particular managementality, 
utilizing the tropes of efficiency and optimality, took hold as a feasible way of 
relating to problems pertaining to how production should be organized. However, 
as will be shown, this rationality, in spite of its initial success, was also beginning to 
be viewed as insufficient and as an increasingly problematic guideline according to 
which productive undertakings should be organized. By way of taking up three 
problematization processes that, in their respective ways, criticized and 
rearticulated the foundations on which this managementality rested, we begin to 
see the trajectories that flow into the co-creation vocabulary and give birth to the 
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experience of the outside as a source of value creation and an object of 
management.   
Human Relations: Managing a spontaneous sociality and the outside  
Taylor’s principles provoked a range of responses (Guillén 1994: 47-48; Barley and 
Kunda: 371-372). Among the most central and notorious of these were those 
generated on behalf of the Hawthorne Experiments (Perrow 1986: 67-68, 90-97; 
Gillespie 1993; Guillén 1994: 58-65; Wren 2005: 279-300; Khurana 2007: 221-222). 
These took place in a period ranging from 1924 to 1933, and were conducted at the 
Hawthorne Works of the Bell System’s Western Electric Company. “Acting in 
collaboration with the National Research Council, the Western Electric Company 
had for three years been engaged upon an attempt to assess the effect of 
illumination upon the worker and his work” (Mayo 2003: 55). However, since the 
results derived from here were inconclusive, the researchers gradually pursued 
other leads, not least pertaining to the distinctively human and social.  
If Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management has become the most famous 
book ever published in the field of management and organization studies, the 
experiments conducted at the Hawthorne Works are probably the most famous and 
widely discussed experiments ever undertaken in order to inquire into the nature of 
work, management and organizing. As Gillespie (1993) in his authoritative and 
highly detailed account has shown, “a body of complex and uncertain data, tenuous 
hypothesis, and conflicting interpretations was transformed into a relative 
dependable body of social scientific knowledge that, while criticized, is accepted as 
an important contribution to several disciplines” (ibid: 5). While Gillespie makes a 
detailed and critical description of how the experiments were shaped by social 
interests, institutions and, not least, Elton Mayo (ibid: 96-126), here we merely seek 
to inquire into a couple of the dominant accounts of the experiments in order to 
take stock of how their interpretations allowed for the emergence of a new set of 
understandings that departed significantly from Taylor and the engineering 
approach to management, and yet also could be seen to prolong several of the 
assumptions advanced by the engineers. Special emphasis is given here, of course, 
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to the gradually surfacing themes and tendencies that later take on significance for 
the coming into being of co-creation.  
Some of the most central accounts and interpretations of the experiments at 
Hawthorne were Elton Mayo’s The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization ([1933] 
2003), and The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization ([1949] 1975), as well as 
Roethlisberger and Dickson’s ([1939] 2000) Management and the Worker. In these, a 
shift in the understanding of the human and the social as that which precondition 
effective management and enhanced productivity begins to emerge. Whereas the 
rationality prescribed by Taylor rested upon the ability to appeal to the individual 
worker’s rational self-interest, and of calculating his or her performance on behalf 
of experimental tests that focused on the worker’s physical abilities (such as 
amount of loads to be handled in a day, questions of ergonomics, time and motion 
studies), Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson shift their center of attention as a 
result of the problems they perceive to be inherent in the engineering approach to 
management. More precisely, the problem is that “plans which are intended to 
promote efficiency have consequences other than their logical ones, and these 
unforeseen consequences tend to defeat the logical purposes of the plan as 
conceived” (Roethlisberger and Dickson 2000: 546). The reason for this is that 
such plans do not take into account the wider context that determines whether 
attempts at promoting efficiency will be successful. This wider context is the 
industrial organization viewed as a social system, which consists of a technical 
organization and a human organization (ibid: 553).  
While the technical organization was the object of investigation within 
Taylor’s account, the human organization was left completely out of sight, since it 
simply could not show up within the engineering prism on management. This 
neglect had detrimental effects: on the one hand, it failed to take into account that 
attempts at optimizing the speed of production through an engineering rationality 
produced social disorganization and insecurity (Mayo 2003: 165-166); and on the 
other hand, it failed to take into account how the human organization, and 
especially the sentiments of the workers, had an impact on and conditioned the 
degree of success one could achieve through manipulating the technical 
organization. While the former gave rise to Mayo’s Durkheimian-inspired view that 
an industrial civilization inevitably spawns an ever more prevailing anomie (ibid: 
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chapter VII), the latter shifted the attention to an investigation of the human 
organization as something to be mapped out and taken into consideration, and it is 
to this human organization that we now attend. 
According to Roethlisberger and Dickson (2000: 553), the human 
organization shows up within the workplace as “a number of individuals working 
together (…). Each of these individuals, however, is bringing to the work situation 
a different background of personal and social experiences.” Following from this, 
two problems come into view: First of all, it becomes necessary to develop a 
distinct form of knowledge about how the immaterial social relations and 
sentiments established between the workers impact on production. Secondly, it 
becomes necessary to take into account how individuals are already socially 
predisposed, before entering the sphere of work, in a way that directly impacts on 
production. We look at each of these in turn and hereafter see how they give rise to 
a new reflexive mode of management that takes into account a perceived 
spontaneity already existing within the organization, and how this new mode of 
management furthermore begins to take into account something existing on the 
outside that influences workers’ productivity.   
 
Spontaneously arising sociality within the workplace 
One of the major findings of the Hawthorne experiments was that group behavior 
among the workers resulted in a spontaneously arising order within the workplace. 
Roethlisberger and Dickson (2000: 524) describe how the “men had elaborated, 
spontaneously and quite unconsciously, an intricate social organization around their 
collective beliefs and sentiments.” This spontaneous social organization could be 
seen to be conditioned on the whole setup of the experiments. Thus, Mayo 
describes how a “sympathetic chief observer” helped a “group to feel that its duty 
was to set its own conditions of work, he helped the workers to find the ‘freedom’ 
of which they so frequently spoke” (Mayo 2003: 71, cf. also Mayo 1975: 64). In this 
sense, the spontaneity described could be seen to be merely a synonym for 
“willing” (Bendix 2001: 318). However, this spontaneity also had a deeper, almost 
ontological, status, deriving from the fact that human beings always tend to 
generate such an order. In relation to the human organization, as described by 
Roethlisberger and Dickson, this shows up as an informal organization, which “exists 
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in every plant” (2000: 559), and without which “formal organizations could not 
survive for long” (ibid: 562). This spontaneously generated informal organization is 
of central importance, since it is intricately bound up with the formation of “modes 
of evaluation” that distribute “‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’” (ibid: 555). 
In this way, a communally established mode of evaluation was spontaneously 
generated within the workplace and the bases for this could not be grasped, nor 
handled, within the approach prescribed by Taylor.1  
Accordingly, a new layer of reality enters into managerial reflection and this 
new reality has a certain naturalness to it, which it is necessary to take into account, 
                                            
1 It is necessary here to specify that Mayo’s account differs from Roethlisberger and Dickson’s in 
a certain respect. Whereas Roethlisberger and Dickson – as we have just seen – identify how the 
workers spontaneously generate an order within the workplace, Mayo (1975, 2003) views the 
forces through which such a spontaneous social organization can arise as being undermined by 
urbanization and industrialization. This social diagnosis gives rise to the coupling of two 
tendencies in Mayo’s thought that have both been criticized. On the one hand, he made a call for 
the establishment of organizations as communities. These should ideally resemble “pre-industrial 
societies” where “the spontaneous corporation of skilled groups” prevailed (J.H. Smith 1998: 
231). According to this view, Mayo has been described as a nostalgic and a reactionary (Guillén 
1994: 61-62). On the other hand, Mayo thought that such communities could only “be restored 
through the creation of administrative elites trained in techniques of social organization and 
control”. In relation to this view, he has been described as “an authoritarian elitist” and “a crypto-
Fascist” (J.H. Smith 1998: 237-238). Thus, whereas Roethlisberger and Dickson readily identify a 
spontaneous social organization arising from the way in which workers interact as something 
without which the formal organization could not survive for long, Mayo thinks that the 
conditions for the flourishing of such spontaneously generated forms of socialization are being 
undermined by industrialization in general, and the economists’ and engineers’ approach in 
particular. Since this threatened spontaneous sociality is of major importance for the functioning 
of the organization, it will have to be promoted, brought into being, nurtured, and secured by able 
and attentive leaders. It is probably also in light of Mayo’s position regarding these matters that 
we should understand his limited, or half-hearted, embrace of thinkers within the liberal tradition. 
More precisely, while Mayo embraces Quesnay and the Physiocrats, he denounces later 
proponents of laissez-faire. The reason for this is that while Quesnay and the Physiocrats made 
their call for laissez-faire in a situation characterized by relatively stable social relations, John 
Stuart Mill, and the economists following him, transformed this principle into an unquestionable 
maxim, without sufficiently taking into account how their one-sided view assisted in speeding up 
the process by which the social bonds of society were being undermined (Mayo 1975: 33-35; 
Mayo 2003: 146-148).  
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since it directly influences production. Whereas Taylor conceived of the best 
organization of production as hinging upon appeals to self-interest and mechanical 
optimization, production now comes into view as a process that hinges on workers 
who are driven by sentiment and enmeshed in complex social relations. Hence, 
what comes into being is a view of the organization as a place that is shot-through 
with relations of sentiment that are spontaneously organized within complex social 
processes. These complex processes on the one hand stand in a particular relation 
to the ‘logical’ or ‘technical organization’, which they influence and are influenced 
by, yet they are completely incapable of being grasped through the rationality with 
which this latter organization comes into view, that is, from the perspective of an 
engineering-based approach. As Roethlisberger and Dickson describe, “what the 
experimenters had been observing (…) was essentially neither logical nor irrational 
behavior. It was essentially social behavior” (ibid: 575, emphasis added).  
That these societal connotations could begin to be seen as something which 
played a significant role within the sphere of production was probably furthermore 
based on the fact that the Hawthorne Works was described as a kind of mini-
society that attended to the manifold needs of people. In this way, the organization 
was not just seen as permeated with spontaneously generated social relations, but 
also as being organized in a way that rendered the image of society an easily 
appropriable one. Roethlisberger and Dickson, for instance, express, how the 
employees within the company not only find “a source of income but also (…) a 
source of advice, friendship, and aid as well as a source of amusement and 
recreation” (ibid: 542). Following from the fact that the company sponsored a range 
of activities (including clubs, baseball, bowling, dances, and parties), as well as 
provided “sickness, accident, and death benefit funds, pension funds, hospital care, 
financial and legal services”, the plant at Hawthorne could be seen as taking over 
“social functions not adequately performed by society” (ibid: 541). We thus see the 
coming into being of the organization as something which resembles a small-scale 
society, that is, an entity which sees to the employees’ various social needs, and 
which is simultaneously saturated by spontaneously formed social relations that 
bubble up from below as a result of the workers ongoing, daily interactions.  
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The outside as a precondition for production inside the organization 
The interpretations of the experiments conducted at the Hawthorne plant were 
significant furthermore, since they explicitly drew attention to how something 
outside the workplace influenced the production going on within the workplace. 
More precisely, as already hinted at above, the spontaneous social organization 
arising between the workers was already preconditioned on the sentiments with which 
the individual worker entered the plant. While there are other instances hereof (see 
for example ibid: 546-548), we merely pick up on one example here, where Mayo 
(2003: 101-106) explains how a group consisting of five female workers took part 
in three test periods spanning the years from 1928 to 1930. While three of the 
workers performed rather steadily within and throughout the three test periods, the 
performance of the remaining two fluctuated rather significantly. One of these two 
workers showed a performance pattern which Mayo describes in the following way: 
in the first period, the irregularity of her output was “at its highest with little or no 
improvement”; in the second period, production-measures showed “reduced 
irregularity and slight improvement”; and finally, in the third period, the results 
showed “no significant irregularity and much higher production” (ibid: 104). The 
problem that now arises is how to explain this pattern of irregularity within and 
between the respective test periods.  
According to Mayo (ibid: 105), the researchers at Hawthorne would have 
missed what caused these fluctuations, had they not “arranged for the observation 
of other changes than those in the immediate experiment”. More precisely, the 
cause of the worker’s fluctuating levels of production should not be seen as 
emanating from something controlled within the experimental set-up, but rather 
from a complex set of causes that are located partly outside the organization, and 
are socially processed partly within it. The young worker, we are told, “is eighteen, 
unmarried, and lives at home, she is ‘restrained by severe parental discipline, 
especially from her mother’ (a native of Southeastern Europe) (…). She resents the 
stern parental control and especially her inability to live as other girls do and to 
make her own friendships as she will” (ibid: 103). 
During the first test-period, this young worker had complained to her 
colleagues about her situation. During the second, however, her colleagues, 
knowing of her problematic familiar situation, had “given her a sense of 
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comradeship and social support” which “operates to diminish the factor of 
personal resentment”. This, Mayo explains, accounts for the improvement made in 
the second test-period. Finally, the young worker recognizes that “the remedy is in 
her own hands; (…) she can transfer herself to living quarters with some girl friend. 
The determination to do this and the actual transfer are the unseen 
accompaniments of the sustained improvement of the third period” (ibid: 105). 
According to Mayo, this transformation is therefore “in some degree” an “outcome 
of social comradeship”, but it is first and foremost due to  
a major change in method of living” which “not only frees the worker from a 
perpetual interference with her personal development – unjustified by 
anything in the Chicago adolescent milieu; it also puts her in a position such 
that she can talk to her immediate relatives and seniors on a footing of greater 
comparative equality (ibid: 105-106).  
With this, we thus see the outside emerging on the inside as a highly complex 
factor to be taken into account (i.e. in the form of the worker’s personal situation, 
mode of living, familiar relations, country of origin, the way in which traditions 
from the country of origin might be at odds with those of the country within which 
the worker lives, etc.). As a consequence, there is a certain logic to the fact that 
Mayo in the opening of the following chapter can state that “our adventure” now 
“moves outside the [Hawthorne] Works and into the rapidly changing modern 
industrial community” (ibid: 122, emphasis added). In this way, the outside emerges as 
a highly complex problem to be taken into account, reflected upon, and dealt with 
within the organization in order to secure high levels of productivity. 
 
The function of personnel work in industry 
The above described interpretations not only bring to the surface a new complex 
reality to be taken into account, they also lead to the question as to how one should 
manage this new complex reality. Roethlisberger and Dickson (2000: 590) propose 
that what they call the function of ‘the personnel man’ could be developed 
systematically and be given a place – within the formal hierarchy of the 
organization – side by side with other specialists such as engineers and physical 
scientists. Unlike the latter, however, the function of personnel management has 
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suffered under the fact that the science of the occupation has as of yet not been 
systematically developed (ibid.). In order to remedy this, Roethlisberger and 
Dickson propose some guidelines according to which this can be achieved. More 
precisely, they describe the skills necessary for the adequate fulfillment of 
personnel work in industry as hinging on a ‘conceptual scheme’, which contrary to 
preconceived ideas, does not disallow “seeing something ‘new’ when it arises” (ibid: 
592). The personnel man, this “human diagnostician”, is furthermore to rely on 
“the techniques of observation” and “the techniques of interviewing”. By way of 
utilizing the latter, just like a medical practitioner, he can go from symptoms “to 
the realities behind them” (ibid: 592, 598-599, see also Perrow 1986: 95). It is worth 
here quoting Roethlisberger and Dickson at some length regarding how the 
personnel specialist is to take into account and handle the outside as well as the 
spontaneously arising relations generated within the organization. They state that 
when  
a personnel specialist is addressing himself to the ‘average’ or ‘typical’ 
employee or ‘what is on the worker’s mind in general,’ he is not exercising 
‘the specific function’ as defined here. However, when he is thinking of what 
is on some particular employee’s mind in terms of a worker who has had a 
particular personal history, who was brought up in a particular family that had 
certain specific relations to the community, and who because of this particular 
‘social conditioning’ is bringing to his job certain specific hopes and fears; 
when he is thinking in terms of an employee whose job is in some particular 
place in the factory which brings him into association with particular persons 
and groups of people, i.e., a particular social setting which is making certain 
specific demands of the employee; and when he is thinking in terms of how 
these particular demands which the job is making of the person and the 
particular demands which the person is making of the job are producing 
either equilibrium or unbalance – when he is thinking in this way and oriented 
in this manner toward the employee, he is exercising ‘the specific function of 
personnel work’ (ibid: 591). 
In relation to the coming into being of co-creation, the Human Relations theorists’ 
detection of how something outside the organization directly influences its 
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production is of significant importance. Of equal importance is also their 
description of how spontaneously developed social processes existing within the 
organization give rise to social values and principles according to which evaluations 
are made. Furthermore, their emphasis on workers’ sentiments, and the complex 
webs within which these exist, also shifts the prism through which management 
thought conceives of the conditions of enhanced productivity – from the physical 
operations performed, to the immateriality of the social. In this way, we see a range 
of components coming together; components that are central for the coming into 
being of co-creation in the late twentieth century. 
The problematization process carried out by the Human Relations theorists 
should therefore be seen as a marked transformation of the prism through which 
management began to be reflected. A transformation which, in opposition to the 
engineering approach, began taking the outside into account, began taking 
spontaneously arising processes into account, and began working with these 
complex realities in order to attain management goals. Nevertheless, as observers 
have also pointed out (Shenhav 1999: 184-186), Mayo, Roethlisberger, Dickson, 
and several of those that followed them, also remained within the vocabulary and 
the perspective developed by Taylor and the other engineers. On the one hand, 
they continued to use concepts such as ‘systems’ and ‘equilibrium’ (Mayo 2003: 
172; Roethlisberger and Dickson 2000: 591), which were brought into formalized 
management thought with the advent of the engineers. On the other hand, in spite 
of all their insistence upon the need to listen to employees (Mayo 2003: 183), and 
of acting in a non-authoritarian way (Roethlisberger and Dickson 2000: 601), the 
workers were nevertheless still seen as passive, as suffering under the burdens of an 
industrial civilization, and as essentially having the potential to be manipulated by 
sophisticated management techniques. In this way, the creative agency and the 
ability to innovate, so central within co-creation, were not part of the Human 
Relations theorists’ conception.  
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Public relations and marketing: the construction of souls and managing the 
outside 
More or less simultaneously with the experiments conducted at Hawthorne, 
another transition of major importance for the coming into being of co-creation 
was beginning to make itself felt. Spawned by the legitimacy crisis with which the 
major corporations in the United States found themselves from the end of the 
nineteenth century, new modes of managing the outside were coming into being 
(Ewen 1996; Marchand 1998). This legitimacy crisis was an outcome of a range of 
factors that began reinforcing each other, and to which corporations and 
intellectuals began responding. Firstly, we take a look at the conditions of this crisis 
of legitimacy, and hereafter we look at how the corporations responded to this. 
Special attention is given here to one particular PR-strategy that, in a previously 
unprecedented way, managed the outside. 
 
The crisis of legitimacy 
Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century, industrial enterprises kept 
growing. This continuous growth was not least spawned by a range of legal 
transformations by way of which the possibilities for setting up a corporation 
became more relaxed than what had hitherto been the case (Roy 1997; Bakan 
2004). Initially, in the late eighteenth century when the United States was 
established, charters to set up a corporation were only granted on condition that 
the initiators could document that the corporation would serve the public interest 
(Nace 2005). Hence, corporations were initially constructed in a much different 
manner than the reigning practice of today:  
Contrary to the notion that corporations autonomously developed because 
they competed more efficiently or effectively in the market, governments 
created the corporate form to do things that rational businessmen would not 
do because they were too risky, too expensive, too unprofitable, or too public, 
that is, to perform tasks that would not have gotten done if left to the 
efficient operations of markets. Corporations were developed to undertake 
jobs that were not rational or not appropriate from the perspective of the 
individual businessman (Roy: 1997: 41, see also Nace 2005: 48).  
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In most instances, the early corporations’ business operations were thus restricted 
to the construction of roads, canals, bridges, and, later, railroads. However, from 
the middle of the nineteenth century and onwards, significant legal changes were 
made, and several of the previous restrictions that limited possibilities for 
‘incorporating’ were now swept away (ibid: 70-86). One significant change was the 
way in which the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad resulted in a 
juridical decision according to which corporations now acquired the status of legal 
persons (Nace 2005: 87-109; Marchand 1998: 7). By way of utilizing an amendment 
to the constitution - an amendment which after the Civil War was constructed to 
secure the legal status of former slaves (Bakan 2004: 16) - the lawyers of the 
railroad company persuaded the Supreme Court that corporations, in a legal sense, 
should be considered as persons (Nace 2005: 102-109). Together with several other 
conditions by way of which corporate law was relaxed in relation to its initial rather 
strict formulation (Nace 2005: 51-52), this transformation aided the corporations in 
expanding to hitherto unprecedented sizes. This, together with the consolidation 
and merger movement that kicked off at the end of the nineteenth century 
(Chandler 1996), resulted in monstrously sized firms, the largest of which 
employed well beyond 100000 people. With this, however, an increasing 
resentment towards the corporations also began to arise (Marchand 1998: 1-9). In 
spite of the fact that corporations had acquired now the status of legal persons 
whose rights could be violated, in the eyes of the public, their sheer size, their 
fights against unions, their pressing of wages, and their relentless strive to attain 
‘economies of scale’, seemed to be at odds with the guidelines by which personal 
conduct usually was evaluated. As a consequence, the corporations began to be 
conceived as “soulless leviathans – uncaring, impersonal, and amoral” (Bakan 2004: 
17), and as entities that, as a result of their sheer size, had lost all personal relations 
with their customers, who were viewed merely as “so many units of consumption, 
a set of impersonal figures on a chart”, as one advertising executive expressed it 
(quoted in Marchand 1998: 8). 
 
Managing the outside 
This negative public perception of the corporations was one of the most central 
problems to which the public relations industry emerged as a response. If the 
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corporations were viewed as ‘soulless leviathans’, their public image necessarily had 
to be reworked and what presented itself as the most important task was the 
construction of the corporate soul (Marchand 1998). Accordingly, a range of 
companies began experimenting intensely with public relations campaigns through 
which they tried to portray themselves as ‘members of the community’ and as 
‘caring persons’ (ibid.). Just as Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson had conceived of 
the personnel man as being akin to a physician, as a ‘human diagnostician’ and as 
someone who should diagnose and relieve the social pathologies brought about by 
industrialization and the hitherto reigning engineering-based approach to managing 
organizations, the new public relations professionals conceived of themselves as 
“’physician[s] for corporate bodies’”, to use Ivy Lee’s phrase (quoted in Ewen 
1996: 76). 
One of the most important among these new physicians was Edward 
Bernays. He was not only the most influential practitioner within the emerging 
profession of public relations (Miller 2005; Ewen 1996; Tye 2002), he also 
published several books on the subject from the 1920s and onwards (Bernays 
[1923] 2011, [1928] 2005, 1952). His early experience with shaping and guiding 
public opinion towards specific goals was not least formed by his employment at 
the U.S. Committee on Public Information (CPI) that played a significant role in 
early twentieth century state-sponsored attempts at modifying public opinion 
(Creel [1920] 2010; Ewen 1996: 102-127). Significant among these early attempts 
was the CPI-organized, huge, and hitherto unprecedented, mobilization of the 
public towards legitimizing U.S. participation in the First World War (ibid.). As 
Stuart Ewen writes, the work undertaken by CPI opened up a whole new avenue 
through which messages could be communicated and through which techniques of 
persuasion emerged as something which could be utilized to the attainment of 
business goals:  
As a colossal experiment in mass persuasion, the Committee on Public 
Information (…) had fostered a belief that public opinion might be managed, 
that a social climate, more friendly to business interests, could indeed be 
achieved. ‘The war taught us the power of propaganda,’ declared Roger 
Babson, the influential business analyst, in 1921. ‘Now when we have 
anything to sell the American people, we know how to sell it’ (ibid: 131).  
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While several rather spectacular PR-campaigns flowed from this war-experience, 
we merely restrict ourselves here to one particular and rather notorious example 
conceived and executed by Edward Bernays. In terms of this example, the 
management of the outside is considered in relation to the managementality 
associated with the knowledge generated by the economists and engineers on the 
one hand, and with the already surveyed Human Relations theorists on the other.  
In 1929, Bernays was contacted by the head of The American Tobacco 
Corporation, George Washington Hill. Hill was frustrated by the fact that the sale 
of cigarettes to women suffered under a taboo according to which it was 
considered inappropriate for women to smoke in public places (Ewen 1996: 3-4; 
Tye 2002: 28-33; Lopdrup-Hjorth and Raffnsøe 2012). Bernays, who was a double 
nephew of Sigmund Freud, was asked whether he could come up with a way to 
solve this pressing issue. He agreed to the task, and the first thing he did was to 
consult a psychoanalyst, Dr. A. A. Brill. Brill told Bernays that in spite of the 
somewhat reduced social boundaries between men and women (which, among 
other things, was a result of the fact that women had begun doing work in factories 
formerly reserved for men), cigarettes, nevertheless, were still a highly masculine 
symbol. Thus, if women could break the social taboo prohibiting them from 
smoking in the street, they could acquire a new degree of freedom. In this sense, 
cigarettes were to be conceived as “Torches of Freedom” (Bernays quoted in Tye 
2002: 28).  
After this meeting, Bernays conceived of a way in which he could solve his 
client’s problem. He sent a telegram, signed by his secretary, Bertha Hunt, to a 
carefully selected group of women, proclaiming the following: “In the interest of 
the equality of the sexes and to fight another sex taboo I and other young women 
will light another torch of freedom by smoking cigarettes while strolling on Fifth 
Avenue Easter Sunday” (quoted in ibid.). At the same time, Bernays made sure that 
the press was informed about what was to happen. Thus, appeals were sent to 
various New York-based newspapers, one of them signed by Ruth Hale, “a leading 
feminist” (ibid: 29). The parade turned out to be an overwhelming success. “The 
outcome”, as Tye (ibid: 33) writes,  
was one that most publicity men (…) [could] only dream about: an irresistible 
script for a stunt, flawlessly executed, covered in nearly every paper in 
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America, with no one detecting the fingerprints of either Bernays or his 
tobacco company client.  
While historians disagree about the social impact of this stunt (ibid: 34), the sale of 
cigarettes to women nevertheless began growing at a rapid pace afterwards and 
what is significant here is not so much the causality that might reasonably be 
established between this stunt and the growth of the ‘female market’. What is 
significant, though, is the way in which management began to be conceived as 
something that could reach outside the organization in a hitherto unprecedented 
way. By way of taking into account already existing social tendencies, such as the 
women’s liberation movement, by way of calculating the probable media response, 
and by way of considering how the public plausibly would respond to the media 
spectacle of this occurrence, Bernays was able to align himself and work with a 
range of already existing forces, and to guide them towards a particular outcome 
from which women smoking in the streets went from being something 
inappropriate to being a gesture of freedom. By staging an event outside the 
organization, taking into account and working with an already existing reality, and 
letting social forces converge in and reinforce one another, Bernays was able to 
utilize ‘the sentiments of the street’ and manage them in a non-disciplinary way.  
Bernays’s conception and orchestration of this stunt was not least shaped by 
his reading and practical adoption of the writings of Gustave Le Bon ([1896] 2006), 
John Dewey ([1927] 1988), and, his intellectual hero, Walter Lippmann, whose 
book Public Opinion had come out in 1922 (Lippmann 2007). Through reading these 
authors, Bernays had been convinced that there was an inherent dysfunctionality 
within modern democratic societies, and that it was not only legitimate, but also 
inevitable, that society should be guided by a small group of invisible “governors” 
and “wire pullers” (Bernays 2005: 37, 60), whom he conceived as “the true ruling 
power” (ibid: 37). As an outflow of the technical revolutions marked by the 
invention of the railroad, the telegraph, the radio, and the airplane, ideas could now 
travel much faster than had previously been the case (ibid: 40), and this 
transformation necessitated new modes of managing the public mind if society was 
to keep on functioning. As Bernays explained, in his straightforward language:  
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In theory, everybody buys the best and cheapest commodities offered him on 
the market. In practice, if everyone went around pricing, and chemically 
tasting before purchasing, the dozens of soaps or fabrics or brands of bread 
which are for sale, economic life would be hopelessly jammed. To avoid such 
confusion, society consents to have its choice narrowed to ideas and objects 
brought to its attention through propaganda of all kinds. There is 
consequently a vast and continuous effort going on to capture our minds in 
the interest of some policy or commodity or idea (ibid: 39).  
Besides its direct ridicule of economic theory, Bernays’s views on the management 
of society pointed to an underlying reality of socially formed sentiments and desires 
that on the one hand exhibited a certain irrationality, but which on the other hand, 
fortunately, could be shaped and guided towards specific ends by those with 
adequate insight into the social formation of attitudes. Of major importance here 
was the recognition that the group mind functioned in a radically different way 
than the individual mind. Thus, whether the PR-man or advertiser were to guide 
the public towards certain political ideas or stands, or towards specific products or 
perceptions, he had to take into account the irreducibility of the formation of 
opinions pertaining to the group (Schwarzkopf 2009: 13-14). Bernays, however, 
was not alone in making such observations. Also drawing on crowd theory and 
psychoanalysis, Ivy Lee expressed similar views when in an interview from 1923 he 
proclaimed the importance of recognizing that “’people are guided more by 
sentiments than by mind’”, and that public relations “was nothing less than the ‘art 
of steering heads inside …the secret art of all the other arts, the secret religion of all religions’” 
(quoted in Ewen 1996: 132).1  
                                            
1 It is worth mentioning here how Ivy Lee’s statement should be seen in relation to the far-
stretching historical problematic pertaining to the government of souls that Foucault takes up 
in his lectures form 1978: “Saint Gregory Nazianzen”, who lived from 329-389, “was the first 
to define this art of governing men by the pastorate as (…) the ‘art of arts,’ the ‘science of 
sciences’” (Foucault 2007a: 150-151). Furthermore, it is important to note that the word 
propaganda, the title of Bernays’s book from 1928, originally “had been coined in 1622, when 
Pope Gregory XV, frightened by the global spread of Protestantism, urgently proposed an 
addition to the Roman curia. The Office for the Propagation of the Faith (Congregatio de 
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With these thoughts yet another problematization of the foundations of the 
managementality associated with economics and the engineering-based approach to 
management had emerged. Just as with the Human Relations theorists, a new 
reality consisting of socially generated sentiments and beliefs had come to be 
expressed and come to be seen as being of major importance. Just as with the 
Human Relations theorists, this new irreducible social layer of reality was not 
expressible within a framework where individuals were considered to behave 
rationally and in accordance with their self-interest. Whereas the Human Relations 
theorists had stressed how Taylor’s system was incapable of delivering on its basic 
premises because it failed to take into account the human organization, the Public 
Relations theorists’ complementary schemes showed how conceptions of the 
rational consumer were just as inadequate as that of the rational, self-interested 
worker. In relation to both of these problematizations, we see the emergence of 
something outside the organization that comes into view as a phenomenon to be 
taken into account, analyzed, and managed in order to secure the attainment of 
business goals. On the one hand, the visible hand of management, controlling and 
specifying the exact details of what is to be done within the organization, is 
challenged by the discovery of spontaneous social processes conditioned on 
‘methods of living’, communally formed modes of evaluation, and specific personal 
histories that reach way beyond the organization. On the other hand, the 
functionality of the invisible hand of the market now becomes conditioned on 
‘invisible wire pullers’ who guide and shape public sentiments and perceptions 
toward specific ideas, ends and products. Revisiting the introduction of the 
dissertation, there is a certain irony in the fact that more or less simultaneously with 
Wallace B. Donham’s (1922: 1) dismissal of the sentiments of the street as 
something on which an executive theory of business should rely, these sentiments 
                                                                                                                                   
propaganda fide) would supervise the Church’s missionary efforts in the New World and 
elsewhere” (Miller 2005: 9). Thus, whereas this ‘art of all arts,’ had been concerned initially 
with governing souls in order to secure their salvation, its twentieth century public relations 
variant sought out more worldly and prosaic aims through the construction of corporate souls.  
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began to show up as something to be harnessed and utilized, as something through 
which it became possible to pass, as detours through which the attainment of 
business goals could be advanced.  
Nevertheless, in spite of their respective attacks on the rational foundations 
of engineering-based management thought and economics, both human relations 
and the proponents of public relations conceived of their efforts through the 
vocabulary developed by the engineers. Whereas Mayo, Roethlisberger, and 
Dickson sought to attain equilibrium between the specific communalities, sentiments 
and beliefs of the human organization and the technical organization, Bernays and 
the other PR-practitioners were probing for ways in which dynamic, passionate 
collectives existing outside the organization could be steered towards a range of 
political and economic ends. While certainly not engineers by training, or practicing 
engineers in any conventional sense, these PR-practitioners nevertheless also spoke 
of what they did with reference to an engineering vocabulary. Thus, in spite of the 
fact that many of the underlying assumptions with which they worked emanated 
from crowd psychology, psychoanalysis, and social theory, the way in which such 
theories were put to use made the tropes of engineering useful conceptual hinges 
on which the insights of humanistic and social science understandings could be 
turned towards practical ends. Edward Bernays’s famous article “The Engineering 
of Consent” in particular was quite explicit on this analogy. Bernays here specified 
that just “as the civil engineer must analyze every element of the situation before he 
builds a bridge, so in order to achieve a worthwhile social objective, the engineer of 
consent must operate from a foundation of soundly planned action” (Bernays 1952: 
161, emphasis added).  
Reflecting this through the prism of Foucault’s history of governmentality, it 
is worth noting how the transition in managementality from Taylor and the 
economists to human- and public relations bears a certain resemblance to that 
marked by the transition from reason of state to a liberal art of government. Just as 
with the latter transformation, in this twentieth century one, we also see a shift 
from one art of management to another that is marked by a complex interplay of 
continuity and discontinuity. In both transitions we see the abandonment of 
attempts at total and thorough disciplinarization, and their substitution - or, more 
to the point, supplementation - with a new mode of management that seeks to take 
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into account a newly discovered and irreducible layer of reality. Just as the 
breakdown of the disciplinary managed space of the town in the eighteenth century 
gave rise to a new mode of managing that relied upon the centrifugal character of 
the apparatuses of security, the crisis of the engineering-based approach and the 
coming into being of human- and public relations gave rise to a new mode of 
managing dynamic collectives. To attain organizational goals, to enhance 
production, to sell more cigarettes, etc., one had to manage in accordance with 
reality as depicted within these modes of knowledge. Hence, to attain such goals, 
one had to take the outside into account, that is, to listen to it, to generate 
knowledge about it, and to manage it through new, anti-disciplinary, facilitative and 
persuasive techniques. Accordingly, a range of similarities as to the respective 
discontinuities existing between these two transformations can be seen.  
Furthermore, besides the respective similar discontinuities, a range of 
complementary continuities also come into sight, for whereas a liberal art of 
government, and its supportive knowledge of political economy, could be seen to 
unfold within the structure marked out by reason of state (Foucault 2008: 14-16), 
the new conceptions of management emerging with human- and public relations 
should also be understood as marked out and proceeding from assumptions and 
understandings already in place. On the one hand, the engineering vocabulary, 
although rearticulated, could still be relied upon as a vocabulary through which 
these new modes of knowledge could begin to be expressed. Though bent and 
twisted to contain the new realities, the concepts of ‘systems’, ‘equilibrium’, and 
‘engineering’ proved flexible enough to be realigned and accommodated to the 
rising aspirations with managing the outside. On the other hand, and in spite of the 
newly surfacing outsides, the individuals, and the collectives within which they 
were a part (workers as well as consumers), continued to be cast in largely passive 
and reactive terms. Whether viewed as irrational or non-logical, or as unconsciously 
driven crowds, workers as well as consumers lacked the distinctive creative and 
inventive capacity so central in co-creation. In this sense, though they had to be 
listened to by sympathetic personnel men, though their desires had to be taken into 
account in the design of advertising- and PR-campaigns, they could still be 
manipulated towards certain ends. As long as one took into account the ‘human 
organization’ or ‘the group mind’, in all their complexities, one could still guide and 
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bend these ‘outsides’ towards goals exclusively formulated by management. Hence, 
the creative agency was still missing. In order to see the emergence of this, we now 
turn to the last of the three problematizations of central importance for the coming 
into being of co-creation.  
Entrepreneurship and innovation: The value of the outside and the 
socialized production of events 
Whereas the previous two problematizations of the engineering- and economics-
based managementality could be seen as problematizations made within the 
discipline of management, the final problematization was initially set forth from a 
bit farther away, that is, within the discipline of economics. The main figure here is 
Joseph A. Schumpeter, and the central concept is that of economic development, what 
Schumpeter characterizes as ‘dynamic’ in opposition to ‘static’ economic action. 
Firstly, we see what this distinction implies, and how it integrates what hitherto had 
been seen as outside the economists’ framework. Of special importance here is the 
explicit connotation with which this distinction is cast within a value vocabulary. 
Secondly, we see how Schumpeter’s conception of this special type of economic 
activity, throughout his work, gradually slides from being associated with 
individuals, marked by exceptional and heroic traits, to becoming a largely 
depersonalized and socialized mode of action. Finally, we attend to how 
Schumpeter’s thought implies a radically new conception of the event than that 
which came to pass in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
 
Bringing the outside inside: the value of economic development 
In 1934, two years after Schumpeter had moved to the U.S., his first major 
economic work came out in English. This work shifted the attention from a static 
view of the economy to a much more dynamic view. Whereas the neoclassical 
economists preceding Schumpeter had concentrated on optimal allocation and the 
attainment of equilibrium within an essentially static frame, Schumpeter found such 
a conception inadequate in explaining the most important part of the functioning 
of economies. More precisely, while recognizing the contributions made to 
economic theory by Alfred Marshall, William Stanley Jevons and Leon Walras in 
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particular, Schumpeter thought that their conception of the ‘circular flow’ failed to 
take into account something of major importance, what he called economic 
development (Schumpeter [1911] 2011a, [1934] 2002). This specific economic 
phenomenon, Schumpeter (2002: 64) explained, is  
entirely foreign to what may be observed in the circular flow or in the 
tendency towards equilibrium. It is spontaneous and discontinuous change in 
the channels of the flow, disturbance of equilibrium, which forever alters and 
displaces the equilibrium state previously existing.  
In explaining this phenomenon, Schumpeter makes clear that the development of 
which he speaks cannot be explained through the construction of “infinitesimal steps” 
between one equilibrium position and another (ibid: 64, note 1). Rather, in 
Schumpeter’s sense, development is the “’revolutionary’ change” by which 
something new comes into the world, leaves its imprint on economic reality, and 
forces it to develop along hitherto nonexistent paths (ibid: 63, see also [1911] 
2011b). In this sense, there is a radical difference between the point of departure 
for static theory on the one hand, and dynamic theory on the other. Hence, 
economic development in Schumpeter’s sense is  
a disturbance of the existing static equilibrium without any tendency to again 
strive towards that equilibrium or any other equilibrium at all. It changes the 
data of the static economy (…). When an equilibrium state is reached again, 
that does not happen because of the driving forces of development itself. It 
happens precisely because of a reaction against development (Schumpeter 
2011b: 173-174). 
The problem, however, was not that economists had not been aware previously of 
economic development. It was rather that they failed to explain it as economic 
development, and instead merely registered it as a fact which came from outside the 
economy and to which the economy afterwards reacted. Hence, the introduction of 
a new technology, such as for instance, the railroad, could only be registered as 
something which impacted the economic system as a non-economic, external 
phenomenon on behalf of which a new equilibrium position would be established. 
In the preface to the Japanese edition of The Theory of Economic Development, 
Schumpeter describes this previously reigning approach in the following way:  
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I felt very strongly that this was wrong, and that there was a source of energy 
within the economic system which would of itself disrupt any equilibrium that 
might be attained. If this is so, then there must be a purely economic theory 
of economic change which does not merely rely on external factors propelling 
the economic system from one equilibrium to another. It is such a theory that 
I have tried to build (Schumpeter [1937] 1991a: 166).  
In explaining this, Schumpeter states that his endeavor had been to theorize “the 
process of economic change in time” in a way comparable to Marx’s analysis of 
“economic evolution as a distinct process generated by the economic system itself” 
(ibid: 165, 166, emphasis added). However, as we saw in chapter one, whereas Marx 
pointed to labor power as the source of value, Schumpeter explains that the value 
created through economic development is of a special type which can neither be 
ascribed to labor, capital, or land, nor can it be explained through those post-1870 
economic theories that render value dependent upon utility (2011a). Hence, what 
we see with Schumpeter’s thought is the coming into being of a highly complex 
theoretical response that strives over largely incompatible theoretical traditions 
(such as those emanating from Marx and Walras, whom he both admired), and 
does so in a manner that renders hitherto reigning conceptions of value creation 
inadequate.  
Schumpeter stated that to the extent that we are not dealing with a completely 
stationary economy, which knows nothing but the repetition of the same, goods 
have two value scales. On the one hand, we have the alternative usages to which 
goods of various kinds can be put in a stationary economy. Here, attaining a 
position where marginal utility equals marginal costs provides the optimum point. 
This reflects what Schumpeter called the goods static value (ibid: 124), which is in 
agreement with what became foundational knowledge for the discipline of 
economics after the marginalist revolution. On the other hand, we have what 
Schumpeter called “developmental value” (ibid), or “the system of future values” (ibid: 
127), that operates in a completely different way, and cannot be understood or 
measured according to the already existing reality: “The future values are the 
correlate of the new combinations; they are new combinations translated into a language of 
value. They are the shadow of future events, the harbinger of the immediate economic 
future” (ibid: 128, emphasis added). Firstly, we take a look at who or what is 
 286 
 
responsible for creating this latter kind of value, and then come back to the notion 
of the event below. 
 
Depersonalization and socialization of the entrepreneurial function 
Within Schumpeter’s work, a marked transformation can be detected from the first 
1911-edition of Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (2011a, 2011b), over to its 
second edition (2002), and then to his later writings from the 1940s ([1942] 2000; 
[1949] 1991b). More precisely, whereas in the early work Schumpeter depicted the 
entrepreneur as an almost Dionysian, creative individual that forces his actions 
upon the world and bends it according to his will, this psychology of the 
entrepreneur is significantly downplayed later to the point at which what had been 
the exception before, reserved for the few, can now be routinized (2000: 132-133), 
and performed not just co-operatively within a firm, but also by a “social 
environment” (1991b: 260-261). This gives rise to what can be called the 
depersonalization and socialization of the entrepreneurial function (Shionoya 1997; 
Swedberg 2000; Becker et al. 2011) and this also marks an important condition of 
possibility for the coming into being of co-creation. However, before taking up this 
issue more explicitly, we take a look at the transformations at work within 
Schumpeter’s thought.  
Initially, what Schumpeter called “the man of action” (2011a: 115), or “the 
entrepreneur” (ibid: 129), is the one responsible for bringing about economic 
development in the form of innovation. It is only by his actions that the economy 
is forced out of its circular flow. This person is contrasted with the static man who, 
belonging to the mass, is incapable of crossing the threshold of the habitual in 
economic life. While the man of action is driven by the urge to create, to conquer, 
and to bring something new into the world, static men, comprising of workers, 
landowners, and capitalists (Schumpeter 2011b: 194) “lack the moral courage to 
try”, because they “cannot risk the basis they have established for their existence” 
(Schumpeter 2011a: 122).  
Hence, only within the minds of the few do the seeds of the new exist. While 
being a necessary precondition, however, it is not the thought or the ability to 
sense something new that is of major importance. Rather, it is the ability to act, to 
seize the new, to force it into the world against all obstacles from habitual modes 
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of conduct, to force it upon the masses of passive men; this is what sets the man of 
action apart (ibid: 123, 2011b: 214-215). As already mentioned, the economic 
development initiated by the man of action cannot be grasped in terms of the laws 
pertaining to habitual economic conduct. His impulse to create is much closer to 
the creative impulse driving the artist or the statesman (Schumpeter 2011a: 107), 
than it is to the drives of static men who largely behave in accordance with the laws 
laid out by ‘static’ economic theory. Indeed, this distinction between the creative 
few and the static many is, according to Schumpeter, not just a distinction relevant 
to economic life. Within politics, science and art, we see the same fundamental 
distinction: on the one hand “those spirits” that “stand out”, “who create new lines 
of art, new ‘schools’, and new parties”, and on the other hand, “those spirits who 
are created by the lines of art, ‘schools’, and parties” (2011b: 214; cf. Sørensen 2008). 
Besides being motivated by the will to conquer and to attain social power 
(Schumpeter 2011a: 105), the man of action is most of all driven by an irresistible 
“pleasure from activity itself” (ibid: 110, emphasis added), that is, the pleasure of what in 
1911 Schumpeter called “creative construction [schöpferisches Gestalten]” (ibid: 80, 
105). Since this urge to act and to create is what drives the man of action, his mode 
of behavior cannot be represented through the prism of economic theory 
according to which disutility (i.e. work) is weighed against utility. He does not make 
such narrow calculations, but does what he does for completely different reasons. 
On the one hand, he does not optimize since, just like the military leader on the 
battle field, he has to “get it right without exhaustively investigating other 
possibilities” (ibid: 134). In this way, he senses, probes and seizes something non-
existing, something essentially incalculable, something “outside” the field of 
visibility of ordinary men (ibid: 137), and makes it into reality. On the other hand, 
he does not act in accordance with the economic laws of conventional theory, 
because “there is no resting point that could be identified, no economic behavior 
and no level of marginal utility where he would come to a stop” (ibid: 110). When 
he eventually stops, it is not because he is satisfied, has attained equilibrium, or 
anything like that, but simply because he has become exhausted, and can no longer 
face up to the heroic battle within which he has been enmeshed (ibid: 111). This, 
essentially, is the young Schumpeter’s sweeping understanding of economic 
development in 1911. 
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In 1934, however, when Schumpeter’s work first came out in English 
(translated from the revised second edition of 1926), almost all of the explicit 
Dionysian connotations had been weeded out of the text (Swedberg 2000: 14-15; 
see also Reinert and Reinert 2006). While still detectable here and there, 
Schumpeter now assured his reader that his theory did not stand or fall “with our 
‘psychology of the entrepreneur’” (Schumpeter 2002: 90). As a way of detaching 
the still vital economic function of economic development from the man of action, 
Schumpeter’s vocabulary now slides towards the much more depersonalized 
concept of “an entrepreneurial function” (Schumpeter 2002, 2011c; Becker et al. 
2011: 8) and this depersonalizing tendency is furthermore amplified when 
Schumpeter, in an article from 1928, speaks of an over-individual ‘entrepreneurial 
mentality’ (Schumpeter [1928] 2011c; Becker et al. 2011: 15).  
The clear-cut separation between the man of action and the static man, and 
between their respective kinds of economic conduct, now becomes increasingly 
difficult to uphold. This is not least due to the fact that what Schumpeter had 
previously regarded as an exceptional case, disrupting the circular flow of the 
economy, has now become much more prevalent, and that “the social whole”, as a 
consequence hereof, “is getting ever more used to incessant innovation” 
(Schumpeter 2011c: 251). This, in combination with a widened sphere of 
calculability, entails that the function of the leader, as well as the entrepreneur, 
tends to become ‘democratized’, to be taken over by a much larger group, and in 
this process turned into something “that can be learned” (ibid: 252). This tendency 
finally culminates in the 1940s when Schumpeter, not without some resignation, 
remarked how the importance of the entrepreneur as a distinct person had begun 
to rapidly fade away. On the one hand, Schumpeter states:  
it is much easier now than it has been in the past to do things that lie outside 
familiar routine – innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological 
progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists 
who turn out what is required (…). On the other hand, personality and will 
power must count for less in environments which have become accustomed 
to economic change (2000: 133).  
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In this way we not only see how ‘the social’ has become accustomed to the 
incessant transgression of the already existing brought about by economic 
development, but we also see how the entrepreneurial function itself, with this 
transformation, begins to be socialized, and begins to emerge as a group activity. It is 
therefore not surprising that in a late text from 1949 Schumpeter can claim that 
this depersonalized and socialized transgression of the already existing “need not 
be embodied in a physical person and in particular in a single physical person. 
Every social environment has its own ways of filling the entrepreneurial function” 
(Schumpeter 1991b: 260).  
 
Productive events 
In spite of the ever less grandiose attributes with which the entrepreneur is 
depicted within Schumpeter’s work, it is nevertheless important to take stock of the 
fact that Schumpeter’s contribution to economic theory is of significant 
importance. More relevant for the present dissertation, however, is the fact that his 
thought brings to the fore something of utmost importance for the coming into 
being of co-creation, namely the event as the permanent transgression of the 
already-existing. This conception of the event marks a radical departure from the 
one Foucault located in the middle of the eighteenth century. Here, the event was 
no longer conceived as an evil to be avoided, but as something natural and 
inevitable, something which should not be prevented, but instead be allowed to run 
its course. As Foucault showed, this constituted an integral part of the liberal art of 
government. With Schumpeter, however, we see something completely different. 
The event is no longer considered as something which has a naturalness to it. 
Rather, the event is unnatural, discontinuous, and inorganic (Schumpeter 2011b: 
174). It is no longer normatively neutral, and something which will balance itself 
out; rather, it is a process of creative destruction “that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within” (Schumpeter 2000: 83).  
While the classical and the neoclassical economists operated from completely 
different underlying epistemological frameworks, as was shown in chapter one, it is 
nevertheless possible to see how their radically different views (with the exception 
of Karl Marx) to a large extent can be seen as different ways of embracing the 
economy as a circular flow. Whether in the form of Quesnay’s Tableau or the 
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neoclassical economists’ static framework, the depiction of the economy as 
reducible to a circular flow is rendered completely inappropriate by Schumpeter’s 
account. More precisely, depicting the economy as a circular flow, whether 
organically (Quesnay) or mechanically (the neoclassicals), prevents us from seeing 
the most important economic phenomenon, i.e. economic development in the 
form of innovation. It is through this intervention, through this ‘entrepreneurial 
function,’ that “the ‘natural’ course of the economy” is changed (Schumpeter 
2011a: 118).  
This crucial addition, this creative destruction, thus overthrows all the 
connotations to nature through which the economy had been depicted by the 
political economists associated with classical liberalism. In this sense, Schumpeter’s 
work can be seen as prolonging the de-naturalization movement, which economics 
had already begun from the latter part of the nineteenth century (Schabas 2005). 
However, whereas the neoclassical economists substituted the naturalness which 
had hitherto permeated economic phenomena with a timeless, highly abstract, and 
mechanical universe, Schumpeter stated that the underlying framework with which 
they did so, essentially barred them from grasping innovation and entrepreneurship 
as economic phenomena:  
Just like the laws of mechanics tell us how heavy bodies behave under the 
influence of some ‘forces’, but without dealing with the nature of those 
forces; and just like mechanics assumes that the bodies do nothing and do not 
produce any new phenomena of mechanical nature as long as no force 
impinges upon it from outside; just like that, pure economics provides us with 
formal laws on the configuration of the economy under the influence of 
exogenously given conditions and the reactions of the economy to changes 
coming from the outside (Schumpeter 2011b: 160-161).  
Schumpeter’s work is an ambitious attempt to bring this outside force inside, and 
in so doing he prolongs and taps into the otherwise displaced growth- and 
production-based value creation framework of the classical political economists, 
and yet does so in a way that completely overthrows the foundational pillars upon 
which this was organized. Hence, on the one hand, his preoccupation with 
innovation and entrepreneurship revisits the shared epistemological space of the 
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classical economists where emphasis was given to a perspective of growth and 
augmentation emanating from some kind of productive activity. On the other 
hand, however, the underlying measure according to which value could be 
determined (be it labor or socially necessary labor time) is completely displaced.  
In doing so, Schumpeter’s work should furthermore be seen as an important 
contribution to and early inspiration for several of the economic works that have 
been associated with the twentieth century rise of neoliberalism. As Foucault 
remarks in passing, Schumpeter’s thought not only nourished the way in which the 
German Ordo-liberals began conceiving of enterprise as that which ought to make 
up “the formative power of society” (Foucault 2008: 147-148, 176-178), his work 
was also crucial to the way in which the American economists, a bit later on, began 
to flesh out their concept of ‘human capital’ (ibid: 231). The way in which these 
twentieth century streams of thought have been depicted as central to the rise of 
enterprise as a far reaching normative obligation for public sector institutions and 
individuals alike (Dean 1998, 1999; du Gay 1991, 1994; Rose 1999b) should 
therefore be seen against the backdrop of Schumpeter’s early work on economic 
development, and especially in light of how the depersonalization and socialization 
of the entrepreneurial function paves the way for a multiplication of productive-
destructive events across all levels of society.  
Still, in spite of the fact that this relationship between the event and 
neoliberalism is indeed an interesting and somewhat under-investigated topic (for 
noteworthy exceptions see Dean 2010, 2011), this is not the right place to continue 
such a study. Rather, turning towards our concern here with how co-creation came 
into being, Schumpeter’s work should be seen as yet another problematization of 
the managementality informed by post-1870s economics and the engineering-based 
approach to management. The reason for this is that Schumpeter’s work, too, 
attacked the very foundations of the rationality on which management thought had 
relied previously. It pointed to something outside the sphere of rational calculability, 
something outside the sphere of economic optimization. Additionally, it pointed to 
the inadequate conception of a technical-economic fix, relying upon self-interest 
and disciplinary organization as the guideline around which production ought to be 
organized and, most importantly, it did this by re-casting the whole problem in a 
value vocabulary through which the creation of value could now begin to be 
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conceived along totally different lines. Hence, whereas value creation had been 
conceived previously as hinging upon optimization, as hinging upon how self-
interested individuals strove to maximize utility, it could now be recast as 
something which should be organized around establishing relations to something 
outside: outside the framework of conventional theory, outside the field of visibility 
of ordinary assumptions, and outside the sphere of habitual economic conduct.  
With this response, we see a highly important shift. Whereas the 
managementality associated with the engineers and the economists had been 
orchestrated around the difference between the actual and the potential, 
Schumpeter’s account forces another difference to the fore which, to utilize 
Deleuze’s (1994, 2002b) distinction, is orchestrated around the actual and the virtual. 
Whereas the crucial problem hitherto had been to go from the actual to the 
potential (no matter whether this was calculated through the principle of 
marginalism within economics or the maximum amount of worker-output in 
Taylor’s (1967: 109) equation), this is now, if not replaced, then at least 
supplemented with the problem of actualizing the virtual, of transgressing the 
perimeters of the already known, of bringing something new into the world, of 
grasping “the shadow of future events” (Schumpeter 2011a: 128). Schumpeter’s 
two value scales (ibid: 124, 127) are the emblematic expression through which this 
becomes articulated as an economic-managerial value creation problematic. 
Seen in this light, the relevant observation to make is probably not whether 
Schumpeter was successful in bringing this outside to the inside of the discipline of 
economics in a theoretically defensible manner (Shionoya 1997: 170). Rather, the 
relevant observation to be made is probably that what had been outside previously 
now began hunting the inside as a concern which made itself felt in a formerly 
unprecedented way, firstly within the discipline of economics, and then, gradually, 
within studies more explicitly oriented towards business and management, with 
Edith Penrose ([1959] 2009), whom we came across in chapter two, being one 
significant intermediary. If Taylor’s late work from 1911 condensed the “efficiency 
craze” in emblematic form that stirred the early twentieth century (Barley and 
Kunda 1992: 370), Schumpeter’s first book, from the exact same year, sowed the 
seeds of the ‘innovation- and enterprise craze’ that flourished at the opposite end 
of the century. Of utmost significance in this regard was the opening up of a whole 
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new plane of thought in economics, an opening up towards the permanent 
transgression of the already existing, a new encounter with events. Such events 
were no longer conceived as something to be smoothed out and self-annihilated, 
but as a reservoir hitherto overlooked, a reservoir previously on the outside, 
through which value could be created.  
The coming into being of co-creation 
With the three problematizations of the managementality associated with the 
engineers’ and the economists’ respective formalizations, we see trajectories of 
major importance for the coming into being of co-creation. Seen against the 
backdrop of Foucault’s history of governmentality, it has been shown how several 
of the components relevant to this made their displaced reappearance in relation to 
management thought.  
On the one hand, Foucault’s history of the art of government can be seen as 
an important chapter in a history of co-creation. The crisis of the disciplinary police 
regulations associated with reason of state and the eventual transition to a liberal 
art of government was proposed here as not only an important prehistory 
pertaining to the coming into being of co-creation, but also as a prism through 
which it became possible to see how early twentieth century management thought 
ran into a crisis and reoriented itself as it stumbled upon a range of phenomena not 
totally unlike those appearing with the transition to a new art of government in the 
eighteenth century. Of particular importance for this twentieth century 
transformation was the way in which things outside the organization and outside 
formalized management thought, emerged as irreducible social realities, which, 
when handled in a proper way, could be utilized and harnessed to attain 
management goals. We saw here how management thought responded to these 
outsides and began devising non-disciplinary, responsive, facilitative, and 
persuasive modes of management that took these complex, spontaneous, social 
realities into account and tried to guide them towards certain outcomes. 
On the other hand, however, we also saw how the third critique of the 
engineering- and economics-based managementality marked a crucial displacement 
in relation to what could be called the complex reappearance of the liberal critique 
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at the level of the organization. Whereas a non-disciplinary way of managing the 
event could be traced back to the eighteenth century, Schumpeter’s thought 
brought a whole new conception of the event to the fore, which not only departed 
significantly from the naturalness with which the economy had been depicted in 
the eighteenth century, but also from the static, timeless, ‘proto-energetic’ approach 
(Mirowski 1989: 63) with which it had come to be depicted in the late nineteenth 
century. Hence, the imperative was no longer to respond to the event by letting it 
unfold and cancel itself out, but it was rather to move in the complete opposite 
direction, that is, of constantly producing events, becoming active, destabilizing, 
and transgressing the perimeters of the already existing through innovation and 
entrepreneurship. With this transformation, we saw how value creation began to be 
rearticulated along completely different lines from those with which it had been 
depicted within political economy and neoclassical economics. 
 
Following this account, it is possible now to propose that the three analyzed 
responses, from their very coming into being up until today, have re-surfaced 
continually as problems to be attended to and further elaborated within 
management thought. Thus, from Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson to 
contemporary HRM, the distinctly human and its social milieu have continually 
surfaced as a problem to be taken into account and managed. Likewise, from 
Bernays to contemporary marketing and public relations, managing something 
outside has emerged continually as a challenge in relation to guiding consumers and 
publics towards specific outcomes. Finally, from Schumpeter up until the present, 
the questions as to what brings about innovation and how it can be facilitated and 
managed have come up in various shapes. While a range of heterogeneous and 
significant historical transformations have impacted all of the three trajectories and 
altered the way in which their respective outsides and realities have been taken up, 
the crucial point in understanding how co-creation came into being, however, 
should not be located within either one or the other of these trajectories. Hence, 
co-creation should not be understood as a phenomenon which comes into being 
solely in relation to managing the organization, its human capacities, and their 
social milieus; it should neither exclusively be understood as a marketing 
phenomenon, which so far seems to have been a predominant tendency (Arvidsson 
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2006, 2008; Zwick et al. 2008; Böhm and Land 2009; Willmott 2010); and finally, it 
should not solely be understood as a phenomenon pertaining to discourses on 
innovation.  
Rather, the three different problematizations accounted for here have entered into ever closer 
relationships with one another throughout the twentieth century. They have nourished each other, 
fed into each other, shaped one another, crossbred, and the outcome of this has been a historically 
established resonance field through which co-creation eventually was born. Through this 
resonance field, spanning across disciplines within management thought and 
running through the problems and solutions these disciplines respectively have 
encountered in relation to managing their outsides and complex social ‘ecosystems’, 
co-creation eventually came to appear as a relevant contemporary response to the 
problem of how value creation should be managed.  
With the Human Relations theorists we have already seen how social values 
and spontaneously formed communal evaluations, dependent upon the outside, 
emerged as immaterial prisms through which the economic and the technical came 
to be filtered and assessed, and through which the effectiveness and speed of 
operations were preconditioned. With Edward Bernays we have furthermore seen 
how something outside, organized in the street, aligned with social tendencies, 
formulated in the language of freedom and women’s liberation, and amplified 
through the press, came into view as a beneficial detour through which it became 
possible to pass in order to achieve business goals. With Schumpeter we have 
finally seen how value creation became preconditioned on transgressing the 
already-existing through an ever more depersonalized and socialized production of 
events that took into account something outside the economists’ frameworks. 
Through these critiques, through these interventions of thought, the outside kept 
appearing as something to be taken into account, as something to be utilized and 
managed and as something through which value creation increasingly became 
dependent. Whether described in spatial terms or in temporal terms, whether 
internalized or left as an external productive reservoir with which one then had to 
relate, the outside nevertheless kept surfacing as a problem that could not be 
contained and handled through a managementality informed by engineering-based 
management thought and neoclassical economic theory.  
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Today, all of these different connotations of the outside overlay and reinforce 
one another. When the contemporary question regarding the most adequate way of 
managing organizations comes to the fore, a prevalent contemporary answer is 
likely to run along the following lines: Let’s utilize the spontaneous processes of 
our self-organizing, creative employees. Let’s put to work their lives and the social 
networks of which they are a part. Let’s utilize their differences. Let’s bring them 
closer to the customers. Let’s bring them closer to the outside, because it is on the 
outside that value is created. It is here, just beyond the border of our too rigid 
organizations that innovative ideas, thoughts, and future products bubble up from 
below. Let’s tap into this outside. It is out here, in creative user-communities, 
driven by sentiments and deep-felt beliefs, driven by non-monetary incentives, 
driven by needs for self-expression and the joy of activity itself, that true creativity 
and innovation flows. And while we are at it, let’s organize our inside as the 
outside. Let’s tear down the pyramids in the name of liberation. Let’s bash 
bureaucracy and promote freedom. Let’s introduce self-management as our 
reigning organizational model. Let’s become processual instead of rigid. Let’s 
improvise. Let’s deterritorialize. Let’s extitutionalize. In short: ‘Let’s go outside.’ 
Should anyone ask why we do all this, let’s throw them an answer that’s formulated 
in a vocabulary that forces even the hard-liners and the skeptics to give in: ‘Because 
it creates value!’ The vocabulary of co-creation is exactly the vocabulary through 
which such answers today come together in the most forceful and pointed way.  
While somewhat caricatured, but only slightly, such contemporary answers 
are nourished by the way in which the three analyzed problematizations gradually 
have come together and reinforced one another. Furthermore the discoveries of 
these complex realities and outsides, from approximately the early 1920s to the late 
1930s, comprise a constantly resurfacing and continually accentuated challenge that 
studies of organization and management have encountered throughout the 
twentieth century up until today, not in the sense of a totalizing tendency towards 
which everything else necessarily has had to adjust, but nevertheless as a significant 
one that has come forward and influenced the ways in which a range of concerns 
have come to be expressed.  
In this sense, the convergence of the respective problematizations can be seen 
as running through and informing later developments within organization and 
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management theory. While this is not the place to fully elaborate how they have 
come together in all of their complexities throughout the twentieth century, it is 
nevertheless possible to point to a couple of instances where they begin to 
converge. For instance, is it not possible to view later developments within Human 
Relations, associated with such names as Douglas McGregor ([1960] 2006), 
Abraham Maslow ([1965] 1998), and Rensis Likert (1967), as conditioned upon a 
particular mixture between the first and the third problematization of the 
engineering- and economics-based managementality? Is McGregor’s (2006) The 
Human Side of Enterprise, and in particular his “Theory Y”, not to be seen as a 
response to the challenge of bringing together, on the one hand, all the 
connotations of sociality, community, spontaneity, and participation of the early 
Human Relations theorists with, on the other hand, the pleasure of activity itself, 
the creative drive, the ability to transcend the already-existing in a way that creates 
value, as described by Schumpeter? Was it not the case that such a particular 
mixture had already been prepared by Schumpeter’s writing about the socialization 
and democratization of leadership and entrepreneurship, by the way in which the 
increasingly depersonalized entrepreneurial function tended to become folded into 
the organization and by the way in which it tended to become something every 
social environment had its own way of fulfilling? Though McGregor’s thoughts 
concerning these matters obviously cannot be reduced to a specific attempt at 
uniting these themes, the way in which he seeks to solve the problems inherent in 
hitherto reigning management theory nevertheless operates within a horizon which 
is clearly shaped by these two problematizations. Thus, when McGregor describes 
how Theory Y, as opposed to Theory X, is dynamic rather than static, when he 
conceives of “imagination, ingenuity, and creativity” as “widely, not narrowly, distributed in 
the population”, and when he states how hitherto reigning management thought, in 
conjunction with the assumptions of Theory X, has not recognized the “substantial 
potentialities” inherent in the human resources, he brings together these two 
responses in a forceful way (ibid: 66). Accordingly, the organization and its 
employees emerge as being permeated with a not yet actualized creativity. To bring 
this forward, to accelerate value creation, the managers of the organization merely 
have to shift assumptions from Theory X to Theory Y, and to redesign the 
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management system in accordance with this latter view. As McGregor pointedly 
formulates it: “Theory Y is an invitation to innovation” (ibid: 77).  
Similarly, is it not possible to view the coming into being of the open systems 
perspective within management and organization theory as a particular way in 
which a range of scholars seek to respond to the problem of the outside, as a 
particular way in which they try to face up to the challenge that the pressure from 
the outside poses? Are the three problematizations accounted for here not 
tendencies of central importance through which the “doors and windows of the 
organization” finally came to be “opened” to the “vital flows and linkages that 
relate the organization to other systems” (Scott 1981: 120)? Again, though marked 
and shaped by a range of heterogeneous theoretical trajectories and concerns, it is 
possible to view the coming into being of theories such as those of Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), among others, as diverse ways in 
which the outside has become an increasingly prevalent problem and challenge 
towards which organization and management thought has sought out new 
responses. To take just one example, Lawrence and Lorch’s Organization and 
Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (1967) could in this light be 
viewed as one particular response by way of which the theoretical foundations for 
the management of organizations sought to move forward by taking the outside 
into account through paying attention to the different environments within which 
organizations are placed (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967: 3). According to Lawrence 
and Lorsch, it is imperative to be attentive to the different dynamics characterizing 
the development and change inherent within these environments (ibid: 3-4). Thus, the 
most favorable management of the organization is not something that can be 
calculated or laid out solely by taking into consideration what the organization 
does, or by taking into account how the organization is managed. Rather, the most 
favorable form of management within the organization can only be established by 
considering what goes on outside the organization and the key concept guiding this 
new framing is that of the organization as an open system (ibid: 6-7). Accordingly, the 
organization now only comes into view as an entity to be attended to through a 
detour over the environment within which it is placed, that is, through a detour over the 
“outside contingencies” which “can then be treated as both constraints and 
opportunities that influence the internal structure and processes” (ibid: 186).  
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Finally, and more specifically related to the already existing accounts of the 
coming into being of co-creation, the discovery of the active and creative consumer 
within marketing theory in the 1950s and the 1960s (Arvidsson 2006: 41-65, 2008: 
327, 331; Zwick et al. 2008: 169-171) should also be seen in conjunction with the 
critical rearticulations attended to above. While Arvidsson merely brushes off pre-
1960 management theory in a much too superficial manner when he reduces it to 
Taylorism and discipline that had not yet discovered “the productivity of the 
social” (Arvidsson 2006: 41), his account of post-WWII developments pertaining 
to the rise of ‘social production’ and ‘customer coproduction’ are nevertheless 
highly insightful. Besides transformations within the discipline of marketing, “a 
new activation of civil society” came to the fore as ever more people got involved 
in “a range of productive consumer practices”, including “mods, hippies, and other 
visible forms of youth culture”. These productive consumer practices came into 
existence simultaneously with an “intensification of political activism and new 
social movements, (…) new forms of New Age spirituality and body practices like 
yoga, jogging, macrobiotic foods, and a host of alternative lifestyles” (Arvidsson 
2008: 327). These trends, in conjunction with a new media environment, the 
emergence of a service and knowledge economy, and a dramatic “expansion of 
secondary and university schooling” (ibid: 328), surely constitute important, later 
preconditions for the coming into being of co-creation.  
While insightful and full of engaging and relevant material regarding post-
WWII developments pertaining to the coming into being of co-creation, 
nevertheless these accounts (Arvidsson 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Zwick et al. 2008; 
Cova and Dalli 2009; Cova et al. 2011) do not sufficiently appreciate the more 
encompassing historical trajectories through which co-creation could begin to take 
on the prevailing contours it has acquired today. This neglect is something that 
they share with several of those who have followed Deleuze’s (1995a) description 
of a new form of post- or anti-disciplinary power emerging after WWII (Hardt and 
Negri 2000, 2004; Fleming and Spicer 2004; Lazzarato 2004; Weiskopf and Loacker 
2006; Spicer 2010; Martinez 2010), and several of those who have depicted co-
creation as a contemporary phenomenon (e.g. Normann and Ramírez 1993a, 
1993b; Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2000, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Vargo and 
Lusch 2004, 2010; Lusch and Vargo 2006; Berthon et al. 2007; Rowley et al. 2007; 
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Banks and Humphreys 2008; Bonsu and Darmody 2008; Humphreys and Grayson 
2008; Payne et al. 2008; Spoher and Maglio 2008; Vargo et al. 2008; Böhm and 
Land 2009; Van Dijck and Nieborg 2009; Helm and Jones 2010; Le Ber and 
Branzei 2010; Ramaswamy and Gouillart 2010a, 2010b; Willmott 2010; Lusch and 
Webster 2011). All of these accounts do not take into consideration how 
spontaneously-formed social realities and communally-based social values had 
already from the 1930s come to pose a problem for management thought to which 
responses were made. Neither do they take into account how the outside, in the 
same period, had come into view as a problem and a challenge, as something one 
had to relate to through non-disciplinary, centrifugal management techniques. Last 
but not least, they completely neglect how value creation itself, throughout the 
1920s and 1930s, began to be conceived as being dependent upon the creative 
impulse, the pleasure of activity itself, the continuous transgression of the already 
existing, and the increasingly depersonalized and socialized production of events.  
None of the three problematizations of the managementality informed by 
engineering-based management thought and neoclassical economics that we have 
attended to in this chapter ought therefore to be brushed off as pre-1960s attempts 
with which “Taylorist management sought to discipline an unruly labor force into 
adopting certain pre-programmed forms of behavior” (Arvidsson 2006: 41). 
Rather, it was exactly here, in the first half of the twentieth century, that a range of 
highly relevant preconditions for the coming into being of co-creation came to the 
fore. If we therefore want to inquire into the conditions of co-creation as a 
particular way in which management and value creation became tied to something 
outside the organization, it is necessary to describe the historically changing prisms 
through which management as well as value creation have been problematized. By 
neglecting to attend to the singularity of these deep-seated historical 
transformations, we inevitably end up producing an account which holds either one 
or the other, or both, of these historical variables as a constant. 
Such accounts furthermore face the danger of setting up the rather tedious 
moral drama of good versus evil, which is then played out as a grand historical 
battle. Whether formulated as the creative multitude against Empire, or as the 
decentralized, free, joyous, and truly value-creating social production against 
exploitative, customer co-production, such distinctions are difficult to uphold as 
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clear-cut categories when confronted with the historical material. Casting such 
distinctions within the meta-historical transformations by way of which we have 
passed allegedly from a disciplinary society to one based on control, from Fordism 
to post-Fordism, or from modern- to post-modern capitalism, does not aid much 
in accounting for the coming into being of co-creation either. Rather, the opposite 
seems to be the case. Instead of facilitating the understanding of the historical 
processes through which the phenomenon of co-creation could emerge, meta-
narratives of this kind tend to obscure it. In doing so, they end up at best with a 
moralizing account and at worst, an account which not only misrepresents history, 
but also fails to appreciate the extent to which the agenda promoted as 
revolutionary, subversive or resistive is already nourished by ‘the enemy’.  
 One particular noteworthy example which incarnates both of these 
tendencies is when Hardt and Negri (2004: 331) in their sweeping account embrace 
innovation as an activity that comes from, or ought to come from, below. They 
then contrast this with Schumpeter, who allegedly stated that the entrepreneur was 
a capitalist who brought “workers together in productive cooperation” (ibid.). 
Following from this, Hardt and Negri claim that just “as only the one can decide in 
politics, we are told, only the one can innovate in economics” (ibid.). However, as 
should be clear from the description presented in this chapter, such a reading not 
only completely misrepresents Schumpeter’s thought, much worse, it also ends up 
normatively embracing a depersonalized and socialized innovation process, which 
Schumpeter had already registered as an empirical transformation in the early 
twentieth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whereas Part One accounted for the formation of the experience of the outside as a 
source of value creation, as this was expressed through the components making up 
the co-creation vocabulary, Part Two has tracked a genealogy of this experience by 
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way of investigating how its constituent parts showed up within a long and wide 
history pertaining to the government and management of human beings. Hence, 
throughout Part One and Two it has been shown how an experience of the outside 
as a source of value creation has been formed, and how the components making 
up this experience have risen as problems towards which responses have been 
made – first within a history of governmentality, and afterwards within a related 
(but nevertheless irreducible) history of managementality. Throughout this double 
perspective, it is thus possible to account for the birth of a complex experience: the 
birth of an experience of the outside as a source of value creation and as an object of management. 
It is furthermore possible to do so without presupposing or defending a specific 
theory of either value creation or management. Instead of defending any such 
theory, the dissertation has shown the historically changing reflective prisms 
through which value creation and management have been problematized. 
Furthermore, it has shown how these historical variables have come together in 
singular and immanent ways, that is, in ways that do not presuppose an external, 
ahistorical position through which such a coming together would be possible. 
Thus, by way of accounting for how conceptions of value creation and 
management have changed historically in conjunction with one another, it has been 
shown how an experience of the outside as a source of value creation and an object 
of management has been born.  
In light of this history it becomes possible to revisit the problem drawn 
forward at the end of Part One, that is, the problem of whether and to what extent 
the formation of the outside as a source of value creation should be seen as 
marking the arrival of an irreducible and autonomous mode of value creation that, 
potentially, challenges the capitalist economy, or whether this experience should be 
seen as inseparably tied to modes of management that reach beyond the borders of 
the organization and tap into a ‘new hidden abode’ (Böhm and Land 2009)? As we 
have seen, Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004, 2009), Lazzarato (2004, 2005), and 
Arvidsson (2008, 2009, 2010) have tended to embrace the first of these positions, 
whereas Böhm and Land (2009) and Willmott (2010), among others, have tended 
to embrace the latter position.  
In terms of the history charted in Part Two, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the emerging new mode of value creation should indeed be seen as 
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having come into being in conjunction with changing modes of management. 
Hence, Hardt and Negri’s (2000: 275-276) account of the way in which new social 
movements in the late 1960s constituted the “truly creative moment” which was then 
co-opted by capitalism and reactive management practices significantly 
underestimates the extent to which the components making up the co-creation 
vocabulary were born out of a considerably longer history of problematizations. In 
particular they overlook how the problematizations of the managementality coming 
into being with engineering-based management thought and neo-classical 
economics was criticized and reformulated within management thought. When 
Hardt and Negri (2000: 294), in addition to this, claim that the multitude’s 
biopolitical production “seems to provide the potential for a kind of spontaneous 
and elementary communism”, Böhm and Land’s (2009: 7, 14) characterization of 
this as “entirely fantastic” and “hopelessly utopian” is well targeted.  
Nevertheless, while scholars within Critical Management Studies rightly have 
insisted on viewing the arrival of co-creation in close conjunction with 
developments within management thought, the historical problematization analysis 
followed in the dissertation has gone through a different route than that laid out by 
thinkers coming out of this tradition. Either such thinkers have taken a completely 
ahistorical approach (such as e.g. Böhm and Land 2009 or Willmott 2010), or they 
have followed Deleuze’s (1995a) and the Autonomist Marxists’ (Hardt and Negri 
2000: 22-30, ibid: 328-332, 1994: 259-260; Hardt 1995; Lazzarato 2004, 2005, 2006) 
description of the rise of a new form of power and a new mode of management 
coming into being after World War II (Munro 2000; Fleming and Spicer 2004; 
Weiskopf and Loacker 2006; Zwick et al. 2008; Spicer 2010; Martinez 2010). 
Whereas the ahistorical approach cannot necessarily say anything about how co-
creation has come into being in conjunction with changing modes of management, 
the second approach, besides having taken over Deleuze’s limited reading of 
Foucault, has been unable to account for the much longer and wider history 
through which a non-disciplinary mode of management (that utilizes 
spontaneously, self-forming processes, that relies upon events, that manages the 
outside) has come into being. 
 By way of following this history the dissertation has shown how management 
thought, in encountering the outside moved beyond and dispensed with its former 
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preconditions; moved beyond the closed, predictable, and mathematically 
calculable space of the disciplinary organization; and moved beyond and 
problematized the managementality informed by engineering-based management 
thought and neo-classical economics.  
In encountering and responding to this outside, however, management 
thought has also come to rely upon objects that are inherently unstable, hard to 
specify, and highly difficult to control. It has come to rely upon objects, the 
blurring contours and inherent dynamisms of which imply that management 
thought seems incapable of establishing and regaining the authority which its 
hitherto existing rationality allowed it to establish. In this sense, management 
thought has encountered exiting new objects that it cannot dispense with, that it 
has to relate to, but which it nevertheless comes to appear somewhat impotent in 
relation to. This loss of control and this loss of a direct authority, however, is to be 
seen simultaneously in conjunction with the fact that management thought begins 
to concern itself with objects that formerly were beyond its reach. In this sense, the 
loss of direct control goes hand in hand with a widened sphere of influence, with 
an attention to processes that formerly were beyond the grasp of management, but 
which now come to appear as processes that have to be taken into consideration, 
as processes that can be utilized and nurtured and as processes that provide new 
detours to be taken to advance value creation. This double tendency - the 
simultaneous loss of control and the widened sphere of influence - at present 
seems to culminate in the experience of the outside. While this experience on the 
one hand has come to appear as something management scholars (critical as well as 
more mainstream ones) have celebrated, cherished, criticized, and/or worried 
about, it has on the other hand also induced a reorientation to the very ways in 
which management thought relates to the organization.  
Another important implication seems to be that management thought has not 
merely become preoccupied with extitutions (Spicer 2010), but that it also has 
become an extitutionalizing machine itself, a machine that constantly grinds away at 
hitherto established distinctions between inside and outside, between producer and 
consumer, between managing and managed. In trying to adapt to the gradually 
surfacing outsides, management thought has accentuated its preoccupation with 
these newly discovered realities to such an extent that what at first appeared as a 
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stimulus to thought, as something management thought could latch on to and 
relate to, has grown now to such an extent that it threatens to undermine the very 
point of departure from which these outsides initially were discovered, i.e. the 
organization as a relatively self-enclosed entity, as a productive unit which was 
differentiable from the environment within which it was placed. Hence, through 
the problematizations of the managementality associated with engineering-based 
management thought and neo-classical economics, through the history by way of 
which these problematizations have cross-bred and fed into each other, through 
the coming into being of the co-creation vocabulary, a trajectory has formed that 
has gradually turned the organization inside out, not in the sense of an empirical 
fact, but in the sense of an accentuated normative injunction according to which 
management thought has increasingly called for the necessity of organizations to 
re-fashion and re-organize themselves, to go outside themselves. While it has been 
claimed that this development should be viewed in light of the coming into being 
of an ethical economy (Arvidsson 2008, 2009, 2010), an emerging epoch of 
biopolitical production (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004), or something similar that 
challenges management thought, forces it to adapt, forces it to give up its previous 
authority, the argument presented here rather indicates that this development 
should be viewed in light of transformations immanent to a managementality that 
has been set forth, problematized and rearticulated throughout the twentieth 
century.  
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